The London School of Economics and Political Science

"Council Democratic" Movements in the First World War Era: A Comparative-Historical Study of the German and Italian Cases

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Declaration

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Abstract

Practical engagements with and theoretical reflections on "council democracy" have resurfaced periodically in the past, most notably in the interwar period, in the "long 1960s", and since the turn of the century. There is a relative gap in the literature to analyze "council democracy" both comparatively, rather than singularly as individual empirical cases or intellectual currents, and as social movements, rather than primarily as theoretical debates or intellectual traditions. This thesis offers a comparative-historical analysis of some of the earliest and most radical instances of "council democratic" movements that developed after the First World War in Germany (1918-1919) and Italy (1919-1920) by looking at the processes that contributed to their emergence and their trajectories, using a strategic-relational approach. It grounds the analysis on a Marxian conception of the formal separation between the "political" and the "economic" spheres as a unique characteristic of capitalist social relation and interprets "council democracy" as a sublation of counter tendencies towards radical democratic control within each of these spheres. Such conception allows the analysis to capture the empirical diversities in the historical manifestations of "council democracy" and illuminates the links between "council democracy" and wider traditions such as radical republicanism and anarcho-syndicalism.

In analysing the making of these movements, the study focuses on the particular characteristics of state-led war mobilization in Germany and Italy in contrast to those in France where such movements did not emerge after the war. It sees the militarised corporatist state form under which Germany and Italy were mobilized for the war as contributing directly to the emergence of these types of movements after the war. In exploring the trajectories of these movements, the study looks at the ways in which various organized forces came to shape the devolution of these movements in Germany and Italy in contrast to those in Russia where such movements temporarily "succeeded" in establishing a form of "council democracy". It sees the organizational capacities of the forces involved, the programmatic vision of the radical demands, and the alliance patterns capable of stabilising the movement into an articulated whole as decisive in the movement trajectories. Aside from the comparative study of the two cases, this study also offers a novel way to study the "council democratic" movements empirically in their historical and theoretical diversities.

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List of Abbreviations

AEG: German General Electric Company (*Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft*)

AM: Arms and Munitions (*armi e munizioni*)

Association: Association of Italian Joint-Stock Companies (*Associazione fra le Societa Italiane per Azioni*)

BBB: Bavarian Peasants' League (*Bayerischer Bauernbund*)

BdI: Federation of Industries (*Bund der Industriellen*)

CCM: Central Mobilization Committee (*comitato centrale di mobilitazione*)

CDI: Central Association of Employers of Germany (*Centralverband deutscher Industrieller*)

CGL: General Confederation of Labour (*Confederazione Generale del Lavoro*)

CGT: General Confederation of Labour (*Confédération Générale du Travail*)

CIDI: Italian Confederation of Industry (*confederazione Italiana dell'industria*)

CIL: Catholic Unions (*confederazione Italiana dei Lavoratori*)

Confindustria: The General Confederation of Italian Industry (*Confederazione generale dell'industria italiana*)

CRM: Regional Mobilization Committee (*comitato regionale di mobilitazione*)

DHV: Chairman of German Woodworkers' Union (*Deutscher Holzarbeiterverband*)

DMV: German Metalworkers' Union (*Deuscher Metallarbeiterverband*)

Federterra: National Federation of Agricultural Workers (*Federazione nazionale fra i lavoratori della terra*)

FIOM: Federation of Metalworkers (*Federazione Impiegati Operai Metallurgici*)

FVdG: Free Association of German Trade Unions (*Freie Vereinigung deutscher Gewerkschaften*)

FVP: Progressive People's Party (*Fortschrittliche Volkspartei*)

GPS: Parliamentary Socialist Group *(gruppo socialista parlamentare*)

IFA: Intergroup Committee (*Interfraktioneller Ausschuss*)

Kadet: Constitutional Democratic Party (*Konstitutsionno-Demokraticheskaya Partiya*)

KEA: War Food Office (*Kriegsernährungsamt*)

KPD: Communist Party of Germany (*Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands*)

KRA: Raw Material Department (*Kriegrohstoffabteilung*)

LIT: Industrial League of Turin (*lega industriale di Torino*)

MSZDP: Social Democratic Party (*Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt*)

NLP: National Liberal Party (*Nationalliberale Partei*)

Obleute: Revolutionary Shop Stewards (*Revolutionäre Obleute*)

OHL: Third German Supreme Command (*Oberste Heeresleitung*)

PCI: Italian Communist Party (*Partito Comunista Italiano*)

PPI: Italian People's Party (*Partito Popolare Italiano*)

PSFPO: Petrograd Society of Factory and Plant Owners

PSI: Socialist Party of Italy (*Partito Socialista Italiano*)

SAG: Democratic Working Group (*Sozialdemokratische Arbeitsgemeinschaft*)

SAPD: Socialist Workers' Party of Germany (*Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands*)

SFIO: French Section of the Workers' International (*Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière*)

SFWO: Society of Factory and Works Owners

SR: Social Revolutionary Party (*Partija socialistov-revoljucionerov*)

UAI: Italian Anarchist Union (*Unione Anarchica Italiana*)

UIL: Italian Union of Labour (*unione Italiana del lavoro*)

UL: Liberal Union (*unione liberale*)

UMI: Bureau of Industrial Mobilization (*ufficio di mobilitazione industriale*)

USI: Italian Syndicalist Union (*Unione Sindacale Italiana*)

USPD: Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (*Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*)

VdESI: German Iron and Steel Industrialists (*Verein deutscher Eisen- und Stahlindustrieller*)

VTsIK: All-Russian Central Executive Committee (*Vserossiysky Centralny Ispolnitelny Komitet*)

WWI: First World War

Chapter 1

Introduction

"Council democracy" presents a model of democratic self-governance on the basis of active, free, and associated individuals working cooperatively within a federated council system in a de-alienated society. As an idea, it is an emancipatory project towards a fundamental transformation of capitalist social relations, radically different from the "actually existing socialism" that dominated much of the Twentieth Century. Practical engagements with and theoretical reflections on "council democracy" have resurfaced periodically in the past, most notably in the interwar period (e.g. Russia, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Italy), in the "long 1960s" (e.g. Hungary, Poland, Algeria, France, Italy, Chile, Portugal, Iran), and since the turn of the century (e.g. Argentina, Venezuela, Greece).[1] It has attracted the attention of some of the major theorists of the 20th century, such as Vladimir Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, Anton Pannekoek, Karl Korsch, Antonio Gramsci, Paul Mattick, Hannah Arendt, Cornelius Castoriadis, Claude Lefort, among others.

There has been a burgeoning literature in recent years on various aspects of "council democracy" both as a theoretical and an empirical question. However, there is a relative gap in the literature to analyze "council democracy" as a historical phenomenon both comparatively,[2] rather than singularly as individual empirical cases or intellectual currents, and as social movements, rather than primarily as theoretical debates or intellectual traditions. This research analyzes the processes that contributed to the inception and evolution of "council democratic" movements. It takes two of the earliest historical cases of "council democratic" movements that emerged in Germany and Italy in the immediate aftermath of World War I (WWI), and draws comparative conclusions regarding their making (Part I) as well as their trajectory (Part II). To highlight the specificities of the processes that went into the making of these movements, it focuses on the particular characteristics of state-led war mobilization in Germany and Italy, in contrast to those in France where such movements did not emerge after the war. To explore the dynamics that led to the "failure" of these movements, it looks at the ways in which various organized forces came to shape the trajectories of these movements in Germany and Italy, in contrast to those in Russia where such movements, at least temporarily, "succeeded".

The introductory chapter begins by grounding the study on a theoretical foundation based on a Marxian reading of capitalist social relations. Accordingly, "council democracy" is theorized as

[1] For general survey of some of these historical episodes, see Gluckstein (1985), Bayat (1991), Wallis (2011), Azzellini (2015), Vieta (2020).
[2] The two notable exceptions are Sirianni (1980) and Gluckstein (1985).

the dialectical unity of two indeterminate counter tendencies arising from the historically unique structure of capitalist social relations. The chapter then sets out the general scope and structure of the analysis of "council democracy" not as an exercise in the history of ideas but the history of movements. Secondly, the chapter lays out the key methodological considerations directly relevant to this research, namely, comparative historical analysis and strategic-relational analysis, before providing a methodological justification for the choice of case studies used in the research. Thirdly, the analytical framework for the study is outlined for the examination of both the making and trajectory of "council democratic" movements. The introduction concludes by providing a brief outline of the chapters to follow. Table 1 below provides an overview of the structure of the research.

A Theoretical Foundation for "Council Democracy"

Practical engagements with and theoretical reflections on "council democracy" have resurfaced periodically in the past, most notably in the 1870s after the Paris Commune of 1871,[3] the (inter)war period after the revolutionary waves starting from the Russian Revolution,[4] in the "long 1960s" in response to the revolutionary waves starting from the Hungarian Revolution,[5] and since the turn of the century initiated by the wave of anti-globalization and anti-austerity movements.[6]

At the most basic level, the above conceptualizations tend to take the organizational form of councils as the defining characteristic of "council democracy", further elaborated in reaction to the particular political contexts within which they emerged, be it Bolshevik communism, or Stalinist totalitarianism, or post-war liberal democracy, etc. "Council democracy" tends to be defined according to static organizational forms with innate democratic and socialistic qualities which counter the contingent ebb and flow of history in different periods. This is why all too often the emergence of councils is conceived as a "spontaneous" phenomenon. To conceptualize "council democracy" as a historical phenomenon requires historicizing both the emergence and the trajectory

[3] The chief theorist in this period who reflected on the council form is Karl Marx. He formulated these ideas most famously in *The Civil War in France* (see Demirović, 2015). Some of the other notable thinkers around the time of the Paris Commune who provided reflections on this historic phenomenon are Freidrich Engels, Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Ernest Belfort Bax, and William Morris. Later socialist and communist intellectuals, notably Lenin and Leon Trotsky among others, continued to write on the implications of the Paris Commune for the socialist theory. For the legacy of the Paris Commune within the socialist tradition, see Forster (2020), Nicholls (2019), Ross (2015), Bergman (2014), Gluckstein (2011), Katz (1998).

[4] The chief council theorists in this period include Luxemburg, Lenin, Pannekoek, Gramsci, Richard Müller, Ernst Däumig, Korsch, Otto Rühle, Herman Gorter, and Paul Mattick. For the theoretical elaborations of this generation of council thinkers, see Quirico and Ragona (2021), Muldoon (2020b), Dubigeon (2019), Muldoon (2019), Thompson (2019a), Bourrinet (2017), Pinta (2017), Hoffrogge (2015), Linden (2004), Salvadori (1990), Shipway (1987), Bricianer (1978), Williams (1975), Bock (1969b).

[5] Notable theorists of this period include Paul Mattick, Arendt, Castoriadis, Lefort, and Guy Debord. For the contribution of these theorists to council democracy, see Popp-Madsen (2020; 2018), Muldoon (2020a), Smith (2019), Holman (2018), Lederman (2018), Adam (2011), Muldoon (2011), Medearis (2004).

[6] Notable theorists in this period include Popp-Madsen (2021), Marcelo Vieta (2020), Muldoon (2018), Medearis (2015), Thomspon (2018), Azzellini (2016).

of its particular manifestations, each of which is an instantiation of a general formal structure. Therefore, the phenomenon is delineated not merely or even primarily on the basis of the presence or absence of a certain organizational form (e.g. council form) but on the basis of a historically dynamic formal structure, itself in dialectical relation with other historically dynamic formal structures (e.g., capitalist social relations). This is not to deny the importance of councils as the organizational identifier of "council democracy", but to conceive of their significance only insofar as they belong to the formal structure of a historically specific phenomenon of "council democracy".

One way to go beyond the organizational form of councils as the most basic common denominator while remaining sensitive to the diverse range of conceptions is to utilize a Marxist conception of capitalist social relation. This allows us to conceive of "council democracy" in its full realization as an anti-capitalist phenomenon while maintaining the conceptual flexibility to make sense of its elasticity, manifested in the wide range of theoretical attributions and empirical cases, as well as its vacillation, apparent in the theoretical slippages to other traditions and the "failure" of its empirical cases.

Building on Karl Marx's conception of capitalist social relations, Ellen M. Wood (1995b) argues that capitalism is a historically unique mode of production in which surplus value can formally be extracted and appropriated without direct "extra-economic" pressures, such as militaristic coercion, traditionalist oppression, or juridical pressure. Capitalist social relations are predicated upon a generalized wage-labour relation for production of commodities; that is the kind of labour, separated from the means of production, which is formally "free" in the double sense that the labourer is free to sell his/her labour-power to any employer who is willing to pay for it and free from means of subsistence (Marx, 1976, pp. 273, 874). In other words, in capitalism, "the social functions of production and distribution, surplus extraction and appropriation, and the allocation of social labour are, so to speak, privatised and they are achieved by non-authoritative, non-political means" (Wood, 1995b, p. 29).[7]

Although the separation of producers from the means of production starts from and necessarily requires a legal basis,[8] it progressively moves into more technical and ideological plains in the form of the separation between the mental and manual labour (e.g. managerial subdivision)

[7] This, however, does not imply that capitalism operates on the basis of "economic laws" in isolation from politics. What allows a system to engage in exploitation and domination formally through seemingly peaceful and equal economic transactions is a deeply political (but not necessarily politicised) social relation.

[8] The emergence of capitalism in a particular time and location (mid-15th century Britain) had nothing to do with the accumulation of wealth or a particular religious ethos and had everything to do with a specific form of the state and its relatively unified national legal system (Wood, 2002, p. 172) which prepared the ground for a purely economic form of exploitation.

that has been a way to deepen the effective separation between the producers and the production process (Poulantzas, 1978; Gunn, 2011; Marx, 1981, pp. 510-511; Egan, 1990). Owing to private property rights and "free" contractual relation with the working class, the capitalist class obtain tremendous control within the "economic" domain in a way that "appropriative power is integrated more closely and directly than ever before with the authority to organize production" (Wood, 1995b, p. 30). Marx (1976) depicts the peculiar despotism of the capitalist organization of production as follows:

> An industrial army of workers under the command of a capitalist requires, like a real army, officers (managers) and N.C.O.s (foremen, overseers), who command during the labour process in the name of capital. The work of supervision becomes their established and exclusive function. (p. 450)

This despotism need not be due to a personal vengeance by the capitalists against the workers. From the perspective of the capitalist, who is "capital personified and endowed with consciousness and a will" (Marx, 1976, p. 254), living labour enters into the production process as a commodity, as labour-power, for the sole purpose of valorization of capital. The capitalist is then compelled by the imperatives of accumulation and competition to organize the production process in a way that maximises surplus value. The possibility of the hierarchical organization of capitalist production lies in the fact that "it is not the worker who employs the conditions of his work, but rather the reverse, the conditions of work employ the worker" (Marx, 1976, p. 546; see also Hudis, 2012, pp. 165-166).[9]

The formal separation of the "economic" and the "political" spheres under capitalism also created a historically unique condition for the realization of democratic rights in the political sphere. Capitalism, with its formally separate economic sphere with its own power structure within which economic exploitation could take place independently of "extra-economic" force, made it possible "for the first time in history to conceive of political rights as having little bearing on the distribution of social and economic power; and it was possible to imagine a distinct political sphere in which all citizens were formally equal, a political sphere abstracted from the inequalities of wealth and economic power outside the political domain" (Wood, 2020, p. 56). Of course, democracy has a longer tradition that goes back to ancient times and its contentious unfolding has a history written with tears and blood. However, at no point in history prior to the emergence of capitalism was it

[9] Since Marx, labour process theorists, such as Harry Braverman (1974), Michael Burawoy (1978, 1985), David F. Noble (1984), and David Knights et al. (1985), have analyzed the complex and historically evolving methods deployed by the capitalist class to direct labour power of workers towards the production of commodities and to structure it under management control to maximize surplus value, labour conflict, and working-class organization. They have also shed light on the contradictions of labour process that opens rooms for the formation of class consciousness and resistance among workers.

conceivable to have the labouring masses intervene in the political domain without at the same time subverting the primary class relation. It was under capitalism that it became possible to include individuals into the political domain as juridically equal subjects under universal suffrage without having to transform the fundamentals of capitalist class relations.

Just as the capitalist mode of production historically emerged out of fundamental transformations that took place within the existing feudal social relations, the modern conception of democracy underwent several metamorphoses whose conditions of possibility was laid out by the advent of capitalism. Two fundamental transformations in the evolutionary process of modern democracy took place in the work of early modern republicans in England (e.g. James Harrington, Henry Neville, and Algernon Sidney), whose notion of citizenship was based on a restricted but active propertied elite, and in the work of the American "Founding Fathers", whose notion of citizenship was one of an expansive but pacified body (see Wood, 1995a). Therefore, as labouring masses gained citizenship rights regardless of their civic status or socio-economic position, their civic equality did not directly impact or significantly alter class inequality essential to capitalism (p. 213). Such pacification of citizenship required the development of a form of representationalism that was fundamentally not a technical solution to an extended franchise but a barrier to the labouring multitude having direct influence in the political domain (pp. 216-17). This democratic expansion within liberal democracy, notwithstanding, generates its own contradictions since it is a channel, as mediated and limited as they were, through which popular will can potentially intervene in the state, based on the constitutional safeguards and rights.

The profound democratic deficit that is created in capitalism within both the "economic" and the "political" spheres generated its own domain of resistance. The struggle against the dispossessing, disempowering, and dehumanizing effects of capitalism can be traced back to its very origins (Neeson, 1993; Thompson, 2013; Linebaugh, 2014; Dimmock, 2014). These struggles continued to evolve as capitalism matured in its transformation into mass industrial production (Thompson, 1967; Hobsbawm, 1968; Foster, 1977; Mann, 1993; Žmolek, 2013), and involved a broad range of ideological persuasions and socio-political forces. The struggle towards democratic control over working conditions and socioeconomic relations, which is broadly referred to here as "workers' control", is at the heart of these struggles.

The notion of "workers' control" has been used to refer to a wide range of organizational configurations with widely different ideological orientations (e.g. see Mattick, 1969; Brinton, 1970; Hunnius et al., 1973; Boggs, 1977; Bernstein, 1977; Rothschild and Whitt, 1986; Bayat, 1991; Dow, 2003; Azzellini, 2016). Some authors use it as an umbrella concept to cover everything from workers' participation in the management of companies to anti-capitalist organizations of

revolutionary transformation (e.g. Atzeni, 2012). Others apply it as an indicator of the highest mode[10] of workers' participation in an ascending escalator that starts from one-way information exchange between workers and management, to communication, to consultation, to codetermination, and finally to control (e.g. Wilkinson et al., 2010). Finally, some draw a fundamental distinction between workers' participation and "workers' control", pushing the boundaries beyond the confines of capitalist relations of production (e.g. Bayat, 1991, Gunn, 2011).

In this study, "workers' control" is conceptualized broadly as characterizing a two-dimensional space defined on the basis of control and ownership.[11] The former is concerned with the degrees to which workers are able to determine the conditions of production as well as the distribution of financial assets and economic returns. The latter revolves around the question of property relations regarding the means of production. These two essentially mirror the basic pillars upon which capital perpetuates the subordination of labour. Defining "workers' control" as a conceptual space rather than an ideal point allows us to capture the diverse manifestations of the notion in practice,[12] without losing sight of the demanding criteria for its full realization as a social arrangement in which workers, as opposed to capital or state bureaucracy, maintain control rights within a socialized mode of production, as opposed to a privatised or nationalized ownership structure.

Taking "workers' control" in its broad sense and along its two dimensions allows us to see the interventions of various forces, with widely different ideological dispositions and political strategies, in the process of articulation of the notion and its role in class struggle. In this sense, it is not an exclusive arena reserved for a definite set of political forces. Rather, contestation over its meaning and implementation can involve syndicalists, industrial unionists, trade unionists, socialists, communists, social democrats, progressive liberals, etc. Nevertheless, when "workers' control" is taken radically as a generally sufficient pathway towards the transformation of society beyond capitalism without having to engage with the "political" sphere, it becomes particularly akin to the archetypical characteristic of the transformative vision of (anarcho-)syndicalism. This, in itself, stems from the fact that the formally separate "economic" domain under capitalism has made the localization of class conflict possible (Wood, 1995b, p. 45); thereby, class struggle can (and often does) take place in the "economic" sphere and can be contained "at the point of production".[13]

[10] The term "mode" is used here to capture the multi-dimensional nature of some of the more sophisticated conceptualization of workers' participation which takes into account not only the degree but also the form, the level, and the range of participation (e.g. Marchington and Wilkinson, 2005).
[11] For a similar approach to the definition of "workers' control", see Vieta (2020, pp. 299-306).
[12] For a historical survey of the concept of "workers' control" up to the Russian Revolution, see Smith (2017). For a longer survey of the concept, particularly its reception in Latin America, see Vieta (2020, chapter 5).
[13] This does not imply the classical distinction between the economistic struggles (e.g. struggle for higher wages) and political struggles. The struggle for higher wages, for example, may remain within the "economic" sphere but it does

If taken to its logical end, it would become intelligible to speak of the total transformation of capitalist social relations solely by transforming the relations of production in the "economic" sphere. In other words, it is only within capitalism that syndicalism is even comprehensible.[14] However, since the condition of the possibility of the formal separation of the "economic" and the "political" is the profound interrelationship between economy and politics under capitalism, overcoming of capitalist social relation cannot be achieved without engaging with the forces that formally reside within the "political" sphere. Therefore, transcending capitalism requires fundamental transformations of both domains.

Struggle over "workers' control" can take many organizational forms and institutional arrangements. Among these, the council form based on a directly elected recallable delegate structure stands out as particularly fit for democratic requirements of collective control as well as organizational militancy of the working class. It can be a vehicle not only to subvert the authoritative structure within the workplace and to maximize accountability towards workers but also to undermine the separation between mental and manual labour. This does not mean that it emerges on its own from the spontaneous disposition of the working class towards this specific organizational form. It also does not necessarily take an independent organizational form with respect to other organizations, especially those of the working classes such as unions. Nevertheless, its characteristics make it an appealing organizational form in the working-class struggle for "workers' control" from the bottom up.

The contradictions created by the advent of capitalism in the "political" domain, involving both its structural possibilities and inherent limitations, led to distinct dynamism towards expansion and containment of democratic pressure from below. Classical republicanism and liberalism, which were shaping the debates on contemporary democracy and the meaning of citizenship as either small but active or extended but disempowered. Alongside these, radical republicanism,[15] particularly in the writings of American and French revolutionaries whose intellectual roots can be traced back to Levellers, Diggers and continued in Chartism and socialism, envisioned a republic based on popular sovereignty in which "active and equal political participation of citizens are seen as the core guarantors of liberty, equality, and solidarity" (Leipold et al., 2020, p. 1). The struggle to

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not necessarily have to. It is not possible to tell from the content of the struggle alone either where the locus of struggle would fall or what the level of militancy would be. This is precisely why we can have militant syndicalist action confining itself to "the point of production" and relatively routine struggle over wages (in certain circumstances) becoming revolutionary.

[14] Due to the inseparability of extra-economic factors from the production of surplus value in pre-capitalist societies, mass struggles against economic exploitation was already a political contest including more immediately and directly against the state itself (Wood, 1995, p. 46).

[15] For a recent attempt to present radical republicanism as a political tradition, see Leipold et al. (2020). See also, McCormick (2011), Nabulsi (2015).

democratize the institutional order and assert popular sovereignty over the "political" domain is what is referred to here as "citizens' control".[16]

There is a multiplicity of ways in which "citizens' control" can be defined and delimited both in principle and organizationally. The source of sovereignty and institutional arrangements define the framework within which "citizens' control" can be understood. In the United Kingdom, for example, the sovereignty of the parliament (rather than the people) and the institutional separation of executive, legislative, and juridical powers define the basic parameters within which "citizens' control" can be understood. Having popular sovereignty as the source of legitimacy of the political system, as was the case in America and France after their revolutions, already created a different set of possibilities for the people to assert democratic control and challenges for the elite to contain such attempts. For radical republicans, citizens not only maintain full sovereignty, but must also be enabled to meaningfully control the political institutions of the republic.[17] Therefore, seeing "citizens' control" as a conceptual space that encapsulates a range of possibilities rather than an all-or-nothing notion allows us to make sense of the diverse ways in which it might manifest itself in reality, without having to give up the critical perspective on the criteria of its full actualization along with the core principles of non-domination and the common good.

Even when "citizens' control" is pushed to its radical limits to realize a democratic republic on the basis of free, active, self-governing, cooperative, and civically virtuous citizens, it cannot realize its democratic aspirations as long as it leaves out the capitalist relations of domination that exist within the "economic" sphere. While a number of theorists in recent years have argued that the realization of radical republican ideas is inextricably bound to their extension into the "economic" spheres (e.g. see White, 2011; González-Ricoy, 2014; Gourevitch, 2015; Anderson, 2015), this has not always been an intuitive leap among radical republicans beyond critical remarks about economic inequality and market imperatives. Arendt presents a vivid example of how radical republican ideas of democracy, even in council form (Arendt, 2006; Muldoon, 2011; Lederman, 2016), can be presented without engaging in, indeed actively dismissing,[18] a critique of capitalism (see Medearis, 2004; Muldoon, 2016). Again, the possibility of decoupling the democratization of

[16] A possible objection to this terminology is that citizenship always already assumes the nation-state, therefore it is inherently linked to all the issues concerning nation building and othering. However, as Nabulsi (2015) argues "the creation of the citizen comes well before any democratic state can appear; their talents, commitments, political artistry and achievements are prerequisites for a republic that is truly free, and is able to maintain that freedom against the constantly developing power of elites" (p. 149).

[17] Thompson (2019b) characterizes radical republican vision of democracy as "one that sees human social life as essentially cooperative and interdependent, and that people must be able to frame laws and rules over all domains of society and make them accountable to as well as oriented towards the common benefit of society" (p. 395).

[18] She (2006) vehemently dismisses the economic aspects of council movements by saying the "so-called wish of the working class [for worker's control] sounds much rather like an attempt of the revolutionary party to counteract the councils' political aspirations, to drive their members away from the political realm and back into the factories" (p. 265).

the "political" sphere from that of the "economic" sphere is only intelligible in the context of the formal separation of the two domains in capitalism.

Among the various institutional forms that struggle over "citizens' control" can take, the council form appears as particularly apt to meet the criteria of free, associative, and deliberative self-government. Despite its serious shortcomings and its profound misreading of the concrete historical experiences (Hobsbawm 1977, pp. 201-208; Sitton, 1987; Medearis, 2004), Arendt's account of the democratic potential of councils in the "political" domain is noteworthy here. She links the ability of the citizens to participate in the government to the essence of political freedom understood as a communal activity (p. 210), which can only be achieved on the basis of equality and plurality. She argues that the political space within which such political freedom can be exercised is made possible under the council system (Lederman, 2018). This leads her to see councils not as means to some ends such as communism, but as an end in itself. In short, for Arendt, the political space created by the council system is what allows the citizens to experience "the political" (Lederman, 2018). Furthermore, the federal system of councils can not only provide the space for the political deliberation of citizens but also solve "one of the most serious problems of all modern politics" (Arendt, 2006, p. 270) that is how to reconcile equality and authority. As James Muldoon (2011) argues, the council system for Arendt is a way to balance the constitutional form and constituent power so that "power emanates from the grassroots but is constituted in a federal structure of councils" (p. 412).[19]

However, as long as struggles towards "citizens' control" concern themselves purely with the democratic constitution of the "political" domain without engaging squarely with the specific form of domination that governs the capitalist social relation, they essentially remain a quixotic endeavour. Conversely, if struggles towards "workers' control" delude themselves with the idea of a fundamental transformation of capitalist social relation merely within the "economic" sphere without facing the capitalist state power, they inevitably run aground. In other words, if they are to push against definite limits, it soon becomes clear that "the very differentiation of the economic and political in capitalism – the symbiotic division of labour between class and state – is precisely what makes the unity of economic and political struggle essential, and what ought to make socialism and democracy synonymous" (Wood, 1995b, p. 48).

[19] The question of how to counterbalance the constituted power (i.e. the state) and the constituent power (i.e. the people) remains one of the central preoccupations of the theorists of radical democracy such as Antonio Negri (1999); also see Azzellini (2016, pp. 35-41).

"Council democracy" is the sublation (*Aufhebung*)[20] of "citizens' control" and "workers' control" in their radically democratic forms to transform capitalist social relations into what Marx described as "the free exchange of individuals who are associated on the basis of common appropriation and control of the means of production" (Marx, 1986, p. 96). Given the formal characteristics of capitalism, the notion of citizenship operates within the "political" domain, in which juridically equal individuals, notwithstanding their position within the economic relation, have certain rights and bear certain responsibilities that are considered fundamental for a formally democratic society. However, those juridically equal individual citizens always already assume a position within the economic relation which place them in structurally exploitive social classes and fundamentally undemocratic relations of production.

Conversely, the notion of worker operates in the "economic" domain, in which relations of production lay out the outlines of class structure and class domination, regardless of the civic equality as citizens, therefore resulting in the fundamentally undemocratic nature of the relations of production. However, the exploited and exploiting classes as structural collectivities simultaneously assume their juridico-political position as free and equal individual citizens. Hence, while each notion, under capitalism, is internally in conflict with the other (i.e. the boundary of citizens as juridically free and equal political subjects ends where the boundary of workers as an exploited class under the domination of capital begins), each necessarily assumes the other (i.e. the vast majority of citizens as individuals are always already workers as a social class and must engage in the exploitive economic relations in order to meet their basic needs).

Therefore, as stated before, the struggle for their democratic expansion towards "citizens' control" and "workers' control" comes up against its own internal limits. Hence, for each to fully realize its own democratic potential, it not only needs to pass internally into the opposite, but must overthrow the formal condition that places them in a dialectical opposition with respect to each other, i.e. the formal separation between the "political" and the "economic". This overcoming is neither a simple synthesis nor a rejection but a process that both cancels and preserves aspects of the two notions (hence, the concept of "sublation"). This associated mode of production on the basis of the council system is what makes "council democratic" movements unique in their attempt to overcome the division between the "political" and the "economic" (see Demirović, 2015). Its socialization project necessarily requires not only the democratization of the production process but also a profound transformation of the political organization of the society as a whole.[21]

[20] G. W. F. Hegel elaborates explicitly on the concept of "sublation" in (1977, §113; 1991, §96; 2010, pp. 81-2). For the definition of this Hegelian concept of "sublation" (*Aufhebung*), see Maybee (2020; 2009) and Palm (2009).
[21] Significant differences of opinion remain regarding how socialization should take place and how areas beyond productive sectors are to be integrated. For an overview of the socialization question, see Muldoon (2018).

The precondition for this is a social relation in which the socialized mode of production is controlled by freely associated producers who coordinate their actions through a federated council system. Such a profound transformation of existing social relations is a tremendously complicated process. Understanding the development of such transformative processes, therefore, requires historical investigations into the actual movements that have tried to carry out such revolutionary projects. This research is a contribution to the study of particular movements that moved towards what is here defined as "council democracy". To this end, the analytic decoupling of the two constitutive modes of "council democracy", namely, "citizens' control" and "workers' control", themselves mirroring the formal separation between the "political" and the "economic", allows us to conceive of their asynchronous developments in concrete cases. Conceiving "citizens' control" and "workers' control" themselves as open-ended outcomes of popular and class struggles avoids a teleological or endemic understanding of the transformative process towards "council democracy". Therefore, political and economic crises themselves are seen not as determining factors in overcoming capitalism but at best as possibilities within which radically democratic struggles may develop.

Methodological Considerations in the Analysis of "Council Democratic" Movements

On Comparative Process Tracing

The central emphasis on processes in the formation and evolution of the constitutive elements of "council democracy" in two particular historical cases (Germany and Italy) makes process tracing a suitable methodology for the study. At a very general level, process tracing is a method of establishing causal mechanisms between a specific set of causes to a specific set of outcomes (Lange, 2013; Bennett, 2008; Checkel, 2008; George and Bennett, 2005). David Waldner (2012) specifies this further by stating that process tracing uses "longitudinal research design whose data consists of a sequence of events (individual and collective acts or changes of a state) represented by nonstandardized observations drawn from a single unit of analysis" (p. 69). Among the variety of process tracing (see Beach and Pedersen, 2013), explaining-outcome process-tracing, rather than theory-driven process tracing, is most apt for the within-case study. It is defined as "seeking the causes of a specific outcome in a single case", with the aim to construct "minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome, with sufficiency defined as an explanation that accounts for all of the important aspects of an outcome with no redundant parts being present" (p. 18). This variation has a strong affinity to historical scholarship as it needs to delve into the historical particularities of each case to decipher the specific processes that led to the outcome in question. In explaining-outcome process-tracing, the notion of causal mechanism is understood more broadly than in theory-driven process tracing, and may need the inclusion of "nonsystematic

parts in the causal mechanism, defined as a mechanism that is case-specific" (p. 19).[22] It uses both deductive and inductive methods iteratively to reduce the number of explanatory factors to arrive at a sufficient explanation.

Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen restrict the use of process tracing to single-case studies (p. 28). However, Bo Bengtsson and Hannu Ruonavaara (2017) have recently suggested ways to use process tracing as a comparative method.[23] They apply process tracing both in within-case and cross-case analyzes. In the former step, "the processes leading 'from A to B' are reconstructed and analyzed in terms of ideal-type social mechanisms" (p. 45). Before moving to the second step, they examine counterfactual outcomes that "from some plausible perspective would have been expected" (p. 46) by "comparing the history in that country with what happened in the other countries, drawing on an assumption about general similarities between contexts" (p. 48). In the second step, "these processes are compared by making use of the identified mechanisms and some ideal-type periodization" (p. 45). They define ideal-type generalization as a two-step process, involving the abstraction of mechanisms from empirical observation, and inferring those abstractions to other comparable contexts as expectation of similar mechanisms (p. 54). The purpose of the comparison in their framework is ultimately to illuminate path-dependent characters of a certain phenomenon that explains the divergence in the outcomes of selected cases in the long run after the critical juncture.[24] However, they offer a less deterministic account of path dependency compared to other scholars such as James Mahoney (2000) by allowing for endogenous institutional changes and counter-factual cases.

Even though some findings in the present research might be reasonably interpreted as having path-dependent characteristics, demonstrating path dependency, even in its "weak definition" suggested by Bengtsson and Ruonavaara (2017), is not the focus of this study. This is because the most relevant processes are relatively ephemeral and highly volatile to demonstrate longer-term self-reinforcement mechanisms that are so central in the conception of path-dependency. Nevertheless, the comparison will make use of the general outlook of the above methodological model. It preserves the two-step procedure by first conducting an in-depth within-case analysis and then a cross-case analysis of the selected cases. For its counterfactual analysis, the research takes France for Part I (i.e. the making of the movements) and Russia for Part II (i.e. the trajectory of the movements) essentially to examine the causal weight of the identified processes

[22] David Waldner (2012) has defined mechanism as "an agent or entity that has the capacity to alter its environment because it possesses an invariant property that, in specific contexts, transmits either a physical force or information that influences the behavior of other agents or entities" (p. 18).
[23] Also see Wendy S. Parker (2010) for an earlier attempt to formalize comparative process tracing.
[24] They define critical junctures as "transitional situations in which actors have the possibility to make choices that would open up a new path" (2017, p. 52).

leading to specific outcomes in Part I, and specific trajectories in Part I. Cross-case analysis also seeks to explain notable differences between the German and Italian cases in both parts. Furthermore, rather than invoking the concept of critical junctures and focal points, both of which are more attuned to path-dependence analysis, the study utilizes the notion of conjunctures.[25] The two major conjunctures concerning the "council democratic" movements around WWI are the outbreak of the war and the post-war crises.

Within each conjuncture, periodization is used to organize the temporally ordered processes into causally significant segments. Periodization goes beyond the organization of the events in smaller and more manageable temporal segments. Just as there are a multiplicity of forces influencing any given process, there can be several time scales that regulate a variety of complex conjunctural developments within the process. As Bob Jessop (2007) emphasizes, periodization "classifies actions, events, and periods into stages according to their conjunctural implications (as specific combinations of constraints and opportunities on the pursuit of different projects) for the actions of different social forces on different sites of action over different time horizons" (p. 88). In this study, the logic of periodization is principally based on modes of class struggles that are causally relevant to the making and the trajectory of the movements. What counts as a causally relevant mode of class struggle relates to the structure of form analysis described below.

Similarly, the formation of ideal type mechanisms in both parts of the study is guided by the analysis of forms. The making of the "council democratic" movements in Germany and Italy is analyzed in Part I by focusing on the transformation of state form during the war and its impact on the form of class struggle after the war. The central role given to the state in the analysis is due to the massive increase in state power in the course of the war to coordinate the war effort, thereby fundamentally shaping the contours of class struggle. Such an expansive transformation of state power was not unique to Germany and Italy, but common to all belligerent countries. However, as will be argued in Part I, the particular transformation in the formal structure of the state during the war laid the ground for the emergence of the particular form of class struggle after the war. The analytical framework through which the state is conceptualized is discussed in the next section.

The trajectory of the "council democratic" movements in Germany and Italy is analyzed in Part II by examining the transformation of the movement after the war. While the state continues to play an important role, the analysis in Part II is anchored on the evolution of the constitutive modes of "council democracy" (i.e. "citizens' control" and "workers' control") in each case studies as shaped by various forces involved in the movement.

[25] For the definition of conjuncture, see Gallas (2017), Flohr and Harrison (2016), Althusser (2014), Jessop (2012), and Clark (2010).

On Case Selection

The WWI era saw the most radical manifestation of the council movement in history. This goes beyond the case of Russia where the movement played a central role in the revolutionary processes especially between the February Revolution and the October Revolution. It also dominated the radical movements during the German Revolution, Austro-Hungarian Revolution, and the *biennio rosso*. Furthermore, compared to the central role that the Soviet Union and the Third International played in relation to the development of communist movements around the world in later years, the "council democratic" movements in the WWI era evolved in relative isolation from the developments in Russia.[26] Another factor that contributes to the relative disentanglement of these cases is that national economies and national political systems in the WWI era were still much less integrated compared to later periods. Lastly, since the trajectory of these movements preceded the development of "council democracy" as a distinct theoretical school that emerged around 1921 (van der Linden, 2004), the study illuminates the historical processes that underpinned the later theoretical elaborations which the movements engendered.

It should be first clarified that each within-case analysis is carried out at a country level, even though there was a considerable variation in the level of intensity and the timing of these movements across each country. There have been many studies that focused on particular cities and regions (e.g. Mazzacurati, 2017; Smith, 2017; Gluckstein, 1986; Tobin, 1984; Comfort, 1966; Mitchell, 1965). Of course, the appropriateness of the unit of analysis depends on the analytic angle of the study. Since the primary focus is on the way state strategies shaped, and in turn were shaped by, the development of these movements, taking the country as the unit of analysis seems more appropriate. Even though a war economy often made a few cities with war industries asymmetrically more important, state strategies had to take larger aggregates into account. This made the evolution of these movements within smaller localities such as a city symbiotically linked to the developments outside.

Among the "council democratic" movements in the WWI era, the German and Italian cases are instructive as each gravitates, at least at the time of the emergence of the movement, towards one of the two constitutive modes of "council democracy", with the former leaning towards "citizens' control" and Italy towards "workers' control". The analysis first aims at illuminating the reasons for the emergence of "council democratic" movements, at least in one of its two constitutive

[26] Of course, this is not an absolute isolation. The news of the Russian Revolution indeed had a tremendous impact on militant labour movement in Europe and beyond (Retish and Rendle, 2020; Rodney, 2018; Pasquali and Pozzi, 2017; Fayet et al., 2017). However, the details of the council movement in Russia were not known outside the country and the newly form Bolshevik government plunged into a civil war did not yet have the capacity or the interest to functionally influence the development of similar movements elsewhere.

modes, in Germany and Italy. It does so by looking at the particular form that the state-led war mobilization took in these countries and compares that with the case of France where such movements did not emerge. The analysis will then trace the subsequent development of the movements to see the factors that contributed to shaping their devolution and ultimate demise. These processes are then contrasted with the dialectical synthesis of the two modes in the case of Russia.

On Strategic-Relational Approach to the State

Different approaches to the state can be categorized into three groups organized in terms of their underlying ontological presupposition about the state, namely, instrumentalist, structuralist, and strategic-relational approaches.[27] Instrumental understanding of the state can be found in both non-Marxist and Marxist approaches. The former tends to take the state as an instrument that is used by the state officials to implement their distinct projects which are generally concerned with the control of territory and people and are shaped by the field of intrastate competition.[28] The latter takes the class composition of state managers as the indication of the class character of the state.[29] Although they differ profoundly in terms of the link between who controls the state and the nature of the state projects, they both analyze the state in terms of who controls it; therefore, taking the state itself as an instrument. They fail to understand the ways states are fundamentally rather than accidentally linked to different modes of social relations of production. Apparent class biases in the state policies or reactions are explained away either by stating that they are the smoothest ways to maintaining the internal order or most beneficial in the intrastate competition, as "state-autonomy" school tends to argue, or by making them contingent on the class affiliation of the beholders of state institutions.

An alternative to this would be a structuralist view of the state. This approach, which has been quite influential within the Marxist tradition, takes the view that the state plays an essential role in the reproduction of the social relation of production within which it is embedded. It does so not because its institutions are occupied by members affiliated with the dominant classes but because it is structurally biased to fulfil that role. The core puzzle of the structuralist approach lies precisely in explaining how such a structural bias is possible. This has naturally led to many different solutions. With regards to the capitalist state, some use the notion of market imperatives and "capital flights" to explain how state policies on average come to be stirred towards favouring

[27] For more nuanced overview of various critical approaches to the state, see Barrow (1993) and Jessop (1990).
[28] An example of this would be Theda Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions* (1979).
[29] The polemical account of the state by Marx and Friedrich Engels in *Manifesto of the Communist Party* would be an example of this.

the reproduction of the capitalist social relation (Barrow, 1993, p. 60).[30] Some begin with the structural tendency of capital towards crises or class struggle and argue that the state plays the essential role in mitigating the social costs and mediating between (and within) classes without which capital cannot reproduce itself. It is not difficult to see how a functionalist ontology of the state – as playing a necessary role in the reproduction of the mode of production – lurks in the background of this approach. Jessop (1990) highlights the weaknesses of the structuralist view of the state. It assumes, first, that the reproduction of the social relation of production is always the priority of state managers; secondly, that the politicians always know what needs to be done to reproduce the social relations; thirdly, that reproduction can ideally be done without itself generating or deepening crises; and fourthly, that the same recipe can fulfil the needs of different factions of capital (p. 117).

The third alternative is to conceive of the state essentially as a relation.[31] Within Marxism, this view is found explicitly in the later writings of Poulantzas where he begins to recognize the state not as an entity or a subject but as a relationship. In a key passage, he (1980) suggests, "the (capitalist) state should not be regarded as an intrinsic entity: like 'capital', *it is rather a relationship of forces, or more precisely the material condensation of such a relationship among classes and class fractions, such as this is expressed within the State in a necessarily specific form*" (p. 128; emphasis in the original). He explicitly mentions that this relationship of forces among and within classes and class fractions has certain materiality that is inscribed in the state apparatus itself (i.e. state policies and the institutional network and personnel that carry state power forward). Furthermore, we always have to take the specific form of the state into account when we examine this condensation of the relationship of forces between classes and class fractions (i.e. the state). The direct implication of this is that the relationship between the state and social classes is no longer something external to the state but traverses through the state as a "strategic field and process of intersecting power networks" (p. 135), albeit in the form-specific materiality of the state.

The relational conception of the state affects how popular struggles are to be conceived. They are not to be understood as movements external to the state seeking to penetrate into its fortress or set up their own independent counter-state outside the walls of the state. These struggles affect what Poulantzas (1980) calls "the unstable equilibrium of compromises between [and within]

[30] There are others, such as Fred Block and Stephen Elkin, who give less emphasis on the "laws of the market" and see them as "merely promoting a natural alliance between state and capital" (Barrow, 1993, p. 62).
[31] This conception can be found again in both non-Marxist and Marxist approaches. The former appears within field-theoretical and game-theoretical approaches. These approaches conceive of the state either as a legally privileged locus of overlapping fields (see Loyal, 2016, and Fligstein and McAdam, 2011; 2012) or as a complex web of non-unitary sub-players such as bureaucrats, legislators, police, and parties that interact with each other on the basis of a set of rules (see Jasper and Duyvendak, 2015a). They generally fail to explain the selectivity of the capitalist state towards some strategies over others.

the dominant classes and the dominated" (p. 31), and in doing this, they "constantly call into question the unity of the state personnel as a category in the service of the existing power and hegemonic fraction of the dominant classes" (p. 155). Therefore, movements traverse the strategic-relational field, which itself is a form-specific material condensation of past and present social relations and struggles, and open new antagonisms and contradictions within this field. Furthermore, since the state is not a monolithic block, the resources and the capacities that it potentially gives access to are obtained through a strategic process of interaction of forces with one another within the state. Moreover, because this engagement must transmit through the state apparatus, this strategic field is by no means symmetrical for all forces. The biases that are structurally built into the state apparatus also include the material condensation of past struggles.

On Strategic-Relational Approach to the Movement

Similar to our conceptualization of the state, the movements involved in these transformative processes are analyzed fundamentally in strategic-relational terms. There have been attempts in recent years within social movement theory towards a (strategic-) relational theory of social movements.[32] A number of Marxist theorists (e.g. Modonesi, 2019; Nilsen and Cox, 2014; Barker et al., 2013) have sought to incorporate class struggle as an essentially relational concept into social movement theory. Their framework conceives of collective action along the principle axis of subalternity-antagonism-autonomy between the "dominant" and the "dominated", with the former pursuing its interest through movements from "above" and the latter through movements from "below". However, their theorization does not go far enough into the reciprocal process of mediated effects between the subaltern and the forces especially within the state. Therefore, the role of formal organizations within and outside the state, including political parties and trade unions, in movements from below are not sufficiently theorized.

Subaltern struggles are rarely completely independent or isolated from the organizations that formally (or informally) represent them and seek to further their collective interests. "Autonomous subalternity" is an oxymoron. This is not to say that emancipatory movements towards self-determination, and therefore eventual dismantling of a particular dimension of subalternity, are not possible. Subaltern struggles are often formed in, through, sometimes simultaneously against, or at

[32] See Fligstein and McAdam (2011; 2012), and Jasper and Duyvendak (2015a; 2015b) as two recent examples of defining social movements relationally outside a Marxist framework. The former offers a collaborative definition of strategic action, operating within dynamic, issue-dependent, and interactive fields, that aims towards stability of social worlds. It emphasizes on the importance of accounting for change as much as of stability; however, it does so by reducing change and transformation to an incidental rather than a fundamental feature of interactions within and between fields. The latter offers a game-theoretical understanding of strategic dynamics and between different "players" within particular "arenas". Taking structures as metaphoric and static, dynamism of social world is deposited on the contingencies of the strategic games and the subsequent changes to players and arenas as a result of micro-strategic interactions.

the very least in an external relation to such organizations. Precisely due to the mediating effects of such organizations, the struggles towards self-determination are not always necessarily waged between the subaltern and the dominant groups. But it is also, and sometimes even more crucially, within the existing and evolving organizations of subaltern politics that the conditions for self-emancipation should be advanced – hence, the importance of struggles for the democratization of unions, parties, etc. Furthermore, the conditions for the development of organizational and ideological capacities of the subaltern groups do not always emerge entirely as a result of a direct struggle between the dominant and dominated groups, but sometimes as a consequence of the operations of the state and changing balance of forces within it, always in relation to and sometimes directly involving formal or informal organizations of subaltern groups.

Therefore, the attempts to incorporate Marxism into social movement studies, and hence to integrate the analysis of class relations and class struggle, need to bring organizational analysis centrally to their study of subaltern struggles. This research can be seen as an attempt towards that goal. Its insistence on the centrality of organizational mediation follows from the fact that subaltern struggles always emerge within the pre-existing mesh of subaltern struggles, themselves mediated by their own network of subaltern organizations. Even if there are organizing forces surfacing originally out of the emergent subaltern movements, they are bound to come into contact with the existing organizations and movements.

A strategic-relational approach to movements allows conceiving of movements themselves as terrains of strategic struggle and contestation between both emergent and existing organizing forces, with their own historicity that includes organizational capacities, programmatic commitments, and ongoing or forthcoming alliances. This implies that the emergent movement is never a blank slate – or at best not for long. Rather, it carries historical residues of the ensemble of forces involved in the movement. Moreover, the multiplicity of forces within a movement implies that the movement is prone to conflicts, fragmentations, and crises in ways that the integrity of the movement cannot be assumed. Possible coalitions between organizing forces are not necessarily based on common belief and collective solidarity but part of a strategic engagement. Furthermore, the movements come into relation with the state (itself understood as a relation) through the mediation of organizing forces in various degrees depending on their types (e.g. political parties, trade unions, etc.) and to a different extent depending on their relations within the state and other forces. Therefore, any emergent subaltern movement cannot be isolated from either the ensemble of pre-existing organizations or wholly outside the state. The strategic aspect of the analysis connects the movement and the larger context through part of which it evolves and upon part of which it operates. This means that the context is never passive but always active partially with regards to the

movement; and that the context is never static but always dynamic partially influenced by the movement in evolution. These interconnected nuances are what strategies are essentially and primarily concerned with to determine the next course of action, henceforth impacting both the movement and the context.

Analytical Framework

This section presents the analytical framework to conceptualize the discussion in Part I and Part II of the study. Part I takes a strategic-relational approach to the state. The analytical framework used to characterize the state follows Jessop's conceptualization (2016; 2007; 1990). It distinguishes between the formal and substantive dimensions of the state. The former is constituted by modes of representation, institutional architecture, and patterns of intervention. The latter is constituted by social base, state project, and hegemonic vision. The most relevant dimensions of the state for the present research is the state form. This makes the analysis in Part I largely a form analysis. However, among the substantive dimensions, hegemonic vision also plays a crucial role. Part II also takes a strategic-relational approach to the movement. The movement is conceptualized as having both formal and substantive aspects. The former is composed of relation with the state, internal structure, and material/symbolic capacity. The latter is composed of social base, programmatic efforts, and alliance patterns. In contrast to the analysis in Part I, Part II focuses mainly on the substantive aspects of the movement. However, it also takes into account movement's relationship with the state.

Analytical Framework for the Study of the State

Since state power can only operate through institutions, the general architecture of power distribution governing the institutional ensemble is essential in understanding the concrete ways in which state power manifests itself. Furthermore, since the constitution of social classes as political forces cannot exist outside and independently of the state, the mode of representation that state structure facilitates is essential in understanding the formation and the dynamics of the relation of class forces and patterns of (inter- and intra-) class alliances. Lastly, state institutions operate on the basis of diverse modes and mechanisms of intervention to extract from and deploy resources to society and to mobilize political and social resources for various state projects. State intervention influences the contested and changing state-society boundaries and patterns of (inter- and intra-) class alliances. The modes of representation, institutional architecture, and patterns of state intervention together constitute the form of state power (Jessop, 2016, pp. 59-71). State-form profoundly influences class struggle in its structure and its effect upon the balance of class forces. As Jessop (1979) argues, "[state-form] enables us to examine the effects of the inadequate

articulation of representation and intervention on accumulation and domination and this provides concepts useful in the analysis of a structural crisis of the state apparatus" (p. 193)

State form is neither static nor stable. Since the state is a terrain of class (and non-class) struggle riddled by internal contradictions and tensions, the form of the state undergoes partial or fundamental transformations over time and at different conjunctures to facilitate the possibility of maintaining what Poulantzas called "the unstable equilibrium of compromises between [and within] the dominant classes and the dominated" (1980, p. 31). A transformation of state form is not required to overcome every internal or external challenge that the state has to face. However, any particular state form presents the state with certain capacities and limitations for maintaining its unity and for promoting the reproduction of capitalist class relation. These, in turn, deeply affect the strategic terrain within and outside the state upon which agents and forces (inter)act. This is why state form analysis offers an entry point into understanding the forms of state crises and revolutionary ruptures but also the strategic-relational terrain upon which the revolutionary forces and movements evolve.

The institutional architecture of the state concerns "the internal vertical, horizontal, and transversal organization of the state system as expressed through the distribution of powers among its parts, considered territorially and functionally" (Jessop, 2016, p. 66). It concerns the formal and substantive relationship between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, the bureaucratic structure of the state apparatus (p. 66). The institutional architecture of the state provides the background upon which the unity of the state apparatus is forged, forces involved in various state projects are coordinated, and tensions and contradictions traverse through the state. The vertical organization of the state system might increase the efficient coordination of action. However, class contradictions and characteristic tensions of hierarchical structures tend to run more deeply through the vertical structure of the state apparatus and affect its unity more fundamentally. Non-vertical organization of the state system reduces hierarchical tensions and facilitates the refraction of class contradictions across different branches of the state, thus making the equilibrium of compromises more sustainable.

The militarized state discussed in this research is considered as a subset of top-down state architecture. It differs from other types of top-down structure such as bureaucratized state because in the militarized state the military apparatus of the state has extended itself into the general bureaucratic apparatus of the state. To avoid sliding into an instrumentalist understanding of the state, we should emphasize that the presence or absence of military personnel per se does not necessarily indicate the militarization of the state or lack thereof. If the militarized state is understood as a condition of rigid institutional verticality in which the lower echelons are strictly

subordinated to the upper echelons, and of sharp skewness of the strategic selectivity of the state towards the fulfilment of the material (and immaterial) needs of the military and the fractions of capital represented or supported by it, then it can potentially be achieved also under a centralized bureaucratic order. Conversely, it is also possible that the presence of military personnel in positions of power by itself would not result in a militarized state if, for example, the institutional architecture of the state is not conducive to centralized control. Therefore, we cannot just look for the presence or absence of military personnel in positions of power as indicative of the militarized state. In war conditions especially at the scale that WWI demanded, there was already a tendency towards a militarization of the state through rigid centralization of state institutions and sharp concentration of resources and sociopolitical forces to the military effort. If the military apparatus is allowed to impose itself structurally and strategically within the state, then such tendency is more likely to be actually realized. In this sense, having the military apparatus under civilian control could potentially (but not necessarily) be a deterrent strategy against the militarization of the state.

Jessop (1979) suggests a scheme, though not an exhaustive one, that divides the possible modes of representation and intervention into three categories, namely, parliamentarism, corporatism, and tripartism. Parliamentarianism is based on indirect participation of formally equal citizens in policy-making of an elected government. State intervention is devised "in the form of legislation or general policies enforced by a permanent rational-legal administration in accordance with the rule of law" (p. 194). Parliamentarism diffuses political pressure from below by atomizing the social base into formally equal individual citizens whose political representations and interests are mediated through political parties. Such mediated diversification encourages fragmentation of economic categories and allows various classes and class fractions to (potentially) channel their political interests into the state and compete on formally equal grounds to broaden their social base and to increase their political power. This, on its own, has a stabilizing effect on competing forces and interests. However, at times of acute socio-economic crisis when the state needs to swiftly and decisively mobilize economic and social forces, this form of representation can acutely strain the political system.

Corporatism involves "the fusion of political representation mediated through a system of public 'corporations' which are constituted on the basis of their members' function within the division of labour [in a given economic space]" (p. 195). Corporatism manufactures a framework of class collaboration and compromise between politically equivalent and functionally heterogeneous socioeconomic producer groups, often with the active support of a sovereign authority to overcome disturbances and impasses. It facilitates the mutual interaction of these groups at the leadership level to coordinate their actions and to mobilize their base in order to push state projects forward. It

nevertheless requires that they maintain functional unity within their socioeconomic bloc and control of their base. Hence, it creates a system of coordination and control rendered through these "corporations". But while it may achieve effective coordination among major socioeconomic producer groups and mediated forms of social control, corporatism brings class conflict right in the heart of the state. Furthermore, due to the limited, predetermined, and functional representation of different class fractions, it may reduce the relative autonomy of class forces to agents of mobilization behind state projects, which in turn can create tensions between the leadership and the members of these class forces.

Tripartism is a hybrid configuration that combines aspects of parliamentarism and corporatism into "a contradictory unity owing to the formal participation in corporatist decision-making of representatives of the parliamentary executive ('government') and/or the delegation of corporatist policy implementation to the parliamentary bureaucracy and/or the formal participation of corporations in the decision-making of the parliamentary executive and/or the delegation of parliamentary policy administration to the corporations" (pp. 195-6). The mode and mechanism of state intervention are themselves the result of a particular combination of the corporatist and parliamentary aspects in a given case. Tripartism is a hybrid system of representation in the form of "liberal corporatism" that has certain adaptive capacities which could potentially help to overcome some of the deficiencies of parliamentarism and corporatism. It can facilitate the formal representation of not only the major economic-corporate entities but broader aggregate (economic or non-economic) entities as well as individual citizens at the state level. It can, therefore, achieve more direct economic coordination and more mediated social control than parliamentarism while attaining more diverse political articulation and a broader spectrum of interests at the state level than corporatism. It can also give more autonomy and flexibility to the corporate groups to toggle between class conflict and class collaboration, enabling them to maintain a closer relationship with their base while benefiting from active participation in state projects. As a hybrid structure, tripartism is also subjected to various contradictions and tensions inherent in parliamentarism and corporatism.

The hegemonic vision of the state is an essential dimension of state power precisely because the state bears the responsibility of creating social cohesion and general institutional integration beyond the ruling classes, even though it is only a part of a complex social order (Jessop, 2017, pp. 58-60). Hegemonic vision pronounces "the nature and purposes of the state for the wider society", thereby legitimizing the state as upholding the common good (pp. 57-8), although in fact always partially and selectively (pp. 86-7). The formal separation of the "political" and the "economic" under capitalism enables the state to play this role ever more effectively than in the previous eras.

However, since the state is in fact essential for the reproduction of the capitalist social relation and capitalist class relations, this remains always partial and deeply contradictory.

Jessop distinguishes between "one nation" and "two nations" projects (p. 87) as two types of hegemonic visions, each of which opens up different strategic horizons for the state. The former "aim at an expansive and inclusive hegemony, based on widespread popular support mobilized through material concessions and symbolic rewards [...]" (p. 87). In contrast, the latter "aim[s] explicitly or implicitly at a more limited hegemony, based on the support of strategically significant sectors of the population, and seek to pass the costs of the project to other, excluded sectors [...]" (p. 87). Each of these legitimization strategies opens up different horizons of possibilities, with their own set of contradictions, for the state. While the "one nation" strategy can potentially expand the legitimacy of the state within broader social classes under one unified vision of the nation, it can both strengthen the material and symbolic capacity of popular classes to challenge the ruling classes, and lead some fractions of the ruling class to withdraw their support from the state in protest against the concessions to the popular classes. While the "two nations" strategy can keep the potentially challenging sectors at bay and consolidate the ruling classes more tightly, it can both result in a crisis of legitimacy among the popular classes by losing its image of promoting the common good, and lose the support of some fractions of the ruling classes which reject exclusionary policies.

Analytical Framework for the Study of the Movement

To expand on what has been mentioned earlier, all the relevant substantive aspects of the movement are rendered through organizing forces involved within the movement since the movement is taken to operate through collective organizations. The analysis of organizing forces takes into account both the preexisting organized forces (e.g. pre-existing political parties or trade unions) that engage with the movement and those forces that are endogenous to the movement (e.g. a new political party that emerged from the movement). These organizing forces, with certain capacities, leadership, etc., all of which are implied under the notion of "organizational forces", must enter into the terrain of the movement with some programmatic vision on the nature of the movement, its goals, and practical steps forward. These are themselves linked strategically with pre-existing programmatic visions and commitments of those organizing forces – hence the extreme unlikelihood of the pre-existing forces abandoning all their previous organizational linkages, programmatic visions, and ongoing and forthcoming alliances to embrace the new, purportedly emancipatory movement upon its emergence.

The historicity of preexisting organized forces may affect the way they interact with other forces within the movement due to their prior organizational links, prior programmatic

commitments, prior ideological positions, etc. Furthermore, since organizing forces on their own and beyond the movement are themselves prone to internal conflict, occasional crisis, and potential splits, all of which can impact the relationship with other forces within the movement, the movement itself is seen as a field of contestation. Moreover, while recognizing the different forms and extents of relations within the state, the analysis incorporates the discussion of both political organizations such as political parties, the military apparatus, the bureaucratic apparatus, etc. and civil society organizations, such as trade unions, cooperatives, etc. relevant to the movement. Political organizations are more directly involved within the state than civil society organizations; although the latter is, at least by proxy, linked to, therefore never entirely outside of, the state.[33] This involvement may impact the type of strategic considerations that political organizations have to make (e.g. electability and governability) compared to those that civil society organizations might have to make (e.g. membership and partnership) with respect to their engagement with the movement.

Programmatic effort concerns with a whole series of considerations about the movement, including its goals, strategies, tactics, boundaries, membership, historical role, class/group identity, etc. At the most basic level, programmatic effort provides the movement with an operational unity for those involved to be able to orient themselves effectively and their actions strategically "in the service of the movement". However, that unity cannot be assumed as stable or conclusive since programmatic efforts are not singular. Since the movement is essentially a strategic-relational terrain, its nature and the principal strategies, etc. to achieve its goals are not a given attribute of the movement but itself an unstable result of contestation between the programmatic efforts of the organizing forces. Since, as stated above, the organizational forces do not have to always be endogenous to the movement, the engagement of some organizational forces with programmatic efforts concerning the movement can be an appendage to or a subset of their larger programmatic visions. This highlights the crucial fact that programmatic efforts are not merely an intellectual exercise of clarification but a strategically oriented activity that can and often does extend beyond the boundaries of the movement.

Furthermore, the complex assemblage of these programmatic efforts does not have to be coherent, homogenous, or comprehensive. It may contain contradictory aspects due to contradictory elements not only within a programme posited by any particular organizing force but also as a result

[33] This is not a statement about the effective power of political organizations relative to civil society organizations on the state. In fact, some civil society organizations might have significantly larger effect on the state than some political parties. Rather, it is derived from the definition of political society as the sphere of forces within the state. Civil society organizations may include those formally active in state-society mediation process (e.g. certain trade unions in their formal corporatist function or employers' organizations) and those formally outside such mediation process (e.g. radical trade unions).

of the compilation of several programmes. Therefore, programmatic efforts may result in contradictory unities. The resulting unity may include the outlines of possible new coalitions between the organizational forces engaged within the movement. Moreover, in the work of defining goals and ways to achieve them, programmatic efforts may inscribe the outlines of possible alliances with forces outside the class/group nature of the movement, whatever that is defined within a given programmatic vision. The latter is different from the consideration of alliance formation since that includes the concrete work of forming such possibilities in an attempt to expand the sphere of movement's hegemony.

The analysis of alliance patterns is concerned with the horizon of strategic alliances with social classes/groups and/or organized forces outside the movements but whose support is needed for the success of the hegemonic project of the movement within the bounds of its transformative vision. While alliance can bring strategic unity between various forces, it does not by itself resolve preexisting tensions or underlying contradictions between the allied forces.

There has been a significant gap in social movement theory with regards to the study of alliance formation. If the relation between organizing forces and social classes are taken not as necessary that can be assumed essentially but as contingent that has to be (re)constructed strategic-relationally, then incongruities between patterns of organizational alliances and patterns of class alliances have to be considered. Hence, for example, "a party entente may last longer than a class alliance, in so far as a class may maintain its agreement with another through the intermediary of its party (or parties) on the political scene, even though they have effectively broken their alliance in the field of the class struggle" (Poulantzas, 1973, p. 252). But since class alliances require organizational mediation, such incongruity implies that shifting patterns of class alliances within organizational mediations depends on organizational capacities and programmatic efforts of collective entities involved. This implies that changing alliance patterns should be analyzed by looking at changing patterns of active collaborations among organizations but without assuming that these necessarily mirror patterns of class alliances. For example, observing an alliance between the socialist party and the Catholic party, while significant on its own account, cannot necessarily be taken as an alliance between the working class (or certain fractions within it) and the landowning classes or the peasants. It should be taken into account that the persistence of alliances, once they are formed, cannot be assumed. Just like any informal organizational links, their preservation requires a certain amount of organizational work and continued strategic interest.

Concluding Remarks

Following the general outline of the research as shown in Table 1 below shows, the introduction had to present many different aspects of the research. The following empirical chapters

will present the historical sociology of the "council democratic" movements in Germany and Italy in the WWI era. Part I, Chapters 2 to 4, presents the within-case studies of the making of the "council democratic" movements in Germany and in Italy, followed by a comparative chapter that starts by presenting the contrasting case of France and discussing comparative conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis. Part II, Chapters 5 to 7, presents within case studies of the trajectories of "council democratic" movements in Germany and Italy during the Germany Revolution (1918-20) and the *biennio rosso* (1919-1920), followed by a comparative chapter that first gives an overview of Russia as the contrasting case before presenting comparative conclusions. The concluding chapter recaps the findings and connects them with the larger phenomenon of "council democracy" both during the postwar period and its later historical manifestations in the 20th and 21st century.

Time Scale	1914 – 1918			1918 – 1920			
Principle Aim	Processes leading to the emergence of "council democratic" movements analyzed by tracing the transformation of state during the WWI and its consequences for the form of democratic struggles after the war			Processes determining the evolution of "council democratic" movements analyzed by tracing the transformation of the movement for "citizens' control" and "workers' control" as the constitutive modes of "council democracy"			
Method	Comparative Process Tracing:		Ideal-Type Generalization Periodization Counter-Factual Outcome	Comparative Process Tracing:		Ideal-Type Generalization Periodization Counter-Factual Outcome	
Case Selection	Main Case Studies:	Germany and Italy		Main Case Studies:	Germany and Italy		
	Contrasting Case Study:	France		Contrasting Case Study:	Russia		
Analytic Structure	Strategic-Relational Approach to the State:	Formal Aspects:	State Architecture Modes of Representation Patterns of Intervention	Strategic-Relational Approach to the Movement:	Formal Aspects:	Internal Structure Material/Symbolic Capacity Relation within the State	
		Substantive Aspects:	State Project Social Base Hegemonic Vision		Substantive Aspects:	Programmatic Efforts Social Base Alliance Patterns	
Part	I: The Making of the "Council Democratic" Movements ...			II: The Trajectory of the "Council Democratic" Movements ...			
Chapter Outline	... in Germany (Chapter 2) ... in Italy (Chapter 3) ... in a Comparative Perspective (Chapter 4)			... in Germany (Chapter 5) ... in Italy (Chapter 6) ... in a Comparative Perspective (Chapter 7)			

Table 1: The General Outline of the Research

Part I

The Making of "Council Democratic" Movements

Chapter 2

The Making of the "Council Democratic" Movement in Germany

Introduction

The conceptual characterization of "council democracy" outlined in the introductory chapter demands a broader approach to the making of "council democratic" movements that goes beyond tracing the lineages of councils as an institutional form. Therefore, this analysis does not offer an institutional genealogy of the council movement but a class analysis of the condition of its possibility in an evolving context. The making of "council democratic" movements should be analyzed in terms of transformative processes that laid the political, economic, and ideological grounds for their emergence.

The primary source of such transformative processes in the WWI era was state-led war mobilization. A total war at the scale that was waged by the belligerent countries required nothing less than an unprecedented intervention of the state in both extent and form into all aspects of social life. It is by tracing the processes through which state-led war mobilization transformed the contours of class struggle, creating new contradictions and capacities which in turn shaped its further evolution, that we can understand the making of "council democratic" movements in their particular form in a particular country. While the extraordinary intervention of the state (eventually) helped reveal the class character of both the state and the economy to a massive number of people in the belligerent countries (Carsten, 1982; Horne, 1991; Corner and Procacci, 1997; Gatrell, 2014; Akın, 2018), class and popular struggles evolved through the way in which state-led war mobilization was conducted. Therefore, the analysis should examine the precise ways that the state shaped and was shaped by class struggle during the war.

The pre-war structure of the German state and the relations of class forces prior to the war predisposed the state architecture to transform into a militarized state. The militarized state architecture assisted the later intervention of the state into social relations (including the economic relations) increasingly under a corporatist mode of representation.

A detailed overview of how the struggle of classes and class fractions within and outside the state since 1871 came together to constitute the structural foundation and institutional order of the state, as well as state-society relations is outlined in Appendix A. It outlines that the hybrid class structure of the ruling bloc composed of a Protestant landed aristocracy (*Junker*) and large capitalist interests, which left the German state far from an ideal type of a capitalist state. This further created a series of tendencies and contradictions within and outside the state. The basic structure of the

German state after the unification was precisely to shield large landed interests of the Prussian aristocracy, an essential pillar of which was the military, from the influence of other powerful political forces as well as democratic pressures from below. This structural insulation was designed in such a closed way that even universal male suffrage that had already been imposed was thought not to have any significant political consequence.

Nevertheless, both Catholic and socialist forces were seen as a threat that had to be repressed by force as well as by a series of reform measures to weaken their popular appeals. The combination of repression and reforms before the turn of the century in the context of universal suffrage yet in an undemocratic state structure had profound impacts on the socialist and labour movement. The state measures that tried to repress the socialist movement without banning their organizations to run in the *Reichstag* elections not only made the socialist movement more widely popular among the working class but also made electoral strategy the primary preoccupation of the socialist party. However, the functional weakness of the *Reichstag* within an undemocratic state structure allowed the socialist party to aim for electoral success as a show of defiance and to direct its attention towards a republican vision of democratization of the state and economy while maintaining its unsubstantiated revolutionary overtone. This strategy, formulated in the Erfurt Programme of 1891, enabled them to leave the question of the transformation of the capitalist state insufficiently theorized. Furthermore, the leadership of trade unions became increasingly interested in taking part in the management of some of the state's reform measures especially after the turn of the century when the state showed a more consolidatory attitude towards working-class organizations.[1] The relative exclusion of small capitalist interests from the ruling bloc and the later collapse of the Bülow Bloc made the socialist party interested in the prospect of collaborating with non-socialist forces to democratize the state. Hence, while the German state remained predisposed to a vertical organization of power and a corporatist mode of representation, the socialist forces were inclined towards democratization of the German state through electoral and alliance strategies with a view towards potential collaboration within the corporatist institutions.

As the state architecture that developed during the war amalgamated the contradictions of the military and that of the state, the crisis of the military due to pressures for democratization from the lower echelon of the military as well as struggles among the top echelon of the military translated itself into a general crisis of the state. In turn, the military order was made more

[1] On the evolving relationship between the socialist union and the party, see Appendix A.

susceptible to pressures for democratization from outside the military as well as struggles between the top echelon of the military and the political leaders.[2]

Furthermore, under the impact of the massive requirements of a total war, the state's mode of representation continued certain trends already present in pre-war years and developed into corporatism. To facilitate the corporatist arrangement during the war, the German state systematically created and integrated rank-and-file organizations which then became the institutional epicentre of radical democratic movements in the form of councils. But this corporatist arrangement also increasingly involved working-class organizations, particularly their leadership strata, in the management of the war.

The growing tensions between the state's militarized architecture with its top echelon standing as representatives of the Prussian landed aristocracy, and the state's corporatist mode of representation with growing empowerment of certain fractions of capital and dominant working-class organizations (as well as elements within other social classes and groups) created pressures for democratization from within the state. At the same time, bottom-up struggles for democratization both inside and outside factories and the army, which was predicated upon bringing the war to an end, surpassed the relatively limited and largely unsuccessful attempts by the forces within the state. These bottom-up movements were not completely aliened from or in principle opposed to struggles within the state. But the inability or unwillingness of the leadership of these popular organizations to effectively channel their grievances and demands into the state, due significantly to their position in the corporatist arrangement, further encouraged the bottom-up struggles to develop their capacities outside the formal channels of their established organizations.

The analysis is organized into three periods according to their conjunctural relevance to the making of the "council democratic" movements. The first section marks the period between the beginning of the war in August 1914 until July 1916. This marks the period between the advent of the militarization of the state on the back of a hegemonic vision essentially based on a "two nations" social truce, until July 1916, right before the establishment of the Third German Supreme Command (*Oberste Heeresleitung*; OHL), which not only intensified the militarization of the state but also moved firmly towards implementing a corporatist arrangement. The discussion of the second period, between August 1916 and August 1917, analyzes the impact of a systematic integration of working-class organizations into the militarized corporatist state under the "Hindenburg Program" on the contours of class struggle within and outside the state. The third period, from September 1917 to November 1918, examines the final measures by the state to

[2] This latter consideration is added since a militarized state is never purely militarized but always accompanied by certain elements in the political society outside the formal sphere of the military.

consolidate its deepening crisis and their consequences on the evolution of democratic struggles within and outside the state. The last section highlights the specific factors that contributed to the emergence of "council democratic" movements in Germany.

The Character of the German War Mobilization

First Period (August 1914 – July 1916)

At the outbreak of the war, Germany was one of the most industrialized countries in the world. It was also the second major producer of industrial product in Europe after the United Kingdom (see Broadberry, Federico, and Klein, 2010, pp. 69-77). However, its peculiar state structure and decentralized infrastructure for production[3] were not suited for the unforgiving requirements of a total war. German society underwent tectonic shifts in the span of the war whose form, scale, and pace exhausted the old state structures and transformed the balance of class forces in ways that led to a profound reconstitution of the state.

There was a serious fear that if the Social Democratic Party of Germany (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, SPD) refused to comply, the military government would use the pretext of war and the law of siege to suppress the party organizations. There was also a perception within the party that the war had large support among workers. The Free Trade Unions (*Freie Gewerkschaften*) was similarly fearful of losing its achievements under government repression, gripped by a strong sense of patriotism, and hopeful of potential benefits from its cooperation (Kocka, 1984, p. 65). However, after it was given assurance by the Office of Interior that the government would be glad to collaborate with the union during the war if the union refrained from disturbing the war effort, it took the first step on 2 August and called off all pending or ongoing strikes and announced that it will divert its strike funds for the duration of the war to unemployment relief and support of war victims (Schorske, 1983, pp. 288-9). After this independent decision by the leadership of the Free Trade Unions, the SPD's options to formulate a coherent opposition to the war was severely limited even if there was enough willingness within the party to do so. Therefore, following the party discipline, the SPD deputies unanimously voted in favour of the war credit on 4 August and agreed to a social truce (*Burgfrieden*) with other parties for the duration of the war. The SPD was hoping that its compliance would create an opportunity to demand substantial concessions from the ruling classes and eventually democratize the state structure from within.[4]

[3] At the break of the war, only 1,378,000 of nearly 11 million German workforce were employed in firms that were larger than 1000 employees (Harman, 1997, p. 21).

[4] For example, only a few weeks after the beginning of the war, the SPD began pushing for the reform of Prussian three-class voting system (*Dreiklassenwahlrecht*), recognition of trade unions, and constitutional reforms (Dahlmann, 2014, p. 45).

While the *Burgfrieden* brought the socialist leaders psychologically closer to the ruling classes (Schorske, 1983, pp. 293-4), it did not entail their active inclusion in the management of the war. The "two-nation" hegemonic vision of the state had its roots in the constitutional structure of the state (see Feldman, 1976, pp. 122-3; Förster, 2014, p. 94) and the relative power of the ruling classes within and outside the state.[5] Deep antagonism between the ruling bloc and the socialist forces whose widespread and multifaceted activities in the prewar years were seen as creating a "state within the state", as well as the anti-democratic structure of the German state had strongly hindered that possibility. Therefore, the *Burgfrieden* sought to temporarily halt the class conflict on the back of a "one nation" rhetorical symbolism while effectively maintaining a "two nations" hegemonic vision towards the conduct of the war – hence the notion of "truce" rather than "unity". Given the dubious ideological foundations of the *Burgfrieden* based on the idea that Germany was fighting a defensive war, it became increasingly difficult to sustain its contradictory hegemonic vision. While many agencies were set up in the first year of the war to mobilize public opinion for the war (Welch, 2014, p. 26), neither the government nor the military apparatus instituted a centralized and coordinated propaganda campaign in the first period of the war. The military government relied heavily on self-mobilization of civil society and the population, as well as on repressive measures such as censorship (Chickering, 2004, pp. 46-50; Hirschfeld, 2010, pp. 433-5).

The state architecture was reshaped through a number of measures that came into effect at the beginning of the war. Under the Law of Siege,[6] the Deputy Commanding Generals took control of the civilian government at local and regional levels. Being accountable solely to the Kaiser, the military personnel enjoyed "almost unlimited power over a broad range of public affairs in their respective districts" (Chickering, 2004, p. 33) and became "something of regional rulers and there was no one to control them" (Förster, 2014, p. 118). Such overriding of civilian government by the military apparatus already shifted the state architecture closer to a militarized structure. The democratic channels of the state suffered further when the *Reichstag* delegated its legislative power to the *Bundestag*, which had far less democratic legitimacy. Although the *Reich* reserved the right to veto any legislation, it never exercised such power during the course of the war with over 800 legislative orders passed by the *Bundestag*. This led to the marginalization of the *Reichstag* in this period (see Chickering, 2004, p. 34; Förster, 2014, p. 118).

[5] An example of the constitutional structure that structurally isolated key aspects of the state from the democratic influence was the complete independence the General Staff, the Military Cabinet, and the War Minister in ways that would prevent the War Minister, who presented the military budget to the Reichstag for approval, from answering any questions about the military policy (see Feldman, 1976, pp. 122-3). At a broader level, the triangular structure of the German state that constitutionally separated the German Supreme Command from the Chancellor while connecting each directly to the Emperor was designed to isolate the top echelon of the military from the influence of the parliament (see Förster, 2014, p. 94).

[6] The Law of Siege was first formulated in 1851 in the aftermath of the 1848 revolutionary upheavals.

The reorganization of the "economic" sphere towards an industrial mobilization for the war moved at a slower pace than the rapid changes that took place at the "political" sphere at the beginning of the war. All expectations and planning at the beginning of the war were based on the assumption that it would be a short war to victory (Harman, 1997, p. 25; Feldman, 1992, p. 56; c.f. Förster, 1995). Therefore, there was not much centralized coordination to reorganize production until the autumn of 1914 (Ullmann, 2014). Under the assumption of a short war, the military planning until autumn 1914 relied primarily on the stockpiles and the state-run factories[7] that had been reserved before the war (Ullmann, 2014; Strachan, 2001, p. 781). An important early state initiative to regulate the distribution of raw material essential for the war effort was spearheaded by the industrialist, Walther Rathenau, the President of the German General Electric Company (*Allgemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft*; AEG). He envisioned and led the creation of the Raw Material Department (*Kriegsrohstoffabeilung*; KRA) to supply raw material to the firms to produce for the war under state contracts. Established a few days after the start of the war, the KRA was dominated by representatives from various levels of industry but was formally subordinated to the Prussian War Ministry (Strachan, 2001, pp. 777, 783-4). To coordinate their collective capitalist interests and influence the state from outside the Central Association of Employers of Germany (*Centralverband deutscher Industrieller*; CDI) and the Federation of Industries (*Bund der Industriellen*; BdI),[8] established the War Committee for German Industry (*Kriegsausschuß der deutschen Industrie*) in the summer of 1914 (Chickering, 2004, p. 38).

In the meanwhile, industrialists were initially reluctant to make dramatic changes to switch to war production as the cost-benefit analysis of such an endeavour was questionable for them. In the absence of any intention within the state to significantly encroach on the capitalist relations of production, the War Ministry was put in charge of creating sufficient economic incentives for the industrialists to produce for the war. The War Ministry's approach to this problem, antithetical to cost-effective production and collectivist spirit required for large scale war mobilization, was through the so-called "cost-plus-profit" system in which the state pays for the production cost, including raw material and labour, and guarantee a fixed profit rate of 5 per cent (Strachan, 2001, p. 783; Feldman, 1992, pp. 56, 60). This outlined the initial mode of state intervention in the first period of the war. However, as the blockade of Germany by the Allied forces tightened, the shortage of raw material and food supplies became more severely felt. This boosted the stature of the KRA and demanded further planning towards more refined economic coordination.[9] To achieve

[7] At the beginning of the war, these state-run factories provided 40 per cent of the supply required by the Ministry of War (Chickering, 2004, p. 36; Feldman, 1976, p. 124).
[8] For the origins of the CDI and the BdI in the prewar years, see Appendix A.
[9] By 1918, the KRA employed more than 20,000 staff (Strachan, 2001, p. 784).

this, a series of joint-stock War Raw-Material Corporations (*Kriegsrohstoff-Gesellschaften*) were established in each category of raw material.[10]

As soon as it became clear to the army generals that their hopes for a short war were in vain, the most crucial question was the distribution of manpower between the army, and industry and agriculture. The mass mobilization of 3.8 million of soldiers at the beginning of the war (Bruendel, 2014) created a spike of labour shortage for a while, reaching more than 22 per cent in September 1914 (see Ritschl, 2005; Ullmann, 2014). Furthermore, as a result of the rapid growth of the war industry, the unemployment rate was reduced sharply. Therefore, the government had to develop institutional capacities to rationally determine the exemptions and the army reserves (Bessel, 2000, p. 441). However, the institutional deficiencies to handle this led to crippling inefficiencies in the army as well as the industry (see Feldman, 1992, p. 73).

Given the universal conscription system that had existed in Germany and the initial enthusiasm for the war within certain segments of the population (Bessel, 2000, p. 438; Ziemann, 2007, pp. 30-2), the social composition of the lower echelon of the army was relatively diverse, from highly skilled industrial workers to peasants. However, in continuation of prewar trends that was sharply skewed towards drafting the rural population (Förster, 1996, p. 465), about two-thirds of male agricultural workers were called up to the German army during the war (Offer, 1989, p. 62). This inevitably strained the agricultural capacities of the country.

German agriculture was not nearly as modernized as that of Britain and still relied heavily on manual workers who composed more than 30 per cent of the workforce in 1914.[11] Furthermore, a significant proportion of agriculture labour was composed of foreign workers especially from Russia (Ziemann, 2014, p. 384). The exodus of agricultural workers after the outbreak of the war to find jobs in war industries, the significant decline of foreign workers (Bessel, 2000, p. 442), and a large number of agricultural workers who were drafted into the army contributed to the reduction of the agricultural production in the first period.[12] The agricultural policy of Germany shifted from protectionism to consumer-oriented policies in the autumn of 1914 (Ziemann, 2014, p. 385; Offer, 1989, p. 64). A central state policy used to protect the urban population from the rising food cost was to introduce a maximum price on key agricultural products such as cereals and flour. These policies not only failed ultimately to meet their basic objective but also became a source of deep resentment among the peasants against the state and widening rift between the rural and urban

[10] By the end of the war, there were 200 of these war companies (Strachan, 2001, p. 784; Kocka, 1984, p. 29). However, their power remained limited in the first period of the war since "neither the civilian nor the military authorities wished to permit wartime exigencies to transform the structure of the economy" (Feldman, 1976, p. 125).
[11] This is in contrast to about 8 per cent in the United Kingdom.
[12] Agricultural products dropped by 15 per cent in 1915 and by 40 per cent in 1918 compared to 1913 (see Table 2.2 in Ritschl, 2005, p. 46).

population (Ziemann, 2014, 385-8, 404). In the face of food shortages, the state took the first step by introducing bread rationing in Berlin in January 1915. This initiated the "compulsory economy" (*Zwangswirtschaft*) which became the paradigm of the state's organization of food supply (Feldman, 1992, p. 102). To give coherence to the patchwork of policies and enhance the regulatory power of the state, the War Food Office (*Kriegsernährungsamt*) was established in 1916 (Offer, 1989, pp. 28, 64; Davis, 2000, pp. 114-22).

The lucrative war industry, backed by the benefits and guarantees that came with state contracts, and the free movement of labour caused significant sectoral shifts towards war industries and away from so-called "civilian industries" and agricultural production.[13] This created a rift between the fractions of capitalist class, extending the fault lines of class struggle more deeply within the power bloc itself. Maintaining the balance of class forces then became a more challenging task. In the face of increasing labour shortage and high turnover, certain proposals gained traction that called for limiting the free movement of labour and introducing industrial conscription. However, the War Ministry resisted these calls not only because it believed high wages would solve the issue of high turnover but also because it did not want to upset the socialist union leaders (see Feldman, 1976, pp. 127-8). Nevertheless, the War Ministry largely avoided to incorporate trade unions into the management of labour relations in the first period and limited their contribution at an advisory level.[14]

Tightening food supply and declining purchasing power of workers were fueled by the soaring rise of inflation which reached 100 per cent in 1916 and made the real wages of male workers in war industry down by 20 per cent and in the civilian industries by 40 per cent (Comack, 2012, p. 36-7). This situation incited high degrees of resentment and discontent among the population. The labour movement organizations had so far been able, in conjunction with the nationalistic sentiment of the population, state repression, and limited propaganda campaigns, to contain its members in a state of industrial peace.[15] However, workers' patience was running low and the position of unions was becoming more precarious as the unions needed to push for a wage increase in the light of steep inflation. Being bound by the *Burgfrieden* that prevented the unions from exercising their traditional method of class struggle, they had to find ways to collaborate with the state. The socialist organizations needed the government to exhibit clear signs of their sincerity that the sacrifices of their members and institutions had made to go along the war efforts were

[13] There was an important gendered aspect to the skewed redistribution of labour within various economic sectors (see Table 2.3 in Ritschl, 2005, p. 46). As more women entered the job market following the prewar trends, increasing percentage of them were relocated to the war industries from 1915 (Frevert, 1989, p. 157; Daniel, 1997, p. 38).
[14] The leader of the German Metalworkers' Union (*Deuscher Metallarbeiterverband*; DMV), Alexander Schlicke, became the labour delegate in the War Office (Welch, 2014, p. 99).
[15] In 1915, there were only 141 strikes involving 13,000 participants (Carsten, 1982, p. 42).

worth it. In the meanwhile, the union movement was growingly concerned with the prospect of postwar demobilization process which would entail large unemployment and consequently the ineffectiveness of strikes for wage increases. This fear fuelled their demand from the government to establish an imperial conciliation bureau on the basis of parity (Feldman, 1992, p. 118).

To address the anarchy caused by the free movement of labour and competition between firms for skilled workers while winning the support of the unions, the War Ministry recommended setting up reconciliation agencies (*Einigungsämter*) in each firm on the basis of equal parity between employee and employer representatives. These agencies were to review cases of workers demanding to change employment and to issue leave certificate (*Abkehrschein*) if they found legitimate grounds (Feldman, 1976, p. 127). This marked the formation of a corporatist mode of representation in its embryonic form.

There were 70 per cent more strikes and about 10 times more strikers in 1916 than the previous year. The majority of these strikes were for higher wages (Carsten, 1982, p. 89). The illegal May Day demonstration, which had brought out some 10,000 people, took a radical turn when Karl Liebknecht was arrested and put on trial on high treason charges and ultimately sentenced to two and a half years of prison. Following these events, a radical group of about 30 lathe operators' representatives in Berlin, who later in 1918 obtained the name Revolutionary Shop Stewards (*Revolutionäre Obleute*) (Hoffrogge, 2015, pp. 27-8) was formed. They organized a mass strike to be held on June 28 to call for Liebknecht's freedom.[16] On the day, an impressive 55,000 Berlin workers answered the call and went on the first political strike in the wartime period. The union and the party leaders were absolutely against the strike and openly defended the importance of maintaining the *Burgfrieden* (p. 37). It was clear to them that this was a serious breach of their authority and their ability to control their members.

The crippling tension between the War Ministry and the representatives of capitalist interests in the war industries, and between the union leaders and the rank-and-file made it clear that the structure of industrial mobilization should be fundamentally revised. Meanwhile, as the prospect of a victory in the war was becoming untenable after the summer of 1916 (Asprey, 1991, p. 284), Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg escalated his confrontation with the Chief of the General Staff Erich von Falkenhayn. To open a path towards a potential peace negotiation, the Chancellor decided to neutralize the right-wing forces by throwing his support behind Paul von Hindenburg, the Chief of the Great General Staff, who had become a folk hero after the victory of the German army under his command in the Eastern front (Feldman, 1976, pp. 133-4; Chickering,

[16] See also Luban (2013) on the role of the shop stewards in the DMV and the June 1916, as well as April 1917, and February 1918 strikes.

2004, p. 71; Welch, 2014, p. 89). But the ascension of Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff as his righthand man into the OHL led to the exact opposite as they proved determined to throw everything behind a cavalier attempt to achieve a total victory (Kitchen, 1976; Greyer, 1986).

Second Period (August 1916 – August 1917)

Soon after the formation of the third OHL in August 1916, fundamental changes took place in the structure of German economic relations and the architecture of the German militarized state. The OHL believed that the deficiencies of the German army should be compensated for quickly by doubling the output of munition and weapons. The OHL proposed a series of changes necessary to achieve this overambition plan in the Hindenburg Program. Two of its most important components were the establishment of the War Office (*Kriegsmat*) to bypass much of the functions of the War Ministry, with General Wilhelm Groener as its head, and to regulate the workforce through a new scheme called Auxiliary Services Act (*Gesetz über den vaterländischen Hilfsdienst*).[17] The former deepened to the militarization of the state form; the latter shifted the mode of representation decisively towards corporatism. The military, whose control over the state apparatus was extended radically under the Hindenburg Program, could not realize these aggressive policies without bringing both the industrialists and the organized labour onboard to collaborate towards an ambitious industrial mobilization.

Among the most contentious issues between the War Ministry and the capitalists in heavy industries since the first period of the war were the supply of manpower and exemption programs, as well as the free movement of labour. Besides the institution of War Office (Kitchen, 1976, p. 73; Welch, 2014, p. 96), to increase its command over the economic policies, the OHL sought to resolve this issue by disallowing the free movement of labour and imposing compulsory labour on all German males between the ages of 18 to 60 years old, prisoners of war, and the unemployed Belgian workers.[18]

It was clear from the past attempts to limit the free movement of labour that the unions would not accept such measures at least without significant compensations. The OHL was well aware of the long-time union demand for work committees based on parity between the workers' and employers' representatives. In the eyes of the union representatives, this was the only way they could ensure some level of protection for their members by negotiating with the employers on an

[17] The institution of War Office was a tactic by the OHL to increase its command over the economic policies by going around the War Ministry. Although the War Office was formally within the War Ministry, it was practically subordinated to the OHL (Kitchen, 1976, p. 73; Welch, 2014, p. 96). The rivalry between the War Office and the War Ministry were not just a bureaucratic matter but was linked to the particular alignment of capitalist interests, with those in iron, steel, and mining sectors more closely behind the former and those in the electro-chemical sectors behind the latter (see kitchen, 1976, p. 144).

[18] Paragraph 2 of the Act excluded those who were already engaged in agriculture or forestry.

equal basis (Feldman, 1992, p. 206). These work committees fell into three general categories (pp. 210-17): determination committee (*Feststellungausschüsse*), responsible for deciding whether a company was essential for the war to be included under the provision of the law; draft committee (*Einberufungsausschüsse*), responsible for drafting the workforce redundancies who were not already under the Auxiliary Service Act, and assigning jobs those who were but could not find employment within two weeks; arbitration committee (*Schlichtungsausschüsse*), responsible for settling any disputes between an employer and a worker who would like to be issued a leave certification without which the workers could not be hired.[19] This institutional arrangement was a significant advancement towards establishing a corporatist mode of representation.

The most consequential concession that the labour union managed to win during the drafting of the Auxiliary Service Act was reflected in Paragraph 9 of the law concerning the appeal committee. In clarifying what would count as "significant grounds" for leaving the employment and requesting the leave certification, the clause merely stated that "a suitable improvement in conditions of labour in some form of national Auxiliary Service shall count in particular as significant grounds." The vagueness of "suitable improvement in conditions of labour" was certainly a venue through which the union could and did press for a host of improvements such as wages.

Under the Act, all firms engaged in Auxiliary Service with at least fifty employees had to establish a workers' committee based on a direct and secret ballot and according to the principle of proportional representation.[20] The stated purpose of these workers' committees was to "bring to the employer's notice and state its position on all suggestions, wishes, and complaints from the workers, insofar as these have to do with the firm's facilities, wages, and other matters of labour relations and welfare." In case of a deadlock between workers' committees and employers, the arbitration committees would stand as mediators unless both parties agreed to take the case to an industrial court or mediation office of a craft association. Furthermore, the Act recognized the right to association and assembly.[21]

It is true that during the drafting of the Axillary Service Act, the unions fought the bitter opposition of the industrialists who were adamant about the consequence of empowering the unions

[19] The Determination Committee and Draft Committee were composed of military officers as their chairmen, two government officials, one workers' representative, and one employers' representative. The Arbitration Committee was composed of a military representative from the War Office as the chairman and three employers' and three workers' representatives (of the three being permanent members with the third representative to be selected from the same occupation as the worker who is requesting the appeal).
[20] The unions made a concession here as they had asked for the threshold to be set at firms with more than twenty employees.
[21] See paragraphs 11 to 14 of the Act.

(Kocka, 1984, pp. 70-1).[22] However, there was no chance that the plan could work without the active cooperation of the unions. The state loosened its restrictions on union activities in January 1917 by allowing them to hold public meetings to inform the workers about the law and work committees and pacify workers' militancy (Feldman, 1992, p. 321). The unions no longer dwelled in the uncomfortable margins of the state but were integrated deeply into the very logic of its corporatist projects, not only at the national but also at the regional and municipal levels.[23] Once they got the significant concessions that they hoped for, they were more interested in operationalizing the law since they were able to utilize its institutional means to advance towards higher wages and better working conditions and extend their reach to areas where they previously had a difficult time to expand into. The official newspaper of the SPD, *Vorwärts*, defended the bill. Furthermore, even though the rank-and-file were very much against the Hindenburg Program (see Weber, 1966, pp. 54-5), the trade union leaders called on their members to accept the bill "whole-heartedly", arguing that it could set the stage for a new role that the organized labour could play after the war (Welch, 2014, p. 102).

Although one of the core motivations behind the Hindenburg Program was the reduction of turnover in war industries, its final form did the exact opposite (Bessel, 1997, pp. 214-15).[24] It created a chaotic situation in the labour market in the early months of 1917 as workers used every opportunity to find a better job and employers offered higher wages and more food to attract more skilled workers. The differential wages between the sectors created further chaos as skilled workers moved from transportation and submarine industries to munition factories. The military tried to mitigate this by issuing a decree in August 1917 to state the reason for the exemption of individual workers and prohibiting them from changing jobs to another sector after exemption. Nevertheless, a vast majority of workers were still not exempted from any specific industry and therefore were not affected by the decree (pp. 309-15).

Looking back at the economic consequences of the Hindenburg Program broadly, it becomes apparent that it had widely different effects on the real profits across the industries. It was explicitly formulated to advance the large capitalist interests in the heavy industries and mining to the detriment of what the Program called "nonessential" firms. However, even though these

[22] On 25 October 1916, the CDI and BdI established a new federation called German Industrial Council (*Deutscher Industrierat*). Even though the federation did not become active until the beginning of 1918, its aim was to bring together the interests of the affiliated associations to "provide the whole of industry with more bargaining power *vis-a-vis* both government and Parliament, as well as in the 'difficult battle against enthusiasts and champions of state-socialist ideas' during the changeover to a peacetime economy and during the period of reconstruction" (Kocka, 1984, p. 75).

[23] Rudloff (2013) points out the growing penetration of social democratic workers' organizations within the municipal governments especially with regards to providing basic social provisioning and food distribution measures (pp. 113-18).

[24] Even though Bessel's (1997) assessment to this point is well taken, his characterization of the revolutionary upheaval of 1918-1919 as essentially a "political demobilization" (p. 212) differs from the claim made in this study.

interests could not be simply ignored given the powers that they still maintained within key state institutions such as the War Ministry and liberal political forces, the Hindenburg Program sent a clear sign to small and medium-size capital about the divisive orientation of the OHL towards fractions of capital (Kitchen, 1976, pp. 94-5).[25] Only a very narrow fraction of capital, namely the chemical and metal/machinery, really profited from the war (see Table 4 in Baten, and Schulz, 2005, p. 43). This weakened the hegemony of the large capitalists and thereby the ruling bloc, hence pushing the unstable equilibrium among political class forces further towards a crisis.

The fragmentation within the dominant classes was accompanied by an increased loss of state legitimacy in the eyes of the German population. Soon after the Auxiliary Service Law came to effect in December 1916, Germany was hit by harsh weather, resulting in the loss of potato harvest which caused severe food shortages throughout the country. The employment of 339,900 foreign workers and 735,000 prisoners of war in 1916 in the agricultural sector did not help to cover for labour deficiencies in German agriculture which still relied on labour-intensive techniques (see Table 2.9 in Ritschl, 2005, p. 53). In the context of the blockade, food prices sharply increased from 143 per cent in 1915 to 198 per cent in 1916 (see Table 2.16, p. 65). As the food shortage worsened, the inadequacies of the state's price and rationing policies gradually turned the vast majority of the German population against the state (Daniel, 1997, p. 231; Davis, 2000, p. 110). While these policies continued to antagonize the rural peasants against the state and the urban population (Ziemann, 2014), they put urban working-class families under increasing pressure to maintain their basic consumption habits.

The epicentre of the working-class struggle for subsistence was working-class women. The industrial mobilization had massively skewed the patterns of female employment towards the war industries. But even in war industries, wages could not keep up with inflation (see Table 2.10 in Ritschl, 2005, p. 54; Daniel, 1997, pp. 97-8; Rudloff, 2013, p. 104). Working-class women were the ones who bore the bulk of responsibility to provide food resources. Since they were not systematically threatened by the coercive measures of the state, were less directly affected by the propaganda efforts of the state, and remained largely outside the corporatist operation of trade unions, working-class women were at the forefront of the articulation of general working-class displeasure towards the failure of the state to fulfil its basic social functions (Daniel, 1997, pp. 231-9, 248; Daniel, 1987; Stibbe, 2013, pp. 46-7, 53).

These grievances against food shortages progressively turned against state authorities. As Ute Daniel (1997) vividly demonstrates, working-class women engaged in a range of "illegal"

[25] A total lack of attention to other industries led to the catastrophic decline of goods such as textile and residential construction material (See Table 2.5 in Ritschl, 2005, p. 49).

means and local mutual aid activities particularly in the second half of the war to provide basic means of subsistence for their families. In the context of the collapsing money and consumer-good market in the second period, these collective strategies laid the ground for nonmonetary local mutual-aid activities (Weinhauer, 2017; Daniel, 1997, p. 289). Furthermore, working-class women extended their anti-state intervention through the creation and propagation of a complex network of informal and subversive communication through jokes, rumours, folk stories, etc. (Daniel, 1997, pp. 241-50; Welch, 2014, pp. 215-16; Stibbe, 2013, pp. 49-50). The urban working-class women bridged the contradictions inside and outside the factories under the conditions of "total mobilization". Their actions, both in their material and immaterial aspects, were instrumental in undermining the legitimacy of the state both concretely and abstractly.

For the leadership of the organized labour movement, stakes were high to hold up their end of the bargain and prevent industrial disturbances to war production. Strike data makes it clear that the unions could no longer prevent strikes to erupt.[26] But in addition to the quantitative increase in the number of strikes, there was a qualitative change in their demands to more politically orientated ones. There were a series of strikes between January and March of 1917 especially in the Ruhr region and Berlin, but the turning point came in April 1917.

The oppositional forces were growing rapidly not only among the workers but crucially within the SPD. The genesis of irreconcilable differences and the ultimate split goes back to 21 December 1915, after the internal truce had ended, when a group of delegates under the leadership of Hugo Haase voted against extending the war credit. The lines of splits became irreconcilable in March 1916 after the opposition group voted against the budget bill that was approved by the majority of the party delegates, causing the expulsion of 18 delegates from the party. The discussions on the Auxiliary Services Law stirred bitter oppositions from a sizable segment of the party that saw the Act as a way to tie workers to the military-industrial complex. However, the leadership of the Free Trade Unions was steadfast about continuing the working-class struggle through the corporatist structure set up by the Hindenburg Program.

In January 1917, the majority within the party used the pretext that the oppositional group, the Social Democratic Working Group (*Sozialdemokratische Arbeitsgemeinschaft*; SAG), had held a separate conference and used party machinery for its own political purpose to expel the 33 deputies from the party. Hence, this split was forced upon the minority opposition preemptively to preclude its cohesive formation. This group, which included prominent figures such as Hugo Hasse, Kautsky, Eduard Bernstein, Luxemburg, Liebknecht, Däumig, Kurt Eisner, Paul Levi, Wilhelm

[26] The number of strikes soared from 14,000 (42,000 days lost) in 1915, to 129,000 (245,000 days lost) in 1916, and 667,000 (1,862,000 days lots) in 1917 (See Table 2.12 in Ritschl, 2005, p. 57).

Dittmann, and Clara Zetkin, held a conference in Gotha on 6 April 1917 and formed a new party under the name the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany (*Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*, USPD). The new party essentially adapted the Erfurt Program but with much less intense centralization and bureaucratization and much more freedom at regional and local levels (Broué, 2005, p. 84). What glued the USPD together was their opposition to the war but beyond that, it captured exceedingly diverse orientations on sociopolitical questions (Eley, 1987, p. 69).

From 16 April, there was a wave of strikes that erupted across Germany involving between 200,000 to 300,000 workers from hundreds of firms (Broué, 2005, p. 93).[27] These workers were emboldened by the news of the "February Revolution" in Russia (happened on 8 March) (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 42; Kitchen, 1976, p. 83). Both the union leaders and the leadership of the SPD denounced the April strikes (Kitchen, 1976, p. 83; Luben, 2013, pp. 125-6). This highlights their position towards rank-and-file militancy and the extent to which they had embodied their corporatist functions.

The shop stewards used the general assembly of the DMV in Berlin on 15 April, representing all the large metalwork firms in the city, to call for a mass strike with the release of Müller as its first demand. The union tried hard to get a hold of the movement by forming a strike committee to negotiate with the government to try to secure the release of Müller and additional food supply. Once Adolf Cohen, a leader of the DMV, got verbal promises from the government representatives on both counts, he called off the strike and the majority of the workers in Berlin went back to work on 17 April.

Nevertheless, in a show of defiance against the order of the union, about 50,000 workers continued the strike. They elected two however short-lived workers' councils (Kolb, 1962, p. 58). These were essentially strike committees, albeit with the potential to be used as platforms for radical elements within the labour movement. Their meetings were attended by the USPD deputies and their actions were supported by the USPD delegates in the *Reichstag* (Broué, 2005, pp. 42-43); this marked the beginning of the involvement of the USPD in the council movement. The demands of these strikers, which they largely adapted from the striking workers in Leipzig, included "commitment to peace without annexations, an end of the state of siege and censorship, the repeal of the [Auxiliary Service Act], and universal equal voting rights with a secret ballot to replace the three-class electoral system" (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 43; Stibbe, 2013, p. 52). They also called for the formation of similar councils to be formed in every firm (Broué, 2005, p. 96). The government was

[27] This happened despite the arrest of some of the leading organizers such as Richard Müller on April 13.

not satisfied with a peaceful resolution of the strike and, to the delight of the industrialists in seeing what they understood as Groener's less consolidatory attitude towards the labour (Kitchen, 1976, p. 84), wished to exhibit a clear show of force. Besides arresting some of the strike leaders and drafting them to the military, the army forces took over some of the munition and weapon factories in Berlin on April 19 and put them under the command of military personnel (Feldman, 1992, p. 339). This forced the remaining strikers to go back to work on 21 April.

The mass mobilization in Leipzig actually proceeded that in Berlin. It was initiated on 12 April by a group of women who marched on the streets to demand more bread and were confronted by the police who arrested 16 of them. When the announcement came the next day that the bread ration was to be cut by 60 per cent, workers decided to go on strike. In addition to an increase in the supply of food and coal, the demands of the 10,000 striking workers in Leipzig included "a government declaration stating its readiness to conclude a non-annexationist peace, annulment of the Law of Siege and the Auxiliary Service Law, an end to all restrictions on the press and meeting, the liberation of political prisoners, and the introduction of universal and equal suffrage throughout the Empire" (p. 338). Although mainly in name, the striking workers formed the first "workers' council" (*Arbeiterräte*) in Germany on 16 April. It then elected a delegation composed of one representative from the USPD and two from the DMV to present these demands to the Chancellor. However, the government decided not to receive the delegation before the strike was called off. After the strike leaders were arrested and drafted into the army, employers promised to reduce the working week to fifty-two hours and increase the wages, the workers went back to work on 18 April (p. 338).

The general tension was still rising among workers as evident by two mass strikes in the summer of 1917, in Cologne on 6 July and Silesia on 14 July. Even though the demands of these strikes were focused on wages and working hours, their critical position in the war industry, especially amid the coal crisis, forced the government to take more dramatic actions to infuse new hopes among the population and pacify their militancy. On 11 July, the Emperor signed an order to the Prussian cabinet to prepare for a bill to give equal suffrage. In the meanwhile, unions were using the pretext of labour militancy to force the employers, who preferred to deal with the conciliation agencies and arbitration committees, to sign collective agreements. Unions were arguing that it would be far more efficient for the employers to deal with unions and accept collective bargaining agreements rather than to settle thousands of individual cases (p. 337). This should not be interpreted as a way for unions to bypass workers' committees or arbitration committees but to bring the institutions that had been created through the Auxiliary Service Act under the union leadership. In fact, at the end of June, unions sent a petition to the government to extend these

institutions beyond the wartime period. In the meanwhile, the state renewed a Bismarckian initiative to establish a "People's Economic Council" (*Volkswirtschaftsrat*) to bring together various interest groups, including the representatives of industries, commerce, agriculture, and labour, into an advisory board and expand its scope to the national economy. The growing severity of the transportation crisis and coal shortages made the national coordination of the war economy ever more pressing.

The rising social tension was coupled with an escalating political pressure within the state. Bethmann-Hollweg's position to maintain a balance between the OHL's desire to expand the war effort unrestrainedly and the *Reichstag'*s calls for a reasonable peace plan and some democratic reforms was becoming impossible. While the OHL was pushing its aggressive policies forward,[28] the *Reichstag* was becoming a more significant player in the politics of Imperial Germany. The failure of the Chancellor in finding a compromise[29] helped to unite diverse forces within the *Reichstag* behind certain democratic reforms by March 1917. This was manifested in the formation of the Intergroup Committee (*Interfraktioneller Ausschuss*; IFA) in early July comprised of a broad coalition of parliamentary forces with the SPD, the left-wing of the liberal Progressive People's Party (*Fortschrittliche Volkspartei*; FVP), and the Catholic Centre Party (*Deutsche Zentrumspartei*). The formation of this majority coalition was no small matter as it was effectively a parliamentary government that sought to make constitutional changes to the state. The actual power of the parliament was growing (Kocka, 1984, pp. 128-9) to a point that, for the first time in the history of Germany after the unification, the representatives of *Reichstag* were asked on 12 July to submit their opinion on the replacement for the Chancellor. Therefore, there had begun a parallel movement to democratize the state from within and by forces beyond the socialist bloc.

Conservative forces including the top echelon of the military were by no means ready to give up to the democratization pressure. The right-wing nationalist and conservative forces reacted to these developments by forming the Fatherland Party (*Deutsche Vaterlandspartei*). The OHL engaged in a series of political manoeuvring to install Georg Michaelis as the new Chancellor and neutralize the peace resolution. These effectively curbed the ascension of the *Reichstag* and put the political process back in the hand of the OHL (Kocka, 1984, p. 132; Asprey, 1991, p. 359). The militarized state reached its maturity after the July crisis, although it alienated a large coalition of political forces; it could move forward with the idea (or fantasy) of total mobilization and total war

[28] This is evident in the securing the unrestricted submarine warfare on 9 January 1917.
[29] An example of such an effort was Bethmann-Hollweg's handling of the *Fidei Commiss* bill in January 1917, and his successful lobbying to convince the Kaiser in April 1917 to promise constitutional reforms after the end of the war.

more effortlessly at the political level, although it had to deal with explosive social unrest within and outside the labour movement.

Third Period (September 1917 – November 1918)

Even though some of the most resilient barriers against further militarization of the state were temporarily and relatively offset, leading to the political ascendency of the OHL as its institutional embodiment, the growing tensions within and outside the state persisted. The IFA continued to press for peace resolution and constitutional reform while the legitimacy of the state and its corporatist structure was progressively subverted among the general public and the industrial workers. It was in this context that the OHL embarked on a series of initiatives to consolidate its power.

It was towards the end of the second period and beginning of the third that the state instituted a centralized propaganda campaign, under the title of "Patriotic Instruction" (*Vaterländische Unterricht*), to systematically boost the morale of army soldiers and the civilian population. Furthermore, given the declining popularity of the Kaiser, one of the aims of the campaign was to restore the Emperor (Welch, 2014, p. 211-13). The campaign was highly centralized, with Ludendorff overseeing the operation, with standardized instructions disseminated down to the Deputy Commanding Generals (p. 216). It also fostered a deeper penetration of the military into civilian life as the campaign was applied equally to the home front and through the same organizational structure as that of the army (pp. 217-18). However, despite these concerted and multifaceted efforts to maintain the hegemonic vision of the state,[30] a general counter-hegemonic perception against the war and the militarized state, with its own broad and organic channels of dissemination, has been developed among the population.[31]

Soon after the Russian Revolution in November 1917, the Bolshevik government sought immediate withdrawal of Russia from the war. This gave hopes to the German military that it could divert its troops from the Eastern to the Western Front. However, the strength of the annexationist forces within the state turned the peace process into a protracted battle against the large majority of the forces within and outside the German state. This process further isolated the upper echelon of the military and the annexationist conservative forces from other forces within the state, as well as the Junker-industrialist class alliance from other classes. This catastrophic equilibrium was

[30] Other notable aspects of the campaign include the institution of a huge public-private film company in December 1917, known as Universal Film Corporation (*Universum-Film-Aktiengesellschaft*), as well as the establishment of the Woman's Home Army (*Heimatscheer der Frauen*) in June 1918 to distribute pro-war messages within the population especially among women (Welch, 2014, pp. 222-6, 244-5).

[31] In 1918, there were alarming signs that the popular resentment against the war had also extended to the professional staff and state functionaries as well (Rudloff, 2013, pp. 112-13).

maintained based on the structural-constitutional position of the military in the state and the hegemonic dominance of the Junker-industrialists in the power bloc,[32] as well as the corporatist structure that had functionally integrated the working-class organizations into the state. However, all the chips in this political gamble were resting on the ability of the German military to win the war or at least score a victorious peace settlement.

The centralization effort of the militarized state in this period extended beyond the consolidation of its hegemonic vision. In an attempt to bring the soaring food prices under control through the centralized food supply, the War Food Office (*Kriegsernährungsamt*; KEA) began to crack down on the firms which supplied food to their workers through the black market (Feldman, 1992, p. 461). This not only antagonized the industrialists who used the food supply as leverage to stay competitive in the labour market but also farmers and peasants who had relied on higher prices in the black market to partially mitigate the acute suffering that they had been experiencing during the war. The resentment of this class against the state became even more profound after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Russia was signed. The treaty had deprived them of a large pool of their labour force which was composed of political prisoners (p. 463).[33]

Furthermore, despite all its scepticism regarding the Auxiliary Service Law, the OHL realized that it had to abandon any hopes of pushing the war efforts forward without the active support of the trade unions. The more conservative successor of Groener to the head of War Office, General Heinrich Scheüch, still preferred to work with the union leaders to improve on the Auxiliary Service Law and find a way to prevent workers from changing jobs too frequently. In October 1917, Gustav Bauer, one of the leaders of the SPD, Legien, as well as other labour leaders were invited to the headquarters of the OHL to discuss their plans to control their base (Kitchen, 1976, pp. 147-8). Therefore, as the state crisis was deepening, the socialist union and party were being brought closer into the state.

The news of the overthrow of the provisional government in Russian by the Bolsheviks and the transfer of power to the Soviets inspired at least the radical elements within the German labour

[32] Although those capitalists linked to heavy industries were able to maintain hegemony within the power bloc, their dominance was by no means uncontested. For example, the representatives of medium size light industries in the War Office, led by General Richard Merton, push Groener to place a cap on the profit in the heavy industries. Groener's shift in favour of such proposals antagonized the OHL as well as the representatives of the heavy industries. Consequently, in August of 1917, the Association of German Iron launched an attack on Groener and the War Office and pressed him to backtrack on controlling their profits and to redraft the Auxiliary Service Law that they saw as giving too much power to the working classes. Although Groener agreed to those requests, he was removed by the OHL in mid-August (see Kitchen, 1976, pp. 143-6).

[33] In 1917 alone, 49.1 per cent of the 1,703,500 prisoners of war was assigned to the agricultural sector (see Table 2.9 in Ritschl, 2005, p. 53).

movement.[34] Nevertheless, the majority of the USPD did not share the revolutionary inspiration of the *Obleute* in late 1917 (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 47). A massive wave of strikes in the opening month of 1918 swept across Central Europe. Following hundreds of thousands of workers who went on strike throughout the Austro-Hungarian Empire in June 1918 (see Beneš, 2016), German radicals were engaged in agitation and propaganda campaigns for a mass strike in Germany (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 48).

On 28 January, at least 400,000 workers in Berlin went on strike (Bailey, 1980, p. 159f),[35] bringing the entire armament industry to a standstill. Within a few days, workers in major cities across Germany, such as Hamburg, Düsseldorf, Kiel, Cologne, and the Ruhr region, went on strike. The 414 delegates gathered in the Berlin union hall and produced a set of demands, including peace without annexation or reparations with the participation of workers in the process, an end to the state of siege and the Auxiliary Service Act, amnesty for all political prisoners (p. 160), as well as "restoration of freedom of the press, an end of military interference in union affairs, and a 'drastic democratization of the entire state apparatus, beginning with universal suffrage – including women's suffrage – for the Prussian *Landtag* or [*Reichstag*]" (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 49). In addition to the highly political nature of the demands, which was quite close to the programme of the USPD, the way of carrying out the strike exhibited explicit defiance against the leadership of the organized labour movement and an embryonic form of workers' council practices: "rank-and-file delegates directly determined demands and actions, the Action Committee received its mandate from them and its legitimacy was not mediated by parties or unions" (p. 50).

State repression descended hard on workers as early as 29 January. Strike committees and assemblies were banned, strike leaders were arrested, *Vorwärts* suspended, and a number of factories were put under military occupation (Bailey, 1980, p. 163; Luban, 2013, p. 129). The Free Trade Unions, which had issued a plea to the workers on 26 January not to go on strike, refused to extend its support in any way to the striking workers after the strike erupted. The participation of the SPD, albeit limited, was primarily due to the pressure of the USPD and the *Obleute* (Luban, 2013, pp. 131-2). Furthermore, the leadership of the SPD tried actively to bring the trade union and the state representatives to the negotiating table. At first, the USPD took a neutral position against this approach but after the military occupation of factories began to take place on 1 February, it

[34] It would be a mistake to exaggerate the influence of the Russian Revolution on the development of workers' councils in Germany. News about the Russian soviets reached the German press in connection with the news of the February Revolution and the peace proclamation of the workers' and soldiers' councils of Petersburg in 1917. Moreover, the details about them were not known to the general public outside the revolutionary activists in Germany. The news from Russia was severely restricted and the Russian propaganda did not gain real momentum until the summer of 1918 and even then, only through illegal means and mainly among radical circles (Kolb, 1962, p. 56).
[35] This number reached 500,000 on the following day (Harman, 1997, p. 31).

changed its position to that of the SPD.[36] In a union conference on 1 February, the union leadership passed a resolution condemning the repressive measures deployed against the strike but also reaffirmed their commitment to their corporatist function and promising to do everything in its power to "secure the national defence" (Luban, 2013, p. 133).[37] In the face of the growing repression and the shifting political opposition, the *Obleute* decided to call off the strike on 3 February (Hoffrogge, 2015, pp. 54-55). The military continued its repression of the strike leaders by making arrests and drafting the strikers and strike leaders, including Müller, into the army.[38]

The leadership of the SPD committed itself to carry out the demands of the strikes to reform the three-class suffrage system of Prussia and realize a peace agreement with Russia. However, the *Reichstag* failed to push through constitutional reform and prevent the annexationist momentum of the pro-war forces behind the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations.[39] As the limitation of the SPD to realize the widely popular and urgent demands of the working class and the corporatist position of the leadership of the Free Trade Unions towards the militancy of its rank-and-file became clear, the radicals directed their attention towards improving their organizational capacities and popularization of the notion of workers' councils.[40]

In their effort to extend the workers' committees that were created under the Axillary Service Act, the unions proposed a bill in May to legislate the formation of worker chambers based on parity between workers and management. They were meant to be institutions through which workers could influence legislation and settle their differences with management. This was also a way for the trade unions to better maintain the control of their base at the factory level. The government objected to making these chambers on a territorial rather than an industrial basis and the inclusion of the state railroad workers unless the bill guaranteed that these workers were prevented from striking. Finally, the vote on the bill was postponed to September after weeks of talks reached a deadlock (Feldman, 1992, pp. 473-5).

After the German offensive on the Western Front failed in July 1918, the OHL finally conceded a defeat in September and advised the Emperor to seek an armistice based on President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. This was communicated to the American government on 6

[36] The Spartacus Group, which was still part of the USPD at the time and included prominent radical left figures such as Liebknecht, Luxemburg, Zetkin, Levi, and Ernst Meyer, vehemently opposed this and instead supported an escalation of the strike towards a revolutionary overthrow of the state.
[37] The crisis of confidence between the leadership and the rank-and-file became apparently also within the DMV in its general meeting in June 1917 (Schönhoven, 2013, p. 67).
[38] About 10 per cent of the Berlin strikers (i.e. 50,000 workers) lost their military exemptions after the strike (Broué, 2005, p. 110).
[39] The SPD deputies ultimately merely abstained from the final vote on the Brest-Litovsk treaty.
[40] Although Bailey's (1980) assessment of the shift of Spartacus Group towards "Leninism" is questionable, see his argument about the consequences of the strike (pp. 164-7; see also Broué, 2005, p. 109; and Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 56).

October by the newly appointed Chancellor, Prince Maximilian of Baden, who had come to office the day before and formed a government that included two socialist representatives, Philipp Scheidemann and Gustav Bauer, alongside representatives from the Centre Party and the FVP. To fulfil the pre-conditions for armistice negotiation, a series of constitutional reforms were pushed through the *Reichstag* in October, including making the Chancellor answerable to the *Reichstag,* abandoning the three-class suffrage in Bundesrat, and amnesty to political prisoners such as Liebknecht. However, it became increasingly apparent after a series of communications with the United States in October that the monarchy could ultimately not be saved (Mayer, 1968; Wheeler, 1976).[41] The collapse of the military order became ever more evident when Ludendorff was asked to resign on 26 October. This paved the way for a fundamental class realignment to the detriment of the Juncker-industrialist towards a labour-industrialist alliance.

As the collapse of the monarchy becoming eminent, industrialists intensified their efforts to take control of the direction of demobilization. Influential members of the German capitalist class came to realize the inevitability of working directly with the trade unions in the process of demobilization towards an ideal of working community (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft*) between capital and labour (Feldman, 1993, pp. 92-4; Lesch, 2019, p. 329-30). But behind such an abstract ideal, there was an institutional reliance on the militarized state apparatus and its personnel as long as possible.[42]

The negotiations that the leading industrialists initiated with the union leadership on 9 October to reach an agreement on the form of transition to the peacetime economy and their support for the abdication of the Emperor in early November were manifestations of such a fundamental, albeit temporary, shift of class alliance (Feldman, 1993, p. 93; Schönhoven, 2013; Lesch, 2019). The industrialists were willing to make serious concessions towards this goal including recognition of trade unions and the factory committees, the introduction of the eight-hour day, and the establishment of mediation agencies on the basis of parity. Given the depth of antagonism of large capital towards the organized labour especially since the second period, these radical moves were necessary steps towards striking a strategic alliance with the organized labour in the hope that they

[41] The actual process of reaching an agreement with the United States for armistice involved much more restrictive measures as communicated to the Germans by Robert Lansing, the Secretary of the State at the time. In his first response to Max von Baden on 8 October, Lansing required the withdraw of German troops from all the invaded territories. After the German government tried to assure the Americans that the "arbitrary power" to wage war would not happen in the future upon the constitutional reforms, Lansing noted on 23 October that if the Allied forces were to deal with "the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany," the terms of the armistice would not be one of peace negotiation but surrender. "Correspondence Between the United States and Germany Regarding an Armistice" (p. 93).

[42] Business leaders lobbied Baden even after the Revolution to put Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Koeth, the head of the War Ministry, as the director of the newly established Demobilization Office (*Reichsminister für wirtschaftliche Demobilmachung*).

could control their base. Given the level of militancy of the rank-and-file and their distrust of the leadership, the trade union leadership was hoping that these concessions from the employers would prevent a revolutionary upheaval after the war (Lesch, 2019, p. 330; Schönhoven, 2013, p. 69). But while such fundamental changes were taking place at the heart of the state, and such negotiations were being held behind closed doors, something far more revolutionary was in the making among workers and soldiers which burst out on 9 November.

Concluding Remarks

The transformations that the German state underwent during the war mobilization, preconditioned by the pre-war balance of class forces and the material condensation of past struggles inscribed on the state apparatus, laid the ground for the emergence of "council democratic" movements during the German Revolution. While these state transformations in different periods of the war came about as particular resolutions of the limitations and contradictions of previous periods, they profoundly configured the relation of forces within and outside the state, which in turn created their own tensions, contradictions, and capacities. Even though a militarized corporatist state form was embedded deep in the structural foundation and institutional order of the state from the beginning of the war, different aspects of the state-form, namely, institutional architecture, mode of representation, and patterns of intervention, did not all develop uncontestedly and synchronously or carried the same relative weight in different periods.

After the outbreak of the war, the institutional architecture of the state rapidly moved towards relative centralization and militarization.[43] The shift in the institutional architecture of the state at the beginning of the war was made possible due not only to the particularity of the German constitution and the balance of class forces but also to the initial success of the social truce that commenced under the *Burgfrieden*. However, the widespread expectation of a short war prevented the patterns of state intervention to change dramatically in the first few months of the war. With some notable exceptions such as a centralized control of raw material, the government relied largely on pre-war market mechanisms until the autumn of 1914 when the crisis of raw material and the disillusionment of a short war prompted the state officials to engage in a wider intervention. The overall level of state intervention in the first period nevertheless remained relatively modest. In terms of the mode of representation, the suspension of the elections for the duration of the war froze the composition of political forces within the *Reichstag*. Having abdicated its legislative power to

[43] Even though the military apparatus gained strong footing in key state institution at the outbreak of the war, its insistence on projecting an apolitical image of itself prevented the process of centralization of the state to necessarily imply militarization of the state at an equal pace. This is reflected in the consequential conflicts between various state institutions such as the War Ministry and the OHL. The process of militarization of the state continued to unfold to its maturity at the end of the second period.

the *Bundestag* with much less democratic legitimacy and stronger presence of the ruling classes, the *Reichstag* severely limited the parliamentarian mode of representation. There were some attempts to promote larger aggregates of business to be systematically formed and incorporated into the war mobilization schemes (e.g. War Raw-Material Corporations), but these attempts remained limited in scale and scope in the first period.

As the industrial mobilization got underway in the first period, manpower soon became a dire issue for the war industries. This required the militarized state to intervene in the labour market to supply manpower in various ways including issuing exemptions from the army and introducing unskilled and semi-skilled labour, most notably women, into the war industries. However, these measures could not meet the demands of the war industries that were growing massively due to the military requirements of the expanding war and the huge economic incentives for the war industries, especially under the "cost-plus-profit" policy. Capitalists in the heavy industries could afford to compete for scarce skilled workers by offering higher wages and counting that towards their cost of production. Yet, this stimulated high turnover as these workers changed jobs frequently in the search for higher wages at a time of rising inflation. Furthermore, the fundamental redistribution of labour that funneled the manpower into the war-related industries created detrimental deficits in many other sectors. Those complications required more direct forms of state intervention. However, the way this was to be done depended on the balance of class forces.

The specific form of war mobilization disproportionally empowered a certain fraction of industrial and extractive capital that produced for the war. The structural and institutional power of these fractions of capital was one of the driving forces behind the particular resolution of these tensions in the second period. But the scale of the issue with labour supply and the hesitation of the military government towards and the adamance of capitalists against taking direct control of private production meant that the trade unions had to be brought into active management of the war. Therefore, there was a transformation in the mode of representation. These were taking place while the "two nations" hegemonic vision formulated under the *Burgfrieden* was becoming progressively untenable, and chronic food shortages under the rising inflation were intensifying popular indignation.

Hindenburg Program was a corporatist resolution to the tensions and contradictions of the first period. However, knowing their structural importance at that conjuncture and their organizational power, the trade unions would not have agreed to the OHL's fantastical attempt to total mobilization without significant concessions. Industrialists would not accept such concessions to labour unless the Program could entice them with even larger profit margin than before while solving the labour issues. Ultimately, the Program integrated capital and labour within the state in

an unprecedented way but failed to satisfy the bases of either of these pillars. While the Program strained the hegemony of the large industrial capital within the capitalist bloc due to the wildly different structural position of various fractions under the agreement, its corporatist integration of the trade unions at the time of intensified rank-and-file militancy caused a rift between the leadership and the base. Therefore, the cooperative mode of representation heightened the tension between the lower echelon of both sides.

In the meanwhile, the militarization of the state was extended further in this period through the establishment of War Office and the subordination of the Deputy Commanding Generals to the OHL. But the dwindling prospect of a victory led to growing calls outside and inside the state for a swift end to the war. It was in this period that the political parties in *Reichstag* coalesced to regain their parliamentary power and limit the power of the military apparatus within the state. Hence, seeking to transfer the state architecture towards a less vertical structure. This political project was tied as much to curbing the forlorn project of the military with associated conservative forces and the large capitalist interests seeking to achieve a non-annexationist peace as to expanding the democratic basis of the state through suffrage reform. Given the centrality of the military within the German state, both in its institutional apparatus and its associated social classes, as well as the deep-rootedness of the Prussian three-class system in preserving the class structure of Imperial Germany both structurally and symbolically, these initiatives, as timid as they were, certainly carried a republican aspiration.[44] Predictably, the upper echelon of the military and the ruling classes fought tooth-and-nail to derail these attempts. In managing the July 1917 crisis, they succeeded in temporarily suspending the political project of the *Reichstag*.

Under the layers of formal politics, the legitimacy of the state was in a deepening crisis among growing segments of the population. Working-class women were at the forefront of these subversive actions. Having flocked to the war industries to fill the shortage of manpower while the male workers were away in what Ute Daniel called “emancipation on loan” (1997, p. 283), these working-class women had to bear the responsibility of securing basic means of subsistence for their families. The inability of the state to provide the basic means of subsistence forced these women to create ways to sustain their families through illegal and communal means. They articulated their grievances against the state and the war broadly and indiscernibly in a variety of creative ways, further undermining the popular legitimacy of the state and war aims.

Militarization of the state reached maturity in the third period after the political ascendency of the OHL. In an effort to recover from its subverted hegemonic vision, the military government

[44] This quasi-democratic push was certainly a continuation of the pre-war trend (Kocka, 1987, p. 131).

embarked on an intense propaganda campaign to improve the morale of the army and the population. But, in the face of the depth and the scale of the counter-hegemonic vision and further disillusionment after the annexationist peace with Russia, this state-led ideological project proved largely in vain. Furthermore, the contradictions of the corporatist scheme of the second periods failed to contain the upheaval within the society and the power bloc.

The rank-and-file militancy, which found direct and intensified articulation of its basic pro-peace and democratic demands within the state after the emergence of the USPD, was spiralling into a revolutionary zeal. And yet, the relative success of the state's corporatist structures to create institutional mechanisms that elevated the organized power of labour within the state and in relation with capital allowed a new class alliance to form between capital and labour. This began to take shape at the time when the downfall of the military and the abdication of Kaiser profoundly weakened the power of Junkers and led to a fundamental transformation of the power bloc. Therefore, paradoxically, the state-led war mobilization laid the ground for the emergence of emancipatory movements while simultaneously providing the structural pathways to venture into a process that could equally quell those radically democratic movements.

Chapter 3

The Making of the "Council Democratic" Movement in Italy

Introduction

This chapter primarily shows how state-led war mobilization laid the political, economic, and ideological grounds, each with their partial and indeterminate translations into institutional materiality, for the emergence of the "council democratic" movements during the *biennio rosso*. The chapter highlights the ways by which state operations forged the potentials for the radical democratic movements to emerge through creating new contradictions and capacities. This chapter elaborates on the particular transformation of the Italian state in its form and hegemonic vision throughout the war. It shows how the militarization of the Italian state during the war put it directly in charge of the conflicts and contradictions of labour relations. Therefore, it internalized them into the state as contradictions *of* the state. As such, the question of the state was wedded with the working-class struggle. Moreover, in order to sustain itself over the course of the war, the state eventually and increasingly created a corporatist system of industrial governance involving key elements of working-class organization. However, due to the general incapacity and unwillingness of the military government to fully establish a corporatist state, its internal contradictions were manifested in not only the institutions but also the ideological operations of the state.

Just as in the case of Germany, the pre-war structure of the Italian state and the relations of class forces in Italian society predisposed the state architecture to transform into a militarized state. A detailed overview of the pre-war era from the unification in 1861 to 1915 is outlined in Appendix B. It shows that the political structure of the Italian state made the role of political parties superficial. This laid the foundation for clientelist politics. As such, the political system was thoroughly reluctant to extend the limited franchise. As far as formal politics was concerned, the parties that did exist, particularly before the 1890s, had loose and contradictory relations with social classes. The *destra storica* (Historic Right) and the *sinistra storica* (Historic Left) were archetypical examples of this. The power of aristocratic families rapidly declined after 1848. This was reflected in their diminishing influence within the state institutions. The agrarian structure of Italy[1] geographically segregated the aristocracy from the locus of the political power in Piedmont. Therefore, they did not assert themselves into formal politics through the formation of a strong conservative party. Neither could they utilize the popularity of Catholicism to advance their own interests through a Catholic party, largely due to the deep antagonism between the Church and the

[1] For an outline of the agrarian structure in Italy, see Appendix B.

state. Although less frontal than the German *Kulturkampf*, this antagonism between the state and the Church dragged on. Thereafter, the process was cautious, slow, and conciliatory, making the formation of a Catholic Party a relatively late phenomenon.

Therefore, while Italy was a largely agrarian country economically up to WWI, it did not have a proximally corresponding structure of class forces politically to systematically coordinate these interests within the state. Hence, in the light of this institutional incongruity, the Italian state turned into a clientelist space to administer the interest of various fractions of the ruling classes. After the emergence of mass movements in Italy, particularly after the formation of the Chamber of Labour (*camera del lavoro*) in 1891 and the Socialist Party of Italy (*Partito Socialista Italiano*, PSI) in 1893 as well as the rising Catholic movement since the beginning of the 20th century, forced the liberals to rethink clientelist politics. This contributed to the formation of the Italian Radical Party (*Partito Radicale Italiano*) in 1904 which pushed for a democratization of the state along republican principles. These new political formations imposed more cohesion within the party system. However, the weakness of the state to effectively extend that relative cohesion across the political system on the basis of the existing institutional infrastructure led to the continuation of clientelist politics under an updated version of the old *trasformismo.*

Instead, Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti, who dominated Italian politics from 1901 until WWI, updated *trasformismo* into a process of pacification through strategic inclusions and appeasement of political rivals. Such a political arrangement, however, essentially requires shrewd politicians with strong characters and extensive political networks to maintain the unstable balance of compromises between contradictory interests and classes. This essential requirement makes the system fundamentally vulnerable to a crisis if and when such political leadership fails to play the mediating role. At the same time, the political leadership is a singular largely non-institutionalized node, with its own possible class interests and preferred alliances – hence strategically selective – that has to balance contradictory interests through a politics of appeasement. Therefore, it operates on a borrowed time before the looming crisis erupts. Therefore, in the context of the economic downturn in Italy in the second decade of the 20th century and the political consequences of the Libyan War in 1911, leading to the eventual resignation of Giolitti in 1914, the stage was set for the militarization of the state in case of large scale war. The military took over the role of providing singular political leadership in a clientelist state in order to maintain the unstable equilibrium of class forces not by appeasement but by force. Additionally, other structural and historical factors, including the position of the King in the state architecture as formulated in the *Statuto Albertino* of 1848 and the crucial role of the Italian military in the process of nation-building as outlined in Appendix B, created further tendencies that made the state prone to militarization.

The effects of *trasformismo* on the development of the socialist movement were also significant. Having come to the conclusion that modernization of the country could not be achieved without some form and extent of collaboration with the socialist forces, Giolitti tried to entice the reformist elements within the socialist movement. The emergence of the General Confederation of Labour (*Confederazione General del lavoro*, CGL) in 1906 with strongly reformist leadership as a result of internal conflict between reformists and the revolutionaries within the Chamber of Labour as well as the split of the syndicalists from the PSI in the same year facilitated this process of cautious and limited cooperation with the state's policies. At the same time, Giolitti pursued strategies to disorganize the socialist movement by passing various modest reform measures to pre-empt the socialist appeal for the working class. He also tried to push the movement into crisis through calculated offers to prominent socialist leaders to take positions within the state (e.g. the Bissolati affair). Nevertheless, these strategies backfired in the lead-up to the Libyan War, causing the radicalization of the PSI with Maximalists taking over the leadership of the party, and hardening the reformist ideology within the CGL exemplified in the expulsion of syndicalists from its ranks in 1912. The latter development resulted in the formation of the Italian Syndicalist Union (*Unione Sindacale Italiana*, USI) in 1912.

The multifaceted bifurcation of the socialist and labour movement before the war, between the party and the union, between the syndicalists and socialists, between the Maximalist and reformist socialists, and between the Chamber of Labour and the Federation of Unions, had paradoxical consequences. On the one hand, it weakened the movement to stage a united action. On the other hand, it allowed for different types of actions to be carried out with less internal tensions if it was launched in the appropriate working-class organizations. Also, state repressions or consolidatory projects could be directed more discriminately to more different working-class organizations. And yet, this bifurcated structure shaped the ideological orientation of the Italian socialist forces towards the war; hence, fundamentally moulding the hegemonic vision of the state. Such contradictory unity within the socialist movement, captured under the slogan of "neither support nor sabotage" (*né aderire né sabotare*), allowed for a peculiar form of (non-) compliant (non-) participation of the organized labour movement in the war project.

The impact of the entry into the war extended beyond the working-class movement. The question of which side of the war the country should align itself with carved fault lines within the capitalist class forces. These fragmentations had their roots in the economic and political alignment of the fractions of capital in the pre-war years (see Appendix B). The ambivalence of the working-class organizations and the fragmentation of the capitalist classes gave more reason for the militarization of the state and direct intervention of the state into the relations of production down to

the factory floor. However, this linked the state more intimately to the tensions and contradictions of the relations of production and made it more susceptible to radical democratization pressures even at the factory level.

Given the pre-war dynamics of relations between classes within and outside the state and the ambiguous orientation of the working-class forces towards the war, the militarized state was at first quite reluctant to incorporate the socialist forces into the war-mobilization project. However, the unforgiving requirements of a total war compelled the state to transform its mode of representation towards corporatism. This process relied on the state-sanctioned working-class organizations at the factory level, internal commissions *(commissioni interne*). Trade unions were brought into the corporatist arrangement for a period as the mediating organizations between the state and the internal commissions. However, the rapid expansion of labour supply, with the massive presence of women workers who were not subjected to the harsh disciplinary measures and could tie together more effectively the social tensions outside and inside the factories, exhausted the organizational capacity of the trade unions. As social tensions spiralled out of control, the state corporatist arrangement circumvented the trade unions and refocused its energy back to the internal commissions, while simultaneously engaging with new hegemonic strategies to stabilize the state intervention, which in turn ideologically empowered the internal commissions. These organizations created the space for militant and relatively independent rank-and-file actions and later became the epicentre of radical democratic struggles after the war.

The first section of the chapter delves into the character of the Italian war mobilization. Based on their conjunctural relevance to the making of the "council democratic" movements, analysis is organized into three periods. The first period marks the beginning of the Italian involvement in the war starting in May 1915 which set out a rapid militarization of the state, until the time when the urgent need to transform the state strategy towards industrial mobilization became apparent around June 1916. The discussion of the second period, between July 1916 to November 1917, examines the (trans)formation of the state's mode of representation into corporatism until it underwent another transformation after the battle of Caporetto in November 1917. The third period, December 1917 to November 1918, looks at the final transformations of the state's mode of representation and their consequences on the evolution of democratic struggles within and outside the state. The last section recounts the significant factors that laid the ground for the emergence of "council democratic" movements in Italy.

The character of the Italian War Mobilization

First Period (May 1915 – June 1916)

The war was deeply unpopular among the Italian people and a number of social classes. The Catholic Church was against declaring war on another Catholic nation, Austria-Hungary (Papadia, 2016; Webster, 1961, pp. 50-6). The peasants felt little attachment to the national project embodied in the war. The PSI, under the leadership of the Maximalists, was fiercely against the war. The CGL was more ambivalent about the war as it could see the potential gains from war mobilization; but in the light of intransigent opposition of the PSI and the anti-war elements within the confederation, it was reluctant to throw its support behind the war effort.

The ambiguous condition upon which the PSI and the CGL went along with the war, captured in the slogan of "neither support nor sabotage", created dualistic flexibility in their strategic actions within the state. The PSI as a whole or certain elements within it (e.g. see Papadia, 2016) could pursue its intransigence outlook under the auspices of "neither support", especially in the context of effective marginalization of the legislative body. The CGL in its national or local levels (e.g. see De Grand, 1989, p. 29) could justify its passive compliance and limited collaboration under the auspices of "nor sabotage", which was eventually implemented. Similar interpretations could be utilized by elements within the party and the union to provide the ideological background for their particular orientation towards the war mobilization. This situation limited the hegemonic vision of the state to a "two nations" ideological strategy. However, the fragmentary nature of national formation in Italy burdened the realization of that ideological strategy even further and challenged the cohesion in the hegemonic vision of the state.

There was also significant resistance within the capitalist bloc against the war or the particular side that Italy should take. In the face of such fragmentations, the form of the state that could possibly impose a unity among the key forces was an authoritarian regime, taking a militarized form in the context of total war. Therefore, the parliament was substantially marginalized and effectively replaced by a government-by-decree well beyond matters that immediately concern the conduct of the war (Procacci, 2010, p. 20; Papadia, 2016; De Grand, 1989, p. 31). Civil rights were seriously compromised throughout the country (Procacci, 2010, p. 18) and the militarized zone was expanded inside large parts of the country.[2]

A series of decrees issued in the first few months after Italy's entry into the war laid the formal parameters of the war mobilization. A decree (no. 506) allowed the government to

[2] By the end of the war, about 30 per cent of the Italian population were living in territories under military jurisdictions. These were disproportionately located in the North (Mondini, 2016).

requisition any factory and manage it directly if the owners failed to comply with the war requirements. Another decree (no. 993) authorized the government to impel the factory owners to modify their production line and to fix prices according to war purposes.

A number of crucial decrees, issued between July and September 1915 (notably, no. 1065, no. 1277, no. 1437), established the structure of industrial mobilization (Tomassini, 1991, pp. 59-60; Forsyth, 1993, p. 80-1; Galassi and Harrison, 2005, pp. 284-5). The Under-secretariat for Arms and Munitions (*armi e munizioni*, AM), headed by General Alfredo Dallolio, was formed within the Minister of War to decide the daily affairs of the Supreme Committee of Ministers. The AM was organized into three main branches, namely, "General Tasks", "Industrial Mobilization", and "Technical Services". The Industrial Mobilization was operated by the Bureau of Industrial Mobilization (*ufficio di mobilitazione industriale*, UMI). The UMI, whose total staff reached 5,700 (Gibelli, 2010, p. 469), was given enormous powers to assign "auxiliary" status to particular firms, allocation of non-military personnel, exemption from the military service, coordination of transportation and fuel, and war propaganda.

The UMI was managed by the Central Mobilization Committee (*comitato centrale di mobilitazione*, CCM). The CCM was comprised of "technicians", who were appointed directly by Dallolio, industrialists, and workers' representatives. Until the second phase of the war mobilization, these workers' representatives were not chosen from the labour unions but by the management on the formal basis of technical experience and competence. The CCM managed its national operation by initially dividing the country into seven regions and managing each through a Regional Mobilization Committee (*comitato regionale di mobilitazione*, CRM).[3] Each CRM, chaired by a military General chosen by Dallolio, included technicians, who were supposed to be civilians but in practice were often business representatives (Adler, 1995, p. 103; Tomassini, 1983, pp. 82-3), representatives of industrialists, which were often drawn from the Chamber of Commerce of important industrial centres, workers' representatives, and representatives from the CCM. The CRMs were not only headed by a military officer, but they also imposed a stringent military-bureaucratic structure (Tomassini, 1991, p. 61; Tomassini, 2010, p. 29; Procacci, 1983, p. 51). The imposition of the military apparatus with its hierarchical organization onto the organizational architecture of the state amounted to the "militarization" of the state.

Although industrial and financial mobilization is the backbone of military engagement, the army is its anatomy. The militarized state-form manifested itself in this period also in the formation and management of the armed forces. The Italian army had a markedly class character, with the

[3] The headquarter of these seven CRMs were in Turin, Genoa, Milan, Bologna, Rome, Naples, and Palermo.

majority of its soldiers drawn from the peasant population. Furthermore, given the weakness of the modern weaponry of the Italian military, it had to rely on a massive army (Cappellano, 2014). This negatively impacted agricultural production which eventually led to severe food shortages and social upheaval (Dentoni, 2014). However, peasants, especially from the South, did not identify much with the nation. Therefore, to hold the army together (Gibelli, 2010; Cappellano, 2014; Wilcox, 2016), the militarized state enforced extreme punishment for draft dodging, dissidence, and desertion.[4] Nevertheless, there was still a significant number of draft dodgers, reaching 470,000 by the end of the war, prominently from the South and islands (Wilcox, 2016).

At an organizational level, strategic selectivity of the state towards the capitalist interest was manifested in the modelling of key institutional structure within the UMI, namely, the CCM and the CRMs, after the suggestions of key industrialists such as Olivetti and the influence of the Italian Confederation of Industry (*confederazione Italiana dell'industria*, CIDI) (Adler, 1995, p. 103).[5] Also, as noted above, industrialists were often selected as the civilian representatives to serve on the CRMs boards and other regulative bodies. This arrangement already put the industrialists in a privileged position in industrial mobilization; therefore, enforcing capitalist class control over the process. Nevertheless, either due to ideological stance or organizational weakness, the industrialists did not take full advantage of this situation to assert their hegemony over the UMI (Adler, 1995, pp. 104, 111). This hesitation made the relative marginalization of the CIDI in the second phase of the war possible.

On practical levels, despite the aggressive extension of the power of the state over private interests such as requisitioning and nationalization, such measures were not implemented. Instead, the capitalist interests, especially but not exclusively those linked to the war efforts, were facilitated more intensely than in the pre-war periods. The government initiated a significant level of protectionism over heavy industries (Coppa, 1970, p. 767).[6] It also shunned imposing cost controls on war production and profit rates despite the knowledge of costing (Vollmers et al., 2016). This wariness to interfere with the market was indeed the relics of free-market ideology that left its mark on the state and government personnel.[7] Instead, it used lucrative state contracts and price

[4] Such disciplinary measures included summary executions by firing squad and life sentences. As Cappellano (2014) recounts, "during the conflict, military tribunals operated actively, imposing 4,000 death sentences, of which 750 were carried out, as well as numerous summary executions and 15,000 life sentences. 101,000 were convicted of desertion, of which about 6,000 were convicted of going over to, or deserting in the presence of, the enemy." See Gooch (2014, p. 363) for detailed data on executions handed down by officially constituted war tribunals between 1915 and 1918.
[5] See Appendix B for an overview of the development of employers' organization in the pre-war years.
[6] Even though Italy did not declare war on Germany until 28 August 1916, its siding with the Entente created disruptions in the importation of goods from Germany that were essential for Italy's industrial production.
[7] We can see such ideological orientation in a ministerial report written in 1915: "let us not deceive ourselves...the government is bound to be slower, and perhaps even less efficient, industrialist than the private concerns; so that production, in its hands, instead of increasing, would probably decrease and become more expensive" (as quoted in Tomassini, 1991, p. 61).

mechanism to motivate the private interests to turn their operation towards war production (Tomassini, 1983, p. 83).

Furthermore, to provide financial support for war mobilization, three national loans were issued in the first phase of the war until the spring of 1916, despite the weakness of the Italian Central Bank in the pre-war years (Galassi and Harrison, 2005, p. 295). The deep ties between Banca Commerciale and the German capital made it more difficult to rely on private banks to finance the war mobilization in the face of strong anti-German sentiment. Empowering the Central Bank was also an extension of the internal hostility between different fractions of capital.

Crucially, the militarized state facilitated capitalist interests by imposing stringent measures towards disciplining the labour and allocating the workforce to the war industries. The trade unions were paralyzed in their traditional functioning at the beginning of the war when strikes were banned and labour contracts were frozen. All disputes between workers and employers were obligatorily referred to the CRMs entrusted with the arbitration function (Ermacora, 2014).[8] Furthermore, union representatives were not actually included in the corporatist structure of the CCM and the CRMs, as mentioned above. Hence, trade unions were effectively excluded from negotiations and their area of activity was severely limited. This situation put the state in charge of regulating the labour market. Therefore, in the first phase of the war in the area of labour relation, the government preoccupied itself primarily with the problem of the labour market, while avoiding direct interference with industrial management. It hoped to regulate the labour market by the militarization of workers involved in war production, prevention of free movement of labour, and assignment of the labour force to particular war industries.

A considerable percentage of workers working in auxiliary factories were subject to military discipline, enforced by army soldiers on factory floors, and to military penal code, sanctioned by military tribunals (Procacci, 1989, p. 34).[9] The conscripted workers in these factories fell into two categories: exonerated and militarized (see Tomassini, 1991, p. 64). The former formally belonged to the army and subject to military discipline but could appear and live like other civilian workers. The latter resembled a soldier much more closely as they had to wear a military uniform, eat at the barrack, and contribute part of the salary to the military administration.[10] For workers in both groups, resignation or leaving one's job for any reason were equivalent to desertion and punished

[8] However, the details of arbitration process were not specified under decree no. 1277 (see Tomassini, 1991, p. 77f).
[9] Overwhelming majority of auxiliary plants (almost 70 per cent by the end of the war) were located in the Industrial Triangle. The number of plants under the control of UMI grew rapidly during the war from 276 by the end of 1915 to 988 by the end of 1916, 1,857 at the end of 1917, and 1,976 (with 903,250 workers) at the end of the war (Procacci, 1989, p. 36).
[10] By the end of 1916, there were 69,677 exonerated workers, 57,957 military workers, and 26,0544 civilians (Tomassini, 1991, p. 65).

according to the military penal code (Procacci, 1989, p. 38). Therefore, by militarizing part of the workforce and other sanctions against collective action, it was hoped that the disciplinary order over the workforce as a whole could be maintained while providing the necessary mechanism to fix the essential workforce to the auxiliary firms.

Despite the stringent measures, there was still a considerable level of intersectional mobility of labour in this phase of the war. The shortage of skilled workers became apparent by the end of 1915. As a result, the government recalled those skilled workers from the front back to the factories and exempted the skilled workers from military service at the front (Tomassini, 1983, p. 84). This created an impetus for the skilled craftsmen in smaller workshops to join the workforce in auxiliary factories to avoid being dispatched to the front. There was also a large-scale flow of labour from smaller to larger factories (Tomassini, 1991, p. 67).

The banning of traditional forms of collective actions such as strikes and strict disciplinary measures led to the emergence of alternative forms of labour protest including obstructionism, slowdown, and sectional shut-downs (see Procacci, 1989, p. 38; Tomassini, 2010, p. 44). These were added to the repertoire of collective action and resurfaced in a profoundly different context and towards a different goal during the *biennio rosso*. But in the first phase of the war, these served as less risky ways for workers to voice their grievances and exert their collective power.

As beneficial and desirable as the UMI auxiliary arrangements towards war production were for certain fractions of capitalists due to lucrative state contracts without cost control, labour discipline and industrial peace, as well as the availability of workforce and raw material, it entailed a fundamental breach of the managerial authority of capitalists over the workplace. Even though much of the power of the state over private production remained on paper, the fact that the supreme authority within the factory was not the private owners but the state in its various manifestations (military personnel, military codes, arbitration boards, etc.) was a profound challenge to the sovereignty of capital over private production. The militarized state-form, therefore, materialized itself visibly to the workers in its repressive form on the factory floor and in its conciliatory form outside the factory. The repressive apparatus of the state both reduced itself to the level of brutal executioner of workplace discipline and elevated itself to the level of neutral arbiter of industrial conflicts. Having effectively bypassed the trade unions in this phase despite the corporatist structure of the CCM and the CRMs and having practically severed its power over capital, the government under the militarized state-form had to manage various tensions and contradictions more directly. The verticality of the state-form meant that severe crises could undermine the state more fundamentally.

The first signs of such a crisis emerged towards the end of 1915 when industrial unrest in Liguria and San Giorgio, led by revolutionary elements within the trade unions, prompted the CCM to process the first serious case of industrial dispute (see Tomassini, 1983, p. 89). Previously, all case of labour disputes was resolved privately outside the UMI arbitration process. Partly due to the ideological standpoint and partly due to the fear of contagiousness if precedence were set, leading industrialists such as Olivetti advised the industrialists "to concede all that was possible in the hope of avoiding any resort to compulsory arbitration" (Adler, 1995, p. 108). However, this method eventually expired, and it became apparent that the UMI was far from prepared to handle the arbitration process. As it became evident that the war would prolong much longer than initially anticipated, the UMI was forced to rethink its strategy towards industrial mobilization.

Second Period (July 1916 – November 1917)

Initially, the slow but definite growth in the number of disputes referred to the CRMs in 1916 (Procacci, 1989, p. 37), as well as the sharp increase in labour demand to 92 per cent of the labour supply in 1916 (Tomassini, 1991, p. 67), convinced the UMI of the need to change its labour relation strategy. It needed the collaboration of the trade unions and more assertive position towards the industrialists especially with regards to the arbitration process and the incorporation of new unskilled workers. Therefore, labour and capital were integrated deeper the mode of representation of the state became more corporatist through more active use of the corporatist structure of the UMI. The relative position of the UMI itself within the state improved in this period as it was elevated from an undersecretary to a ministry in July 1917 (Procacci, 1989, p. 49).

The first signs of this strategic shift towards the trade unions emerged when General Dallolio reversed his opposition and occasional personal attacks towards the leaders of trade unions and met with the representatives of the Federation of Metalworkers (*Federazione Impiegati Operai Metallurgici*, FIOM) in the summer of 1916 (see Tomassini, 1983, p. 89). Later in 1916, the General Secretary of FIOM, Bruno Buozzi, received an invitation to join the CCM (see Tomassini, 2010, p. 41). The inclusion of top representatives of trade unions continued into 1917, with Ludovico Calda, the Secretary of Genoa Chamber of Labour, and Emilio Colombino, a member of the national secretariat of FIOM, both were included in the CCM (see Ermacora, 2014). To dilute the presence of the socialist labour representatives in the state, representatives from the Catholic labour organizations were brought to the CRMs. However, this was not very effective in damping down the influence of the socialists in the state (Tomassini, 1983, p. 90).

To address the shortage of workforce in the context of accelerating war production, the state facilitated the influx of new unskilled and cheap workers, especially women and minors, into the

war industry.[11] This was nothing short of a fundamental recomposition of the workforce. Given the reservations of trade unions, especially with regards to their skilled members, and the industrialists particularly with regards to the cost and disciplinary measures associated with the reorganization of production to absorb a large number of unskilled workers (Tomassini, 1991, p. 70; Bartoloni, 2015), the UMI had to intervene actively to advance the project. Therefore, the UMI established a Bureau of Women's Work and initiated a series of studies towards this goal. Furthermore, the UMI introduced a series of reforms from March 1917 (see Tomassini, 1991, p. 71) specifically to address concerns about the exploitation of women and minors.[12] Notably, the female and child workers were from the beginning of this process not classified as militarized workers and therefore were subjected to substantially lighter disciplinary measures. Even though they could not freely change jobs, they could protest without the risk of breaching the military code and being sent to the front or tried in front of a military tribune.

The state introduced a series of reforms in this phase in the hope of containing the rising unrest among workers and the general population as the war dragged on. One of the most notable of such reforms came through in August 1916 after the Piecework Commission, which included industrialists and labour representatives, came out in favour of freezing the existing piece rate until the conclusion of the war (Ermacora, 2014; Tomassini, 1982, pp. 98-101; Tomassini, 2010, p. 42). Other reforms included wage increase, injury insurance, and unemployment insurance (see Ermacora, 2014; Procacci, 1989, p. 49; Tomassini, 1983, p. 88). These were among some of the goals that the PSI and the CGL had struggled to get before the war but never quite achieved (see Horowitz, 1963, p. 55; Salomone, 1960, p. 71). The flipside of this cooperation for the trade unions was that they not only had to suspend some of their top demands such as the eight-hour working day but also maintain industrial peace and ensure higher labour productivity.

To improve the arbitration mechanism to address "economic disputes", which were bound to increase especially in the light of the intensification of work, the UMI created more specific provisions. Accordingly, when workers of a particular plant thought that higher wages were necessary to keep up with the rising living cost, they could meet (even on the factory floor) to form a commission in order to formulate their request and represent them in front of the CRM. Therefore, the process legitimized the factory-based intersectoral collective representation of the rank-and-file. As before, an appeal had to be referred to the CCM. This was a method to adjust wages to the living costs without engaging in large scale contractual changes in the industrial sectors. Although wage

[11] By the end of 1916, there were 75,989 women and minors in auxiliary plants. This number grew to 145,574 by 1 June 1917 (see Table 1 in Tomassini, 1991, p. 65).
[12] The CGL had made an explicit request to the UMI in the autumn of 1916 towards a number of reforms to protect women and minor workers (see Tomassini, 1983, p. 87).

adjustment was against the original decree that froze all labour contracts until the end of the war, it was not too unpalatable to the industrialists as long as the costs were not controlled by the UMI. The increase in wages could be offset by an increase in price in the state contracts. Furthermore, the state bureaucracy would slow down the wage adjustment process enough for the existing high inflation to effectively nullify the increase in wages.

Despite these state provisions, however, popular discontent in this phase was on the rise to insurgent levels.[13] The news of the February Revolution in Russia was received broadly, albeit diffusely compared to the later October Revolution,[14] as a symbol of a popular revolt against the despotic ruling class. Besides the psychological and geopolitical effects of these momentous events earlier that year, the high living costs and food shortages were among the leading factors behind the popular revolts in 1917.[15] As the military cut the rationing for soldiers in December 1916, it extended the promise to give land to the peasants to reduce the likelihood of revolts in the agricultural sector. However, in 1917, there was a resumption of land occupations in the south and the centre, pro-peace demonstrations in share-cropping regions, and agricultural union actions in Lombardy and Piedmont (Bianchi, 2014).

Protests against the high cost of living erupted in large cities including Milan (May 1917), Turin (August 1917), Genoa (August-September 1917) (Dentoni, 2014). Besides the high cost of living and war-weariness, another reason for the rapid spread of the protests in the industrial triangle was the arrest of many socialist and trade union leaders during the insurrectionary actions in summer 1917 (Levy, 1999, p. 90). The government gained control of the situation after dispatching the military to quell the movement in Turin.

The Catholic forces did not remain passive towards these anti-war developments. Their unwillingness to grant their tacit support to the state project was captured in Pope Benedict XV's condemnation of the war as "useless carnage" and call for a diplomatic solution to the conflict, issued in August 1917 shortly before the Turin revolt. Hence, while the state sought to integrate different forces within its corporate structure in this phase, it was losing their support under the weight of the popular discontent and militant actions against the war.

This phase of the war saw a change in not only the intensity but also the pattern of labour protest. From scattered and spontaneous protests involving few workers in individual firms, there

[13] For an account of these unrests in Turin and Liguria in 1917, see Bertrand 1976, pp. 109-111; Procacci, 1989, p. 48; Levy, 1999, pp. 84-88.
[14] The February Revolution was received positively even among the interventionists as reminiscent of their revolt against the political elite linked to the Giolittian project in 1915 and as an inspiration for their imagined political project of a seizure of power as the Russians did (see Procacci, 1968, pp. 157-8).
[15] There was a 50 per cent increase in food prices by the end of 1916. The prices increased further in 1917 (see Procacci, 1997, pp. 54, 84).

was a shift from the end of 1916 towards large strikes involving thousands of workers with collective demands. These demands became increasingly more political and directed against the war effort in 1917. Women played a central role in this phase of popular and labour militancy. Between December 1916 and April 1917, there were 450 protests by women (Dentoni, 2014). The percentage of female strikers grew from 43.9 per cent in 1916 to 64.2 per cent in 1917 (Procacci, 1989, p. 46). They also initiated the Turin revolt in August 1917 which began as a food riot. In the sphere of work, women strikers protested against low wages, timetables, and shift work (Procacci, 2010, p. 76). Women's particular position in social relations helps to explain their leadership capacities in these actions (see Pisa, 2010). Bearing the bulk of responsibility towards social reproduction, they were acutely sensitive to the rising cost of living and food prices. Furthermore, women's entrance *en masse* into the factories in this phase acted as a bridge that extended the troubles "outside" the factories "into" the fortress of private production. The different disciplinary measures that the female workers were subjected to lower the risk of engaging in industrial actions such as strikes. Therefore, their actions were instrumental in expanding the industrial militancy in this phase and generalizing it as intimately linked to the struggles outside the factory floors.

The state plunged into a crisis after the October Revolution in Russia (November 7-8) and the defeat in the battle of Caporetto (October 24-November 19). The schism was reinforced within the socialist movement due to the revolutionary zeal inspired in the Maximalist wing of the PSI after the October Revolution and the patriotic sense induced in the reformist wing of the PSI and the GCL after the defeat at the Caporetto (see Bertrand, 1976, p. 114; Papadia, 2016). This strained the capacity of the socialists to effectively participate within the state. Already before these far-reaching events, the growing protests made the position of the trade unions within the state more difficult as they seemed unable to control their members and maintain industrial peace. After Caporetto, the trend towards repression and incarceration of socialist leaders intensified (Procacci, 1989, pp. 48-9; Bertrand, 1976), further paralyzing their ability to function within the state regardless of their willingness to do so.

Henceforth, in the context of the alienated socialist and Catholic forces, the state-form underwent another transformation to overcome the limitations of the second period. The change in the government, after Vittorio Emanuele Orlando succeeded Paolo Boselli as the Prime Minister on 30 October 1917, and the top echelon of the military, after General Armando Diaz replaced Luigi Cadorna as the Chief of Staff on 9 November 1917, paved the way for the next phase.

Third Period (December 1917 – November 1918)

To renew the war effort after the terrible demoralizing defeat at Caporetto, the state engaged in a widespread propaganda campaign within the troops, workers, and peasants, as well as the

general population (Bertrand, 1967, p. 120; Procacci, 2010; Cappellano, 2014). The Orlando government invited Filippo Turati, Claudio Treves, and few other reformist socialists in April 1918 to participate in a commission to study the post-war problems. However, to avoid a split in the party, Turati declined the offer (De Grand, 1989, p. 33).[16] Propaganda was a largely neglected aspect of the Italian war mobilization until then. But in this period, it was pushed forward fiercely on various fronts, through the distribution of leaflets and newspapers, to achieve patriotic stability. The state also renewed its appeal to the rural population and widely disseminated the campaign of the "land to peasant" in 1918 (Bianchi, 2014).

Although it is difficult to isolate the effect of these efforts from other measures such as reforms and repressions, they presumably had some effects on recovering the general morale among the troops (see Wilcox, 2016; Cappellano, 2014) and patriotic feelings among the workers (Procacci, 2010).[17] But they also had more profound and unintended effects on the consciousness of different social classes. With messages such as "the war is for the soldier: the peasant, the worker, the clerk. It is fought for all those who suffer and who are hard up, in the countryside and in the cities in Italy and outside Italy. The war is for the proletariat: this is the war of the workers" (as quoted in Bertrand, 1967, p. 120), the propaganda campaign induced a sense of indispensability in the life of the nation among workers and soldiers (Corner and Procacci, 1997, p. 232).

The government propaganda had more specific effects in developing key ideological concepts which were profoundly different from the pre-war understanding. It popularized the notion of "man as producer", uprooting the liberal notion of "man as citizen" (Adler, 1995, pp. 121-2). The concept of "man as producer" was used after the war by both the socialist theorist, Gramsci, and the Fascist leader and theorist Benito Mussolini.

In the rural context, the popularization of the slogan of "land to peasant" and the state's legal activities to set up arbitration courts to deal with rural property helped develop the concept of "communal property" within the property law. It was understood as a type of property that is to be used collectively for social purposes according to the needs of the community (see Latini, 2014, pp.

[16] Despite these appeals, the government did not scale back its repression of the working-class organizations. The Orlando government intensified the crackdown on the socialist leaders after Caporetto, while the interventionists were popularizing the myth of "enemy within". This further hardened the intransigent position of the Maximalists within the PSI (see Procacci, 1968, pp. 162-3; De Grand, 1989, pp. 33-4). Also, one third of the workforce in the auxiliary factories were punished with fines and 25,840 workers were imprisoned in this phase of the war. Moreover, overtime became obligatory and work shifts were extended to 12 hours, and holidays were suspended (Ermacora, 2014).

[17] While preserving the tough measures such as capital punishment, General Diaz made key reforms in the army including better system of troop rotation and leaves as well as a more generous life insurance and pensions for the soldiers (Wilcox, 2016; Cappellano, 2014). There were also reforms in other areas in this phase of the war. For example, redundancy funds due to involuntary unemployment was broadened. The fund covered cases of suspension of employment resulting from lack of not only raw material, as it was established in 1917, but also electricity (Tomassini, 1983, p. 92). The state also implemented more protective measures towards the female and child workers (Tomassini, 2010, p. 46; Procacci, 2010, p. 19; Ermacora, 2014).

245-9). Such notions provided the conceptual and legal basis for the widespread land occupation movements by Italian peasants after the war.

However, despite the government's efforts to improve its relationship with the peasants, tension was rising in the countryside. The last year of the war experienced a different pattern of rural protest from pressuring the government to grant state subsidies to rural families to rejecting such measures in the hope of accelerating the end of the war (Bianchi, 2014). The peasants also engaged in many disruptive actions in the southern and central regions in February 1918. By May 1918, such anti-government and anti-war rural protests reached the other regions (Procacci, 1989, pp. 50-1). In the urban centres, there was a decline in the number of protests in 1918 which was probably due to a combination of the government crackdown on socialist and labour organizations, toughening of disciplinary measures on workers, and the propaganda campaign. Nevertheless, there were still hundreds of protests by thousands of workers in 1918.[18]

A squeeze in international credit provided by the allies (Esposti, 2015) meant that the economic pressure intensified in late 1917. Francesco Saverio Nitti, the new Minister of Finance in the Orlando government, was working to swing the Italian credit supply towards the United States and securing the fifth and the largest war loan (Forsyth, 1993, p. 121). The structure of war finance and monetary policy remained more or less the same throughout the war in terms of general subordination to the exigencies of the Treasury, so the banks were making direct advances to the treasury. However, Nitti's intervention, besides approaching the USA for credit supply, in a way changed the significance of financial mobilization. Before taking office, he criticized the previous government for not engaging with financial mobilization with sufficient vigour. So, when his term began, he thoroughly embraced productivism and rigorous financial mobilization[19] and flagged the 5th war loan as a symbol of national unity and productivism. It was in this sense that perhaps we can see Nitti's intervention in this phase as fitting into the larger project of the hegemonic vision.

Nevertheless, the cost of living and inflation continued to rise making the wage adjustment provisions in the second phase completely insufficient to catch up with the basic needs of ordinary people. The government had to come up with another wage adjustment method. It opted for the "sliding scale" scheme that indexed wages based on the cost of one "basket" of the normal diet of a working-class family (see Tomassini, 2010, pp. 44-5; Tomassini, 1991, pp. 81-2). This was a way to formally uphold the provision of wage-freeze imposed at the beginning of the war while addressing the cost of living more urgently and directly. It was also believed that this method could

[18] The official statistics reported 303 protests involving 158,035 in 1918 (see Procacci, 1991, pp. 171, 177).
[19] The combination of productivism and rigorous financial policies in the context of the unwillingness of the government to control costs of industrial production is a contradiction which ultimately resulted in the collapse of the Italian fiscal system in the post-war period (Forsyth, 1993, p. 76; Galassi and Harrison, 2005, pp. 302-4).

avoid the legal complications associated with the previous scheme and would enable the government to skip the organized efforts of the unions (Tomassini, 2010, p. 45). However, the scheme was in practice very imperfect and achieved limited success (Procacci, 2010, p. 16).

The bypassing of the unions required a more direct and sustained channel to the internal commissions (Tomassini, 1991, p. 83). It was also needed in the process of more rational distribution of resources that the UMI began in the last phase of the war to reallocate the labour force based on productivity, and organizational functionality of the individual firms (Tomassini, 1991, p. 72).[20] Therefore, the CCM began a process of legal recognition of the internal commissions from November 1917. Prior to this point, the internal commissions had a difficult life and had limited impact on the workplace hierarchy or autonomous input into the CRMs (Adler, 1995, p. 107). Until the end of 1917, the question of the internal commissions revolved around the technical aspects regarding the particularity of their tasks. It was in the third phase that the question of the recognition of the internal commissions became a centre focus (Ortaggi, 1983, p. 215-17).

The CCM was cautious in its legislative proposal towards the recognition of the internal commissions. Two members of the CCM, Pio Cabonelli and the industrialist Giovanni Silvestri, drafted a scheme that was designed to curb the most dangerous aspects of the recognition project (see Ortaggi, 1983, p. 217). But the political objective behind this was clear to the forces involved: to facilitate a more direct involvement of the state in the industrial regulation by excluding the unions while confining the internal commissions to the factory levels under the firm control of the employers. The legislation sought to enforce these through a series of clauses including the management's right to appoint a certain number of members in the internal commissions, the prohibition of any external interference by a person or an organization into the conducts of the internal commissions, and the absolute subordination of the internal commissions to the decisions of the rank-and-file (see Ortaggi, 1983, pp. 217-18).

The attitude of industrialists towards the question of recognition was mixed. Some fiercely opposed the proposal even though they had already acknowledged their existence in previous years, believing that the recognition would lead to a flood of claims by the workers. Some were open to the idea and hoped that doing so would allow them to maintain control over the internal commissions. This diversity of opinions already created confusion in the process. Ultimately, the LIT's opposition to the proposal was decisive in formulating the industrialists' political position (Orgaggi, 1983, p. 218). The major trade unions such as the FIOM and their leaders (e.g. Colombino and Angiolo Cabrini) were also against the measure, even though previously they in fact

[20] This move not only created tensions between smaller and larger firms but also between the UMI and some industrialists (see Tomassini, 1991, pp. 72-3).

pushed for the formal recognition of the internal commissions, believing that it was intended to exclude the union access to the rank-and-file. They were also concerned about the controllability of these movements if they were legalized as was outlined in the legislation (Ortaggi, 1983, p. 218).

In the face of such opposition, the government dropped the legislation in its original form. However, through a decree issued on 23 January 1918, the state recognized the internal commissions (although named differently) in a limited sense insofar as they stand until the end of the war as a simple and direct representation of workers to negotiate strictly economic issues with the UMI bodies (Ortaggi, 1983, p. 219). This was the last major intervention of the state into the labour relation before the end of the war.

The alienation of the major industrialists and labour unions from the state resulted in a rapid dismantling of the UMI after the war. Both the CIDI and the trade unions were eager to go back to the pre-war liberal order with its "free-market" labour relations and different state functions. While the PSI hardened its intransigence stance after its August 1918 Congress abandoned the remaining reformist aspects and reject any reformist solution to the post-war reconstruction including any alliance with the bourgeois parties (De Grand, 1989, p. 33-4), the CGL went back to the faith in gradualism, *laissez-faire*, and evolutionism (Tomassini, 1991, p. 86). The influence of the CGL on the PSI was institutionally strengthened after the Pact of Alliance was signed between the two at the end of September 1918, sharply distinguishing the "economic" and the "political" strikes and giving the leadership of the former to the union and the latter to the party. Likewise, while many industrialists experienced the material benefit of state intervention into the economy and labour relations, the CIDI upheld its ideological commitment to the imagined liberal order as the only possible path for the post-war reconstruction. However, the old and new tensions and contradictions burst after the war, shaking the Italian society to its core.

Concluding Remarks

From the beginning of the war, the state-from that emerged from the specific pre-war context to carry out the war project already laid out the foundation of a militarized corporatist state with a particular hegemonic vision embedded in its structural foundation and institutional order. For example, the foundation of the UMI not only imposed itself militarily (via decrees no. 506 and no. 993) but also already established a corporatist structure (via decrees no. 1065 and no. 1437) and retained the possibility of manufacturing its hegemonic vision (via decree no. 1277 and propaganda powers). However, different forms gained prominence during different phases of the war. The state-form underwent a series of transformations to overcome the limitations and to resolve contradictions of the previous periods. In turn, each created its own tensions, contradictions, and capacities.

Having effectively nullified the parliament, the militarized state organized social relations between class forces in a rigidly vertical order. This meant that any crisis within the state would traverse vertically and affect the stability of the state as a whole. Moreover, the localized crises had the tendency to be generalized and, therefore, required more direct and immediate interventions. Furthermore, the stability of the state was more susceptible to disturbances within the military hierarchy. All this implied that the fate of the state was existentially and simultaneously tied up to absolute control over not only the classes and class fractions but also the military order from the top to the bottom. This situation gave acute disruptive power to challenges from various social classes as well as the lower echelons within the army. It also demanded significant state capacity and relative flexibility within the rigid parameters of its militarized form.

Initially, the militarized state fundamentally breached the axiomatic principle of managerial authority in the workplace and established a brutal military order within the sphere of private production. This was a radical departure from the nominal liberal order in relation to the extent of state interference into the private sphere of capitalist production. But due to its unwillingness to exercise its hegemony over the capitalist class even at the level of cost control over war production let alone requisitioning, it lost its ability to implement effective fiscal policies and effectively reduced its operation to strict regulation of the labour market and a military discipline of the workplace. Nevertheless, the penetration of the state into the sphere of production meant that any challenge to the managerial structure and any movement towards democratization of the workplace was simultaneously a challenge to the militarized state form and implied democratization of the state. Therefore, the struggle for the democratization of the workplace and the state were vertically bridged.

In the meanwhile, the particular composition of the Italian army, with its large armies drawn mostly from the peasant population, required brutal disciplinary measures to hold the lower echelon of the army under control. However, the social composition of the army also implied that agricultural production was significantly weakened and led to food shortages from the second period of the war.

During the first period, the government believed that it could maintain industrial peace through military discipline and manage the labour market by banning strikes and the free movement of labour. These not only led to new forms of resistance such as slow-downs which were used again during the *biennio rosso* but also showed their fundamental limitations as soon as it became apparent that the arbitration scheme originally envisioned by the UMI could not handle the increasing industrial disputes. Also, due to rapidly growing war industries in the second period, the government had to secure new and cheap sources of labour for war industries. It did so by a

significant increase in the number of unskilled workers, notably women and minors. To overcome the deficiencies in the arbitration process and to facilitate the integration of the unskilled workers into the production process, the UMI more actively incorporated the trade unions into its corporatist structures.

While overcoming some limitations, the state generated new tensions and contradictions. As the female workers entered the factories, the struggle for social reproduction "outside" the factory, such as protest against high living cost or food shortages, were linked to the struggle "inside" the factory via the militant activities of women, who were not categorized as militarized workers and could strike without the fear of being sent to the front. In other words, the same agents who were at the forefront of struggles outside capitalist production since they bore the bulk of the burden of the reproduction of labour now had entered the factories *en masse* and could strike with much more immunity from the brutality of the repressive apparatus of the state than their male counterparts. Therefore, the struggles "outside" and "inside" the factories were horizontally bridged. Furthermore, the new arbitration procedure, though under the formal liaising power of the trade unions, empowered factory-based intersectoral collective representation of the rank-and-file.

As social unrest grew due to the internal tensions and the external developments towards the end of this period, the corporatist structure of the state reached its yield point. The trade unions could no longer be trusted in maintaining control of their members. Also, after the defeat at Caporetto, the government had to rethink its approach to total mobilization. In the third period, the state engaged in more direct and consensual approaches to social mobilization and labour relations. Its intense propaganda campaign within the military, the peasants, and the working classes generally elevated the self-consciousness of the agrarian and working classes, and produced specific concepts such as "man as producer", "associational property", "land to the peasants" that partly laid the ideological foundations for post-war radical movements. Moreover, the state sought to bypass the trade unions and regulate the working classes through wider utilization and official recognition of the internal commissions. This move antagonized both the trade unions and many capitalists. It is true that the recognition of internal commissions as such was halted and only established in a more limited form through a decree. However, the penetration of the state into the sphere of private production has now created the institutional and political road map that could be used to channel the radical rank-and-file movements in relative independence from the reformist unions.

The rapid rewinding of the state back to its liberal form after the war was greatly desired by both the major industrialist associations and the major trade unions. However, on the one hand, the strategic selectivity of the state in favour of capitalist reproduction as well as the particular corporatist approach to war mobilization weakened the associational capacities of capitalists and

prevented them from developing a strong cohesive national association to be able to stand for their interests firmly after the end of the war. This made the capitalist fractions particularly vulnerable to movements by the working classes and the agrarian classes (Adler, 1995, pp. 151-2). On the other hand, the CGL's stringent faith in a reformist path to the post-war reconstruction, while confining its activities to the "economic" sphere and relying on the now-firmly-intransigent PSI to carry out the "political" struggle, crippled its ability to either effectively contain or radically generalize the post-war rank-and-file militancy.

Since state capacity was insufficient to swing the situation back into a normal liberal regime after the war in a gradual manner (due also to the huge resistance by both major industrialists and unions who were so attached to the myth of liberal order), the country went into a process of near social revolution. Why that attempt took the form of "council democratic" and why it was unsuccessful in realizing its transformative potential will be explored in Part II.

Chapter 4

The Making of "Council Democratic" Movements in a Comparative Perspective

Introduction

The past two chapters presented case studies of the making of "council democratic" movements in Germany and Italy. It was discussed through analyzes of transformations that the German and Italian states undertook during WWI. It showed how the transformations of state-led war mobilization in each case laid the foundation for the emergence of "council democratic" movements after the war.

This chapter looks at the making of the "council democratic" movements from a comparative perspective to examine the extent to which case studies can offer more generalizable and theoretical conclusions. It takes up the question of the making of "council democratic" movements by a comparative analysis of Germany and Italy as positive cases, and France as a negative case.

The comparative analysis here deploys the theoretical framework discussed in the introductory chapter. It focuses on the form of the state and its hegemonic vision. The former is understood on the basis of three dimensions, namely, mode of representation, institutional architecture, and patterns of state intervention. The latter defines the nature and purpose of the state's project for the wider society. Using this theoretical framework, the chapter offers an overview of the key characteristics of French war mobilization as the negative case. The comparative analysis starts by discussing the particular characteristics of the two positive cases that laid the ground for the emergence of "council democratic" movements by putting them in contrast with the negative case. The analysis then moves to a comparative study within the positive cases to link the specific form of the "council democratic" movements that emerged in each to the particular dynamics that unfolded in Germany and Italy.

Overview of the Case of France

This section limits the historical account of the French war mobilization to its most essential factors needed to conduct the comparative analysis in the next section. The evolution of the relevant dimensions of the French state during the war can be organized into three periods: 4 August 1914 – 21 December 1914, which marks the formation of the *union sacrée* and the initial phase of war mobilization through governance by decrees, 22 December 1914 – 15 November 1917, which marks the reopening of the Chamber of Deputies and the progressive enhancement of

tripartism, 16 November 1917 – 11 November 1918, which marks the ascension of Georges Clémenceau to power and the end of the *union sacrée*.

In the face of the military invasion of Belgium by the German army at the beginning of the war and its rapid advancement towards the North-East part of France, it was made possible for the French state to bring together diverse political forces. It included the French Section of the Workers' International (*Section française de l'Internationale ouvrière*, SFIO) and, the anti-imperialist wing of the revolutionary syndicalist union, the General Confederation of Labour (*Confédération Générale du Travail*, CGT), under the leadership of Léon Jouhaux, in support of a defensive war (though not without internal tensions). They came together under the rubric of the *union sacrée* (sacred union) against German aggression.[1]

The *union sacrée,* operating on a "one nation" hegemonic strategy, went beyond the rhetorical level of national unity and took steps towards a cautious broadening of the state to the opposition. This process began after two socialists, Jules Guesde (Minister without portfolio) and Marcel Sembat (Minister of Public Works), entered the reshuffled government of René Viviani on 26 August 1914. Later in May 1915, Albert Thomas, the leader of the reformist wing of the SFIO, was appointed to the crucial role of Under-Secretary of State for Artillery and Munitions, becoming the Minister of Munitions a year later.

The legislative branch was suspended at the start of the war upon the ratification of a state of siege by the Chamber of Deputies. This allowed the executive branch to manage the war through decrees. In one of its first steps, the government re-appropriated the 1877 law that allowed requisition of industrial establishments by the state authorities and imposition of censorship to control the flow of information.[2] Ultimately, the power of requisition remained merely as a threat and proved to be the least active mechanism used by the state to manage the war industry. However, the concentration of power in the hands of the government that was strictly focused on advancing the military objectives and the compulsory national military service that scooped up millions of people into the army, enabled the military to hold control over civilian life (Horne, 1991, pp. 50-1, 57).

The loss of the Northern territories, the industrial heartland of France after Paris, was a major blow to the war effort in this period and pushed the state to delve into the question of

[1] For a comparative analysis of the CGT's support of the war in relation to other syndicalist movements, see Darlington (2012). On the decline of militant activities at the outbreak of the war and the general compliance the party and the union to the *union sacrée*, see Becker (1985, pp. 64-74).

[2] A more notable aspect of the French propaganda campaign than the state's direct involvement is the degree to which civil society (e.g. see Robert, 1997; Audoin-Rouzeau, 1997) and public intellectuals (Smith et al., 2003, pp. 53-9; Hanna, 1996) got involved in the ideological operation. This highlights the level of self-mobilization that went well beyond the centralized mechanisms implemented by the state.

industrial mobilization and social provisioning.[3] On 20 September 1914, Alexandre Millerand, the Minister of War, called on leading bankers and industrialists to come up with plans for industrial mobilization. The industrialists immediately started demanding the return of drafted workers to the factories (Hardach, 1992). Millerand divided the industrialists into 12 regions, each of which was led by one person responsible for distributing raw material, allocating military contracts, and coordinating actions towards efficient production, and controlling prices (Godfrey, 1987, pp. 48, 106-26). It was at this moment when the members of the *comité des forges* (Heavy Industry Committee), the most powerful and organized employers' association in France at the time, were able to dominate the leadership position of these regional committees (Godfrey, 1987, p. 49). This, in turn, empowered the *comité des forges* and prompted it to develop its own bureaucratic structure to strengthen its organizational capacity (Godfrey, 1987, pp. 221-30). The French system of delegating private employers' organizations to manage the supply of raw material to metallurgical industries was unique among the belligerent countries (Smith et al., 2003, p. 63; also see Hardach, 1992).

The delegation of employers' associations to coordinate industrial production was not the only mode of state intervention. This mode was true in the metallurgical sector where there were pre-existing employers' associations organized and influential enough to be able to coordinate the actions among the producers. Different modalities of state intervention emerged in other industries as the war went on. In chemical industries, the state had to step in and form a bureaucratic organization of its own to organize the sector and establish public-private entities such as National Dye Company that were "not fully nationalized, not directed by bureaucrats, but yet an instrument of state policy, defending the interests of one group of chemical industrialists against another..." (see Godfrey, 1987, p. 180; also see pp. 51-2; 157-70, 295). In the textile industry, the state's intervention took the form of regulatory standardization as exemplified in the case of the National Shoe company (see Godfrey, 1987, pp. 150-6). Despite the differences between these modes of intervention, there is a common thread that runs through them. Generally, the state intervention avoided getting directly involved in control and management of production and limited its operation to coordination and regulation.

Under the condition of severe limitation on the right to strike after the war began (Horne, 1992, p. 268) and rapid decline in the membership of the union and the party in this period largely

[3] The number of unemployed increased sharply, reading 2 million workers, at the beginning of the war. The government responded to these by establishing employment agencies (see Chancerel, 2015; Smith et al., 2003, pp. 67-8).

due to national conscription,[4] the SFIO and the CGT began to overcome the traditional gap and work more closely together. They formed the *comité d'action* (Action Committee) in early September 1914 as a joint lobbying group, a "united front" of the two major working-class organizations, to defend the interest of the working-class producers (especially skilled workers) and consumers. Through the *comité d'action*, "labour leaders, in cooperation with socialist parliamentary deputies, pressured politicians and civil servants by criticizing government policy and advancing counter-project for a variety of problems" (Horne, 1992, p. 251; see also Horne, 1991, pp. 69-70).

In the first period of war mobilization, a move towards the development of a tripartite mode of representation can already be observed. Even though the architecture of the state system underwent a centralization in this period, it (cautiously) broadened its executive branch to opposition parties and institutionally legitimized the *union sacrée*. Despite the influence of the military High Command in this period over civilian life, the civilian politicians were able to maintain control of the government and avoid militarization of the state. As discussed above, it also averted the militarization of industrial relations. The state laid the initial foundation for a corporatist inclusion of industrialists into the state through the creation of regional committees in heavy industries whose leadership was delegated to members of the *comité des forges*.

Despite the compliance of the CGT to the *union sacrée* at the beginning of the war, the state in this period was not keen to actively involve the union in its industrial mobilization scheme. This situation prompted the formation of the *comité d'action* which later operated mainly as a pressure group. Although the cooperation between the party and the union within the *comité d'action* was weakened after the reopening of the Chamber of Deputies (Horne, 1991, p. 57) and became more closely linked to the leadership of the CGT (especially its majoritarian wing), the organization continued to pressure the government to make improvements on welfare, employment relief, and living costs. The *comité d'action* also allowed the CGT to maintain its relative independence from the state and the negative aspects of its war effort.

The two legislative chambers reopened on 22 December 1914 but suspended any new national elections until the end of the war. The aim was to gain democratic legitimacy while avoiding electoral instabilities. Yet, the suspension of elections also entailed freezing of the current composition of forces in the chambers for the duration of the war. This meant that the largest parliamentary block, dominated by the centrist Radical and Radical-Socialist parties, could maintain

[4] The membership of CGT fell from 350,000 prior to the war to 50,000 in 1915. The membership of the socialist party declined from 90,000 in 1914 to 25,000 in 1915. However, by 1918, the union membership reached 600,000 members (Chancerel, 2015).

their 1914 electoral success throughout the war. The chambers began reasserting their authority over the government by scrutinizing the ministers on a host of issues, especially regarding its war efforts. They did so in a variety of ways, first through parliamentary committees (reaching its peak between November 1915 and February 1916), then through direct delegation (though this was hardly implemented in reality; Godfrey, 1987, p. 55), and through its constitutional prerogative to hold secret sessions (eight of such sessions were held between 16 June 1916 and 10 October 1917).

The revitalization of the parliamentary process entailed a transformation of the architecture of the state into a more transversal structure owning to the formal accountability of the executive branch to the legislative body in the context of the progressive involvement of the government into the developing tripartite structures. The extent to which the legislative bodies had a substantive impact on the government's industrial policies during the war is debatable.[5] However, the inability or unwillingness to influence the war effort more directly and decisively led to catastrophic tensions at the heart of the state which were exacerbated as social unrest intensified in 1917. This in turn led to the fragmentation and ultimate collapse of the fragile coalition of forces under *union sacrée* by mid-November 1917.

The appointment of Thomas as the Under-Secretary of State for Artillery and Munitions in May 1915 ushered a period of profound changes to the industrial relations in French war mobilization. Even though Thomas was fully committed to the sanctity of private production and even resisted proposals to impose a tax on war profits (Hardach, 1992, p. 95; Hennebique, 1992), his presence as a socialist deputy in charge of one of the most important positions in the state, his rhetorical strategy towards the working class, and his reformist measures to reduce the acute burden on the working class was significant in sustaining the image of incorporation of the working class into the state. To address the severe shortage of skilled workers in heavy industries at the time when it had become clear that the war would take longer than originally expected, Thomas asked industrialists to draw up lists of skilled workers who were drafted into the army but whom they needed for their operation as well as the number of unskilled workers to be recalled from the frontline back to the factories. The exemption process of skilled workers was systematized and codified in August 1915 under the Dalbiez law, under which 500,000 workers were recalled back to

[5] Godfrey (1987) argues that "traditional methods of French parliamentary control, such as debate, procedural sabotage, and the work of commissions had very little influence on the course of state industrial intervention" (p. 296). However, one can point to the profound impact of the legislation, pushed through the Senate by Clémenceau in March 1917, that banned any imports into France unless it is regulated by government committees, on the development of corporatist structures in the metallurgical sector as evidence of the influence of the parliamentary process on state industrial intervention. Furthermore, the bill passed in the summer of 1915 also imposed certain parliamentary control over the industry according to which "the state oversees orders, the reception of manufactured goods, and the rational use of labour, etc.", and "the state had the right to impose a service representative 'invested with control over the technical, industrial, or commercial management of the company insofar as manufacturing related to contracts signed with the state is concerned" (Hardach, 1992, pp. 100-1).

industrial work, recovering much of the labour force shortage that hit the industries in the first year of the war (Smith et al., 2003, pp. 61-2).[6]

In order to stop employers from abusing this situation, the government required the conscription workers to be paid the same as the current regional wage and allowed union representative to examine the qualification of each recalled worker (Bonzon, 1997, p. 180). Furthermore, the law established tripartite commissions to oversee the condition of the conscripted workers with members appointed by the prefects based on the lists provided by trade unions and employers' associations (Vichniac, 1990, p. 172). The continued shortage of workers, especially in unskilled and semi-skilled positions, was addressed by introducing new categories of workers into the factories. These included women, children, colonial workers, and prisoners of war.[7]

One of the ways by which the trade unions were incorporated into the state project in this period was carried via consultative commissions such as the *Commission Consultative du Travail* (Labour Advisory Board) between June to December 1916, as well as joined consultative committees such as *Commission Nationale du Placement* (National Placement Commission) in June 1916 (Horne 1991, pp. 71-3). Thereby, the role of the CGT as an interlocutor between its members and the government ministers and deputies continued into this period along the lines that had started in the previous period. Also, once in January 1917 the government announced the introduction of a wage scale to adjust for the rising cost of living (in addition to a minimum wage), it pursued three methods to implement this policy: based on direct negotiation between the employers and workers' representatives, based on a tripartite commission established by the government, or based on direct administrative order (Vichniac, 1990, p. 176).[8]

All these efforts could not dampen the upsurge of militancy in 1917 among workers and soldiers in the form of strikes and mutinies.[9] In the hope of improving industrial relations, Thomas

[6] In a significant ideological shift behind national conscription, the law replaced the notion of "blood tax" to "the right man in the right place" to justify the distribution of military service between the home front and war front based on efficiency in the overall war effort (see Chancerel, 2015; Beaupré, 2014). To avoid favouritism, the law also changed the basis of request for skilled workers from specific workers to the category of skilled workers (Vichniac, 1990, p. 172). These both indicate a shift in the state's policy towards an efficient and rational distribution of manpower both in the home front and war front.

[7] The employment of women especially in war industries increased sharply during the war. In the Department of the Seine, this number increased from 5 per cent in 1914 to 30 per cent of the workforce in 1918 (Dubesset et al., 1992, p. 186). Under the pressure of groups such as the *Comite Intersyndical d'Action contre l'Exploitation de la Femme* (the Inter-Union Committee Against the Exploitation of Women Workers) associated with various unions and workers' organizations (Horne, 1991, pp. 222-3), the government implemented a series of measures to protect female workers (Dubesset et al., 1992, p. 192). Also, see Darrow (2000) for a more recent account of the participation of French women in the war.

[8] To resolve possible conflicts arisen from this process, the government instituted compulsory arbitration commissions, albeit without the participation of the representatives from employers' associations or workers' unions and with considerable objection from but the socialist party and the CGT (see Becker, 1985, p. 206).

[9] Although the number of mutinies was quite high, the vast majority of the cases were pardoned or reduced to imprisonment. Between August 1914 and January 1917, there were 424 cases of imprisonment in total and between 7 to

called for the institution of the *delegues d'atelier* (workshop delegates or shop stewards) in early 1917. Contrary to the case of Britain, the purpose of the *delegues d'atelier* was not the protection of craft boundaries but bread and butter issues (Vichniac, 1990, p. 192). The idea of establishing the *delegues d'atelier* was initially supported by the CGT because it could potentially be used to strengthen union presence in the shop floors. Most employers were not supportive of this initiative in the fear that it could fall under the control of the unions or be used to generalize collective grievances beyond individual workshops. Therefore, the election of delegates and their jurisdiction became hotly debated issues.

Internal tension within the CGT with regards to the form of interaction with the state after 1917 found its locus on the question of shop floor representation (Horne 1991, pp. 190-1). The majority-wing of the CGT demanded an industry-wide system that could reflect the general transformation of labour relation during the war and empower the union to stand for the industrial workers. They also wanted the union to be able to send their own candidates. They wished to use the delegate system as "agents of syndicalist 'management and control'" (Horne, 1991, p. 195). But the minority-wing of the CGT disagreed with the reformist direction of the majority CGT and, instead, wanted to utilize these to intensify anti-war campaigning in revolutionary syndicalist directions. Ultimately, however, the government followed the instruction of the *comité des forges* on this issue not only about who could vote but also the inability to present collective demands (see Vichniac, 1990, p. 178). Despite the systematic efforts to prevent radicalization of these institutions, these workshop delegates in some cities such as Paris extended their militancy to political issues such as pacifism.

The tripartite structure gave working-class organizations a level of flexibility to switch between lobbying and parliamentary efforts, and cooperation in the corporatist structure. For example, in 1917 and 1918, when the establishment could not reduce industrial action, "The official CGT leadership was fully involved in the strike negotiations and in consultation over the law" (Horne 1991, p. 179; see also Becker, 1985, p. 205-16). This allowed the syndicalist leaders to take responsibility for the militant industrial actions and the victories (p. 179), while also (in the case of majority CGT) distancing itself from the anti-war efforts. The tension within the CGT during the 1917 and 1918 strikes between minority and majority reflect the tension in the gravitational pull within tripartism between parliamentarism and corporatism (see Horne, 1991, pp. 189-90). In line with corporatist tendencies, the majority GCT saw an opportunity to enhance the contractual relation with employers based on collective bargaining in exchange for a disciplined workforce.

8 executions per months (Keiger, 2000, p. 251). On the question of mutinies and remobilization of soldiers after 1917, see Smith (1994; 1997).

Yet, in line with parliamentarism, especially the minority CGT sought to gain concessions from the employers through radicalization and generalization of class struggle into wider industrial circles.

The contradictions of tripartism exacerbated under the pressure of the war on the French military at the war front and the growing social unrest at the home front, as well as the impact of international events such as the Russian Revolution and the defeat of the Italian army at Caporetto. Calls for ending the war on a negotiated peace were growing not only outside the state among the strikers and mutinies but also at the heart of the state even among influential deputies of Radical parties, spearheaded by Joseph Caillaux. On the right, there was a concerted campaign, led most notably by Clémenceau, to escalate the economic and industrial efforts to achieve a total military victory. The political crisis began in the secret sessions. The government, and particularly Thomas, came under increasing pressure by the chamber in two secret sessions in June and July 1917 regarding his war policies. The crisis resulted in the fall of two governments, headed by Alexandre Ribot and then the Paul Painleve, within a short span of time. Furthermore, the refusal of Ribot's government on 2 June 1917, under the instruction of President Raymond Poincaré, to issue passports for the socialist delegates to attend the socialist Peace Conference in Stockholm created a deep disdain among the SFIO and the GCL against the state. In September, the SFIO decided to leave the *union sacrée*. Respecting the party discipline, Thomas announced his resignation as the Minister of Munition. All these developments made the critical task of Poincaré, who had actively work to maintain the unstable equilibrium of forces under the *union sacrée* until 1917, impossible. On 15 November 1917, Poincaré asked Clémenceau to form a government, effectively ending the *union sacrée* and entering a new period in the state structure.[10]

What happened under Clémenceau was far from a transformation into a dictatorship, military or otherwise. It was essentially a change in the architecture of the state back to a more centralized configuration through extensive use of decrees by the executive branch.[11] This was similar to the first period albeit without the suspension of the chambers. In this vein, although Clémenceau concentrated the power in his hands, he continued to seek the approval of the chamber on key issues and to appear in front of the chamber for parliamentary inquiries.[12] As Keiger (2000) argues, "what allowed Clémenceau to act independently and govern so strongly, was his popularity and the fact that, for all his authoritarian manner, he operated within the bounds of the constitution and maintained republican legality" (p. 260). Clémenceau was well aware of the deep-seated

[10] For the detailed account of the decisions that led to the selection of Clémenceau as the Prime Minister, see Keiger (2000).
[11] On 10 February 1918, the chamber passed legislation into law that expanded the government's use of decrees into specific areas.
[12] In this period, however, the use of secret sessions of the chamber was abandoned.

resentment towards him by the SFIO and the CGT which had roots in his role during the miners' strikes in 1906. Given the antagonistic position of the socialist deputies towards the state in this period and the generally supportive disposition of the CGT towards the strike actions, Clémenceau took a "carefully nuanced" attitude towards the organized labour and the strikes by distinguishing between "reasonable" economic demands and "unacceptable" pacifist demands (Horne, 1991, p. 172; Horne, 1997).

This centralization of state structure did not lead to a qualitative change in the tripartite structure of representation and state intervention. The role of the *comité des forges* in heavy industry as the only legitimate entity to negotiate with the British government and distribute raw material among the French producers had been irreversibly solidified by the beginning of the third period. Furthermore, a vast network of consortia[13] had been developed largely by the state during the previous periods to facilitate the state's supervision on material distribution and commodity prices in almost every area of production, military or civilian (see Godfrey, 1987). Although the state played a constitutive role in creating the corporate aggregates among the private interests, it limited its further engagement at the level of coordination and regulation. It never crossed the boundaries of capitalist ownership and control and left capitalists in charge of production. The private industry maintained the right to accept or refuse government contracts (Smith et al., 2003, p. 65; Hardach, 1992, p. 72).

The alienation of the working-class organizations from the state and a rather cautious attitude of the government towards them in this phase prevented the development of the working-class leg of a corporatist arrangement. Conversely, this relative distance of the CGT especially in this period, from the war effort allowed the union as a whole, albeit to a different extent between the majority and minority wings, to maintain the control of the strikes and their relationship with the rank-and-file. This becomes clear when looking at the strike actions that erupted in the spring of 1918, most notably in the Paris region and Loire.[14] The *delegues d'atelier* were radicalized in these two industrial centres by the end of 1917 and they were organizing workers along openly anti-war demands. Despite their initial success in rallying up a large number of rank-and-file workers behind the anti-war strike actions, the movement died out after a few days without significant state repression. These strike movements faced serious problems that prevented their generalization and success. First, the hesitations of the CGT leadership with regards to the nature or timing of these actions[15] and the failure of the militant *delegues d'atelier* to coordinate their activities effectively

[13] These were manufacturing groups that were subordinated to a leading company.
[14] The following account draws on Jean-Jacques Becker's (1985, pp. 251-301) account of these movements in 1918.
[15] This extended beyond the leaders of the majority wing of the CGT such as Jouhaux who were completely against any action that would disrupt the war effort. In the most militant centres of the anti-war actions, it was also largely true of

with anti-war elements within the CGT leadership prevented the union (or even the anti-war fraction) to extend its support to these movements. Furthermore, the *delegues d'atelier* themselves were unable to overcome the contradiction between their outright rejection of "defeatism" even though the logical conclusion of their revolutionary anti-war actions required accepting the potential defeat of France in the war.[16] Such fundamental problems made these potentially revolutionary movements susceptible to the gravitational pull of the contradictory unity that the CGT was able to maintain because of its insider-outsider position in the war effort. This ambiguous position prevented the alienation of the rank-and-file from the leadership.

To sum up, despite the momentum behind the self-mobilization of society, parliamentarism, in the context of a weak civil society, was not feasible in France after the outbreak of the war. A direct, active and coordinated state intervention in industrial mobilization was required. France needed a rapid and vast mobilization especially after the loss of the Northern territories. It had to overcome the weakness (or non-existence) of collaborative structures, most notably, between producers in key economic sectors such as chemical and textile, and between employers and workers' organization generally. This demanded a state form that could enable assertive and constitutive actions needed to carry out the war effort. Yet, the underlying republicanism of the French state and its constitutional structure prevented a militarization of the state that might have been needed to aggressively and perhaps directly organize social classes under the state project. Furthermore, the weakness of the labour unions with their rapidly declining membership in the first period and state's reluctance to recognize them as an active partner in war mobilization until late in the war, on the one hand, and the relative weakness of state bureaucracy and authority in heavy industries such as the metallurgical sector compared to those of employers' associations, on the other hand, soon made it clear that the corporatist path was not feasible either.

During the course of the war, the French state took a tripartite mode of representation. At first, the *union sacrée* provided a strong basis to nurture the tripartite state, despite the fragile equilibrium of forces that composed it. After the effective collapse of the *union sacrée* at the end of the second period, the pattern of state intervention and its institutional infrastructure had been laid out in ways that could still sustain the tripartite form despite the shift in the architecture of the state towards a relatively more vertical distribution of power. The hybridity of tripartism in terms of political representation and modes of state intervention facilitated flexible and diverse ways through which capitalist and working-class forces were "incorporated" into the state.

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the leaders of the minority wing of the CGT, such as Alphonse Merrheim and Albert Bourderon, and, to a lesser degree, the Trade Union Defense Committee, the explicitly anti-war contingency within the CGT.

[16] Even one of the most radical individuals among the *delegues d'atelier*, Clovis Andrieu, went to a great length to distance themselves from charges of "defeatism" while emphasizing their "pacifism" (see Becker, 1985, p. 284).

Under the tripartite state, new employers' associations were created, and prominent ones strengthened. In this way, capitalist forces gained more coherence as a class and were incorporated into the state project as a more unified force. Although they maintained a significant level of autonomy from and leverage over the decisions of the parliamentary executive, the parliamentary oversight and powers reserved by the government, including formal, constitutive, and coordinating, gave certain leverage to the parliamentary bureaucracy to participate in the corporatist decision-making process and implementation of policies.

Regarding the incorporation of the working class, the inclusion of socialists into the *union sacrée* government, first symbolically with Guesde and Sembat and then substantially with Thomas, implied a significant yet limited opening for the working-class forces to expand the horizon of class struggle deeper into the heart of the state. As discussed above, the socialist deputies abandoned the *comité d'action* after the reopening of the Chamber of Deputies at the end of the first periods since they saw a shift in the locus of class struggle. The inclusion of organized labour into the state was limited largely to consultative inputs and, later into the second period, to union representations on certain tripartite commissions (Hardach, 1992, p. 68).

The state still relied on the self-mobilization of organized labour behind the war effort to sustain their precarious inclusion into the state projects. Incorporation of the working-class in the tripartite state implied that the class struggle that the working-class forces could wage was both diversified (in the sense that it could be waged at different levels inside and outside the state) and diffused (in the sense that it could be externally countered at multiple loci and internally obscured). Given the weakness of the working-class organizations, the ambiguities of their programmatic orientation, the internal fragmentations, and the strength of their adversaries, their inclusion within the tripartite state diffused its class struggle across the state and in effect disorganized it. Further implications of tripartite state-form on class struggle in comparison with the Italian and German cases are discussed in the next section.

Comparing the making of the movements France with Germany and Italy

Political processes through which the state-forms evolved in each of these countries are elaborated separately in the case studies. Here, the key differences are recounted and their implications for working-class movements are explained. The comparative analysis between the positive and negative cases anchors itself on a characterization of the cases based on the hegemonic vision of the state and the principal dimensions of state-form, namely, institutional architecture, modes of representation, and patterns of state intervention. While providing an overview of the principal characteristics of the cases, the consequences of such characterization on the processes are discussed through which class struggle, especially those of working classes, in these countries are

rendered through the state. It is precisely in the diverse processes within which class contradictions and tensions evolve that the emergence of the "council democratic" movement can be understood.

An important factor that lies in the background of the evolution of state-form is the hegemonic vision underpinning the war effort. Although not always directly relevant to the transformations of state institutions and the balance of class forces, hegemonic vision may facilitate or hinder certain resolutions and therefore affect the transformation of the state-form. Regarding this factor, there was a qualitative difference between France, and Germany and Italy. The ability of the French state to rally diverse political forces behind the *union sacrée* until late in the war contributed to a high level of self-mobilization by social and political forces. The *union sacrée* was more sustainable not only because it was easier to argue that France was fighting a defensive war but also because it went beyond rhetorical measures by introducing diverse political forces into the heart of the state.

Consequently, this freed the state to a large extent from having to develop institutional structures and modes of intervention necessary to control organized labour either through overt coercion or intense integration. Furthermore, the success of this "one nation" ideology contributed to the reduction of antagonism of working-class organizations within the state and a large segment of the rank-and-file against the capitalist classes. The depth and breadth of the self-mobilization process behind the French war effort also multiplied the number of layers, especially outside the state and within various levels of civil society, that could actively intervene to justify actions and normalize ideological tensions if and when occurred. In other words, the maintenance of the ideological unity behind the war effort was decentralized and cascaded beyond the state.

The situation was profoundly different in Germany and Italy. In the case of the former, the preservation of the *Burgfrieden* was much more precarious in the face of military aggression against Belgium and France from the initial phases of the war. This hegemonic vision was further impaired by the failure of the state to go beyond symbolism and actually bring together diverse political forces under a unified ideological project. Most notably, the socialist party and unions, which went along with the *Burgfrieden* following a patriotic duty and in the hope of future concessions from the state, continued to be seen as untrustworthy allies and a necessary evil that should be kept at bay. The safeguarding of the governing bodies responsible for the management of the war from the direct participation of the socialist representatives and the lack of any serious incorporation of the organized labour into the organization of the war until 1916 made it apparent that the spirit behind this social truce was but an attempt to establish a "two nations" hegemonic vision. The hegemonic vision in the Italian case was even more limited due to the process through which it abandoned its neutrality and joined the Entente side but also the refusal of the socialists and the Catholic forces to

throw their active support behind the war effort. What the working-class organizations were willing to formally agree on at best was a noncompliant non-interference with the war effort under the slogan, the *né aderire né sabotare*. This made the state even more cautious than in the German case to involve socialist representatives and working-class organizations into the war effort in direct and substantial ways. The existential problems embedded in the fragmentary national formation under Risorgimento continued to cripple the ability of the Italian state to even conceive of a cohesive "two nations" hegemony strategy.

Consequently, the fragility of the hegemonic visions in both Germany and Italy required more direct interventions and creative integrations, in repressive and consensual forms, to preserve the unstable equilibrium of compromise between different class forces. Therefore, the state became responsible for carrying out large bulk of the ideological operation to manufacture consent as it could rely less extensively and spontaneously on the diverse and decentralized ideological nodes within the civil society. This put the state's war project on a more perilous and contentious path towards the effective mobilization of class forces. The active role of the state in these two countries in this regard becomes more apparent after 1916 which often created disunity among the social and political forces.[17]

As the historical account above depicted, the architecture of the French state underwent changes in different periods, but it eventually adapted a relatively non-militarized transversal structure. For constitutional and historical reasons, the French military and the major institutions of the state was kept under the control of and accountable to the civilian representatives. The reinstitution of the parliament from the second period reversed the centralization process that had commenced at the outbreak of the war and empowered the legislative body to hold the executive branch and the conduct of the war formally accountable through diverse methods such as secret sessions and parliamentary delegation system. Although the state reverted back to a relative centralization in the third period, as shown above, it remained essentially non-militarized. Furthermore, even though the French state had a relatively high degree of centralized bureaucracy, its institutional capacity was quite limited in certain key sectors, most notably the metallurgical sector, to meet the needs of its war mobilization. It, therefore, had to rely on preexisting non-state bureaucratic structures of employers' associations such as the *comité des forges* which retained a considerable level of autonomy. In other key sectors, such as the chemical, the state actively

[17] One of the most consequential symptoms of such a pluralizing process was the emergence of the embryonic forms of the myth of "enemy within" primarily by the nationalist right-wing forces.

proliferated such networks of consortia. It was then possible for the state to limit its intervention to coordination and regulation, and to offset the pressing needs of the military and the society.[18]

The non-militarized state architecture in France relatively decoupled the dialectical processes within the military order from those of the state. Therefore, the contradictions within the military order did not translate more directly to a crisis of the state. For example, even though the French army experienced far more numerous and intense mutinies especially in 1917 compared to the German army up until the Revolution and the Italian army including the crisis of Caporetto, such large-scale direct challenges to the military hierarchy did not traverse deep into the state relative to the protracted effects of tensions within the German and the Italian military apparatuses on the entire states.

The non-militarized transversal state architecture also increases the chance of diversifying the strategic selectivity of the state institutions in favour of broader political forces and, therefore, balancing more effectively between the needs of the military, the industry, and the public. Furthermore, since the relations of production were not militarized, the formal separation between the "economic" and the "political" was maintained, creating a buffer between economic and political crises. This allowed the capitalist state to present itself as hovering neutrally above the relations of production and upholding the "general will".

The state's architecture in both Germany and Italy, though under different constitutional preconditions and political processes, underwent a process of militarization which profoundly affected the key institutions of the state and the relations of forces within it. The militarization of the German and Italian states was due to a combination of constitutional preconditioning and political processes which came about due not only to particular developments during the war but also the historicity of past political struggles between classes and class fractions as outlined in each case study. The militarization of the German state had its roots in its constitutional structure which severed any control of the military High Command by the Chancellor or the Reich. This made the military High Command structurally immune from interference by both executive and legislative branches. What the government could do at most to exert some influence on the military was through the military budget. The Italian constitution (if one can call the *statuto albertino* a constitution) was even more complicated due to the equivocal nature of the *statuto* in defining the relationship between various aspects of the state and branches of the government (see Cassese, 2011). The monarch was the absolute centre of the political system. As far as the military apparatus

[18] The attempt to balance the needs of the military, the war industries, and the public is exemplified in the way the French government conceived the exemption process of skilled workers and protective measures of conscripted workers under the Dalbiez law.

was concerned, all significant matters relating to foreign policy and the military high command were reserved to the monarch. The executive power was also constitutionally vested in the King.

The German state underwent a definite process of militarization and centralization after the outbreak of the war starting from the abdication of the legislative power to the executive, coupled with the empowerment of the military apparatus to substantially control the key institutions of the state such as the War Ministry and its KRA (under the leadership of Major Josef Koeth from April 1915). This process reached its maturation after the advent of the Third OHL under Hindenburg in August 1916. After the failure of the parliamentary coalition in the third period between the Centre Party, the SPD, and the FVP to curb the power of the militarized state and push for a peace negotiation, the state moved further towards militarization by replacing Michaelis with Hertling as the Chancellor, therefore, leaving all the important decisions to the military apparatus. The militarization of the Italian state came about under a precipitate process after joining the war effort in 1915, beginning from the abdication of the legislative power at the outbreak of the war to an extensive transfer of executive power to the Supreme Command. Upon the declaration of a large part of Italy as a military zone, the militarization process expanded beyond the state and explicitly into the social sphere. The centralization process also intensified in Italy especially during the second period with the institution of the CCM under the directorship of General Dallolio.

In both of these countries, the influence of the military apparatus within the state grew over time during the war. The militarization process also led to a more direct intervention into the management of labour relations and a more vertical configuration of the relation of forces. In Germany, this was formalized under the Hindenburg Program and its Auxiliary Service Law under which the state introduced industrial conscription. In Italy, this took the form of direct militarization of labour relations down to the factory floors. However, the strategic selectivity of the capitalist state towards the reproduction of capitalist interests exhibited itself in the asymmetrical reorganization of relations of production. Neither in Germany nor in Italy was the relation with the private interest militarized to the extent that would lead to requisitioning of factories, even though the threat of such an action was made and the legal basis for it was laid out. Even though the capitalists were infuriated by the state's interference in their managerial authority to the extent and in the form that it was realized, the benefits of such a militarization of labour relations quelled their dissent.

The consequences of the militarized state were profound for the dialectical processes within and outside the state. Besides the distorted strategic selectivity of the militarized state sharply towards hierarchical subordination of the state to the military order and the fraction of capital linked to it, such a state also has the tendency to militarize labour relations as a way to bring the working

class under its chain of command.[19] To the extent that it militarizes labour relations, it precludes the formal separation of the "political" and the "economic" and, thereby, transmits the class contradictions of capitalist social relations more directly to the state. It, therefore, ties up with struggles of working classes more intimately to the struggle against military order and the militarized state. Its vertical structure tends to focus class contradictions at different levels and channel them through the state to the top echelon of the military. Conversely, the challenges to the military order within the army ranks can threaten to destabilize the state more directly. Altogether, the contradictions of the military, the state, and capital are intertwined.

It is important not to conceive of the military either as an autonomous force or the mere embodiment of the repressive state apparatus that affect all class forces and fractions indiscriminately. Even though it affects the constellation of forces through a vertical organization of the state architecture as an image of its own hierarchical structure, it also reconfigures the balance of forces between class fractions into a new unstable equilibrium. This implies that the military order is caught up in class struggle between classes and class fractions not just as an outsider to these forces but as part of the constellation. The determination of the latter depends on particular cases in terms of the dynamic relation of military forces to a specific fraction of capital, especially those related more immediately to the material and strategic needs of the military command.[20] In the case of Germany and Italy, the militarization of the state facilitated a more direct intervention into the management of labour relations and a more vertical configuration of the relation of forces. Furthermore, it crystalized the domination of certain fractions of capital within the state – in both cases but to different extent and in diverse forms, the fraction of capital linked to heavy industries and finance. The rigid structure that it sets up in favour of certain fractions of capital smother the struggle within the capitalist bloc, thereby elevating such struggle potentially to the level of opposition against the military and the state.[21]

The negative and the positive cases differed crucially on the mode of representation and intervention. Even though none of these countries perfectly and statically map onto archetypical models, it can proximally be said that France developed a tripartite mode, and Germany and Italy a corporatist mode of representation. Tripartism in France is characterized as structural hybridity and flexibility in the form and extent to which the employers and working classes were incorporated

[19] The realization and the form that such tendency takes depends largely on the strength of the working-class organizations both within and outside the state via political parties and labour unions.
[20] In rare but crucial cases, the military might represent the working class or other popular classes.
[21] The extent to which such challenges are articulated or realized depends on many factors including the level of antagonism of such fractions to the balance of class forces struck by the military order, the strength of their collective organization and social bases, and the ability of the state to contain/preempt such challenges either through coercion or concession. Nevertheless, the support of smaller fractions of capital in Italy and Germany for the takeover of fascist and reactionary forces after the war is a case in point.

into the state. This did not always take the form of associational integration. France had to move rapidly towards re-organizing its industrial production after the loss of its Northern territories. This initiated a process of associational organization of the economy either by empowering the existing employers' organizations or creating new ones. While the intensification of the war and the external pressures[22] in later periods entrenched such associational organization of the economy, the reopening of the parliament and the appointment of Thomas in the second period paved the way for a different mode of representation and intervention. The mode of representation was diversified between some level of corporatism, especially with regards to the representation of employers' interests through the constitution of relatively autonomous syndicates, and parliamentarism, especially with regards to the representation of workers as citizens through parliamentary actions.

Consequently, the French state actively engaged in organizing the capitalist class through the formation of consortia and strengthening the organizational power of existing employers' associations while disorganizing the working classes through dilution of working-class struggle. Even though the tripartite structure gave the working-class organizations a level of flexibility to alternate between lobbying and governmental efforts, and cooperation in a corporatist structure, it resulted in strategic confusion and diffusion. In the meanwhile, the working-class organizations could in effect contain the rank-and-file militancy, not by disciplinary actions but by the underlying positional ambiguity as an insider-outsider that this mode of representation had granted it. Furthermore, the systematic presence-absence of the socialist deputies in the functioning of the state also contributed to the overall containment of the working-class grievances.

In the case of Germany, the state approached a corporatist militarized state especially after the Hindenburg Program in 1916. However, the fact that the socialist deputies and labour leaders were kept outside the direct management of the war from the very beginning and the military rapidly increased its dominance over the state apparatus already made the state-form prone to corporatist arrangement. An example of this is the KRA which was designed and led by the prominent industrialist, Walther Rathenau, but fell under the direct control of the military after he was replaced by Major Koeth in April 1915. In the first period of the war, the state tried to align private industrialists behind the state project by creating huge economic incentives and limiting state intervention to the supply of raw material for the army and food provisioning. Until the end of 1916, the working-class organizations were not integrated into the state in a systematic and meaningful way. Therefore, while the state architecture was relentlessly becoming militarized, the

[22] The most notable of such external pressures was the demand of the British state to deal directly with the *comité des forges* to organize the import of raw material into France.

mode of representation and intervention were still quite different from a corporatist arrangement in the first two years of the war.

As the war dragged on, the pressure over the state's economic arrangement and hegemonic vision became paramount. The fundamental shift necessary to dislocate the contradictions and tensions of the first period was realized in the Hindenburg Program. It intensified the verticalization and militarization of the state architecture by centralizing all exports and war-related industries under the newly established War Office led by General Groener. But more importantly, it moved decisively towards setting up a corporatist arrangement. Under the leadership of Groener, the state corporatist capacity was expanded through establishing war corporations (*Kriegsgesellschaften*) in various branches of the industry.[23] As the militarization of the state intensified, these entities (with important exceptions such as the iron and steel industry) became less self-governing and more channels of state authority (see Roth, 1997). The gains that capitalists made under this program well outweighed the relative tightening of control and freedom under this corporatist arrangement. Their profit margin was not to be restrained and the closure or consolidation of inefficient industries was left to be decided among the industrialists themselves. Furthermore, the industrial conscription that restricted labour mobility and compelled them to work where they were assigned gave capitalist a massive advantage.

The integration of the trade unions into the state project was facilitated not only through their participation in the joint committees (determination committees, draft committees, and arbitration committees) and creating mandatory workers' committees, but also by agreeing to some of the key demands of the union, particularly articulated under the Paragraph 9 of Auxiliary Service Act,[24] in exchange for the union support in the implementation of industrial conscription and the control of their members against industrial agitations. The unions now had a more concrete stake in the game to ensure the working of the Auxiliary Service Act. Amidst a considerable loss of membership in 1916 and the persisting restrictions on union collective actions, the unions found it increasingly difficult to control the workers. This was made even more complex since the state sought to address the labour shortage in war industries by facilitating the introduction of new types of workers, most notably female workers and prisoners of war, despite the resistance of the employers and concerns of the trade unions. Large-scale introduction of female workers in key industries at the time of severe food crisis created a bridge between the agitations outside and inside

[23] More purely corporatist ideas were pitched in this period by prominent individuals such as Wichard von Moellendorff, an engineer and one of the leading members of the KRA since its inception, to establish a social economy (*Gemeinwirtschaft*) through "people's economic councils".
[24] This clause allowed "a suitable improvement in conditions of labour" to count as "significant grounds" for issuing leave certification for the workers who wanted to change their job. For other concessions to the unions, see Feldman (1992, p. 225).

the factories. Therefore, the integration of the trade unions into the corporatist structure of the state at the time of increasing sociopolitical agitations created a swelling gap between union leadership and rank-and-file.

The inability of the trade unions and the socialist party to maintain the social truce became ever more evident in early 1917. Despite the failure of the unions to maintain discipline among the workers, the corporatist arrangement persisted because some of the leading figures within the militarized state still thought it could win the war through a more total mobilization that the Hindenburg Program envisioned and even if Germany is defeated, the monarchy could be saved if the unions could regain control of the workers. To regain legitimacy in the eyes of the public, the SPD pushed for reforms in the Prussian three-class suffrage system. However, the campaign achieved only a vague rhetorical promise by the Kaiser for reconsideration of such reform measures after the war. The attempt to change the balance of political forces that commenced after July 1917 further tied the socialist party to the prospects of such fragile consolidatory measures to reform the state from within. However, the new equilibrium of force proved too unstable and weak to plough its way through the militarized state. Therefore, the reforms never took place and the peace resolution proposed by the coalition was discarded by the OHL. Instead, the internal tensions within the SPD reached their peak amidst mass protests for peace and industrial agitations in 1917 and caused a split within the party.

The case of Italy is more complex because of the relative weakness of both the unions and the employers' associations. Nevertheless, following schemes suggested by leading industrialists such as Olivetti and the CIDI, the basic corporatist structure was laid out in the first period through the establishment of the CRMs. These institutional entities brought together representatives of the industry, workers, civilians, and the military to organize regional economic activities under the centralized directorship of the CCM. Labour disputes were obligatorily referred to the CRMs for arbitration.

Despite some unpalatable aspects of the arrangement from the perspective of the private producers, the overall trajectory of state intervention through this corporatist structure was overwhelmingly beneficial to the industrialists. Similar to Germany, the state avoided restricting profits of the capitalist producers or controlling their costs. The Italian state limited state intervention to protectionist measures especially for the heavy industries. It linked the private interests to the war effort by offering lucrative state contracts. The situation was significantly different for the organized labour movement in the first period. Due to the noncompliance of Italian organized labour with the war effort, the representatives of trade unions were not formally included in the CRMs in the first period. Having lost their traditional forms of action due to the banning of

strikes at the beginning of the war and having been pushed outside the formal participation in the war efforts, the trade unions were completely marginalized in the first period.

The contradictions that resulted from the direct intervention of the state in the labour relations compelled the state to bring in the representatives of the trade union in the second period in the hope of managing the growing industrial unrest that had exhausted the arbitration capacity of the corporatist structure. This process pushed the mode of representation further in the direction of corporatism. Similar to Germany, the state sought to address the shortage of labour by facilitating the introduction of a large number of female and child workers into war industries. This not only created difficulties for trade unions to maintain the rank-and-file discipline but also created a bridge between the tensions outside factories and the industrial unrest inside the workplaces. Furthermore, to reduce the tensions at the shop level, the state proliferated the factory-based intersectoral collective representation of the rank-and-file. The unions initially welcomed this step since they saw these intuitions as a means of improving union representation. In the context of further alienation of the socialist and catholic political forces from the war project and the inability of the trade unions to maintain control of workers, the militarized state reverted back to its earlier approach to corporatist arrangements. It bypassed the trade union as the formal workers' representatives in the CRMs and instead worked towards formal recognition and direct integration of the internal commissions into the corporatist structure. This angered not only the trade unions but also the industrialists as they both saw their authority undermined by this process.

The diverse effects of the corporatist transformation in the case of Italy and Germany will be analyzed in the next section. Here, the focus is on the consequence of corporatist arrangements on class struggle within and outside the state more generally. In both Germany and Italy, the effective isolation of the political parties from influencing the management of the war crippled the possibility of maintaining the balance of class forces through parliamentary representation. It was the functional representation of class forces in corporatist structures that became the dominant mode to maintain the unstable equilibrium of class forces. Corporatism created a level of cohesion among a significant segment of the capitalist class and empowered them economically and politically. The restriction of the working-class forces, either coercively or voluntarily, from exercising their class power through industrial militancy and the limitations of the socialist deputies in channelling workers' interests through parliamentary means left organized labour reliant on the corporatist channels to protect their members and improve their conditions. This was, of course, only allowed as long as these working-class organizations did not partake in militant agitations. The crucial condition for their functional participation in the corporatist structure was in their ability to maintain control of the workers. However, their further incorporation into the state was accompanied by a

rising level of social tensions which rapidly span out of their control. The level and form of workers' grievances could not be addressed within the confines of the corporatist structure. But with the labour unions deeply embedded in such structure and hopeful of their prospects, the gap between the rank-and-file and the union leadership widened.[25]

Overall, the French state relied on a stronger hegemonic vision and a more flexible state form that allowed it to contain class contradictions and tensions within the boundaries of "normal politics" during extraordinary times. The relative success of the *union sacrée* eased the threshold for sustaining the unstable equilibrium of class forces by building on sociopolitical self-mobilization both within and outside the state. This allowed the hegemonic vision to develop more markedly along its axis of consensus, making the state more lenient toward the integration of key actors into its project.

It was against the background of such a hegemonic vision that the war project in France was pursued through the transversal tripartite state. Its state-form better facilitated the formal separation of the "political" and the "economic" by avoiding the militarization of the state and the industrial relations. This resulted in the relative decoupling of class contradictions and tensions at the level of production as well as those within the military order to traverse immediately through the state and turn into a generalized state crisis. The tripartite state broadly organized the capitalist class by proliferating consortia, strengthening the powerful existing employers' associations, and facilitating capitalist production through coordinating and regulation. It disorganized the working-class struggle in two main ways: a vertical diffusion of working-class struggle at different levels of potential intervention, and a horizontal tie between the union leadership and the rank-and-file through a relative decoupling of the unions from the functional requirements of a corporatist arrangement.

The fact that the French parliament, with a significant presence of the socialist representatives, could exercise authority over the conduct of the war and that a socialist deputy had occupied a powerful position in the government meant that working-class struggle could be waged at different levels including the government, the parliament, the workers' unions, and the factory level. Furthermore, due to the contradictory role of trade unions in the French tripartite structure as neither autonomous organization of the working class nor functional agents of the state policies, the unions were able to generally maintain control of workers during the peak of labour militancy. This is how the militancy of the French working class, to the extent that it did occur, did not manifest itself in a generalized radicalization of the *delegues d'atelier*. However, the structural weakness of

[25] The trajectories of the socialist parties were rather different in Germany and Italy due to their different dispositions towards the war effort. The SPD was initially compliant and remained generally committed to the war project. But the PSI was initially reluctant and later distant itself from the war effort.

the trade unions within the French state that this tripartite arrangement ensued allowed the French employers to continue their hostile dismissal of the trade unions and consolidated the functional mediation of the state between capital and labour.

Class contradictions and tensions were rendered differently in the militarized corporatist state in the case of Germany and Italy. The weakness of the hegemonic visions in both countries required the state to intervene more directly to maintain the highly unstable equilibrium of compromises between classes and class fractions and to implement more comprehensive functional mediation to incorporate key class fractions into the state project. The militarization of the state and the more direct state intervention in labour relation coupled more intimately class contradictions and tensions at the level of capitalist production and those along the military hierarchy in ways that would channel them through the state. Therefore, the crisis of the military and relations of productions could more easily translate into a generalized state crisis.

The corporatist arrangement organized broad segments of the capitalist class in the effort to coordinate industrial mobilization. However, given the dominance of the military apparatus within the state, the fractions of capital that were closest to the military, in either substantive or clientelist way, received exceedingly preferential treatments.[26] To bring the representatives of capital and workers to collaborate in formally equal groups on fundamental issues concerning the regulation of labour relations and the organization of the economy, the state empowered the collective representation of the working class through their participation in these corporatist structures. However, they could not fulfil the basic expectation of their functional role in maintaining the discipline of the workers. Yet their integration into the state alienated the rank-and-file from the trade unions. Militant elements within the rank-and-file began to organize at the factory level outside the corporatist parameters set by the trade union leaderships.

Comparing the making of the movements in Germany with Italy

Despite the general similarities between Germany and Italy which laid the foundation for the emergence of "council democratic" movements, their differences generated tendencies towards different dimensions of "council democracy", namely, "citizens' control" and "workers' control" in Germany and Italy respectively. This section explains such diverse tendencies by focusing on the differences in the underlying counter-hegemonic predispositions and the characteristics of the incorporation of the working-class forces into the state.

[26] This is one of the reasons why more morbid distortions are seen in economic arrangements under militarized states compared to non-militarized states especially in the condition of large-scale wars.

The left-wing forces in Germany and Italy evolved within significantly different contexts during the pre-war years. The absence of the liberal phase in Germany before the war turned the republican demands for the democratization of the state structure into a principal calling within the socialist movement under the leadership of the reformists. Bismarck's strategies of switching alliances fundamentally weakened the liberal forces before the turn of the century. The National Liberal Party increasingly shifted to the right and rallied behind large capital interests. The left-liberal parties before the war were too weak to monopolize the republican values under the liberal flag, leaving the ideological space on that front open for the socialist forces to manoeuvre within. The socialist forces could potentially gain massively from suffrage reform and democratization of the state both in terms of electoral strength and parliamentary power. After a short hibernation during the first two periods of the war, these demands resurfaced once again resolutely after 1917. As evident in the historical trajectory of the German state before the war outlined in the case study, the militarized state could be seen as a morbid yet logical extension of the profound democratic deficit within the German state. In contrast, Italy had a nominally liberal period before the war and the strong pressure within the Liberal Bloc by the Italian Radical Party to push forward republican values somewhat quelled the republican demands within the socialist movement under the leadership of the Maximalists.

The militarized state could be seen as an exceptional state required by harsh conditions of the war that could revert back to a normal state after the war. Giolitti's strategy towards the (left-) liberal forces was markedly different from that of Bismarck as Giolitti sought to integrate them under *trasformismo* by accommodating their principle demands some of which included suffrage expansion and democratization of the state. Given the general weakness of party structure and relatively loose connection between political parties and class interests in the Italian political system, such reforms were less consequential for the ruling classes than was the case in Germany. This limited the ideological horizon of the socialist party to anchor its demands principally on republican values. Additionally, the limitations in the social basis of the socialist movement in Italy and the changing leadership of the PSI increasingly towards Maximalism also contributed to the relative lack of enthusiasm to pursue republican aims towards democratization of the state from within.

A notable distinction between the two labour movements was the relative absence of syndicalist and anarchist trends in Germany compared to Italy which produced different counter-hegemonic tendencies within the working-class movement. The ideological and institutional strength of the Italian syndicalist movement, as well as the symbolic and popular profile of the

anarchist movement, created a stronger inclination inside the Italian labour movements towards syndicalist praxis.

Besides these ideological predispositions, the working-class organizations were integrated into the corporatist structure of the German and Italian state in different ways. The analysis is divided here into three segments, namely, the conditions of the two working-class movements at the beginning of the war, the form and status of the incorporation of the working-class organizations into the two states in the second period, and the specific form and implications of state crisis in Germany and Italy.

At a basic level, the development of capitalist social relations was much more advanced in Germany than in Italy. The much larger size of the German working class empowered the working-class organizations to be an undeniable force to be reckoned with. This was less of an issue within the Italian political landscape, though unevenly so in different industrial sectors. The German socialist movement was also much more well-organized, both bureaucratically and ideologically than the Italian counterpart.

Nevertheless, the active participation of the German working-class movement in the *Burgfrieden* made it less immediately threatening to the war effort than was the case in Italy. This had paradoxical effects on the development of the working-class movement during the war. On the one hand, the active cooperation of the German working-class organizations in the war effort made them into a relatively reliable ally that could be worked with in the industrial mobilization; on the other hand, such an integrationist orientation not only betrayed their pre-war internationalism but also deprived them of utilizing their institutional capacities in the pursuit of disruptive methods of struggle. Therefore, despite its organizational and numerical strength, the German working-class movement became but a toothless partner in the war effort which had to gear its institutional capacities profoundly towards fulfilling its function within the corporatist structure.

The ambivalence of the Italian working-class movement towards the war project at the beginning of the war had its own paradoxical effects. On the one hand, it helped the Italian working-class organizations to maintain a continuity with its pre-war ideological and tactical positions, and to potentially maintain closer links with the rank-and-file; on the other hand, this made the government deeply cautious of collaborating with them in industrial mobilization and led to harsher militarization of labour relations and bypassing of the organized labour unions. Therefore, despite its relative organizational and numerical weakness, the Italian working-class movement presented itself as a serious threat to the war effort which could not be trusted much as a necessary partner within the corporatist structure. This was despite the eagerness of the trade union leadership, especially after the start of the war, to participate in such arrangements.

Within the working-class movement, there were undoubtedly dissenting voices within the party and the unions in both countries. However, there was more cohesion between the socialist party and the union in Germany than between those in Italy. These dynamics had their roots in the pre-war years that shaped the relationship between the party and the union. In Germany, the party and the union answered the call to war in unison by extending their consent to the *Burgfrieden*. In Italy, the discord between the socialist party, under the leadership of the Maximalists, and the socialist unions, under the leadership of the reformists, was reflected in the very term that the working-class movement went along with the war effort, namely, the *né aderire né sabotare*. This essentially ambiguous formulation allowed for the dissonance between the party and the union not only in their attitude towards the war but also their supposedly separate sphere of activities. Thereby, it created further hurdles in the way of transmitting the "economic" to the "political" agitations not only materially but also ideally by transforming the abstract-formal separation between the "economic" and the "political" spheres into a concrete-real separation.

The two countries saw similar patterns in their second periods of war mobilization as labour organizations and their representatives were integrated systematically into the evolving corporatist structures. It was also in the second period in both countries when the state initiated the proliferation of rank-and-file organizations to facilitate its corporatist arrangement. However, the above characteristics created diverse dynamics in Germany and Italy in the way this integration was realized.

In Germany, the corporatist structures of the state facilitated the integration of organized labour into the state much more extensively than was realized in Italy. This had as much to do with the organizational capacity and numerical strength of the German working-class forces as the particular architecture of the corporatist state in Germany, itself affected by the balance of class forces, that allowed for broader and deeper integration of the organized labour. This bounded the German working-class organizations more comprehensively and thoroughly to the state project than the Italian counterpart; yet it obstructed effective communication between workers' organizations and the rank-and-file and redefined the relationship between the unions and their members in functionally corporatist terms. As a result of the comprehensiveness of this integration, the organizational and ideological capacities of the working-class organizations, and the particular form of the regulation of labour relations in Germany, the German unions were relatively more successful in maintaining control of their members and slackened the sociopolitical tensions to be channelled inwardly towards workplace agitations.

The response to the unfolding crisis of the German state, especially since the second half of the war, manifested itself first and foremost outside the factories within the numerous local

initiatives that emerged in response to the food and coal crisis in 1916-17. They were community-led self-help initiatives, often outside the network of trade unions, which sought to fill the gap left by the state's growing failure to provide the basic means of subsistence, first at the local and later at translocal levels. These initiatives preceded the activities of militant labour delegates who started a process of articulation and agitation on the factory floors independently of the union activities and link their activities to the local initiatives. The "council democratic" movements that emerged after the Revolution were rooted precisely in the generalization and radicalization of such initiatives, fueled by the militarization of rank-and-file. From the start, they were primarily preoccupied with subversive activities against the militarized state. They sought to compensate for the inability of the state to meet its basic functions, with a particular emphasis on local control, in matters that went beyond the factory floor and concerned the social reproduction more broadly. They already contained an embryonic form of "citizens' control".

The third period of the German war effort coincided with direct negotiations between the labour unions and the employers' organization in the situation of increasing sociopolitical unrest and deepening state crisis. In the eyes of the upper echelon of the military and the leading capitalists, the organizational and numerical strength of the unions made them an indispensable actor in the survival of the monarchy in the postwar era and a smooth transition to the postwar economy. As a consequence, the unions and the SPD were ever more invested in operationalizing the smooth transition along the lines of the agreement with the employers. Furthermore, the SPD, now in the context of the opposition from the USPD, sought to fill the gap to enable the necessary continuity at the political level that was required for such smooth transition to the postwar order.

In Italy, the more direct militarization of the relations and forces of production directed the locus of sociopolitical struggles to the agitations at the factory level. Due to the mistrust in the socialist movement, the organizational capacity of the trade unions, and the particular form of the regulation of labour relations in Italy, the integration of the organized labour in the corporatist structures was relatively more limited and unstable. Furthermore, the type of institutions that the state helped to proliferate in order to facilitate its corporatist project, namely the internal commissions, was much more firmly rooted in the factory-floor activities than the German workers' commissions. The internal commissions already contained an embryonic form of "workers' control".

In the third period of the Italian war effort, the state once again bypassed organized labour through more direct utilization of the rank-and-file organizations. In this phase, the distance between the socialist party and the union grew even larger as the events of 1917 strengthened the intransigence orientation of the PSI and its increasing hostility in this period towards the war effort.

However, the weakness of the reformist wing within the PSI and the relative flexibility of the CGL towards localism prevented the split within the two.

A significant difference between the two cases lies in the fact that the central authority of the state apparatus, including the military order, did collapse at the end of the war in Germany but not in Italy. The political vacuum that this situation created allowed the radical movements in Germany to take a decisively "political" orientation. This was not as readily possible in Italy where the central authority and the military order remained largely intact despite the deepening crisis and led the way to postwar transition. As the Italian labour movement resumed its traditional method of agitation to improve the condition of its rapidly increasing members, the focus of radical movements fell primarily on the "economic" struggles.

To summarize, the German organized labour under the *Burgfrieden* became a more reliable partner in the war mobilization project than the Italian organized labour under the *né aderire né sabotare*. As a result of the general disposition of the organized labour towards the war project and in the light of the relative numerical and organizational power of the German organized labour, the German trade unions were integrated within the corporatist structures of the German state more deeply than was the case in Italy. Even though such integration eventually burdened effective communication between the union leadership and the rank-and-file, the German unions were relatively more successful in maintaining control of workplaces. Compared to the German corporatist structures with their intermediate institutions of workers' commissions, the corporatist structures in Italy that sought to integrate organized labour into the state project were more limited and precarious.

Although the state did involve the socialist trade unions in the second period of the war mobilization, its corporatist structures relied more heavily on institutions that operated at the factory level. In the third period of the war, the German unions (and eventually, the SPD) became more indispensable to the efforts to keep the state intact and facilitate the postwar transition. In this context, the German employers became more interested in working with organized labour more directly to layout the structure of the postwar labour relations. In the context of the collapse of the state apparatus after the war, these rank-and-file militant actions linked up with the local initiatives outside factories towards democratic governance. In the case of Italy, the state increasingly bypassed the established trade unions in the face of growing social and political unrest in the third period and worked more directly than before with the internal commissions. The Italian employers also were more intransigent towards working with the organized labour in the last period of the war. In the context of the post-war crisis, the rank-and-file militant actions resulted in a generalized radicalization of internal commissions.

These were the factors and dynamics which came together to create a relative divergence between the German and the Italian cases in gravitating towards different moments of "council democracy", with Germany inclining towards "citizens' control" and Italy towards "workers' control". The next chapter delves more deeply into the concrete process through which the movement towards "council democracy" unfolded in each of these countries.

Part II

The Trajectory of "Council Democratic" Movements

Chapter 5

The Trajectory of the "Council Democratic" Movement in Germany (1918-1920)

Introduction

Part I examined the transformative processes that laid the foundation for the emergence of "council democratic" movements. While these developments were conditioned by pre-war struggles within and outside the state, they were shaped by the particular form of state-led war mobilization.

The sudden collapse of the German military apparatus pushed the militarized state into an existential crisis. It created a unique political space for the exponential growth of the movements for democratization that had already emerged in institutional and non-institutional forms during the war. Due to the entanglement of the military apparatus within the state apparatus under the militarized state form, struggles and crises in the military would propagate through the rest of the state. Therefore, the initial impetus ignited by the mutinous soldiers quickly took the generalized form of democratization of the state. This situation gave the council movement in Germany in its initial period a distinctly political character directed towards the democratization of the state.

The chapter analyzes the trajectory of the "council democratic" movement during the German Revolution in strategic-relational terms, on the basis of organizational linkages, programmatic efforts, and alliance patterns. The discussion of the trajectory is divided into three periods. The first period is between 4 November 1918, when the first soldiers' council was formed, to 21 December 1918, marking the end of the First Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils (First Congress, for short). During this period, the movement is analyzed along its constitutive mode of "citizens' control". The second period is between 24 December, marking the "Christmas Battles", to 14 April 1920, when the second Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils ended. After the first period when the institutional path towards radical democratization of the state ceased to appear feasible, certain elements of the movement continued to push towards radical "citizens' control" outside the formal-institutional path. Furthermore, workers in industrial regions could no longer accept the deferral of their demands for democratization of the economic relations and began a series of militant actions. In this way, the trajectory of the "council democratic" movement in the second period took a bifurcated form with one branch seeking to establish radical "citizens' control" and another to realize radical "workers' control", both on the basis of council system. These "branches" were largely disconnected not only geographically but more importantly in terms of formal and substantial aspects. The third period is between 15 April 1919 and 7 October 1920,

when the subordination of factory councils (*Betriebsräte*)[1] to unions was formalized at the end of the first National Conference of German Factory Councils. After the onslaught of paramilitary forces and series of legislative hurdles against the council movement during the second period, the locus of struggle had shifted decisively towards the issue of "workers' control" in the third period and was largely confined to the question of the relation between the factory councils and the trade unions.

The Trajectory of "Council Democratic" Movement of the German Case

First Period (1 November 1918 – 21 December 1918)

The trigger for the volcanic emergence of workers' and soldiers' councils throughout the country was the mutiny of Wilhelmshaven sailors. The mutiny itself was a consequence of the refusal of the sailors to comply with the Naval order to attack the British fleet in the North Sea on 31 October. Faced with the sailors' revolt, the plan was called off and the ships were ordered to go to Kiel while holding the rebellious sailors as prisoners on-board. The Kiel sailors gathered in Union Hall on 1 November to formulate a set of demands to free the imprisoned sailors. After the commanding officers refused to meet their delegates, the sailors organized a large public demonstration on 3 November which turned bloody when the police opened fire. The following day, the sailors formed the first soldiers' council, effectively took control of the city, and issued a list of 14 demands. They included the recognition of the authority of the soldiers' councils and some democratization measures within the military.[2] This was followed by the joint call from the local representatives of the USPD and the SPD for a general strike and the formation of a workers' council to fuse with the soldiers' council.

Kiel soldiers' councils went as far as demanding "the immediate end of the war, the abdication of the Hohenzollern, … [and] the implementation of general, equal, and secret suffrage for men and women" (Artelt, 2012, p. 21). This shows how amidst the crumbling militarized state, the demand for peace and democratization of the military were naturally linked with the demands for democratization of the state and society. In this sense, the question of democratization of the military was not seen as an internal affair but explicitly linked to the question of "citizens' control".

Once the central government in Berlin learned about the revolt in Kiel and the formation of councils, Gustav Noske, an SPD representative from the right-wing of the party, was sent to Kiel with the order to offer amnesty to the revolting soldiers as long as they surrender their weapons and end their standoff. Although he failed to gain the chairmanship of the Central Soldiers' Council,

[1] The term *Betriebsräte* is sometimes translated as "works councils". I follow Ben Fowkes' translation of the term as "factory councils" also to highlight the analogy with the Italian case of factory councils (*consiglio di fabbrica*).
[2] See http://www.kurkuhl.de/docs/kieler_14punkte.pdf for their list of demands.

Noske's popularity as the new governor grew over time, especially among the soldiers. This involvement at the advent of the movement demonstrates how quickly existing organizations can get entangled with subaltern movements. In addition to this attempt to contain the movement at its inception, the government mobilized a real or perceived fear of the potential interference of the Russian state and closed the Russian embassy on 5 November. This marked the beginning of a long process of casting radicalism of the council movement as a "Bolshevik threat" by the government (Buse, 1972, pp. 244-6).

The early strategy of containment was not enough to prevent the spread of the movement elsewhere. As the news about the events in Kiel spread out, workers and soldiers in many other cities followed suit by forming their own councils. By 10 November, councils were formed in numerous cities across the country. Despite some variations in the formation of these councils (e.g. see Tobin, 1984, p. 157 and Comfort, 1966, pp. 35-36), ultimately, workers and soldiers joined forces in all cases in the early days of the revolution. The formation of workers' councils in small and medium-sized cities was generally much faster than in large cities in this period.

The spatial patterns of revolutionary protests in the early days of the revolution (5-9 November) almost everywhere in Germany reveals a pattern of starting from outskirts of towns or cities in places associated with socialist politics such as union buildings and moving into city centres in and around places that symbolized the imperial state (see Jones, 2015). Indeed, contemporaries saw the transformation of the political space as the foremost reason for conceiving the events as a revolution (p. 48). This pattern highlights the rapidly evolving aspiration of the revolutionary movement towards a radical democratic understanding of "citizens' control" manifesting itself symbolically in spatial terms in controlling the public spaces.

The SPD leadership generally considered councils as unrepresentative units due to their class (or sectional) orientation and called for the election of a National Assembly on the basis of universal suffrage as soon as possible.[3] Furthermore, they saw councils as short-lived entities whose possible usefulness extended only to the distribution of food and demobilization of soldiers. While some figures such as Philipp Scheidemann rejected any use for the councils after the commencement of the National Assembly, others such as Max Cohen reserved vague but always subordinated role for the continued existence of the councils alongside the National Assembly. Regardless, the SPD soon mobilized its organizational network at the local level to bring as many of the councils as possible under its leadership in order to maintain control of the revolutionary process.

[3] On 9 November, Ebert said "only a constituent assembly can decide what becomes of Germany" (quoted in Buse, 1972).

There was much less homogeneity in the USPD's orientation towards the councils. It was essentially the opposition to the war that had initially brought together quite a wide range of tendencies under the USPD. The formal end of the war on November 11, shortly after the outbreak of the revolution, diminished the internal cohesion of the USPD and widened the ideological rifts between various factions. This manifested itself most distinctly in USPD's programmatic orientation towards the council movement. These positions became increasingly clear, contentious, and divisive as the question of the political role of the councils in the emerging republic took the centre stage. Hence, the internal diversity of the USPD's programmatic orientation towards the council movement hindered its ability to provide a unified articulation of the movement's political aspiration.

The position of those who could be considered as the "right-wing" of the party, such as Eduard Bernstein, was quite close to the SPD with regards to the councils. Having recognized council republic (*Räterepublik*) as inevitably falling into the "Bolshevik" model in which "a minority exercises its rule with the help of paid guards" (Bernstein, 2020a, p. 363), he identified the parliamentary democracy as the path for the new republic (Bernstein, 2020, pp. 381-2), pending important reforms (Bernstein, 2020b, pp. 381-4). Furthermore, Bernstein saw the socialization of the economy as a slow and gradual process into a distant future (Bernstein, 2020a, pp. 361-6). Similarly, Hugo Haase and Wilhelm Dittmann argued that only a national assembly elected on the basis of universal suffrage would have the legitimacy to determine the future of the German State (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 94). Bernstein called for a speedy convocation of the National Assembly.

The USPD "centre", represented by figures such as Kautsky and Rudolf Hilferding was more open to the possibility of an independent role of councils in the new republic. This often implied a mixed system that could combine the parliament and the councils. Kautsky noted the aim of the revolution in general in the democratization of state institutions and revival of production. However, he considered councils not as an alternative state but instruments of mass organization that could keep a democratic check on the bureaucratic apparatus and could prevent the emergence of counterrevolution (Kautsky, 1918; Salvadori, 1990, pp. 227-28). In their social tasks, Kautsky believed that councils could facilitate far-reaching reforms for both producers and consumers (Kautsky, 1918). Kurt Eisner, a leading USPD representative in Bavaria, had a similar view about the role of councils in the revolutionary process. In the early days of the revolution in Bavaria, Eisner coined the notion of "*Nebenparlament"* which was intended to replace the upper house of the Bavarian state with a representative body composed of delegates from revolutionary councils and other "vocational organizations". He considered the power of the councils, albeit transitory, as

instrumental in preventing counterrevolution and Bolshevism and in pushing the parliament to the left (Mitchell, 1965, pp. 107-16, 161-172).

The "left-wing" of the USPD can itself be divided into two groups, the *Obleute* and the Spartacus League. They both believed in the possibility of a council republic in Germany and rejected the liberal parliamentary path that they saw would begin from the convocation of a National Assembly. In a preliminary program prepared by Ernst Däumig, a leading figure of the *Obleute*, argued that,

> the new political power is embodied in the revolutionary organization of the workers' and soldiers' councils...This cannot happen if the German state is transformed into a bourgeois democratic republic. Germany needs to become a proletarian republic on the grounds of a socialist economy, in which only the working people, that is, all manual and intellectual workers, have public rights. The ambitious of the bourgeoisie to convoke a national assembly as fast as possible will rob the workers of the fruits of the revolution (as quoted in Müller, 2012a, p. 62).

In a similar vein, Luxemburg warned in early November that "the fight for the national assembly is led under the rallying cry, 'Democracy or Dictatorship!'"; however, in rejecting that dichotomy, she argued that "'Dictatorship of the proletariat' means to use all means of political power to realize socialism and to expropriate the capitalist class for the benefit—and by the will—of the proletariat's revolutionary majority, that is, in the spirit of socialist democracy" (Luxemburg, 2012, p. 92). However, the *Obleute* and the Spartacus League differed in the method of pursuing their revolutionary goals. The *Obleute* members, including Richard Müller, were deeply skeptical of what they saw as putschist tendencies within the Spartacus League (Morgan, 1975, p. 316). This prevented these factions to coordinate effectively during the critical days of the revolution in the first period.

Besides these major programmatic fragmentations, the organizational capacity of the USPD was far inferior to the SPD. This further complicated its ability to facilitate the expansion of the movement across the country and effectively mediate the political project of the movement in various localities. At the dawn of the revolution, the distribution of political power between the two socialist parties varied across the country.[4] Nonetheless, due mainly to the organizational limitation, the USPD did not actively try to influence the creation of the councils in the early days of the revolution (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 75; Broué, 2005, p. 203). This was in contrast with the SPD which

[4] In large cities in some states, such as Prussia and Saxony, there was a parity between the SPD and the USPD. In some states or territories, such as Württemberg and Hess, the SPD dominated and in some other cities and states, such as Brunswick, Hamburg, Bremen, and Thuringian, the USPD had the upper hand (Kolb, 2004, p. 9).

intensely engaged in agitation campaigns to encourage the formation of councils but under the SPD leadership.

Political parties were not the only organizations that significantly influenced the trajectory of the council movement. Another important organization that influenced the evolution of the movement was the Free Trade Unions. Kolb (1962, p. 91) identifies two types of workers' council with respect to their pattern of formation: those workers' councils which initially constituted committees whose composition was determined by the party (either the SPD or the USPD depending on the city);[5] or those negotiated between the party and the trade union and subsequently send delegates to the committee.[6] Therefore, the role of the socialist trade union was not only central in the later development of the council movement, as we will see, but also in its early stages. However, its influence in the first period was rather covert in line with the cautious and hands-off approach of the union leaders such as Carl Legien. And given the relative alignment of the Free Trade Unions with the SPD, the organizational presence of the union within the movement often boosted the SPD line.

As we saw in Part I, there was growing dissatisfaction within the socialist party and the union regarding their involvement with the state's war project. However, contrary to the case of the SPD, these tensions within the Free Trade Unions did not result in a formal split within the organization, even though the opposition against the union leadership and the post-war settlement was no less militant.[7] In the absence of a formal split, the militant opposition within the union movement founded channelled their grievances through the councils, especially in the third period. In the first period, the union leadership conceived of the councils as a transitional phenomenon and not as an immediate threat to the internal cohesion of the union movement and was more concerned about the political implications of the movement on the trade union. As the revolution unfolded in the first period, the union leadership appeared willing to accept councils as the political organ of the revolution as long as the union's authority in the "economic" sphere remained unchallenged (Krüger, 2018, pp. 135, p. 153).

Already in October 1918, leading German industrialists had begun serious planning for demobilization and transition to a peacetime economy in October 1918. Despite the diversity among the capitalist class on their vision of post-war Germany, it had become evident that any viable plan would require an active engagement of the trade unions, particularly the Free Trade Unions.

[5] These were more typical in Ruhr area, Koln, Bielefeld, Karlsruhe, Offenbach, Magdeburg, Leipzig, Braunschwig, and others.
[6] Although, in these cases, sometimes their composition was those that emerged in large gatherings of factory delegates which issued practical guidelines to the managing committee.
[7] This was particularly the case not only in Berlin but also in Hamburg, Bremen, Mülheim and the Ruhr region (Krüger, 2018, pp. 125, 140).

Conversely, the union leadership was quite enthusiastic about the prospect of such corporatist schemes (see Krüger, 2018, pp. 111-17; see also Henicke and Hesselbarth, 2009). While the basic legal structure of the agreement was already laid out between the two sides (p. 120), they initiated a series of formal negotiations with the General Commission of the Free Trade Unions and the Central Association of Employers of Germany between 9 and 15 November in Berlin. The revolution that erupted in the middle of these negotiations apparently gave an upper hand to the position of the unions. However, unsure of their authority over their members, the unions were also quite worried about economic devastation and the complexity of demobilization that, in their view, the revolution might lead to if they did not cooperate with the employers on securing the economic position of the workers (Feldman, 1970; Krüger, 2018, p. 135).

The result of the ratification was the *Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft* (ZAG; also referred to as Stinnes-Legien Agreement) which established collective bargaining in Germany. At the core of this 12-point agreement, recognition of trade unions as the bargaining partner on issues concerning wages and working conditions, the introduction of the eight-hour day without a reduction in payment, "joint supervision and control of employment records", "the establishment of a workers' committee in every factory with at least 50 employees to supervise the compliance with the collective agreement", "the creation of arbitration committees on the basis of parity between employers' and workers' representatives", and bilateral demobilization committees in each trade on the basis of parity to ensure the implementation of the agreement.[8] The trade unions in their turn promised to uphold "the continued existence of private property and employer organizations … and even went so far as to join with the employers in the creation of an *Arbeitsgemeinschaft* [social partnership] to institutionalize and organize future collaboration in the formulation of joined economic and social policies" (Feldman, 1970, p. 313).

These measures aimed at a structural integration of both the German capitalist class and the working class into the now-emerging state and facilitated the transition to a new class relation in the relative absence of the Junkers. This not only gave huge incentive to defend the framework of the agreement but also gave the leadership a great advantage in fending off the challenges of the council movement towards radical democratization of the economic relations by flagging the concrete and significant reform measures under the corporatist scheme of the ZAG.

Regarding lesser industrialized and predominantly agrarian regions in Germany, the state of Bavaria stands as a special case in the first period. A prominently agricultural region with peasants forming a strong majority, Bavaria had very little industries even until the beginning of the war. The

[8] For the full text of the agreement, see *German History in Documents and Images*, "The Stinnes-Legien Agreement (November 15, 1918)," 2018, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/stinnes_eng.pdf.

outbreak of the war brought the momentum towards a gradual reform of the monarchic state in Bavaria into a temporary halt, but they were taken up again in September 1917 (Mitchell, 1965, pp. 16-30). As a result of SPD's parliamentary pressure and their alliance with the liberals in the last year of the war, a constitutional amendment was passed on 2 November 1918, effectively creating a constitutional monarchy in Bavaria.

In the meanwhile, Eisner met with Ludwig Gandorfer, the leader of the left-wing of Bavarian Peasants' League (*Bayerischer Bauernbund*; BBB) on 3 November to plan to topple the Bavarian regime. Under the leadership of Eisner, a coup was staged on 7 November and a People's State of Bavaria was proclaimed on 8 November. Eisner was elected the Chairman of Council of Workers on the same day (pp. 91-9). The presence of a significant number of peasants' councils as well as the alliance between the USPD and the BBB, which was due not only to the personal friendship between Eisner and Gandorfer but also the left-leaning tendencies of the BBB, makes Bavaria a unique case in the German Revolution. The initial formation of hundreds of peasants' councils in Bavaria came from the organizational work of the BBB, often to balance the influence of workers' councils (Carsten, 1972, p. 179). On formal grounds, peasants' councils were not given meaningful political role in the new republic and were seen primarily in their economic function to ensure food distribution to the cities and facilitate with the demobilization process (pp. 188, 205). This subordinated role for the peasants in the revolutionary process effectively in the service of the working-class minority already made the relationship between the councils and its peasant base precarious.

At the organizational level, although the USPD-BBB alliance stabilized the rapid transition to a republic in Bavaria in the initial period, it impended the possibility of engaging with socialization in agriculture given the opposition of the BBB to any such radical measures (Mitchell, 1965, p. 186; Carsten, 1972, p. 183). But the BBB was not the only peasant organization in Bavaria. The two most powerful agrarian organizations in Bavaria were, Bavarian Peasants' Association (*Bayerische Bauernverein*) and the Farmers' Association (*Bund der Landwirte; BdL*), both of which were pro-monarchic conservative Christian organizations, and stood for the interest of large landowners. These other agrarian groups got involved with the organization of their own peasants' councils (Mitchell, 1965, p. 156-7), thereby pursuing their interests through the new organizational vocabulary of the revolution. After taking power, Eisner had to navigate between these major interest groups.

Compared to Bavaria, the events in Berlin were happening at a rather slower pace. The *Obleute* and Spartacists were engaged in intense debates in secret meetings before the Kiel revolt.[9] There were considerable disagreements between them especially about the method of revolutionary uprising. Even though the *Obleute* was in touch with the Bolsheviks starting in September (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 65), they did not believe that insurrectionary methods would be appropriate in the case of Germany. Unsure of the readiness of workers to stage an uprising, the *Obleute* finally decided to issue an announcement for a mass political strike to be held on 11 November. However, as the other cities were caught in the revolutionary wave, Berlin workers spontaneously took to the streets on 9 November.

After the abdication of the Kaiser was announced by Prince Maximilian of Baden, the future form of the state could take the form of a constitutional monarchy, a democratic republic, or a socialist republic. Scheidemann's proclamation of a (democratic) republic from the balcony of the *Reichstag* while Ebert was planning for a transition to a constitutional monarchy (Buse, 1972, p. 245f49), at the same time when Liebknecht, surrounded by a massive crowd on the streets, proclaimed Germany a socialist republic was a dramatic indication of these possibilities and the initial fluidity of the situation.

The SPD leaders were extremely wary of letting the councils determine the course of the revolution. So, they immediately began negotiating with the leaders of the USPD in the *Reichstag* to come to an agreement about the composition of the provisional government – the so-called Council of People's Deputies (*Rat der Volksbeauftragten*). The USPD leaders put forward six basic demands to the SPD leaders as the precondition to joining the coalition: to proclaim Germany a socialist republic; the executive, legislative, and juridical branches to be composed of representatives elected by workers and soldiers; no bourgeois representative to become a minister; the coalition to expire after the conclusion of the armistice; technical ministers to be accountable to purely political staff; and the cabinet to be on the basis of parity between the SPD and the USPD (Broué, 2005, p. 150). At first, when the SPD leaders refused to accept these demands except the last two, the USPD representatives decided to abstain from the coalition but they changed their mind on 10 November and announced three candidates.[10] The SPD's rejection of the first three demands left the door wide open to steer the new republic towards establishing a liberal democracy while remaining within the general framework of the SPD's Erfurt Programme.

[9] See Luban (2009) on the secret conference on Spartacus League before the revolution on 12-13 October 1918 during which they decided on founding of councils in Germany and plans for socialization.
[10] The three candidates were Wilhelm Dittmann, Hugo Hasse, and Emil Barth. The three SPD candidates were Ebert, Scheidemann, and Otto Landsberg.

In its first act, the Council of People's Deputies announced nine reform measures. They included the lifting of the state of emergency, granting of the right of assembly and association, giving freedom of speech and religion, repealing the Prussian servant law, and reinstituting worker protection measures that were suspended at the beginning of the war. In addition to these, the socialist coalition fulfilled one of the key points of the Erfurt Programme by issuing a decree on 12 November to pass universal suffrage that included women. The latter had a paradoxical effect on women's mobilization, especially in the context of the generally male composition of the council movement (Boak, 2019) and the tendency towards replacing women workers with returning soldiers either organically or as part of demobilization plan (Sneeringer, 2002, p. 20; Boak, 2013, p. 66). While a significant achievement on its own in paving the way for formal participation of women in the political life, it transformed women, who have been side-lined within the council movement, from relatively active political subjects, to a relatively passive voting bloc which different political parties had to compete over.

The radical elements within the council movement in Berlin were trying to take control of the rapidly developing process. Following a proposal drafted by Müller, the delegates of the workers' councils, had been elected on 10 November in factories across Berlin,[11] gathered in the Circus Busch, one of Berlin's largest meeting halls, to elect an Executive Council of the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils of Greater Berlin (*Vorsitzender des Vollzugsrats der Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte Groß-Berlins*) as well as the Council of the People's Deputies. After fierce and chaotic debates and rejecting the *Obleute*'s plans to form an action committee made up exclusively of its members and Spartacists, the delegates agreed to elect a 24-member executive council, composed of an equal number of soldiers and workers. There was already a significant imbalance in the party affiliation of the executive council since, on the one hand, the soldier representatives were under a strong influence of the SPD and, on the other hand, the worker representatives were to observe a parity between the SPD and the USPD. In the end, six leading members of the *Obleute* joined the Executive Council with Müller as its chairman.[12]

At this point, there were then two parallel governing organs, the Executive Council and the Council of People's Deputies, whose unclarified spheres of power overlapped especially with regards to the executive power. After the signing of the armistice on 11 November, thereby initiating a six-month peace negotiation between the German government and the Entente countries, it was ever more important to clarify the boundaries of power, given the predominant presence of

[11] In Berlin, the election to the councils was based on one delegate per 1000 votes in large factories and small proportions for smaller factories. This proportionality was different other cities such as Stuttgart (1 per 180), Hamburg and Leipzig (1 per 600), and Frankfurt (1 per 400) (Broué, 2005, p. 160).
[12] They were Müller, Barth, Paul Eckert, Georg Ledebour, Paul Wegmann, and Paul Neuendorf.

radical democratic organizations and popular currents, this implied defining "citizens' control". On 18 November, the two organs held a joint session to discuss these issues. But it took until 22 November to reach an agreement. The Executive Council was given the authority to control (*"Kontrolle*") the activities of the Council of People's Deputies while putting it in charge of the peace talks.[13] Given the political environment both external and internal and the fear of the Executive Council towards radical policies that might cause an economic collapse (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 81), the ambiguity of the notion of control left the effective executive power in the hands of the Council of People's Deputies.

As a result of the internal pressure by the USPD members such as Emil Barth and external pressure by the Executive Council, the Council of People's Deputies decided on 18 November to begin immediate socialization of the appropriate branches of industry. Consequently, the Socialization Commission (*Sozialisierungskommission*) was formed on 24 November to study the feasibility of socialization in certain economic sectors and advise the government on practical steps towards that goal. It brought together some of the most prominent economists, social theorists, and politicians in Germany, including Kautsky, Hilferding, Joseph Schumpeter, Emil Lederer, and Otto Hué, with Eduard Heimann as its General Secretary. The task of the Commission was to prepare reports and legislative framework for the socialization of coal mining, nationalization of fishing and insurance, as well as municipalization of certain facilities. The initial report from the Commission was not published until 7 January 1919 (Frambach, 2019, p. 5). In this way, the question of "workers' control" was relegated to a panel of experts to contemplate on. Therefore, it deposited active class struggles from the bottom-up into a top-down legal-administrative form. However, it was an effective way to put this, at least temporarily, on hold.

The rapid and largely organic demobilization of soldiers at the end of the war and the strength of the SPD within the soldiers' councils were the main reasons behind the general deradicalization of the soldiers' councils and the reduction of their size. The soldiers' councils declared their support for the government and their desire for a speedy formation of a National Assembly (Carsten, 1972, p. 70). However, this did not mean that the initial demand of the soldiers' councils to democratize the military was completely forgotten. They continued to push for some measures towards that goal in this period. There were also some attempts by radicals to form their own armed units.[14] Nevertheless, the core of the armed wing of the revolution fell under the control

[13] As evident in Richard Müller's speech on 16 December 1918, the Executive Council saw its own power as provisionary which should be replaced by "a different body, appointed by a broader electorate [...] as soon as possible" (Müller, 2012b, p. 34).

[14] After the Executive Council was forced under the pressure of the soldiers' representatives to reverse its decision the day after it unanimously agreed to form a Red Guard on 12 November, the Spartacus League began organizing a Red

of the SPD as the party formed a hegemony over the soldiers' councils. The SPD also led the formation of the People's Militia (*Volksweher*) on 12 December for the general maintenance of the public order, and the use of the paramilitary group funded by the government, Free Corps (*Freikorps*) units that began to be formed from mid-December.[15]

As the battle to take charge of the direction of the new republic was being waged at the national level, the councils continued to pursue the initial momentum behind the revolution to democratize the state at the local level. The nature of their demands certainly varied significantly between different localities, ranging from calling for the socialization of the means of production and formation of a council republic to the general maintenance of public order, organizing food distribution, and overseeing orderly demobilization. The way the councils saw their role ranged from those, typically in large cities with armament industries, which immediately began the democratization process at the local levels to those, typically the SPD-controlled councils, which saw themselves as provisional power to maintain public order, organize food distribution, and to oversee orderly demobilization until the national election (Tobin, 1984, pp. 158-61). In most cases, the councils sought to exercise a control function over the local government.[16] Eisner, for example, explicitly invoked the notion of "right to control" (*das Kontrollrecht*) over the conduct of the bureaucratic officials (Mitchell, 1965, p. 154).[17] Therefore, either implicitly or explicitly the movement was engaged in defining the scope of "citizens' control" in relation to the old and new state organization.

On the whole, the bureaucratic structure of the local governments remained largely intact after the revolution. Coupled with the political development at the national level and the lack of confidence among almost all councils in their ability to govern without the expertise of local bureaucrats, the recovery of local governments in the first period after their initial vulnerability played a crucial role in the inability of the councils, even those dominated by the USPD, to succeed in restructuring the local government in significant ways (Tobin, 1984, p. 166; see also Carsten, 1976, p. 25). In specific cases, the dynamic between the councils and the local governments was the result of the way the councils saw their own role in the revolutionary period and the level of their

Soldiers' League (*Der Rote Soldatenbund*) in several cities. Its stronghold in Berlin reached a maximum of 12,000 members (Moore, 1978, p. 299).

[15] For a comprehensive study of the activities of these paramilitary units, see Jones (2016).

[16] For example, working in conjunction with the local city government (e.g. Cassel), acting under the supervision of the local government (e.g. Dortmund), joining the existing local government in advisory capacity (e.g. Göttingen), forming specific task committees to work on specific issues such as postal work, railway work, or policing (e.g. Frankfurt), ordering the occupation of certain factories (e.g. Hanau), dismissing government officials like the Chief of Police (e.g. Berlin and Düsseldorf). Only in exceptional cases, they went further and dissolved the local governing bodies (e.g. Gotha) or declaring a republic (e.g. Brunswick) (Tobin, 1984, p. 162).

[17] In the "Provisional Regulations for the Workers' Councils" issued in Bavaria on 26 November, the notion of "right to control" was no longer mentioned (Mitchell, 1965, p. 155). This indicates not only the difficultly in delimiting the notion but also its subversive potential.

militancy (itself affected by the organizational composition of the councils and the developments in the ongoing at the national level) and the way the old bureaucracies interacted with the councils (itself influenced by the changing alliance structure with the national government and powerful class interests). Hence, as the organizational structure of the old state advanced in its consolidation of power, the space for the articulation of "citizens' control" shrank rapidly.

The turning point for the council movement came during the First Congress that took place between 16 and 21 December. The organizational affiliation of its 489 delegates tells a lot about the relation of forces within the movement: 288 SPD-affiliated delegates, 90 USPD, 25 Democrats, 10 "United Revolutionaries", and 47 unaffiliated (Herwig, 1968, pp. 152-153).[18] The SPD had been quite successful in establishing itself within the council movement beyond its hegemonic basis in the soldiers' councils. The USPD and the more radical elements were well outnumbered within the council movements. This made it hard for the council movement to engage in organizational appropriation independently of the policies of the SPD leadership at the national level.

The core discussions in the congress can be divided into three main topics: democratization of the state and the future form of the new republic; democratization of the economy and the process of socialization; and democratization of the military and the concerns over demobilization. On the question of socialization, the delegates unanimously passed a resolution based on a speech given by Hilferding (USPD) on 18 December.[19] He firmly rejected the syndicalist path of the direct takeover of factories by the workers and cautioned against a simple confiscation of property. Instead, Hilferding called for a gradual transformation to put the whole of production at the disposal of the community (Hilferding, 2014, pp. 24-5; Carsten, 1972, p. 135). The resolution called on the government to initiate the socialization process immediately in industries that were ready for it, notably the mining sector. As it became evident in later period, the socialization process created a conflict between the unions and the councils since it was unclear which of these two working-class entities were in charge of the socialized units (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 80).

With regards to the democratization of the military, the delegates passed a resolution, known as "Seven Hamburg Points", that was proposed by Walther Lamp'l (SPD). It sought to protect the young republic from counter-revolution and to empower citizens, including soldiers-citizens, to control the military structure by putting it under the command of People's Representatives and

[18] Among these delegates, which included 84 soldiers, there were 179 workers (including both blue- and white-collar workers), 71 intellectuals, 164 journalists and professional staff of the socialist parties or trade unions (Broué, 2005, p. 184). Leading members of the Spartacus League, namely Luxemburg and Liebknecht were not allowed to attend the First Congress in person, even in an advisory capacity.

[19] Some aspects of Hilferding's conception was challenged by a number of USPD colleagues. For example, Barth called for immediate socialization as a necessary measure to keep the workers in the factories.

under the supervision of the Executive Council.[20] It also involved making the elected soldiers' councils in charge of maintaining the military discipline. This struggle led by soldier-citizens should be seen as part of the larger process of "citizens' control" after the war. As such, it deeply threatened the old military establishment. A group of top military figures (e.g. Hindenburg, Groener, and von Schleicher) met with Ebert and threatened to resign if the government did not find a way to reverse the decision. The democratic shock also pushed a critical fraction of the top echelon to get prepared to reclaim their power by forming paramilitary units.

On December 19, Congress moved to the crucial topic of the future form of the republic. The Congress first witnessed a series of passionate debates on the relationship between the Executive Council and the Council of People's Deputies by prominent figures on both sides such as Müller and Dittmann respectively. Thereafter, the delegate discussed a motion by Herman Lüdemann from the SPD that proposed the transfer of legislative and executive power to the Council of People's Deputies until the convocation of a National Assembly. The motion also suggested the appointment of a new governing organ called the Central Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils (*Zentralrat der Arbeiter- und Soldatenräte*) with important monitory (*Überwachung*) responsibilities. These included supervision over the German and Prussian cabinet and the conduct of the Reich Offices, the right to appoint and recall members of the Council of People's Deputies until a normal state of affairs was established and to be consulted before the appointment of ministers and assistants. This motion was passed by a large majority. In the later days, some of the USPD delegates tried to retain a veto right for the Central Council over the legislative power of the Deputies. However, the Council of People's Deputies reasserted its exclusive executive and legislative authority.

For many USPD-affiliated and revolutionary delegates, this was a manoeuvre by the SPD to cut off the council movement from the Executive Council as the only institution that could potentially push it to the left. The USPD boycotted the election and abstained from participating in the Central Council after the rejection of its demand for giving the Central Council veto power over the legislative process. This left the SPD to present a list of 27 candidates from its own ranks for this important organ (Carsten, 1972, p. 134). The abstention of the USPD resulted in severing their influence on one of the most important organs in the revolutionary process, giving the SPD a tremendous advantage to push forward its vision of the future state (see Henicke and Hesselbarth,

[20] The resolution also included a host of important symbolic operations (e.g. removal of military medals, prohibition of carrying arms off duty, etc.) to abolish democratically illegitimate forms of military authority especially in its extension outside the military.

2009, p. 65). In the meanwhile, the internal tension had been rising between the key members within the *Obleute* and the USPD in December.[21]

After the above resolution came one of the most consequential discussions in the First Congress revolving around the question of the future form of the republic as a council system or a parliamentary system. The former vision was presented by Däumig from the *Obleute* and the latter by Max Cohen from the SPD. Cohen argued that the only possible means for Germany to be able to grapple with the difficult circumstances towards postwar recovery was the institution of the National Assembly that had its mandate from the whole of the people and could deal with these issues effectively and efficiently. He saw the step towards a speedy convocation of the National Assembly as a precondition for economic recovery and the possibility of implementing any socialist measures. On the contrary, Däumig argued that "the council system is, and *has to be*, the organizational structure of modern revolutions" (2012, p. 42); and that if the delegates accepted Cohen's argument, the election of a national assembly would be a "death sentence" for the councils (p. 43). He contended that a National Assembly would not be able to realize socialism in the sense of the radical transformation of property relations towards an economic system democratically determined by the people "with equal rights to producers and consumers" (p. 46). At best, it would create institutions that could implement some state-capitalist measures. Arguing that socialization could only be undertaken on the basis of a council system, he called for "the implementation of the council system in the workplace [in which] workers [are] in charge of their shops and factories through councils they trust" (p. 48). Therefore, he proposed a counter-motion in which councils were to be "the highest legislative and executive authority" and called on the delegates to elect a commission to determine the electoral system for the next election of councils across the country which would then determine the future constitution. Until such an election, he proposed the Central Council to be the "highest monitoring body of the Council of People's Delegate and the ministers" (Müller, 2012a, p. 74).

The Chairman of the USPD, Haase, argued that since councils would still retain some of their significance even in the case of the convocation of the National Assembly, the dichotomy between a council system and National Assembly was incorrect. Therefore, he cautioned against a hasty election of the National Assembly without clarifying these matters. Scheidemann spoke afterwards in which he restated his opposition to the very existence of councils as it would result in "the absolutely certain demise of trade and industry, the ruin of the Reich, and incalculable misery of our people" (as quoted in Bernstein, 2019, p. 156). Finally, despite the efforts of a minority of

[21] The *Obleute* expelled Barth from the ranks on 21 December due to his support of the SPD policies.

delegates to postpone it as much as possible, the date for the election of the National Assembly was set on 19 January 1919.

To summarize this period in terms of organizational links, programmatic efforts, and alliance pattern, the unexpected revolution that erupted at the downfall of the military apparatus took the form of council movement that aimed at democratization of the state, the military, and the economy. Given the collapse of the state, as partial as it was especially at the local level, councils quickly proliferated across the country. Their significant sociopolitical role turned them into the base of the political vocabulary of the emerging republic. The exclusively socialist composition of the provisional government made the socialist parties keenly interested in the councils as organizations through which they could gain legitimacy among the politicized populous and control the direction of the revolution by transforming these organizations. Therefore, councils became the political battleground for the socialist parties to establish their hegemony within, thereby becoming hegemonic over the revolutionary process itself. These included the SPD, USPD, Spartacus League, Free Trade Unions, and *Obleute*. Other political forces could not deny the centrality of councils and therefore had to involve themselves with councils either directly or indirectly. However, the working-class character and composition of these councils made it more difficult for the elements affiliated with non-socialist forces to involve in their leadership directly and openly. These battles were fought at different council levels, from local councils to the Executive Council, and in different localities, from North to South. The relative organizational capacity of these organizations, their internal cohesion, and their relative power within the emerging state, laid the ground rules for strategically-determined relative dominance of these organizational forces to become hegemonic within the council movement. This put the SPD (and the Free Trade Unions) as a far more influential force than others engaged within the movement. Nevertheless, the strategic operations of the SPD did not remain seriously unchallenged. This was most notably due to the presence of the USPD (and the *Obleute*) in strategically important councils, either due to their spatio-sectoral significance or their politico-hierarchical position.

The SPD mobilized its vast organizational capacity throughout the country to bring as many councils under its direction as possible. It generally succeeded in achieving hegemony over the councils particularly in small and medium-size cities and rural area, and among the soldiers' councils. The SPD leadership also moved aggressively and intentionally at the national state level to curb the ability of more radical elements to determine the course of the events. On the other hand, the USPD, whose *raison d'être* before the revolution was primarily a united front against the war, suddenly found itself as the party to push for the revolutionary demands of a movement it could not effectively and cohesively represent. Given its organizational limitation and programmatic

multiformity towards the council movement, the USPD could not provide a coherent articulation and effective organization for the radical possibility of the movement. Furthermore, the organizational influence of the USPD over political developments at the national level was severely limited by its decision not to participate in the Central Council created at the end of the first period.

Given the collapse of the state (as partial as it was especially at the local level), the programmatic efforts of the movement in this period revolved heavily around the question of the political form of the future state and the question of "citizens' control". Calls for the transformation of the economic relations could be deferred at least temporarily and relatively not only because of the urgency of the issues in the "political" sphere, but also because of the ability of the Free Trade Unions to maintain organizational unity and flag significant gains that it had been able to achieve under the ZAG. Even the militant rank-and-file groups such as the *Obleute* did not pursue a frontal attack against the union leadership. Furthermore, the institution of the Socialization Commission early in this period justified the temporary postponement of the question of implementation of more radical measures towards economic democracy. Therefore, the question of "workers' control" was largely postponed to the following periods. Having said that, there was a variation among socialist groups with regards to the socialization question, with some seeing it as a long, gradual, and effectively top-down process, some reserving certain roles for councils to facilitate reforms, and some calling for rapid socialization.

On the "citizens' control" dimension, failing to realize a constitutional monarchy in response to the radical demands of the movement, the SPD leadership stood well within its Erfurt Programme and opted for a liberal democratic republic. This required a coordinated effort to push for the election and convocation of a National Assembly as soon as possible, while limiting the power of the councils both at the national and local level to a mere, and often practically hollow, supervisory [*Kontrolle*] role. At best, they saw councils as a transitory phenomenon and useful in the immediate tasks of demobilization. The USPD encapsulated a wide range of programmatic articulations of the movement, from liberal democratic to council republic with different combinations of the two in the middle. The incommensurable diversity of these visions and the method of achieving them deepened the internal fragmentation within the USPD that resulted in a split shortly after the first period. The Spartacus League articulated a radical, though not always clear and detailed, programmatic vision for the councils to the left of the USPD on the political and economic questions. However, its serious organizational limitations, both in terms of geographic reach and social base, hindered its ability to determine the programmatic direction of the movement if taken as a whole.

In terms of alliance patterns, the revolution erupted in the middle of a process of disintegration of the Junker-industrialist class alliance and its replacement with a corporatist alliance between capital and labour that had already been set in motion especially in the third period of the war. This shift was formalized under the ZAG that was signed in the early days of the revolution. It raised the stakes massively for the trade union leaders to avoid sacrificing both significant material gains in exchange for the union movement and the promise of a corporatist path to postwar recovery for unknown plans for a transition to socialism (unless this was defined in very modest and vague terms projected into a distant future). While the SPD was forced to work within a formal alliance with the USPD in the provisional government, it had no patience for what was broadly defined as "Bolshevik" tendencies within the USPD. The SPD formed conditional alliances with powerful elements of the old military apparatus both to have access to armed forces independent of the soldiers' councils and to prevent a possible counterrevolutionary reaction to be launched by the old military generals.[22] The internal fragmentation of the USPD hindered the ability of the party to form an alliance with other forces. With regards to peasants, there was a general failure of the socialist bloc to form a meaningful alliance with peasant organizations. The only notable exception in this period was the case of the Bavarian revolution in which a formal alliance between the USPD and the BBB was formed. However, this did not lead to a significant and expansive infusion of Bavarian peasants into the emerging political order. This was due to a combination of relative marginalization of peasant councils (even those linked to the BBB) in the emerging state apparatus, the power of competing organized agrarian interests to swing peasants away from the revolutionary path, and the reluctance of the peasants themselves to pursue their interests through a socialist revolution. Shortly after the end of this period, this fragile alliance collapsed, further disconnecting the peasant population from the revolution.

Second Period (24 December 1918 –14 April 1920)

At the end of the first period, the possibility of achieving radical "citizens' control" and substantive self-governance in the new republic was largely lost at the formal political level. After the decision by the delegates at the First Congress to hold an early election for a National Assembly, the abstention of the USPD from the Central Council, and the resignation of the USPD representatives from the Council of People's Deputies on 28 December,[23] the locus of "political" struggle among most political parties shifted primarily towards electoral politics and considerably away from the council movement. However, not all political forces saw the development in the first

[22] For a discussion of the conditional alliance between the SPD leadership and the old military, see Buse (1972).
[23] The USPD justified this resignation by referring to the government's reaction to the so-called "Christmas Battles" (Weihnachtskämpfe), the failure to implement the Hamburg Points, and the failure to initiate the socialization process (USPD, 2014, pp. 56-57).

period as irreversible. They continued to agitate outside the parameters of rapidly consolidating formal politics to restore the political power of the councils. This was done in a diverse set of tactics including demonstrations, protests, putsch attempts, and coup d'etat. In parallel to this trend, aspects of the council movement shifted the focus towards the "economic" struggle for "workers' control". Therefore, the trajectory of the council movement in the second period experienced a bifurcation along radical articulations of "citizens' control" and "workers' control". But these attempts were often disconnected from each other in terms of organizational links, programmatic efforts, and alliance patterns.

While political parties began to aggressively mobilize for the election, the USPD found it difficult to convince some of its key members such as Hass, Däumig, Müller, and Ledebour to work together to prepare a list of candidates for the National Assembly. The isolation of the *Obleute* in the USPD pushed them towards the radical left and the Spartacus League. They attended the national conference on 29 December organized by the Spartacus League to discuss expanding their organizational capacities on the ground as well as creating a new political party. In this process, the Communist Party of Germany (*Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands*; KPD) was officially formed on 1 January 1919 after the Spartacus League broke from the USPD and merged with the Bremen left communists. Uncomfortable with what Müller called "anarcho-syndicalist-putschist mentality," (as quoted in Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 98) the *Obleute* leaders had a considerable reservation about joining the new party. At the end of the conference, the *Obleute* refused to join the new party after its five pre-conditions were rejected.[24] This disunity was costly for the KPD as it was cut off from an invaluable source of organizational influence among workers in key industries in Berlin. This pushed the newly formed party further into agitational politics on the streets, as manifested in the so-called Spartacus Uprising (*Spartakusaufstand*) between 5-12 January. Conversely, the *Obleute* missed the opportunity to switch its political affiliation from a party which had little room for its political project into a party with a much greater level of militancy, including in radical cities outside Berlin, and with more compatible programmatic vision. This pushed the programmatic vision of the group increasingly towards "pure councilism".

The bifurcation phase took place between December and January. As its first act in the New Year to cleanse the police force in Berlin from the influence of the revolutionary sympathizers, the SPD dismissed Eichhorn from his post as the Chief of Police arguing that he refused to comply with the orders to contain the demonstrations during the Christmas Battles. However, the decision

[24] These conditions, stemming from the profound distrust of the *Obleute* in the Spartacist revolutionary methods, were: "renunciation of fundamental antiparliamentarianism, total parity between Shop Stewards and Spartacists on the executive board, a revision of the Spartacists' 'street tactics', Shop Stewards' influence on the party's publications, and removal of the word 'Spartacus' from the future party name" (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 99).

backlashed when thousands of workers went on a general strike on 5 January in protest against the decision. Seizing upon this opportunity, the radicals formed a 52-member Provisional Revolutionary Committee (*Provisorischer Revolutionsausschuss*) on 6 January with Ledebolur, Liebknecht, and Paul Scholze as its co-chairmen (Broué, 2005, p. 244). However, the uprising quickly came to an end as a result of the split between the revolutionary forces once the negotiation between the USPD members of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee and the SPD began on 6-7 January, and the bloody suppression by the troops and Free Corps (pp. 248-50). However, over the following days, amidst a widespread wave of militant demonstrations across the country,[25] the Free Corps units extended their brutal crackdown by targeting the leaders of the revolutionary movements, most infamously the arrest and the subsequent murder of Liebknecht and Luxemburg on 15 January.

This was the context in which the election of the National Assembly on 19 January took place. The result was a disaster for the USPD which gained only 7.6 per cent of the vote (22 seats). Although the SPD came on top, its 37.8 per cent vote (163 seats) was far behind what they might have expected given their dominance in the political currents or compared to what they gained (34.8 per cent) in the last *Reichstag* election before the war in 1912 (Nohlen and Stöver, 2010, p. 762). The non-socialist parties did quite well, considering how soon the election took place after the revolution and especially for the liberals and the conservatives whose parties were newly formed after the revolution.[26] The overall strength of these parties made the socialists dependent on their cooperation in drafting the new constitution. Therefore, the "Weimar Coalition" between the SPD, the Center Party, and the DDP was formed.

The influence of the struggles for democracy after the Revolution had a considerable impact on the electoral programme of non-socialist parties. Simultaneously, the coalition with some of these forces severely limited the possibility of implementing a far-reaching socialization program. While insisting on the preservation of private property and class cooperation, the DDP presented itself firmly on the side of the new liberal democratic republic with equal rights for all citizens, as well as basic worker rights such as freedom of association, collective bargaining, and minimum wage. The DDP rejected "the transfer [...] of all means of production into the possession of society" and called for socialization to be limited to "purely factual[] for each individual case" (as quoted in Bernstein, 2020c, p. 284) and only when it results in economic growth and rise of productivity. The

[25] The January unrest was not limited to Berlin. There were demonstrations in many cities including Dresden, Stuttgart, Hamburg, Halle, Düsseldorf, and Bremen (for details see Broué, 2005, pp. 263-265).
[26] The Catholic Centre Party gained 19.6 per cent (91 seats), followed by the newly formed liberal German Democratic Party (*Deutsche Demokratische Partei*; DDP) with 18.5 per cent (75 seats), and new formed conservative German National People's Party (*Deutschnationale Volkspartei*; DNVP) with 10.4 per cent (44 seats) (Nohlen and Stöver, 2010, p. 762).

Catholic Central Party claimed to stand in favour of the liberal democratic republic, what it called "a free social people's state [*Volksstaat*]..." in which people have equal right to "participate in the administration of all affairs without the spirit of caste and class [preference]" (as quoted in Bernstein, 2020c, pp. 288-9). It also stood firmly for the sanctity of private property but rejected capitalist monopolies and in favour of strong domestic agricultural production. On the socialization question, there was a belief in the Center Party that workers had to become "internally mature" first before embarking on a social experiment such as socialization (Eissrich, 2019, p. 35). Within the programmatic framework effectively delineated by the governing coalition, any meaningful socialization would soon reach definite limits.

As we saw in the previous section, the question of democratization of the economy took a back seat in the first period while the primary focus of the movement was on the political form of the emerging republic. Nevertheless, the theme of democratic transformation of the economic relations was by no means absent from the demands of the councils. But due to series of decrees at the beginning of the revolution, the announcement of the ZAG agreement, and the institution of the Socialization Commission created the impression that the socialist government was attentive to the economic democratization demands. But, given the resolution passed in the First Congress that called on the government to immediately socialize all eligible sectors and the deteriorating economic condition of the country, the stakes were high for the Socialization Commission to lay out a concrete plan for socialization especially the mining sector. The initial report of the Socialization Commission was released on 7 January 1919 on the principles of socialization. However, the more comprehensive report did not come out until 15 February 1919.

There were several reasons why the mining sector was singled out to start the socialization process. It was not only because coal was a vital resource for all industries and household heating but also because the sector was already largely state-owned due to the war policies (Frambach, 2019, p. 14). However, the private entrepreneurs in the mining sector had a long history of fiercely asserting their "master of the house" position more than any other industry in Germany (von Oertzen, 1963, p. 128; Moore, 1978, p. 202; Frambach, 2019, p.14). The uncooperativeness of these employers could make the socialization process extremely contentious. Conversely, miners in the Ruhr region, but not necessarily the leaders of their collective movement, shared syndicalist ideas of workers taking over and running the mines themselves and distributing the profit (von Oertzen, 1963, p. 129; Lüpke and Kruppa, 2009, p. 107). This made controlling the socialization process in the mining sector further difficult. It was also at this juncture that the syndicalist Free Association of German Trade Unions (*Freie Vereinigung deutscher Gewerkschaften*, FVdG) became a mass

organization, after having been severely districted during the war due to its rejection of the *Burgfrieden*.[27]

The issue of socialization resurfaced among miners in the Ruhr region and they took a more proactive role in the process from the beginning of the new year (von Oertzen, 1963, p. 112). The miners in the Ruhr region, who were suffering not only from food shortages but also a soaring rise of coal prices by 50 per cent in December, were quite keen to initiate the socialization process in the mining industry following its ratification in the First Congress. On 6 January, for example, a group of miners (Victoria mine in the town of Lünen) expelled the managers and elected a three-person council to run the mine. On 9 January, the workers' and soldiers' councils in Essen proclaimed the socialization of mines based on a council system. After a large strike on 11 January, the office of Mining Cooperation and the Coal Syndicate were occupied and the occupiers took control of all wages and process. On 13 January, a conference of workers' and soldiers' council and the trade unions in the Ruhr region was held to discuss the issue of socialization. They elected a commission, composed of three SPD, three USPD, and three Communists, the so-called "Commission of Nine" [*Neunerkomission*], to prepare concrete plans for socialization of the mines (Carsten, 1972, pp. 153-154; Lüpke and Kruppa, 2009, pp. 116-17). The congress decided unanimously that socialization should be carried out on the basis of a council system and proposed that mining council organization be established on a district basis (von Oertzen, 1963, p. 113). During a state-wide conference of workers' and soldiers' councils in Baden in January, the delegates announced that the councils would continue to exist until the key demands of the revolution, including democratization of the state and socialization of appropriate industries, were realized (Tobin, 1984, p. 168).

Amidst the revival of the council movement in the Ruhr region, predicated on the democratization of the economy through a relatively radical articulation of "workers' control", the Socialization Commission was finding it exceedingly difficult to gain the willing cooperation of the government.[28] The majority in the Commission believed neither private capitalist control nor a centralized state control in the mining sector was appropriate for the post-war context. Instead, it saw the solution in rigorous socialization through the expropriation of the existing private and state enterprises in the mining sector and the formation of an autonomous cooperative, the German Coal Association [*Deutsche Kohlengemeinschaft*] whose board of directors would be composed of capitalist, worker, consumer, and state representatives (Frambach, 2019, p. 7). But soon it became abundantly clear that the government has no intention to take up the recommendation of the

[27] Its membership reached 60,000 in August 1919 and 111,675 in December 1919 (Bock, 1969, pp. 134, 156), far higher than any time in its history. For an overview of the history of the emergence of FVdG since 1901, see Jenko (2007) and Bock (1969b).

[28] For examples of such tensions, see Frambach (2019, p. 9) and Eissrich (2019, pp. 34-7).

Commission. In protest, the Commission tendered its resignation in a letter to the government on 3 February; although it continued to work until its dissolution on 7 April 1919.

Of the notable programmatic visions of the Commission on the question of socialization were those of Kautsky and Heimann.[29] In a pamphlet published in January 1919, Kautsky saw the economic revival of the country and maintaining production as "the prerequisite for any attempt to socialize production" (as quoted in Salvadori, 1979, p. 233). Therefore, he preferred not to rush the process before the capital flow was revitalized. However, he maintained that besides the question of the immediate socialization of certain eligible sectors, other industrial sectors should be put under the control of "syndicates", led equally by employers, workers' councils, consumers, and state representatives, "whose task would be to provide for the supply of raw material, the sale of products, and the regulation of the conditions of production" (p. 233). The call to expand the representative base of the syndicates was in line with Kautsky's view about the limits of democratic legitimacy of workers' councils as local workplace-based institutions (see p. 237; Thompson, 2019a, p. 165). He suggested that in each company, workers' committees should be set up to "monitor the implementation of the resolution of the syndicate and [...] to ensure the safeguarding of workers' interests". He emphasized that all nationalizations should be accompanied by compensation of the owners. He further proposed the nationalization of the land by turning landowners into tenants but without breaking up the large farms or expropriating the peasants (Kautsky, 1919).

For Heimann, who came from the tradition of Christian socialism, socialization was not a method of democratic control over economic relations but of increasing economic efficiency (Backhaus and Backhaus, 2019, pp. 65-6). This sprang from his idea that, in a competitive market, the profit generated from innovation should not be associated with the labour of workers but that of the entrepreneurs. Similarly, in a monopolistic context, the profit of a monopoly should belong to the consumers who were behind building up the monopoly rather than the employed workers. Therefore, he concluded that "the material benefit of socialization, when looking at it merely as a task of distribution among various stakeholders, at best would be disappointingly small" (as quoted in p. 66). He saw the role of the state, rather than workers' councils, as a possible remedy for the concentration of power at the top of capitalist enterprises. Ultimately, the legislative proposals produced by the Commission were closer to Heiman's vision than Kautsky's (p. 68).

More radical theoretical elaborations on councils in this period were published in the newly founded weekly journal, *Arbeiter-Rat*, under the editorship of Däumig, which became publishing

[29] The basic ideas of Hilferding, a key member of the Commission, on socialization were discussed in the previous section.

from late January 1919. It was there that Müller and Däumig sought to clarify and popularize their notion of "pure councilism" as distinct from both social democratic and Bolshevik model, in which radical democratic project based on class dominance of the working class was realized through workers' self-management (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 111). In their model of "pure council", they envisioned a parallel system of economic and political workers' councils in which delegates were elected on workplace and district bases respectively.[30] There were federally structured levels of larger aggregation with respect to both economic and political councils, whose delegates were indirectly elected by councils in the lower levels, and whose final point of contact was a central council at the national level. In this system, the executive and legislative powers were amalgamated and placed under the democratic control of councils (see pp. 111-17). The relation between the political and the economic councils remained largely unclear. But besides the abstract merit of this model, the theoretical form of "pure councilism" reflects the bifurcated trajectory of the movement in the second period into struggles for the revival of council democracy in the "economic" and "political" spheres.

Back in the Ruhr region, the council delegates were becoming increasingly impatient with government's response to their demands (Lüpke and Kruppa, 2009, p. 110). The leaders of the movement in Essen went to Berlin and Weimar to negotiate with government representatives on 13-14 February to achieve recognition of the council movement and gain a firm commitment to socialization. The negotiations led to the formal recognition of factory councils (*Betriebsräte*) but their representatives had to be selected independently from the exiting workers' committees. This made it possible for the government to give formal recognition to the councils while depriving them of any interference with management even to the extent that was possible with workers' committees. And yet, it enabled these councils to potentially break out of union control under which workers' committees operated.

This situation facilitated the gravitation of the councils towards syndicalism. However, the relative organizational weakness of syndicalism in Germany slowed down the process. The programmatic shift towards syndicalism emerged while similar negotiations were taking place between the government and the council movement representatives in Central Germany. The workers' councils in Halle published a "Provisional Instruction for the Factory Councils" on 13 February. The provision envisioned factory councils represent all workers within the plant, whose primary task is "to democratize the company without delay and prepare it for socialization". This required giving the councils full control over management and the workforce to ensure maximum

[30] They envisioned each individual workplace to be managed jointly by the workplace as well as district councils so that the interest of the community outside the workplace was included in the decision-making process.

productivity. The factory councils representatives, who were on a one year term but could be recalled at any time if the majority of workers pass a vote of no confidence, were to meet in the plant during the working time and given full compensation for their activities.[31] On that basis, the workers' councils of Central Germany held a conference in Halle on 23 February. However, given the fierce resistance of the SPD representatives in the government against councils' right to intervene in management,[32] even the USPD representatives such as Wilhelm Koenen, a member of the USPD central committee, moved away from program of top-down socialization and called for bottom-up socialization.[33] This was indicative of a programmatic shift of the forces involved in the movement in the Ruhr region and Central Germany towards a syndicalist understanding of "workers' control" as a path towards a full development of the council system. Given the concentration of the mining sector in the Ruhr region compared to the industrial sector in Central Germany, the question of socialization through the councils was more central to the movement in the former compared to the program of factory control by the councils in the latter. Amidst these contentious negotiations, the Free Corps began a series of assaults against the councils in the region in February. In response, workers' and soldiers' councils in the Ruhr under the strong influence of the FVdG and despite the opposition of the SPD and its threats to resign from the Commission of Nine, the Ruhr workers initiated a General Strike that lasted until 21 February.[34]

Around the same time of these strikes in Ruhr and Central Germany, workers in Berlin decided to strike on 3 March. Müller assumed the chairmanship of the strike committee. Despite his best efforts to form a united front among the socialist and syndicalist forces, both the KPD and SPD refused to participate in the action (Hoffrogge, 2015, pp. 118-23). Berlin Workers' and Soldiers' Councils put out its demands on 3 March. Besides the calling for recognition of the workers' and soldiers' councils as well as the Hamburg Points, it highlighted the role of councils in workplaces "to exert a thorough supervision (*Kontrolle*) over those enterprises" and engage in "the rapid socialization of economic and state life" (see Fowkes, 2014, pp. 61-2). Three days later, the USPD published its Programmatic Declaration (see pp. 337-9) which in some respects reflected the leftward shift within the party as a result of the developments in this period. Having placed the party "on the ground of the council system", the Programme identified the council system as the fighting organization of the proletarian revolution which "creates the right...to proletarian self-government

[31] For the full resolution, see "Vorläufige Dienstanweisung für die betriebstäste" in von Oertzen (1963, pp. 262-3).
[32] In response to council representatives from Essen, the SPD representatives – specifically the Minister of Economic Affairs, Rudolf Wissell and the Minister of Labour, Gustav Bauer, unwaveringly rejected these demands, arguing "under no circumstances should the workers' councils intervene in the management" (von Oertzen, 1963, p. 141).
[33] Koenen argued that "[socialization from below] requires a democratic expansion and development of the council system, in which the factory councils above all secure the workers' right to co-determination in all production" (as quoted in von Oertzen, 1963, p. 143).
[34] This action was not supported by the KDP leadership in Berlin, calling it "syndicalist nonsense" (Bock, 1969b, p. 120).

in factories, local councils, and the state, and implements the transformation of the capitalist order into a socialist one." Although it called for "integration of council system into the constitution", it echoed much of the previous positions of the party on the programmatic details such as socialization. Similar to the events in Ruhr, Berlin strike ended after a few days of intense and bloody battle with the Free Corps and government forces.

On 30 March, council delegates, now dominated by the USPD and KPD, from the whole of Ruhr region met at a conference and decided to withdraw from the Free Trade Unions and founded the General Miners Union (*Allgemeine Bergarbeiter-Union*) based on council system. They formulated a set of demands including six-hour shift, approval of the council system, disarming of the Free Corps, arming the workers, and reestablishing diplomatic relation with Russia (von Oertzen, 1963, p. 117). In the following month, the Free Trade Unions lost a quarter, and in some districts more than half, of its members in the Ruhr region. While the second national Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils (Second Congress, for short) took place (April 8-14), Ruhr workers went on another General Strike between 10-14 April, involving 300,000 workers affecting 75 per cent of the mines in the region. Most of these workers joined the General Miners Union (p. 117).

Face with mass arrest and suppression, the General Miners Union (Bock, 1969b, p. 127) saw a decline at the end of April strikes. When the Central Mining Council called in early May 1919 for the formation of a new organization, the KPD now under the Chairmanship of Paul Levi who had strong anti-syndicalist views (p. 139), extended its support for the initiative. The syndicalists who previously composed a significant part of the General Miners Union branched out and began constructing their own union, soon dwarfing the General Miners Union (pp. 127-8). From here on, the effective alliance between the communists and syndicalists that had existed from the beginning of the revolution through the first few months of the second period came to an end (Jenko, 2007, p. 16). The trend towards syndicalism (and later towards anarcho-syndicalism) in the Ruhr region and Central Germany continued until the end of the second period.

The trajectory of the movement in this period within the "political" sphere manifested itself most sharply in Bremen and Bavaria. As noted earlier, Bremen was a stronghold of radical forces. This was reflected in the composition and orientation of the executive council. After the revolt of the Bremen executive council upon the decision of the First Congress in favour of a National Assembly, it became apparent to the radicals that the fundamental transformation of the state as they conceived it could not be done along the strategic lines of the USPD leadership. After a dispute between the left-wing forces over the result of the new council election held on 6 January in Bremen, the newly formed KPD organized a demonstration, took over the legislative assembly,

formed a nine-member Council of People's Deputies,[35] and declared Bremen a Soviet Republic. A fifteen-member Executive Council was formed to "control" (supervise) the conduct of the Council of People's Deputies. Furthermore, a People's Commissars who were subordinated to both the executive and legislative bodies of the Soviet Republic, were assigned top administrative role. Overall, the state structure of the Bremen Soviet Republic was not much different from what had emerged organically at the beginning of the revolution in several radical cities. The difference was the strict exclusion of the SPD and bourgeois forces from taking office. The immediate decision in front of the Bremen Soviet government was to decide on holding an election for the National Assembly in Bremen. This was taking place amidst rapidly worsening economic and financial situation of the city and increased pressure by the financial sector to block further loans unless the Soviet government reversed some of its initial decrees and open the government to other forces. Both the decision-making process to call for the election and the result of the election exacerbated the tensions between the KPD and the USPD within the Bremen Soviet Republic. Under such economic and political conditions and regardless of the internal debates on economic policies, no socialization plans could be undertaken.

Despite the initial peculiarity of the revolutionary process in Bavaria in the first period especially with regards to the alliance patterns, the overall trajectory of the councils towards the end of the first period and the beginning of the second period was similar to the rest of Germany. The Basic Law of the Republic of Bavaria passed on 4 January gave the state a firmly parliamentary democratic framework, without any structural role for councils. By mid-January, all the individual Bavarian councils with the notable exception of the Munich Workers' Council, while retaining their symbolic power, had either directly or indirectly relegated their authority to the government ministers (Mitchell, 1965, pp. 242-4). Just before the National Assembly election, the militant leaders of the Bavarian councils began organizing and planning to secure the position of councils within the state based on radical proposals. Among these was the proposal to completely replace the state bureaucracy with a council system, or instituting the councils as the supreme legislative body of the republic, as opposed to a parallel supervisory body as appeared in Eisner's scheme, strictly subordinating the *Landtag* in the legislative process (pp. 245-8). The result of the National Assembly election and its disastrous outcome for the USPD in Bavaria (2.5 per cent of the vote; 3 seats) increased the agitational activities of the radicals against the convocation of the *Landtag* and brought left-wing socialist and anarchist forces closer together in their effort to retrieve the structural power of councils within the state. By the beginning of February, the lines in the political

[35] This was composed of equal delegates from the USPD, KPD, and soldiers' councils. The SPD's delegates were excluded from the Council of People's Deputies as well as all workers' councils, and were replaced by representatives from the KDP and USPD.

struggle were drawn clearly between those in favour of a liberal parliamentary government and those who favoured a council system (pp. 252-3). This made Eisner's "third-way" position politically infeasible and his position in the government inadmissible. A dramatic turn of events took place when Eisner was assassinated. This happened on the day when he was delivering his signed letter of resignation to the government. An hour later, Erhard Auer, the leader of the Bavarian SPD and the primary political rival of Eisner, was shot.

The political shock of this event created the space for the council activists to hold a general meeting of the Munich councils and declare martial law. This put the newly created Central Council (*Zentralrat*), consisting of equal representations from workers', soldiers', and peasants' councils, at the head of the Bavarian state. The Central Council moved immediately to form a socialist unity government, with representatives of the USPD and SPD. It also called for securing councils in the state constitution to appear in all ministries in "advisory" capacity, a representative of the BBB to join the new Ministry of Agriculture, recalling of the elected *Landtag* when conditions permit, standing army to be abolished, and freedom of the press to be restored under some temporary restrictions (Mitchell, 1965, pp. 278-80). These proclamations, precisely in their ambiguous formulations, shifted the line of political struggle back to the parliamentary versus council republic. The shift, although still quite Munich-centric, was already visible in the debates in the congress of Bavarian councils that was commenced on 25 February (pp. 282-5).

On the last day of the congress, the motion to declare Bavaria a soviet republic was rejected by a large majority and the motion to recall the *Landtag* immediately was approved (p. 286). After a series of negotiations between the two socialist parties and the BBB during which the debate expanded beyond Munich into less revolutionary provinces, an Accord was signed which required a new council election, deprived of the Central Councils of any executive or legislative authority, but gave the councils power to demand a referendum on any decision by the *Landtag* (p. 288). On that basis, a new coalition government headed by Johannes Hoffman (SPD) was formed on 7 March. Hoffman used the pretext of socialist unity and a sweeping program of socialization to suspend strikes and factional discord.[36]

While the Bavarian state was rapidly consolidating around a social-democratic program, the revolutionary council activists began to regroup in the city of Augsburg and passed a resolution in favour of the Bavarian soviet republic and a full socialization program (pp. 300-1). By 4 April,

[36] Even at the rhetorical levels, the proposed plan for "full socialization" was devoid of even the most modest measures. On 25 March, Otto Neurath, the head of newly appointed Socialization Commission presented the outline of the plan where he said "we do not believe that we can today operate the factories in a communist fashion; for a time being we must work within the framework of capitalism and create socialistic foundations. We will then automatically grow into a socialist economy" (as quoted in Mitchell, 1965, p. 293).

Augsburg workers, with the support of the Central Council in Munich, initiated a general strike against the convocation of the *Landtag*. In a move to curb the militancy and bring the radicals under control, the Deputy Prime Minister, Ernst Schneppenhorst (SPD), offered to declare Bavaria a soviet republic if a coalition government that included the Communists could be formed. But the KPD representative, Eugen Leviné, refused the offer on the ground of a deep distrust of the social democrat's intentions, unfavourable political and economic conditions in the country, and the cost of potential failure of the soviet republic for the Communists. Shortly after this, the SPD held an extraordinary congress and renounced Schneppenhorst's offer.

Nevertheless, on 7 April, the USPD, the Central Council (now under the control of the radical forces), and the Revolutionary Workers' Council declared Bavaria a soviet republic. The revolutionary government, under the chairmanship of Toller (USPD), passed a series of sweeping measures to including the socialization of mines, banks, and the press, formation of a Red Army and revolutionary tribunal, and confiscation of foodstuff. However, none of the substantial measures could be implemented in the short lifespan of the soviet republic and its limited authority was confined largely to Munich. The Bavarian KPD refused to recognize the authority of the revolutionary government as it deemed it unrepresentative of the Bavarian workers. Nonetheless, it committed itself to fighting counter-revolutionary forces.

After a failed attempt by the Right-wing forces on 13 April to topple the revolutionary government in Munich, the Factory and Soldiers' Councils of Munich, under the direction of the Communists, proclaimed Bavaria a Communist soviet republic. The legislative and executive authority was transferred to an action committee headed by Leviné, and supported by the leading figures within the USPD such as Toller, and (at least initially) anarchists such as Gustav Landauer. Soon, under brutal military suppression led by Noske and supported by the Free Corps, the council republic in Bavaria came to an end.

Both Bremen and Bavarian soviet republics represented the particular characteristics of the bifurcated form of council movement's trajectory in the second period as it manifested itself in a struggle largely within the "political" sphere. The principle organizing links behind these were the left-wing of the USPD, the newly formed KPD, and the anarchists (especially in the case of Bavaria). The programmatic effort to articulate this struggle drew a sharp distinction between parliamentary republic and council republic as two fundamentally incommensurate forms of "citizens' control". The sharp opposition to the developments in the first period nurtured new and wider alliances between radical left forces, notably between socialists and anarchists, while severing some of the previous ties particularly between the left-wing of the USPD and the left-peasant organizations in the Bavarian case.

In response to the fear that the wave of general strikes in central Germany and Saxony towards the end of February would reach the Ruhr area, the government issued verbal concessions towards the implementation of socialization in the mining sector. The government issued a proclamation on 4 March that "the Coal Syndicate is to be socialized immediately" and "the socialization of potassium mining is being prepared with the utmost rapidity." It gave assurance that "the framework law on socialization, which has been laid before the National Assembly, will provide a foundation for the Communal Economy (*Gemeinwirtschaft*)[37] for Germany in place of the previous unrestricted private economy" (in Fowkes, 2014, pp. 30-31). However, a few days later, on 23 March, when the government announced the Socialization Law, it became clear that the government had no interest in a real and immediate process of socialization. It prompted some vague notions of welfare, called for legislative measures to transfer industries such as extractive and energy branches into the Communal Economy, and to regulate their production and distribution through the Communal Economy (pp. 31-32).

The second Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils took place on 8-14 April 1919, a day after the Bavarian soviet republic was proclaimed. The Second Congress was dominated by the SPD affiliated delegates with 146 seats as opposed to the USPD with 56 seats (Fowkes, 2014, p. 46), and was strongly biased towards rural areas dominated by the SPD due to the voting system (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 125). The delegates rejected the very idea of councils and voted on setting up "Chambers of Labour".[38] The SPD resolution on the question of councils stated that the socialist democracy could be best achieved through occupationally-based Chambers of Labour. Each trade should set up an Economic Council which included the representatives of both employees and "the managers of enterprises". These Economic Councils had to then elect delegates to the Chambers of Labour.[39] This formation was to be replicated at the district, province, and state levels. These chambers were to work alongside other representative bodies such as the *Reichstag*, which the resolution called "People's Chamber" (*Volkskammer*). If a bill was of an economic nature, it would first go to the Chamber of Labour and, if of a political and cultural nature, it would be first discussed in the People's Chamber. It identified the trade unions as the representatives of the workers, and factory councils as their executive organs at the factory levels.

The purpose of the resolution was clearly to put a nail in the coffin of the workers' councils by reestablishing parliamentary politics within a corporatist structure. It empowered the

[37] The notion of Communal Economy is not necessarily a socialist one. It is perfectly compatible with a corporative model which can operate within some type of public-private partnership.
[38] The resolution can be found in "SPD Resolution on the Question of Councils…" (Central Council, 2014b, pp. 63-65).
[39] It appears from the articles 3 and 4 of the resolution that the workers delegates to these Chambers of Labour were rhetorically called "workers' councils".

representatives of employers and trade unions to have seats in the core organs of the economic planning of the state. It is hard to see much difference between this formulation and the ZAG agreement. The strengthening of the unions within the new state was also clear to the ordinary workers. They flocked to join the ADGB whose membership reach a staggering 5,479,073 (38 per cent of the workforce) in 1919 and 7,890,102 (54.7 per cent) in the following year, compared to 1,664,991 (11.5 per cent) in 1918 (Fowkes, 2014, p. 332).

Kautsky gave a speech at the Second Congress on socialization. He renewed his warning against either full or accelerated socialization, while criticizing the lack of government's commitment to the challenges of the socialization process. He called for the institution of a Central Socialization Office, modelled after a similar office in Austria, with far-reaching powers including expropriation of land and mines. In reality, however, nothing came out of this programmatic effort, as it was already evident in the Socialization Law passed a few weeks prior. In fact, at the SPD party congress in June, Wissell (Central Council, 2014a) discussed the general failure of the government to deliver on economic demands. He saw this as the cause behind a slide to the left notably the increased popularity of the USPD. He saw the solution in the Communal Economy as a pathway towards socialism. Nevertheless, an overwhelming majority of the SPD delegates were against even that level of a planned economy.[40]

Aside from the legislative and military suppression of the councils at the national level, most other workers' councils died out either voluntarily or due to the funding cuts by the various levels of government. For example, as early as May 1919, the workers' councils in Düsseldorf were forced to dissolve themselves after their funding was cut, forcing them to borrow money (Carsten, 1972, p. 176). Similarly, the state in Karlsruhe cut all funding to the workers' councils in July 1919 after declaring their role as over in May (pp. 157-158). In some cities, the government got rid of the remaining workers' councils by making them illegal. For example, the government of Stuttgart declared the workers' councils illegal on 15 July shortly after calling them unnecessary (p. 160).

To summarize, the second period saw a bifurcation in the form of council movement, with no significant crossover between the two branches. There was a change in the gravitational centre of politics after the early election to the National Assembly was called for. It marked a decisive shift among organizations to focus their energy to gain hegemony over the revolutionary process from councils to the National Assembly. It also inflated the indirect programmatic interventions of non-

[40] After the Second Congress, there were a number of important theoretical elaborations among the council theorists on the question socialization. The most notable of these were written by Karl Korsch ("What is Socialization?" published in May) and Anton Pannekoek ("Socialization" published in September). Notwithstanding their theoretical insights, these elaborations, which tellingly lacked much practical details, could not be implemented by the council movement even in Ruhr region and Central Germany.

socialist parties on the question of "citizens' control" and "workers' control" which fundamentally impacted the political horizons of the movement within the consolidating legal-administrative state within post-war corporatist industrial relations. On both accounts, the country moved decisively towards a liberal parliamentary understanding of "citizens' control" and a corporatist understanding of "workers' control" on the basis of codetermination between trade unions and employers.[41] Broadly speaking, councils were now operating in a context in which they were seen by the majority of political forces, including the SPD, as a transitory phenomenon that had to practically be made superfluous or suppressed after the convocation of the National Assembly. This unmaking of the movement did not imply rapid withdrawal of the forces for the council movement. But it implied a systematic dismantling that still required continued involvement of political forces, either directly or indirectly, to ensure a coordinated strategic response. Under the auspices of such transformations, the movement bifurcated along the radical trends within it.

Along the dimension of radical "citizens' control" on the basis of councils, the case of Bremen, Bavaria, and Berlin stand out as three cases in point. Depending on the political landscape of each region, the principal organizing forces behind these included the KPD (largely in Bremen and Berlin), *Obleute* (largely in Berlin), left-wing of the USPD (minority in the three regions), and anarchists (largely in Bavaria). The organizational capacity of the newly founded KPD was quite limited (e.g. their near absence in Bavaria). Its inability to absorb or establish a strong working alliance with the *Obleute* into the party further severed it from an organic link with a large and critical mass within the working class. The *Obleute* had its stronghold in Berlin among the metalworkers and operated at best indirectly in other regions through its impacts on the USPD general strategic orientation. The left-wing of the USPD could operate with a significant margin of freedom in different regions due to the party's heterogeneity and decentralization. However, the party's evolving relations with the rapidly consolidating state (which always includes relations with other political organizations) particularly after the election to the National Assembly forged the overall strategic horizons of its left-wing.[42]

The dimension of radical "workers' control" on the basis of councils are most vividly manifested in the case of Ruhr, Central Germany, and Berlin. The principal organizing forces behind the council movement in this context included the KPD and USPD dominated General Mining Union (largely in the Ruhr region), the syndicalist FVdG (largely in Ruhr and Central Germany), the KPD (mainly in Berlin and Central Germany), as well as some influence from the

[41] This was pushed forward in the second period not only on the basis of ZAG but also under later schemes such as the Economic Councils and the Chamber of Labour.
[42] This included, for example, a rift that was created between the USPD and the KDP due to the decision and the result of the election.

SPD (particularly as part of the Commission of Nine). This period saw a definite shift towards a growing influence of syndicalist forces in the Ruhr region and Central Germany. The exodus of members from the Free Trade Unions to the General Mining Union and later to the FVdG was a manifestation of that development. This process was fueled by the failure of the Socialization Commission and very limited achievements made by the Commission of Nine to make concrete steps towards meaningful socialization.

The radical programmatic efforts along the dimension of "citizens' control" appeared most notably in Bremen, Bavaria, and Berlin. In Bremen, activists sought to institute "control" (in the sense of supervision) over the Council of Deputies. In Bavaria, as the alignment of forces after the election to the National Assembly made Eisner's "third-way" scheme increasingly infeasible, the programmatic fault lines were being drawn between liberal democratic and council republic, with the balance of forces decisively towards the former. The political shock after the assassination of leading political figures tips the scale and enabled a progressive shift, first under the socialist unity government and then under the short-lived Bavarian Republic, towards a more radical conception of "citizens' control" with the councils playing a more significant role within the programmatic schemes. In Berlin, the radical vision of "citizens' control" under a council republic was elaborated on in the journal *Arbeiter-Rat*, where leading members of the *Obleute* developed the notion of "pure councilism".

The theoretical elaboration along "workers' control" in this period revolved around the militant actions in the Ruhr region and Central Germany. These were ignited by the decision of the First Congress at the end of the first period to begin an immediate socialization of the mining sector. Contrary to largely top-down state-centred scheme geared towards increasing economic efficiency that were later put out by the Socialization Commission, the Commission of Nine outlined a much more bottom-up cooperative socialization process. Negotiations with the government in Central Germany led to the formal recognition of factory councils. The shift towards syndicalism manifested itself also in a radical programmatic articulation of these factory councils. This in effect prepared them to potentially become institutions of rank-and-file militant actions.

The movement trajectory towards radical "citizens' control" on the basis of a council system led to new alliances between the anarchists, the leftwing of the USPD, and the KPD. This came at the cost of the breakdown of the alliance between the USPD and the BBB. Furthermore, due partially to the consorted efforts of the other peasant associations to organize the peasants against the socialist forces and partially due to the fear of peasants themselves towards the prospect of a revolutionary socialist government for their material interests, there was a general alienation among the peasants against the council movement.

The SPD continued its unrelenting suppression of the council movement by all means necessary including military intervention, partisan takeover, alliance with non-socialist parties within the state, legislative interference, and budgetary restrictions. By the end of the second period, the movement within the "political" sphere was effectively terminated. However, the wave of strikes across the industrial heartland of Germany pointed to a decisive shift in the trajectory of the council movement from the question of workers' councils to factory councils in the third period.

Third Period (15 April 1920 – 7 October 1920)

The trade union leadership had been relatively reactive towards the revolutionary development in its initial periods. However, the upheavals in the industrial heartland seriously undermined their ability to control their members. Furthermore, the growing popularity and concrete expansion of factory councils, which no longer bracketed the question of power relation within the workplace but were primarily interested in direct democratization of enterprises, threatened the authority of trade unions over workplace relations. The challenge to the trade union leadership was not confined to the Ruhr region and Central Germany. This was also distinctly felt within the German Metalworkers' Union (*Deutscher Metallarbeiter-Verband*, DMV) with over a million members[43] when a member of the *Obleute*, Otto Tost, replaced Adolph Cohen as the head of the Berlin section of the DMV on 1 March 1919. In the third period, the left within the DMV succeeded in taking over many union branches in Bremen, Halle, Brunswick, and Stuttgart (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 130).

In response to these developments, the strategy of the union began to shift into a more proactive position from February 1919, particularly by latching onto the distinctly radical programmatic vision of Theodor Leipart, the Chairman of German Woodworkers' Union (*Deutscher Holzarbeiterverband*, DHV) (Potthoff, 1987, p. 153-5).[44] From early on in the Revolution, the leadership of the DHV were a strong proponent of socialization since they saw socialization as inseparable from socialism; that is, economic democracy as a necessary continuation of political democracy. Leipart considered councils (both in their operational and territorial forms) as representative bodies, democratically elected by workers, to realize co-determination in all questions of production and operation (Plener, 2009, pp. 83-7). On the question of the relationship between unions and councils, Leipart considered unions as indispensable in the process of socialization and argued that councils should "draw on the trade unions for solutions to economic issues" (as quoted on p. 87). Compared to the more radical vision of some of the leaders

[43] The DMV reported 1.6 million members in October 1919 (Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 135).
[44] The strategic intention of the trade union leaders was hinted at when Hermann Sachs, the President of the German Miners' Union, said in February 1919, "If workers' committee in the factories were called workers' councils, the people would have been thrown a bone to chew on" (as quoted in Potthoff, 1987, p. 163).

of the DMV, Leipart was positively critical yet sufficiently flexible to offer a pathway to appeal to both radicalized and moderate segments of the working class in an effort to contain the movement.

In addition to such rhetorical strategies, the old union leadership tried to push back against the leftwing efforts to replace the old union functionaries. Even though they failed to block this within the DMV, they succeeded in the first post-war General Union Congress on 5 July. The rhetorical strategy of the union leadership became apparent when ironically Legien, the Chairman of the Free Trade Unions under whose leadership the unions participated in the *Burgfrieden*, and Robert Dissmann, the political rival of Müller in the DMV, delivered the position of the left "in place of bureaucratic fossilized thinking" (as quoted in Hoffrogge, 2015, p. 132) within the union leadership. And yet, the newly formed General German Trade Union Federation (*Allgemeiner Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund*, ADGB) ensured leadership continuity by electing Legien as its first Chairman.

A watered-down version of the councils found its way into the new constitution that was being drafted in Weimar and was adopted on 11 August. Article 165 of the constitution stated workers and employees were to negotiate with the employers "on an equal footing" on the regulation of wages and work as well as "the whole economic development of the productive forces". It called for the formation of Factory Workers' Councils (*Betriebsarbeiterräten*) as well as District Workers' Councils (*Bezirksarbeiterräte*) and the Imperial Workers' Council (*Reichsarbeiterrat*). Workers' representatives in the latter two organizations were to meet and cooperate with the employers' representatives on economic issues in the Economic Councils at both district and national levels (i.e. *Bezirkswirtschaftsräten* and *Reichswirtschaftsrat*). Despite all its ambiguities, Article 165 was explicit in delimiting the general scope of negotiations that councils could engage in both in terms of substance (regulation of wages and working condition) and form (subordinating Factory Workers' Councils and the Economic Councils in their tasks and formation to the *Reich* government). However, even this seemed too much in the government's eyes and it tried to modify Article 165 to limit the power of workers' committees.

In the months that followed, the debate within the organized labour movement with regards to "workers' control" continued along the lines of the relation between the unions and the councils. During the 14th congress of the DMV in October 1919, Dissmann presented the outline of his programme for the democratization of unions essentially through decentralization them. He proposed giving greater financial authority to the local unions, holding more frequent local general assemblies, and electing union officials on an annual basis. While giving lip service to factory councils, he did not want to use them as the basis for democratic restructuring of the union (Hoffrogge, 2015, pp. 133-5). Müller, on the other hand, pushed towards industrial unionism by

calling for merging trade unions to form "powerful industrial organization" as the "foundation of an organically developing council system" (as quoted in p. 133). Ultimately, none of these two proposals reached the two-third threshold needed to make structural changes to the union.

While these struggles were unfolding within socialist unions especially in industrial cities, the council movement in the Ruhr region continued its shift towards syndicalism under the growing programmatic influence of the anarcho-syndicalist theorist, Rudolf Rocker. In December 1919, the FVdG merged with the anarchist union Free Workers' Union (*Freien Arbeiter Union*, FAU) to form the anarcho-syndicalist Free Workers Union of Germany (*Freie Arbeiter-Union Deutschlands*, FAUD).[45] It unanimously adopted Rocker's "Declaration of Principles of Syndicalism". In the Principles, Rocker, who was deeply influenced by the anarcho-communist theorist Peter Kropotkin, argued that contrary to capitalism where the economic order was left entirely to the self-determination of the capitalist class facilitated by the state, socialism was organized on the basis of self-determination of the associated producers. He characterized the state, regardless of the external form that it took, as the political expression of a class society. Therefore, he rejected all forms of political engagement through the channels of the state to implement transformative projects, including nationalization, political parties, and parliamentary activities, as a means to bring about socialism. On the question of unions, he considered them not as a temporary product of the capitalist society but as "the nucleus of the future socialist economic organization." These revolutionary unions had to resist subordination to any central office and maintained complete self-determination. These unions were to be linked federally within each sector, and then linked in a supra level across professions to form the Federation of Industrial Associations. The organization of the sphere of consumption was left to the Federation of Workers' Exchanges.[46] Factory councils appeared as the entities through which factories and workshops were to be organized. The transformative vision of anarcho-syndicalists in the Principles differed from that of "pure councilists" in its strictly economic reorganization of society.

Amidst the growing centralization of the KPD, the party published its view on trade unions on 23 October. While identifying trade unions in their present forms as "a tool of the bourgeoisie and the counter-revolution" (as quoted in Fowkes, 2014, p. 89), it called for communists to continue agitating within those organizations to isolate the union bureaucracy from the masses rather than resigning from the union. The declaration did not mention the potential role of the councils in the struggle against union bureaucracy. Furthermore, Levi put out a declaration of communist principles in October. While emphasizing the primacy of political struggle led by the party over "an

[45] In its congress in December 1919, the FAUD reported 111,675 members (Jenko, 2007, p. 18).
[46] The relation between factory councils and "revolutionary unions" is not entirely clear in the Principles.

economic revolution", he called on communists to "join together to form factions within these workers' councils and endeavor by using appropriate slogans to raise them to the height of their revolutionary mission and to win the leadership of the workers' councils and the masses of workers" (Levi, 2014, p. 86). Strict rejection of federalist ideas, emphasis on the primacy of the party, and the openness to potentially engage in parliamentary struggle increasingly alienated the left communists within the KPD among whom there were leading council theorists such as Anton Pannekoek. This led to their split in April 1920 to form the anti-parliamentary Communist Workers' Party of Germany (*Kommunistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands*, KAPD).

The USPD, with an eye on the prospect of joining the Third International, released its action programme in December 1919 (see Fowkes, 2014, pp. 339-42). In its vision of achieving proletarian struggle for the conquest of political power, it identified the need for an independent social democratic party committed to revolutionary socialism, trade unions to be transformed into fighting organizations for the revolution, and "revolutionary Council System, through which joins the workers together for the purpose of revolutionary action" (p. 340). It committed to replacing the capitalist state with a system of political workers' councils to institute the self-determination of the working people. On the specific points of action, it did not move significantly from its previous practical position. Aside from its revolutionary rhetoric with consistent references to workers' councils, most of which had been dismantled in various ways at that point in time, it did not include any guidelines on the party's orientation towards factory councils.

The legislation on factory councils was debated towards the end of 1919 and became the Factory Council Law on 4 February 1920. This came about despite strong opposition from the USPD and the KPD demanding "a full right of control over the running of the factories" (p. 66), and bloody protests on the streets. This time, however, the blue- and white-collar workers had to be represented by separate councils (see Article 6 of the law). Excluding the essential task of collaborating with the employers on wages and working conditions, it limited the role of the factory councils "to give advice to the factory management; to cooperate in the introduction of new methods of work; to negotiate with the employer on labour regulations, within the framework of existing wage contracts; to take note of complaints by the Workers' Council and to work towards dealing with them in joint negotiations with the employer" (Fowkes, 2014, p. 67). They were also entitled to receive quarterly reports by the employers regarding the situation and progress of the firm. Additionally, there was a clause regarding profit sharing for firms with more than 300 employees (see Article 71 and Article 72 of the law, p. 68).

Amidst the dwindling prospect of any breakthrough for the council movement, a coup was staged by the right-wing forces on 13 March 1920 in Berlin. What became known as Kapp Putsch

was met by an unprecedented wave of general strikes across the country in the following days that brought the counter-revolutionary forces to their knees. Although this event brought the left-wing opposition forces to act together in parallel against the right-wing assault on the revolution, it could not result in an alliance between the SPD-ADGB and the KPD-USPD, particularly in Berlin. In Ruhr, where communists and syndicalists came together to form a Red Army to fight the reactionary forces,[47] the fundamental schism reappeared after the coup was defeated. As significant as the March events were for the history of the German working-class and socialist movements, it did not have much impact on the trajectory of the council movement. This was due not only to the misalliance between the key organizing forces behind the movement and their programmatic ambiguities towards the movement in its present form but also to the legislative hurdles against the possibility of the revival of the movement. In response to the renewed calls for immediate socialization, the government convened the second Socialization Commission in March 1920. However, it was staffed mostly with personnel from business associations, trade unions, and political parties.[48] Until its dissolution in 1923, none of its reports and proposals had any political impact (Fermbach, 2019, pp. 10-11). Even the result of the *Reich* election in June 1920 which saw a significant increase in the vote share of the USPD (17.6 per cent, 83 seats), largely in exchange for the decline of the SPD (21.9 per cent, 103 seats), could not help the council movement to recover.

The final nail in the coffin of the council movement in Germany came at the end of the national conference of German factory councils on 5-7 October 1920. Despite the best efforts of council activists such as Müller to carve out some level of independence in the relationship between trade unions and councils, the delegates voted to subordinate the councils to the unions and to transfer all decisions of significance to the ADGB's executive board (Hoffrogge, 2015, pp. 142-3).

To conclude, the council movement in the third period experienced a decisive shift towards the struggle for "workers' control" within the "economic" sphere. This brought the trade unions face-to-face with the movement since, in both substance and form, it challenged their authority over industrial relations. The unions then sought to contain the movement through rhetorical and legislative means. The DMV led the movement for independent factory councils within the socialist unions. Despite their best efforts to exert a leftward push within the ADGB and to achieve considerable success in replacing the old union functionaries with council activists in some of the key industrial cities, they could not break through the large and complex machinery of the union bureaucracy. It was in this period that the anarcho-syndicalist FAUD became a dominant force in the Ruhr region.

[47] The members of the FAUD are believed to have formed 44.9 percent of the Ruhr Red Army (Jenko, 2007, p. 21).
[48] See Frambach (2019, p.10f) for the list of the members of the second Socialization Commission.

The KPD could not influence the trajectory of the movement significantly. This was because of its limited organizational capacity and its structural and ideological restructuring that made it difficult to work with any other forces within and outside the socialist camp (perhaps with an exception of the USPD only in extraordinary circumstances such as during Kapp Putsch). However, the ideological position of the KPD towards what it perceived to be syndicalist trends, as well as its openness to parliamentary struggle alienated the left communists, some of the leading members of which were council theorists, leading to the formation of the KAPD. Council movement was suffering from internal fragmentation which led to a missed opportunity amidst massive mobilization in the wake of Kapp Putsch. In the meanwhile, the movement was redirected legislatively. This severely limited the scope of the activities of the councils and ultimately subordinated them to the union executive board.

The programmatic efforts in this period were carried out both inside and outside the trade union movement. These articulations were being formulated on the background of careful and multifaceted strategies of the ADGB leadership as well as the government more broadly, including rhetorical and legislative interventions, to contain the movement from within and isolate the movement from without. Radical elements within the DMV and DHV put forward different views along "workers' control" dimensions on the basis of councils that spanned from industrial unionism (e.g. Müller) to broad and active co-determination (e.g. Leipart). Outside the formal bounds of the trade union movements, the FAUD put forward an anarcho-syndicalist view towards revolutionary unionism and strict rejection of all forms of political engagement with the state. Furthermore, the USPD continued to express commitment to the council ideas. However, it failed to present a concrete strategy to build on the movement in its present form of "factory councils" rather than its previous form of "workers' council" that was no longer in sight. Ultimately, these programmatic efforts could not compete with the legislative power of the state and the organizational power of the ADGB.

Given the high degree of organizational fragmentation within the movement and the geographic and sectoral confinement of the movement in this period, the horizon of possible alliance was quite limited. This became evident in the failure of the movement to muster any significant and durable alliances that could expand its social base and influence the trajectory of the movement.

Concluding Remarks

Radical democratic struggles that proliferated in Germany at the end of the war found its institutional form in the councils. Conditioned by the specific form of war mobilization, the breakdown of the state apparatus, the formation of a formal corporatist alliance between capital and

labour after the war, all came together to locate the primary locus of "council democratic" movement along the "citizens' control" dimension in the first period. This went beyond democratic challenges within the state apparatus and extended to the self-governing networks of workers' and soldiers' councils that facilitated the distribution of food and demobilization of soldiers in the first period. However, without revolutionary changes to the structure of the state, such self-governing bodies were bound to be transitory.

The SPD and the Free Trade Unions were deeply invested in facilitating their inclusion in the political and economic structures of Germany. While this had already begun before the war, their maturation accelerated in the course of the war, making the social democratic forces indispensable not only to the conduct of the war but to the post-war transition. Their organizational capacity, relative internal cohesion, and structural position in the emerging state and new class alliances in the revolutionary context at the end of the war put the SPD and the Free Trade Unions in a far superior position than any other organizations to direct the course of the revolution. Having been thrown at the centre of a revolution it did not want, the SPD leadership could not possibly afford not to engage actively with the "council democratic" movement. The leadership of the Free Trade Unions, in contrast, could temporarily defer open conflict with the movement at least until the third period. Nevertheless, even their seemingly passive support for the SPD's policies contributed significantly to the ability of the party to influence the trajectory of the movement. Moreover, the substantial concessions that they drew from the ZAG empowered the leadership of the Free Trade Unions to maintain control of its massive membership.

On the left of the SPD, the USPD was an organization of ideologically diverse tendencies that had united together in 1917 to coordinate the struggles of various anti-war forces through a political party. This main adhesive element that had brought these forces together was no longer available after the war. Therefore, the USPD suffered from a lack of internal cohesion. The USPD also lacked sufficient organizational capacity to exert its influence in the vast majority of the country. Furthermore, its position within the emerging state dwindled rapidly, especially after its electoral results in ad its refusal to participate in the Central Council in the second period. This weakened the party to facilitate the movement through its structural position within the state. However, the party did have an affiliated critical mass, most notably the *Obleute*, among industrial working class in Berlin. The influence of the Spartacus League on the trajectory of the movement remained marginal and confined to Berlin. However, given the popularity of some of its leading figures and uncompromising militancy at the height of the revolution in the first period, it perhaps had some impacts on the movement by exerting leftward pressure on the USPD. After its transformation into the KPD in the second period, it began to expand its organizational capacity,

internal cohesion, and social base. However, these contextually conditioned and strategically selective factors, could not catch up with the processive pace of the movement's trajectory to give the KPD a determining role in the evolution of the movement.

The failure of the movement to realize its radical democratic demands in the first period weakened the movement quantitatively as many councils dissipated and radicalized various tendencies within it. In the second period, this led to a bifurcation of the movement that sought to revive the movement along radical articulation of "citizens' control" and "workers' control". This development broadened the spectrum of organizing forces engaged within the movement and included syndicalist and anarchist forces particularly in the Ruhr region and Central Germany.

Further consolidation of political power after the suppression and containment of the movement in the second period pushed the locus of the struggle further along the "workers' control" dimension. This manifested itself not only in further and radical socialization, which involved the FAUD, but also in struggle towards democratization of industrial relations on the basis of councils. It was at this juncture that the ADGB leadership got involved more directly in the development of the movement. The leadership of the trade unions was successful in deflecting these internal challenges through organizational, rhetorical, and legislative strategies. The external challenges could not muster enough force, due to their relatively limited organizational capacities, narrow social base, and strictly external relation with the state,[49] to match the hegemony of the socialist trade unions over the movement.

Regarding programmatic efforts, the leadership of the SPD and the Free Trade Unions firmly believed that a liberal democratic state (indeed even a constitutional monarchic state for that matter) and corporatist industrial relations would offer the best possible option for the German working class (not to mention their own positions within it). Having realized the indispensable role of councils as the primary organizational form of the struggle of democratization after the war, they cast councils as transitory institutions to absorb the initial shock of the state breakdown and to take on some basic social functions such as food distributions and army demobilization.

For the SPD, "citizens' control" was a process strictly mediated between individual citizens and the state, by party representatives and state functionaries. The SPD leadership could not even accept a mild form of indirect supervision of the councils over the conduct of the state at different levels, seeing it as disruptive interference. Hence, they orient all their strategic actions towards electing a National Assembly as soon as possible. Similarly, "workers' control" was understood as a strictly mediated process by the elected union representatives. In this sense, the union leadership

[49] The KPD's openness towards parliamentary activities makes it an exception in this regard.

could swallow the presence of workers' councils in the relations of production as long as they were strictly subordinated to the trade unions and could help the unions to expand their scope of influence, particularly within the large enterprises. The socialization demands were acceptable in a very limited scope and slow pace, and only insofar as they could be articulated within the general framework of the ZAG agreement.

The USPD encapsulated an incompatible array of programmatic orientations towards the councils. These ranged from positions that were very similar to those of the SPD on key issues such as the short transitory nature of the councils and the need for the speedy convocation of the National Assembly, to a mixed or parallel system that reserved some more permanent role for the councils in the post-war state and society and postponement of the election to the National Assembly, to a total rejection of liberal representative democracy in favour of a council system. Therefore, there were fundamentally competing articulations of "citizens' control" within the USPD ranging from liberal democratic to council communist understanding. This is in contrast to the relatively coherent programmatic vision of the Spartacus League which called for "all power to the councils" in both the economic and political spheres.

The horizon of the USPD's programmatic efforts on "citizens' control" narrowed substantially after the decision of the First Congress and then the election of the National Assembly. However, given the decentralized character of the USPD, various elements within the party could still participate in programmatic efforts within the movement along its trajectory in the second and the third period. With regards to the "workers' control" dimension, the USPD first sought to influence the debate both through the formal institutions (e.g. Socialization Commission) and outside those institutions (e.g. General Miners Union). In any case, the USPD's programmatic vision for councils revolved around various degrees of supervision by the councils over the conduct of the state institutions or employers. A notable exception to this is the affiliated "pure councilists" that gathered around *Arbeiter-Rat*. They developed a scheme that assumed a far greater role for the councils beyond supervision.

As the movement became increasingly radicalized in the second period along its both dimensions, the programmatic efforts of the syndicalist and anarchist forces impacted the movement more significantly. However, given the contextual as well as ideological factors concerning those efforts, these forces often failed to transcend any given dimension of "council democracy" in their analysis. In fact, as the prospect of the movement faded, their position radicalized further.

A significant part of the programmatic efforts in the third period focused on the democratization of unions either by transforming them from within or remodelling them from

outside (e.g. on the basis of industrial unionism or revolutionary unionism). To contain the movement, trade union leadership had to orient itself strategically to absorb the majority of workers through programmatic readjustments and isolate the radical factions through legislative manoeuvring.

Regarding the alliance patterns, the SPD, which had entered into the provisional government with the USPD, generally showed more eagerness to work with non-socialist forces to its right than others to its left. Such alliances with liberal or conservative forces were more appropriate for maintaining the fundamental shift of class alignment that had begun towards the end of the war, and ensure its relative hegemony over the working-class movement in the post-war era. The USPD, which itself was a broad coalition of diverse socialist tendencies, found it hard to form an effective alliance with other forces. The SPD had already blockaded the forces to its right and was uninterested in sharing power to a splinter party which not long ago it had expelled. The KPD was the former Spartacus League which formed the communist party precisely in response to the inability of the USPD to effectively lead the revolution. The large improbability of such alliances was a reminiscence of the rapid split in the former SPD, first creating the USPD and then the KPD in a span of 2 years. Although there were short-term tactical alliances between the syndicalist/anarchist and USPD during the course of the movement in different regions, their ideological positions were divergent enough that could not sustain the alliance. With regards to the KPD, its continued organizational centralization and hardening ideological anti-syndicalism/anarchism hindered effective alliances with the syndicalist and anarchist forces.

Regarding the possibility of alliance with broader social classes, the socialist forces were generally inactive in not only expanding their organizational reach within other social classes, particularly the peasants, but also developing programmatic details to bring non-working-class subalterns into the hegemonic project of the movement. The only notable exception took place in Bavaria, between the USPD and the BBB. However, even that was largely on the basis of personal connection between the leaders of the two parties rather than the strategical alignment of the two organizational forces. Therefore, the movement did not expand much beyond the working class and some segments of the enlightened intellectual sector. The relatively rapid demobilization of the soldiers, many of whom were of peasant origins in rural Germany, quickly depleted the class character of the movement. Even while soldiers' councils were active within the movement, they were under strong dominance of the SPD which had no desire in leading the "council democratic" movement towards success.

It was through such complex processes that the trajectory of the movement was inscribed. They involved a multiplicity of organizing forces whose strategic-relational struggles for hegemony

within the movement, always already connected with their existing projects within the society and in relation to the state, led to conjunctural transformation of the movement and in turn the transformation of their own characteristics. The evolving balance of organizing forces within the movement, with their programmatic efforts concerning the movement, and their alliance patterns in relation to other forces, all in relation to the developing state and consolidating class relations eventually pacified the movement in both of its constitutive dimensions. Therefore, “council democracy” could not be realized in Germany.

Chapter 6

The Trajectory of the "Council Democratic" Movement in Italy (1919-1920)

Introduction

Chapter 3 offered an analysis of the processes that laid the groundwork for the emergence of the "council democratic" movement during the *biennio rosso*. While preconditioned by the material condensation of pre-war struggles that shaped the relations of class forces and the state, these processes were forged by the ways through which the war mobilization was carried out in Italy.

The rapid dismantling of the military structure of the state back to formally parliamentary system after the war demanded a swift reorientation of the political organizations of social classes to the new post-war reality. Amid the severe economic and political pressures and the impossibility of a return to the pre-war *trasformismo*, the Italian state fell into a profound crisis. Soon, the contradictions and capacities created during the war caught up with the post-war realities and opened up space for radical movements to emerge. The formation of "council democratic" movement in Italy began precisely from the radicalization of the internal commissions whose institutional genesis went back to the war time. However, due to the changing relations of forces both within and outside the labour movement and the state, the trajectory of "council democratic" movement in Italy moved increasingly towards its syndicalist axis and manifested itself in factory occupations.

The chapter analyzes the trajectory of the "council democratic" movement during the *biennio rosso* in relational terms, using organizational links, programmatic efforts, and alliance patterns as its primary analytic framework. The evolution of the movement is contextualized within the broader yet relevant changes that the state and society underwent during the *biennio rosso*. The discussion is divided into three periods. The first period begins in June 1919 when the burgeoning militancy of factory workers in Turin found the epicentre of its programmatic efforts among a small group of socialists who gathered around a weekly newspaper, *l'ordine nuovo*. This period ends just before the first post-war general election for the Chamber of Deputies in mid-November 1919. During this period, the movement evolved primarily along the "workers' control" dimension as the question of "citizens' control" was posited to the liberal-parliamentary channels. The second period begins from the election on 15 November 1919 to August 1920, before the wave of factory occupation in the following months. During this period, the balance of organizing forces within the movement shifts decisively toward the syndicalist forces. As a result, the programmatic articulation of the movement shift towards syndicalism. The third period examines the events during the late

August to September 1920 when a wave of factory and land occupations swept across the country. Even though the movement carried forward under an implicitly syndicalist articulation of "workers' control", the formal leadership of the CGL and the PSI directed the structural resolution of the movement into a corporatist model within a capitalist framework. The concluding section of the chapter highlights the factors that significantly impacted the particular trajectory of the "council democratic" movement in Italy.

The Trajectory of "Council Democratic" Movement of the Italian Case

First Period (21 June 1919 – 14 November 1919)

Before delving into the discussion of this period, it is worth recounting briefly the socio-political context of Italy between the end of the war and the beginning of this period. The peace process that commenced in January 1919 profoundly affected the relations of forces within the state and society. The Italian delegates went to Paris with the hope to get what was outlined under the secret London Agreement of 1915 as well as Fiume. While President Woodrow Wilson was prepared to give Southern Tyrol and Brenner to Italy, he was inflexible with regards to Italy's other demands, particularly on the question of Fiume.[1] After months of diplomatic struggle, the Italian delegation failed to get the widely expected concessions. This was far from just a diplomatic failure. It discredited the conservative faction within the Liberal Union (*unione liberale*; UL) and strengthened the ideological position of both the interventionist and the anti-interventionist forces outside the liberal bloc. Among the former, there were the anarcho-syndicalist Italian Union of Labour (*unione Italiana del lavoro*; UIL) and the proto-fascist forces which labelled the failure as a "mutilated victory" (*vittoria mutilata*);[2] among the latter, there were the PSI and the USI which found further proof of their anti-war position. It also strained Italy's relationship especially with the Americans, making it more difficult to obtain the much-needed credit for the post-war economic recovery.

The loss of confidence in the ability of the government to lead the country through the difficult post-war transition led to the fall of Prime Minister Orlando on 23 June 1919. However, there was no viable political force that could take the place of the liberal bloc. Among the two parties with the largest popular support, the PSI had already voted against taking office on its January 1919 session and the Italian People's Party (*Partito Popolare Italiano*; PPI), founded only on January 1919, had no seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Amidst a crumbling hegemony of the

[1] While citing the principle of national self-determination from his Fourteen Points for his position on Fiume, he was concerned that such concession might tilt the emerging Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (what alter became Yugoslavia) towards the Russian influence.

[2] The term was probably inspired by Gabriele D'Annunzio's poem, published in *corriere della Sera* on the anniversary of Caporetto on 24 October 1918, wrote: "our victory will not be mutilated" (*vittoria nostra, non sarai mutilata*).

UL, Francesco Saverio Nitti, the Minister of Finance in the Orlando government, became the new Prime Minister on 24 June.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, the employers' organizations in the industrial triangle (e.g. the LIT) came to the realization that the processes pioneered as a part of war mobilization had set in motion a series of largely irreversible, albeit incomplete, changes in labour relations. Initially, they tried to get ahead of the curve by bringing this process to completion under their terms to meet their interests. As explained in the previous chapter, the corporatist structure that had been conceived during the second period of war mobilization was halted as the militarized state sought to bypass the workers' unions and engage directly with the internal commissions. The employers had always seen the internal commissions and the militarization of the factory as a direct challenge to their managerial authority. With the termination of the latter at the end of the war, the solution they sought to secure their managerial authority was to initiate a process of reconciliation with the large workers' unions by giving serious concessions in return for the unions to accept the absolute managerial authority and the intensification of Taylorism while maintaining control of their members (Adler, 1995, pp. 196-8; on Fiat's position, see Castronovo, 2005, pp. 90-2). On the other hand, the workers' union leadership saw this as an opportunity to assert its position in the post-war labour relations while winning long-fought reforms from the employers.

The most significant instance of such a conciliatory move in the immediate aftermath of the war was the Fiat Agreement, signed between the FIOM and the Fiat employers. It came to effect on 18 March 1919 after the CGL launched its 8-hour day campaign in January. They conceded on the long-standing demands of the union for 8-hour day and 48-hour week, and granted some increases in hourly wages and piece-rates (Mazzacurati, 2017, pp. 68-9). However, the industrialists used this to limit the ability of the workers to engage in militant action by banning unofficial "economic" strikes, and to increase the disciplinary power of management.[3] This was done by creating a complex arbitration process that made a legal strike incredibly difficult.[4]

Such concessions in exchange for gaining labour discipline and a possible increase in labour productivity would make economic sense for large firms, such as Fiat, which were hit to a lesser degree by the massive economic downturn after the war due to the continued demand for certain commodities such as cars. It also fitted well with the ideological commitment of large industrialists

[3] The management was granted the power to fine or dismiss workers for reasons such as leaving their posts without justification, working slowly or carelessly, subordination, etc. It also forced the internal commissions to meet outside the working hours and prohibited them from freely circulating among the rank-and-file (see Gluckstein, 1985, pp. 179-80).

[4] The regulative provisions within the Agreement for dispute and legal strike demanded that the dispute is first brought up between the internal commission and the directorates; if the agreement is not reached, then the matter is escalated to the Industrial Committee and the Confederation of Industry; only if the dispute cannot be settled at the national level then workers are allowed to launch a legal strike (see Maione, 1975, p. 10).

towards productivism (Sarti, 1967). The General Confederation of Italian Industry (*Confederazione generale dell'industria italiana*; Confindustria), established in February of 1919,[5] was using the agreement ideologically as a symbol of their conciliatory attitude towards the organized labour in exchange for the union's sense of responsibility and commitment to post-war economic recovery. However, the precedence that it set for other sectors was quite concerning especially for smaller companies and intransigent employers. This began to create a schism between fractions of capital. However, since the small companies did not have an organized force for independent action, they followed the direction, at least temporarily, determined by the large capitalist interests.

In the meanwhile, although the union leadership hailed the Agreement as a great achievement, it sparked dissatisfactions among the rank-and-file for its restriction on the operation of internal commissions, their rights to strike, and other demands on working condition (see Mazzacurati, 2017, pp. 96-7 for workers' letters published by the Turin section of Avanti!; see also Levy, 2000, p.134). Therefore, the agreement brought the top echelons of the employers' organization and the union together while radicalizing the lower echelons of both.[6] The failure to adequately implement and generalize the agreement in different industries, strengthened the intransigent fractions within both the employers and labour organizations.

The militant struggles of workers during the war, the continued economic pressure after the war, and the possibility of gaining serious concessions from the employers further radicalized the rank-and-file beyond the parameters of the new corporatist arrangement. Between 14-17 March 1919, around 2,000 workers occupied the Franchi-Gregorini steelworks in Dalmine and continued the production, after the employers dismissed their demands for eight-hour day, a minimum wage, and Saturdays off. In addition to these demands, the workers insisted on the recognition of their council and the right to be consulted before the implementation of any technological changes to the production process. In other words, they saw the core reformist measure as inseparable from the right to maintain control over the production process. What was unique about this act of militancy was its use of factory occupation not to stop but to continue the production process. It was a direct violation of the principle of private ownership of the means of production and a subversion of the

[5] At the time of its official inauguration on 9-10 April 1919, the membership of Confindustria included 55 associations with nearly 6,000 firms. This increased to 144 association by 1922. Although the confederation had a national intent and outlook with 14 of the 17 regions having some representation by 1922, the majority of its members were still located in the North (Sarti, 1967, pp. 22-4, 40-1).

[6] This became evident within the rank-and-file not only in their open letter critical of the agreement which was published in *Avanti!* on 15 March and the subsequent response of the union leadership 12 days later defending the Agreement as the best possible option, but also in the collapse of the industrial truce after less than a month in Fiat when the workers launched action to increase piece-rate. On the other side, many employers refused to go along with the agreement.

notion of workers as wager-earners within the capitalist relations of production. Instead, it treated the means of production as "associative property" within which workers operate as "producers".

The socialist forces failed to understand the significance of this new type of rank-and-file militancy and absorb it in its programme of struggle for a socialist transformation. This fell in the hands of revolutionary syndicalist forces such as the UIL and Mussolini. Writing in *Il Popolo d'Italia* on 19 March after 1,500 soldiers forced workers out (Bertrand, 1982, p. 388), Mussolini highlighted the distinct nature of this action while giving it a distinctly nationalist twist. He saw it as the "proof of the proletariat's ability to directly manage the factory" compared to the "traditional method of strike" that was "harmful to class and nation alike". He argued that "the formation of the workers' council, which for three days has managed the direction of the factory by assuring its functioning ... represents an honest and painstaking effort and a worthy ambition to supersede the self-proclaimed bourgeois class in the control of production" (as quoted in Rutigliano, 2002, pp. 272-3; with some modifications). This was an indication that the emerging radicalizations of workers were open spaces in which various forces could participate in to articulate it in particular ways.

Amid growing rank-and-file dissatisfaction, the month of May saw a huge rise in food prices and a severe shortage of certain consumer goods, which led to food riots in mid-June and July. This wave started from the syndicalist strongholds in Liguria into the rest of the North and Emilia (Williams, 1975, p. 71). The situation put the labour organizations under increasing pressure to evaluate their stance on the militancy of the population in the aftermath of the war. This led to a rift within the labour movement between the CGL and the Chamber of Labour. The CGL used this opportunity to broaden its role within the corporatist structure beyond industrial relations by helping to create joint commissions with the representatives of the government and labour to address the food shortages. In contrast, the Chamber of Labour rejected that path and began organizing local autonomous efforts to address the food crisis (see Maione, 1975, pp. 31-4).

The growing dissatisfaction of the rank-and-file with the outcome of the Fiat Agreement and the worsening food crisis inspired workers to assert their power through the shop-floor organization of internal commissions. However, given the institutional constraints imposed on the internal commissions by the Fiat Agreement, the only way to revive them was to radically transform them. This is where the role of the newly established weekly newspaper, *l'ordine nuovo*,[7] launched on 1 May 1919, to construct the theoretico-ideological background for this emerging institutional order

[7] Despite its relatively small circulation number around 6,000 copies, the newspaper was hugely influential in Turin. It was also received quite positively by the Turinese anarchists and wrote a number of contributions in the newspaper (Levy, 2000, pp. 141-4).

became important (Mazzacurati, 2017, p. 45). The group included figures such as Antonio Gramsci, Angelo Tasca, Palmiro Togliatti, and Umberto Terracini.[8]

Gramsci wrote an article entitled "Workers' Democracy" (21 June 1919) which can be considered the first step towards the theoretical articulation of the council movement. In this landmark article, Gramsci (1977) singles out the internal commissions as the "organs of workers' democracy" and the embryonic form of the socialist state, while acknowledging the need to supersede their current limitations. This was to be done through "election of vast assemblies of delegates" (p. 66) with the aim to incorporate the representatives of all categories of workers in the factory. He argued that creating a "genuine workers' democracy" required articulation of already existing institutions of potential proletariat power (i.e. the internal commissions) into a coordinated and cohesive whole. This articulated whole should be capable of giving "disorderly and chaotic energies" "a permanent form and discipline" (p. 66) in order to replace the "bourgeois state". In drawing a qualitative continuity from the proletarian power at the workshop level to the state level, Gramsci underscored the importance of including peasants into the transformative programme through the formation of workers' and peasants' councils.

Shortly after, *l'ordine nuovo* launched a campaign for the formation of factory councils and continued its theoretical elaboration on the topic. In an article on 26 June, Gramsci identified a fundamental contradiction in post-war Italy that, in his eyes, had begun with the installation of the Nitti government. On the one hand, the post-war era had ushered the return of economic and political freedom; and yet, the former would lead to mass starvation and the latter to popular power towards the overthrow of the government. He saw the resolution of this contradiction in the ability of the proletariat to take over this mission "by eliminating class struggle and private property within the national sphere" (p. 72). In a later article on 12 July, *l'ordine nuovo* elaborated on the nature of the conquest of the state. It rejected both the syndicalist/anarchist path for its dismissal of the fight against the state and parliamentary socialists for believing that the socialist state can be embodied in the institutions of the capitalist state. Instead, it defined the notion of the conquest of the state in "replacement of the democratic-parliamentary state by a new type of state, one that is generated by the associative experience of the proletarian class" (1977, p. 76).

Therefore, the solution to the joint crisis of the post-war era had to be sought in the ability of working class to take power through the generalization of a system that connected "various workshops of a factory together to form a basic economic unit". These were to further link up with the agricultural industry in a "horizontal and vertical planning" to "construct the harmonious edifice

[8] On Gramsci's knowledge of the experiences of the Russian soviets and the British Shop Stewards movement, see Levy (2000, pp. 135-7).

of the national and international economy, liberated from the obstructive and parasitical tyranny of the private property-owners" (p. 77). In these articles, he was rethinking the possibility of "council democracy" in the particular context of post-war Italy in which the crisis of the state was deep but not (yet) terminal, therefore leaving less room for radical struggles to project themselves immediately within the state.

Gramsci was also elected to the executive board of the Turin section of the PSI which provided the movement with a direct link to the party. Gramsci began presenting the new direction to the Turin branch of the PSI from 23 June and steering it towards adopting a more radical and independent stance (see Clark, 1977, pp. 79-80). The programme of *l'ordine nuovo* towards the formation of factory councils did not at first raise an alarm for the CGL since they could be seen as decentralization of the union operations towards a more effective, albeit potentially more militant actions.

From 23 August, workers in different branches of Fiat began to re-elect members of the old internal commissions, charged with the task of appointing workshop commissars (shop stewards) at all departments. As representatives of their units on the factory councils, the commissars were to perform the basic tasks of the old internal commissions that included maintain discipline in the event of a strike, and observe the daily managerial operation (Clark, 1977, pp. 56-7). On the same day, *l'ordine nuovo* published an article to clarify the distinct role of factory councils in relation to "soviets". It argued that since "soviets" as such did not exist in Italy as it did in the context of revolutionary Russia, the programmatic slogan of "all power to the soviet" was not only nonsensical for the Italian case but can damaging to the prospect of a revolutionary transformation as it would diffuse the organizing efforts away from the existing loci of proletarian power.

The attitude of the socialist party and the union towards these emerging institutions began to change around the same time. By this time, the PSI had launched its election campaign and had to clarify its ideological stance towards the developments in Turin in relation to its revolutionary rhetoric. Also, once the question of giving voting rights to non-union members in the factory council elections became central and even put into practice in some branches at the end of August (e.g. Brevetti-Fiat plant and, soon after, fifteen other metalworking factories),[9] the union leadership felt that it could no longer maintain control over the evolution of these institutions. This became ever more pressing as the councils spread rapidly throughout Turin in September 1919.[10]

[9] See Levy (2000, p.147).
[10] The month of September saw the election of 32 commissars representing 11 sections which later in October spread to each of Fiat's 42 divisions (Davidson, 1975, p. 35)

l'ordine nuovo continued to provide the programmatic outline of the movement in clearer terms; or in its own words, "to give concrete expression to an aspiration" (Gramsci, 1997, p. 94). In an article on 13 September, it argued that the workers' organization that exercised communist social power could be nothing other than "a system of councils", developed through the creation of central organs "for every group of workshops, every group of factories, every city and every region, right up to a supreme national workers' council" (p. 97). On the same day, Amadeo Bordiga, the leader of the abstentionist wing of the PSI, published an article in the journal *Il Soviet* to clarify the position of the abstentionist wing with regards to the question of factory councils. Rejecting the theoretical position of *l'ordine nuovo* on the essence and strategic significance of factory councils, he argued for the primacy of soviet as the true "political representation of the working class with deputies representing local constituencies" (Bordiga, 2020, p. 127). He did not see factory councils as organs of revolutionary transition as well as the basic structure of the communist society after the revolution. He preserved that dual character for the soviets. In the "early stages" of the transition, the political nature of soviets would dominate while their economic and constructive role would dominate their nature after the bourgeoisie is largely expropriated (p. 127). In another article in *Il Soviet* on 21 September, he further limited the role of the soviets as means of revolutionary transition to the conscious operation of the communist party outside the electoral system of bourgeois democracy (p. 131). He also elaborated on the Council of the Economy as the organ "responsible for the technical implementation of the socialization measures decreed by the political assembly" (p. 129). Trade federations and local economic councils (including factory councils) fell under this organ. He declared his position in favour of "a system of representation that is clearly divided into two divisions: economic and political" (p. 130). Therefore, his difference with the position of *l'ordine nuovo* group was not simply with regards to a primarily territorial as opposed to a sectoral basis of proletarian power. His scheme reinstated the separation between the "economic" and the "political" sphere of social life in the structure of communist representation. This is precisely what the *l'ordine nuovo* was trying to overcome.

As these developments were taking place in Turin, a profoundly consequential event took place in the Adriatic. On 12 September, a group of war veterans and mutinous soldiers, led by D'Annunzio, occupied Fiume. The PSI, following its anti-interventionist position, categorically distanced itself from the action but saw it as yet another sign that the Italian bourgeoisie was standing on its last leg. Therefore, it was left to forces other than socialists to articulate this mutinous act. Among these forces, there was the UIL whose General Secretary, Alceste De Ambris, saw the occupation as a possible path towards the Italian Revolution (Bertrand, 1982, p. 388). The takeover of Fiume initiated a process of consolidation of nationalist anti-parliamentary forces, such as the UIL, that sought to establish "a form of representation which wanted to bring to the forth the

real producers of national wealth, the real source of national strength" (Tasca, 1938, p. 43). The government understood the gravity of this mutiny in its ability to control its armed forces and effectiveness in internal affairs; it inspired the formation of a parallel military wing, "Royal Army" (Gooch, 2014, p. 315-17; Mondini, 2006, p. 475).

Amidst these developments, the PSI held its congress in Bologna on 5-8 October 1919 to examine its programmatic orientation in the post-war era and its policy towards the upcoming parliamentary election. The internal composition of the Congress was essentially divided into three groups: the Maximalists (including Giacinto Menotti Serrati, Nicola Bombacci, Egidio Gennari, and Costantino Lazzari); the reformists (including Filippo Turati and Claudio Treves); and the abstentionists (including Bordiga and Ruggero Grieco).[11] After much debate, the delegates in the Congress voted in favour of Maximalist electionist programme, proposed by Serrati, the leader of the Maximalist wing and the editor of *Avanti!*, to participate in the elections in order to propagate its revolutionary ideas towards the ultimate goal of establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat through an ultimately violent seizure of power to be handed over to the workers' and peasants' councils. The Congress also passed the resolution for the PSI to officially join the Third International that had been established in March 1919.[12] Even though this might seem like a great opportunity for the party's involvement in the expansion of a council-type organization, the programme did not recognize the councils as the vehicle of such revolutionary transformation but as the form of the socialist state after the revolution. Hence, on the one hand, its revolutionary rhetoric inhibited its parliamentary performance while its Maximalist orientation crippled its facilitation role towards the councils.

In the meanwhile, the factory councils were expanding in Turin.[13] *L'ordine nuovo* published an article on 11 October that highlighted the growing bureaucratization of working-class organizations and its consequent soul-crushing effects on workers. In pointing out the historical and structural limitations of unions, the article made a distinction between the proletariat as "wage earners" and "producers" (Gramsci, 1977, p. 100). The foremr is the ontological basis of unions and the latter of councils. In contrast to the understanding of the PSI outlined above, the article identified councils as *both* organs of revolutionary struggle *and* the basis of the new society after the revolution. Furthermore, it recognized a parallel transformation from wage-earner to producers

[11] *L'ordine nuovo* group supported the key Maximalist resolutions in Bologna Congress, despite their important differences. Therefore, we do not list them as a separate tendency in this juncture.
[12] See the full debate in Spartaco (1958, pp. 69-80). Specifically, for an outline of Treves' critique of the Maximalist belief in a violent overthrow and his contrasting view on the radical possibility of electoral and parliamentary activities, see McNally (2017).
[13] By mid-September, factory councils were formed in almost all the metalworking factories in Turin and some other sectors (e.g. chemical factories), representing more than thirty thousand workers (Spriano, 1971, p. 54).

in the social sphere from "citizens" to "comrades". It claimed that "the Factory Council is the model of the proletarian State" with all of the problems of the latter already embodied in the former (p. 100). Despite its criticism of unions, it did not dismiss their importance entirely, arguing that they can play a positive role but should be directed by an autonomous organization of the working class.[14]

In the first meeting of the factory commissars on 17 October, it was decided that the non-unionized workers should participate in the council elections precisely to expand their representativeness and intensify their autonomy. It also distanced itself from the Chamber of Labour for its decision to accept the local government's ban on a mass meeting to protest the seizure of Fiume (Clark, 1977, p. 84), therefore highlighting the need for a new institutional order to carry out the working-class struggle. The commissars in metal and automobile sectors elected a Study Committee (*Gruppo di Studio*) at the end of October to formulate its programmatic groundings and coordinate the campaign for factory councils. On 8 November, the Study Committee presented its "Programme of the Workshop Delegates" which became the bedrock of the council movement in Turin.

The programme recognized the factory delegates as "the sole and authentic social (economic and political) representative of the proletarian class since they are elected by all workers in the workplaces on the basis of universal suffrage" (Gramsci, 1977, p. 116). As an embodiment of working-class power organized at the plant basis, factory councils were "the anthesis to the employers' authority" (p. 117). It outlined the selection process of the delegates, the duties, power of the factory commissars and the executive council, and the relation between the commissars and the unions. The programme summed up the role of delegates during working hours as "control", defining it as ensuring that the agreements were faithfully adhered to, defending the interests and concerns of workers, maintaining orders on the job, gaining information on the capital employed and the output produced, and preventing removal of machinery by the owners. In their executive role, delegates had to negotiate with the management and to process complaints. While recognizing unions as "indispensable form of organizations" (p. 116) and calling on all workers to join a union, the programme subordinated unions to the executive committees of the factory councils in their negotiations with the employers and conditioned the ratification process to the approval from an assembly of the commissars, who could be recalled any point by a majority of the members (p. 119).

[14] See also *l'ordine nuovo* article on 25 October that elaborated further on the question of the role of unions. It encountered the syndicalist perspective on the role of trade unions according to which "the job of the trade unions should have been to train the workers for control over production" (Gramsci, 1977, p. 105). The article called this an illusion since union leadership had never been based on industrial but juridical and bureaucratic competence.

The union leadership reacted to these in the union's annual assembly in early November. Their vehement resistance against the voting rights to non-unionized workers and the subordination of the unions to the councils had both ideological and practical dimensions. On the former, some like Emilio Colombio, a member of the national secretariat of the FIOM, insisted that unions were an expression of the working class and not just workplaces as with the factory councils. Giving voting rights to non-union workers would mean allowing the corporative interests of the workplaces, rather than the union, to direct the working-class struggle (Di Paola, 2011, p. 138). This was echoed by the PSI leadership when Serrati wrote around the same time against the voting rights to non-unionized workers by arguing that this had confused the nature of union struggle in England and the United States with that in Italy.

At the practical level, the union leaders argued that the scheme cannot guarantee the election of experienced activists capable of navigating the negotiation process. The only point that the union was willing to concede was the official recognition of the factory councils and the commissars under the condition that they remained under the control of the unions. This could be viewed strategically as a way not only to maintain some control over the factory council movement but also use the workshop organization to increase union's institutional capacity in the midst of rapid membership growth. Despite the opposition of key figures in the leadership position, a motion was passed on 1 November to recognize the workshop commissar and to grant voting rights to the non-unionized workers; however, with the compromise that the commissars and the members of the internal commission had to be union members. The union leadership at the national level reaffirmed their disagreement regarding this decision at the FIOM's national meeting in Florence on 9-10 November.

Despite the organizational and programmatic tensions between the Turin section and the national leadership of the PSI, *l'ordine nuovo* espoused a Maximalist line in the lead-up to the election arguing for the use of election to occupy the parliament through an electoral success in order to halt its functioning to strip "the democratic mask away from the ambivalent face of the bourgeois dictatorship and reveal[] it in all its horrible and repugnant ugliness" (Gramsci, 1977, p. 128).

The relative absence of the union and the party from the developments in Turin (including the strikes in August and September) due to their preoccupations with the strike actions in Lombardy, Liguria, and Emilia towards securing minimum pay-scale allowed the space for the growth of factory councils in Turin (Clarke, 1977, p. 81). However, those efforts led to massive electoral success for the PSI at the 15 November elections (see, Lewin and Elazar, 2002).

To conclude, it was in this period that the "council democratic" movement emerged in Italy. The principal organizing forces involved with the movement were linked with the actions of the Turin section of the PSI and the FIOM. While the internal tensions had begun to emerge between the factory council movement and the CGL especially after expanding of voting rights to non-unionized workers, it had not yet been threatening enough to the corporatist direction of trade union strategy for the national leadership to take a strong position against it. The national leadership of the PSI was also too preoccupied with its Bologna Congress and the election campaign to pay sufficient attention to the unique developments in Turin. The two main syndicalist forces, the USI and the UIL, had weak organizational capacities within and ambivalent programmatic orientation towards the movement and were observing the developments from the sidelines.[15]

The programmatic efforts of the movement in this period were largely by *l'ordine nuovo* group. While progressively clarifying the distinct nature of the movement and laying out the theoretical foundation of the movement, their articulation was not devoid of certain ambiguities due largely to a degree of diversity within *l'ordine nuovo* on some key issues as well as external constraints related to organizational embeddedness of the larger labour movement. This was particularly evident in the question of the relation between factory councils and the union.

In terms of alliance patterns in this period, the movement was mostly confined to the urban socialist movement mainly in the city of Turin, with some following in the other centres within the industrial triangle. Despite the theoretical elaboration of *l'ordine nuovo* regarding the importance of incorporating the peasants into the council movement,[16] it could not go beyond the programmatic rhetoric because of the organizational weakness of the socialist movement within peasant dominated regions, its ideological position towards the war that created bitterness among peasant-soldiers, and its programmatic ambiguities towards the peasant question.

The alliance with syndicalists did not seem urgent for the Turin section. At the national level, while the PSI leadership tried to form alliances with the USI and even with UIL in 1919, its basic parameters of such an alliance that required political subordination were unacceptable to the syndicalists (Bertrand, 1969, pp. 259-62). After the takeover of Fiume, working with the UIL was no longer a viable option. An alliance with the Catholic unions, particularly the national federation

[15] The USI was thus far unsure about its orientation towards the council movement and had not been able to extent its sphere of influence into the industrial triangle in this period. The UIL was largely focused on the events of Fiume and its struggle towards the strategic direction of the organization (see Bertrand, 1969, pp. 277-92).
[16] See, for example, the article published in *l'ordine nuovo* on 2 August 1919, which examined the profound effect of the war on the mentality of peasants and drew parallels between the conditions in Russian and Italy with respect to peasant-soldiers. The article argued for the importance of industrial transformation of agriculture under the leadership of the proletariat as the precondition of effective incorporation of peasants into the communist movement.

of Catholic unions (*confederazione Italiana dei Lavoratori*, CIL) established in 1918,[17] did not play a significant part in the strategic calculations of the Turin section. During 1918-19, there was a relative period of calm and even alliance on certain issues such as the eight-hour workday between the socialist and Catholic unions. However, the fundamental difference in the ideological and political orientations,[18] as well as their overlapping constituencies especially within the textile sector regions (notably in Lombardy, Piedmont, and the Veneto) made effective alliance strenuous (Foot, 1995, pp. 268-70, 273; Horowitz, 1963, p. 114).

Second Period (15 November 1919 – 24 April 1920)

What dramatically changed the landscape of the political forces was the 1919 national election. It consequently impacted the relations of forces within which the "council democratic" movement was embedded. The PSI came out on top with 156 seats (32.3 per cent of the total vote), followed by the PPI with 100 seating (20.5 per cent). Northern and Central Italy were dominated by the PSI and the PPI, while the South was largely in the Liberals, Democrats and Radicals electoral alliance (*Liberali, Democratici e Radicali*) which obtained 96 seats (15.9 per cent of the vote). The election result marked the effective collapse of the UL. The liberal bloc had to form a coalition government with the PPI. Given its religious charm among the Catholic population, its programmatic appeal to rural Italy especially among landowners, sharecroppers, and peasantry, and its stainless image of nonparticipation in the war decisions made the PPI a potent political force with a broad base (see Webster, 1961, pp. 61-3).

Given the profoundly different readings of the election result by the major factions within the PSI, it indeed widened the tensions within the PSI. The electionist Maximalists saw it as a clear sign that the bourgeoisie was standing on its last leg and an affirmation of their political strategy to use the electoral success of the socialist party to paralyze the "bourgeois parliament" from within.[19] The reformists saw the election result as a great opening to consolidate the socialist position with the capitalist state to push their progressive measures forward.[20] For different reasons but now for both major factions within the PSI, there were fewer reasons for them to facilitate the transformative proposals of the Turinese councilists.

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[17] The membership of the CIL grew rapidly from 162,000 in 1918, to 700,000 members in 1919, to 944,812 in 1920 (Foot, 1995, p. 292f52; Neufeld, 1961, pp. 368-9). The bulk of its membership was among sharecroppers, peasants and smaller land-owners, female textile workers, and urban bureaucrats (Foot, 1995, p. 268).

[18] The CIL followed policies towards class collaboration, arbitration, and increase of small properties, and transition from sharecropping to rented property (Foot, 1995, p. 269).

[19] *l'ordine nuovo* echoed a similar interpretation of the election result in an article published on 29 November 1919. It called on the socialist deputies to "paralyze the functioning of parliament as the constitutional form of political government" (Gramsci, 1977, p. 131).

[20] See Treves' conception of "integral socialist strategy" that he elaborated on in an article published in *Critica Sociale*, no. 20 (16–31 October 1919). See also McNally (2017, pp. 323-4).

As the horizon of a possible alliance between the Turinese "council democrats", and the PSI and the GCL at the national level was closing, new alliances were being sought by the "council democratic" activists.[21] *L'ordine nuovo* group used their presence in the local PSI to pass a motion on 11 December to recognize councils and set up a group to promote their expansion. Gramsci also sought the alliance of the abstentionists wing of the PSI as well as the USI. In the meanwhile, the Chamber of Labour announced its full support of the movement (including the voting rights for the non-unionized workers despite the opposition of the leaders of the Chamber of Labour) after a special session on 14-15 December and called on the CGL and the PSI to facilitate the creation of councils throughout Italy.[22] The union was not ready to simply abide by the decision. Nevertheless, the decision of the Chamber made it difficult for the union to openly resist the creation of new councils and therefore paved the wave for a rapid expansion of the movement into other industries through local actions.

Amidst its growing popularity,[23] the USI focused its Congress in December on two central themes: factory councils, and working-class unity (Bertrand, 1969, p. 292). This was a clear sign that, despite its initial reluctance towards the idea of factory councils, the USI had begun to show interest in extending its influence within the movement (Di Paola, 2011). The General Secretary of the USI, Armando Borghi, recognized the merits of factory councils as linked to the long-standing strategic orientation of the USI towards industrial autonomy. But he expressed concerns since the factor council movement was originated in Turin, which for him, was the centre of socialist reformism. Although not all leading figures in the USI agreed with the transformative potential of the factory councils, the delegates passed a motion to express their "sympathetic support" for the council movement but did not go further (Bertrand, 1969, pp. 293-5). The USI saw factory councils as "the organs which keep alive in the proletariat a clear understanding of the end towards which we aim (expropriation) and which prepare the office workers who will, the day after the revolution, guarantee the functioning of production in the proletarian directed factories without upset or difficulties" (as quoted in p. 295). To expand its influence among the industrial workers in urban centres, the USI moved its Headquarter from Bologna to Milan in February 1920 (Bertrand, 1982, p. 392).

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[21] *L'ordine nuovo* published a number of articles (e.g. 29 November 1919, 6-13 December 1919, 3 January 1920) on the horizon of possible alliance and the structure of such alliances especially between workers and peasants. It is here that the group opens its theoretical framework to the potential strategic benefit of peasant land occupation (e.g. see Gramsci, 1977, pp. 132-3, 140-1, 147-8). Gramsci and Togliatti argued that "factory control and land seizure must be seen as a single problem" (p. 141) linked to the uneven development between the North and South of Italy.

[22] In an article on 27 December, *l'ordine nuovo* showed optimism in including the trade unions and the socialist party in the "network of institutions in which the revolutionary process is unfolding" (Gramsci, 1977, p. 146).

[23] In December 1919, the USI claimed 1030 local sections with 305,000 members, the majority of which were agricultural workers in the North. Nevertheless, its appealed had been growing in Lombardy and Piedmont (see Bertrand, 1982, p. 392).

At the beginning of 1920, a massive wave of strikes shook the country.[24] The PSI's strategic orientation towards such widespread radicalism continued to be governed by the Maximalist line. After its delegates walked out of the Chamber of the Deputies in December in a symbolic show of their disregard for bourgeois parliamentarism, the Maximalist delegates, such as Bombacci and Gennari, introduced schemes during the PSI's national meeting (11-13 January) for the constitutions of "soviets" under the full control of the party in Italy.[25] Once again, this was a preemptive extension of Maximalism that served little more than countering councilist efforts at an ideological level while preserving the Maximalist outlook of the PSI.

L'ordine nuovo published a series of articles between 24-31 January extremely critical of the existing socialist party in its capacity to lead a revolutionary transformation (see Gramsci, 1977, p. 156). The group published the Action Programme of Turin Socialist Section calling for a generalization of the demand for control to encapsulate the broadest section of people and laying out plans for transforming municipalities, trade unions, and the socialist party. Against "reformist" measures that would absorb the councils into the corporatist structure of the capitalist state, it argued that "control must be exercised by purely proletarian organs, and the working class must make it the vehicle for their mass revolutionary action" (Gramsci, 1977, p. 159). In the transition period, councils were conceived of as the organs of "constant criticism of Parliament and the bourgeois State" and "for direct control of the municipalities." (p. 159). It argued that the municipal elections should be fought on the slogan of "all real power of decision to the Workers' Councils" (p. 160). The Turin socialist section was to facilitate the formation of "communist groups" in every league and union to "carry out revolutionary propaganda within the organization" (p. 160) and criticize or block reformism and opportunism. These groups should promote from within the unions the establishment of industrial unions with the task "together with the Factory Councils, of drawing up and creating the higher institutions of workers' control and communist management of production, thereby surpassing in effect the correct phase of struggle over hours and wages" (p. 160). The Turin section of the PSI was further called to focus its efforts towards arming the proletariat and building alliance with the peasants and small landholders.

Bordiga published a series of articles in January and February on the establishment of workers' councils in Italy. After reiterating his disagreement with the Turin conciliates and position on the primacy of the conquest of political power under the leadership of the communist party, he

[24] These included state postal and telegraph workers (13 January), students (14-19 January), railway workers (20-28 January), textile workers (18-20 January), General Strike in Milan (1 March), and agricultural workers in Po Valley (February to July). On February 24, 60,000 farmers went on strike mainly in the north and central Italy (Neufeld, 1961).
[25] Such schemes for the formation of soviets became a central theoretical discussion among the Italian socialists from June to April 1920 (Forti, 2014).

stated that "'workers' control' has a revolutionary and expropriative significance only after central power has passed into the hands of the proletariat" (p. 215). In response, *l'ordine nuovo* published an article on 14 February arguing that in the context of Italy, factory councils had primacy over soviets because empirically they were where the Italian working-class struggle had found itself. It argued that factory councils were the invaluable source of building consciousness among the working classes and the foundation for the appropriation of the means of production.

The relation of forces within the labour movement began to shift from mid-February. There were a number of factory occupations, led predominantly by syndicalist workers, that took place in Sestri Ponente (Liguria) on 17 February due to the breakdown of negotiations over pay-rates which quickly resulted in settlements (Clark, 1975, p. 93). The remarkable point about these was that the factory councils played a central role in running these factories during the occupation (p. 94). The strategy of factory occupation took a new form when it took place in the heartland of the council movement in Turin. On 28 February, the workers at the Mazzoni's cotton mill near Turin occupied the workplace after a month of strike reached an impasse. The action was indeed planned by the union as a method of resolving the dispute with the reactionary employer. It came to an end after a few days when the government put the factory under state management (it was returned to the employers later) and enforced an agreement to recognize the internal commission and the union (with no mention of factory councils), readmission of dismissed workers, and repayment for the lost days.[26]

This development triggered a few small events elsewhere, including one in Bianchi Metallurgical factory in Milan under the leadership of anarchists (see Buttà, 2015, p. 204).[27] In response to the use of police violence that resulted in casualties among workers, the syndicalists and anarchists called for a General Strike. However, it could not be realized due to the lack of support from the socialist organizations. This widened schism between the USI and anarchist organizations, notably the Italian Anarchist Union (*Unione Anarchica Italiana*, UAI),[28] and the socialist organizations (pp. 204-5; Bertrand, 1982, p. 393). *L'ordine nuovo* group became suspicious of occupations as a path to a socialist revolution (Maione, 1975, p. 110); syndicalists saw it as an example of workers' willingness to engage in syndicalists' preferred method of militancy;[29] the

[26] Martin Clark (1977) presents some evidence that supports the hypothesis that the union leaders requests the state intervention (p. 95f).
[27] See Spriano (1975, p. 32) for other instances of occupations in February and March.
[28] By the summer of 1920, the membership of the UAI reached around 20,000 members (Levy, 2000, p. 119).
[29] Alibrando Giovannetti, the secretary of the USI's metalworkers' union, saw the non-violent peaceful occupation of factories as a preferred method of struggle than the old insurrectionary methods (Levy, 2000, p. 240). Errico Malatesta, one of the most popular and influential Italian anarchists, reached a similar conclusion in his article on 17 March in the widely read Milanese anarchist newspaper (Buttà, 2015, p. 186), the *Umanita Nova*, founded in that month (2015, p. 143). He called for takeover of all factories, arguing "the method certainly has a future, because it corresponds to the

union understood it as a legitimate method of forcing the employers to settle; and the employers realized that the government is not likely to take their side on such instances.[30]

In response to these shifts in the relations of forces, *l'ordine nuovo* group published a series of articles between 28 February and 6 March in which they emphasized the essential leadership role of the socialist party in the revolutionary transformation of society and the role of councils in creating the necessary conditions for the party to become the governing party of the working class by transforming the working class as a whole into "the executive power of the workers' state." The factory councils were identified as the first step for the Italian working-class movement "towards self-government in a workers' state" (Gramsci, 1977, p. 171). The group also provided an analysis of the notion of "proletarian unity", a concept dear to anarchists and syndicalists,[31] in which it identified "the opportunists and reformists" as well as the "anarcho-syndicalists" as obstructions against achieving organizational unity of the working class; the former due to its perpetuation of capitalist logic within the labour movement and the latter due to its revolutionary phrase-mongering and its dilution of working-class organizations away from the socialist ones.

In the meanwhile, the weakness of the coalition government in the face of such widespread labour militancy encouraged the employers to form national organizations in industrial (and, later in the agricultural) sectors to coordinate their actions among each other and with local Prefects.[32] Their hegemonic counteraction went beyond the institutional and political coordination and included an intellectual effort to study the new forms of labour militancy in relation to the Russian, Hungarian, and German experiences and to examine the extent to which it could provide an instrument for class collaboration (Maione, 1975, pp. 94, 119). It pushed the issue of factory councils at the forefront of employers' insurgency. On 22 February, the General Assembly of the Industrial League[33] issued a declaration stating its intent to fight against the factory councils (p. 121), two days after the director of the main Fiat factory announced his refusal to recognize Factory Commissars (Clark, 1977, p. 97). The decision to fight the factory councils by a coordinated action among employers was reaffirmed in the inaugural session of Confindustria in a speech by its

ultimate ends of the workers' movement and constitutes an exercise preparing one from the ultimate general act of expropriation" (p. 142).

[30] In the newspaper *Corriere della Sera*, Luigi Einaudi, a liberal economist, wrote "the case of Mazzoni is one of the milestones of a profound transformation that took place in the relationship between capital, labor and the state".

[31] These articles (28 February – 6 March) were in fact written as a rebuttal to another article by Alfonso Leonetti published in *l'ordine nuovo* that was extremely critical of Malatesta and led two anarchist factory commissars to block the distribution of the newspaper in their workplace (Levy, 2000, p. 155).

[32] For examples of such coordination with local Prefects, see Williams (1975, pp. 200-1), Di Paola (2011, p. 140), and Clark (1977, p. 98).

[33] The Industrial League was a well-established employers' organization in Piedmont, emerged in Turin since 1868, with Olivetti as its secretary.

General Secretary, Gino Olivetti on 7 March.[34] The April events Turin provided an ample opportunity for the employers' organization to exercise coordinated actions among different employers.

The increased militancy of the employers targeting specifically the internal commissions to reclaim their managerial authority was increasingly evident. Two examples can demonstrate this vividly: one on 22 March at the Fiat-owned *Industrie Metallurgiche* works and another on 23 March at the *Acciaierie* Fiat works. In the former, members of the internal commissions were dismissed in a Fiat factory when they asked the managers to set the hands of the factory clocks back to the solar time in opposition to the daylight-saving time – reminiscent of the wartime. The workers at the factory went on strike in solidarity with the internal commission. In the case of *Acciaierie*, the workers went on strike without going through the regular dispute procedure first when their demand for the members of the internal commission to be paid for the time they spent on their duties were denied.

On the one hand, the employers were adamant in using this opportunity to destroy the institution of factory councils as a condition for any settlement with the workers' representatives. With the support of the local and regional state apparatus to deploy the armed forces to enforce lockouts, arrest workers, ban public meetings, etc., they had strong backing in pushing for their ideal outcome to regain control over the factories again. On the other hand, the members of the factory councils and the rank-and-file workers had a clear sense that this is a fight of principles. Hence, they overwhelmingly approved commissars' call on 26 March for internal strikes in all metalwork factories, now under the direction of an elected Action Committee rather than the union. In turn, the employers responded on 29 March with a lockout, implemented by the state troops.

Between these two intransigent poles,[35] the role of the union and the party was crucial to tilt the balance. The representatives from both the Chamber of Labour and the National Committee of the FIOM led the negotiations and reached an agreement with the employers on both cases on 8 April. The Turinese workers largely abstained by 77 per cent for the ratification vote (Di Paola, 2011, p. 142). But when the two sides met to sign the agreement, the employers seized upon the opportunity to bring out the question of the function and regulation of the internal commission that in the draft of the agreement was to be postponed to the future (Clark, 1977, pp. 103-4). This threw the situation into a crisis when the factory commissars rejected the new proposal, despite the

[34] In the speech, he made it clear that in case of political pressure by the local governments to make concessions, "it is the duty of member organizations to refuse co-operation and to warn the Confederation immediately so that it can take any measures it thinks suitable" (quoted in Clark, 1977, p. 98).
[35] See Castronovo (2005, pp. 93-5) for the preparation and reaction of Fiat's leadership towards this episode of militancy.

recommendation of the FIOM's leader, Bruno Buozzi, and along with the Chamber of Labour as well as the Turin section of the PSI and the local branch of the FIOM, proclaimed a General Strike on 13 April, joining the large pool of striking workers in other sectors.

The question of the leadership of the General Strike at a local level was settled on 14 April when an Action Committee was formed between representatives from both the Chamber of Labour and the Turin section of the PSI. However, the question of the extension of this action throughout Piedmont and beyond proved complex and consequential. Such geographical expansion was vital for the movement's success especially given the local state's willingness to use thousands of troops to squash the workers' actions (see Di Paola, 2011, p. 143). Already, the unusual involvement of the national union representatives in the negotiation process at the local level regardless of its severity had given the event a national outlook. To avoid further highlighting the logical extension of the movement at a national level, the CGL turned down the Confindustria's proposal to meet in Milan for a new round of negotiation (Clark, 1977, p. 105, 105f46). Furthermore, their profound dissension towards the factory council movement that had developed in Turin prevented them from getting involved in a negotiation at the heart of which was the question of employers' attack on those very institutions. In effect, the national union suffocated the "April Strikes" in Turin by containing it largely to Turin and preventing its expansion. The central government was happy to keep the General Strike contained as Nitti feared its expansion would have a negative effect on the Italian bonds when the economy was already under huge stress,[36] and its containment using the army could worsen the fragile loyalty of the army after Fiume.

The view of the PSI was articulated between 19-21 April, during its National Council in Milan. While debating all sorts of schemes for soviets in Italy, the top leadership either condemned the Turin's actions as "localism" (e.g. Gennari), called for more time to set up communist principles and to prepare for a proletariat armed force (e.g. Bombacci), or simply supported the plan to reach an agreement with the government (e.g. Giuseppe Emanuele Modigliani) (see Williams, 1975, pp. 207-8). The failure of the Maximalist leadership of the PSI at the national level to facilitate and generalize the militant actions should be seen in light of their understanding of the nature of the Italian state and the kind of movements required to carry out a socialist revolution in Italy, itself rooted in the experience of their intransigence past as well as the Maximalist model. These deeply affected their strategic orientation towards the "council democratic" movement and their potential roles in the Turin events.

[36] Nitti said that "the situation at Turin is acute because it is only political and the new requests are exclusively political, put forward while I am here. This worsens the foreign exchange rate and general conditions …" (as quoted in Clark, 1977, p. 106).

By 19 April, the strike had organically gone beyond Piedmont into parts of Liguria, Tuscany, and Lombardy. While the leading socialist institutions at the national levels refused to assist the Turinese strikers concretely, the syndicalists in Liguria and Lombardy were actively supporting the movement. They not only led the demonstrations in Milan in support of the Turinese workers but also mobilized railway workers in Florence, Pisa, and Lucca, and dockyard workers in Genoa to refuse the transport of troops who were being sent to Turin (Gluckstein, 1985, pp. 206-7). Their active solidarity with the movement laid the ground for the increased popularity of syndicalists among the urban industrial workers later in this period.

As the dimming hopes for a successful conclusion of this prolonged General Strike[37] – the longest in Piedmont history – were making the material toll on the strikers ever less tolerable, the new round of negotiation was commenced. The talks that first began between the CGL and the Confindustria and then transferred to the Chamber of Labour and the Turin Industrial League reached a devastating conclusion for the factory council movement. The strike was called off on 23 April, after the agreement was signed off that conceded major points on the regulation of the internal commissions to the employers' demands. The internal commissions lost many of their powers on the shop floor of the factories, including the ability to meet with the workers during the normal working hours.

The economic crisis continued to worsen into 1920 on many key economic indicators, both in terms of production and trade balance.[38] Furthermore, the living cost continued to rise into 1920.[39] The program of Nitti's government for an "economic partnership" to control over the supply of a wide range of products was no longer sustainable. In the absence of financial support from the United States and Britain, there was a growing need for tax reform to cut down on the war profits of major companies and banks (Esposti, 2015). This was unsurprisingly resisted and effectively blocked by the large interests.

Amidst these economic challenges, there was a political crisis that was brewing in the parliament (see Maier, 1975, pp. 179-81). The PPI's alliance with the liberals had been strained by Nitti's disregard of the grievances of the "White" Catholic workers at the expense of the "Red" striking workers and the government's delay in delivering the promised land transfer to the peasants. While his handling of the eastern border negotiation and the suppression of nationalist student protest on 24 May further radicalized the interventionist forces, his attempt to end price

[37] The General Strike involved 120,000 workers from all companies in the province (Castronovo, 2005, p. 93).
[38] In 1920, there was a decrease in the production of wheat, yarn and fabric, and iron ore compared to 1919. There were only slight increases in the production of coal, and hydroelectricity in 1920 compared to 1919. The trade balance was -13.802 million lire in 1920 compared to -7.774 million lire in 1919 (see Esposti, 2015 for details).
[39] Just in the first six months of 1920, the cost of living increased from 124.67 lire to 153.9 lire (Clark, 1977, p. 144f43).

control over grain (through a decree issued on 4 June) deepened antagonism from all sides of the political spectrum, forcing him to resign on 9 June.[40] His resignation was a further sign of the deep crisis of the liberal bloc, now under an electoral condition that had allowed the interjection of mass political parties under proportional representation. In such a context, it was not possible for Nitti to realize his economic vision for the postwar transition.

The only replacement who had the relative support of all sides was Giolitti who formed a government on 20 June. However, Giolitti came back to the scene with the hope that he could turn back the clock and regain control on the basis of pre-war *trasformismo*. He tried to neutralized political rivals by giving key positions to representatives from all major political parties, including the PSI.[41] He knew that the general direction begun by Nitti towards economic recovery had to be continued even more aggressively.[42] But such political strategy was no longer possible in post-war Italy. His insistence, particularly on the taxation of war profit, further antagonized large capital interests linked to the war industries who saw this as the failure of the state to maintain their hegemony, causing them to fall back further on their own organizations. The war profit tax was generally supported by the farmers and small businesses that had not significantly benefited from the war contracts, as well as reformist in the CGL. Most industrialists (with some notable exceptions such as Fiat's owner, Giovanni Agnelli) and financiers found these proposals unacceptable (Castronovo, 2005, pp. 97-8).

This had already begun towards the end of May when the Confindustria outright rejected all of the FIOM's demands that it had put forwards during its Genoa Congress (20-25 May). These demands, which closely resembled those proposed by the CIL and the USI around the same time, included higher piece rate and wages. The USI continued to fiercely insist on the issue of internal commissions in their demands but they were also seeking to join forces with the FIOM to push the employers to come to the negotiating table (Clark, 1977, p. 150). This placed the FIOM in a difficult strategic position. It would make sense to force an alliance with the USI on such an occasion but did not want to reopen the issue of internal commissions. Even more than socialist organizations' reluctance towards working with the syndicalists, they loathed the left-wing Catholics who had recently broken ranks with the PPI and were engaged in militant strike actions in Cremona in June while *Federterra*'s strike actions in Po Valley was going on (See Foot, 1997, 422;

[40] The decree was abandoned even though the subsidies costed the Treasury 7 billion lira (Spartaco, 1958, p. 153).
[41] The Minister of Justice (Luigi Fera) and the Minister of Labour and Social Security (Arturo Labriola) were from the PSI.
[42] It must be noted that similar proposals were already in Giolitti's agenda during his election campaign in 1919 (Maier, 1975, p. 127). Upon taking office, he pushed to end fixed price of bread, to crackdown on financial speculation, and introduce a tax system aiming at a "total call-back" of war profit (Esposti, 2015; Spriano, 1975, p. 37; Spartaco, 1958, p. 158). See Spriano (1975, pp. 43-44) for an overview of the scale of war profit of the large firms.

Dunnage, 2002, p. 49).[43] In an attempt to prevent further diffusion of the working-class movement, the PSI extended an invitation in early June for a meeting to be held on 2 July with all Italian "revolutionary groups" towards building a "united front".

While the process of relative dispersal of working-class struggle beyond the socialist bloc was unfolding, the gulf within the theoretical engine of the "council democratic" movement itself was becoming ever more visible. The fault line of this internal tension ran along the issue of the relationship between councils and trade unions.[44] On 29 May, Tasca published an article to elaborate on the relationship between councils and trade unions. This initiated a series of fierce polemics between Tasca and Gramsci in the following months.

Tasca argued that "the union is the master body growing the councils by productive sector, coordinating and disciplining their action" (1977, p. 252); hence it would be nonsensical to speak of a "pact of alliance" between union and councils since the latter is an integral part of the former (p. 243). In a number of articles published in June, Gramsci clarified his position by arguing that councils "cannot possibly be confused with, co-ordinated with or subordinated to the trade unions" (p. 257). He held that trade unions and political parties emerged as "the affirmations and developments of liberty and democracy in general, and where the relations of citizen to citizen still exist." Factory councils as "the negation of industrial legality" (p. 266) emerged "where freedom for the worker does not exist, and democracy does not exist" (p. 261). This was getting precisely at the limits of substantive democracy under liberal democracy and the necessity of extending that struggle into the social relations at the point of capitalist production. The difference between the unions and the councils lie in the primarily mediatory role of the former operating under the functional assumption of the reproduction of the existing social relations, and the primarily subversive role of the latter operating under the functional assumption of the self-empowerment and self-emancipation of the working class. Therefore, Gramsci believed that "the party and trade unions should not project themselves as tutors or as ready-made superstructures for [councils]" (p. 264).

Tasca sought to criticize Gramsci's conception of the emancipatory power of workers' council, what Tasca took to be a syndicalist conception (p. 281), by wrongly using the dialectical method that if councils are an antithesis of the capitalist power, they cannot logically also transcend it. He instead saw the synthesis in soviets (p. 273). Beneath this theoretical diversion at the heart of

[43] Gramsci was among the small number of voices within the socialist block who wrote against the PSI's ideological rejection of alliance with the Left Catholics. This was while the *Federterra*'s strike actions in Po Valley (with its epicentre in Bologna) since February reached its peak in June.
[44] This was a sensitive topic both within and outside the socialist bloc, including the anarchists (see Levy, 2000, pp. 148-9).

the "council democratic" movement was the profound strategic question with respect to the organizational source for the sustainment and growth of the movement. Tasca was looking into the socialist trade unions as the organizational source to carry this project forward; Gramsci was putting his hope in the factory councils themselves to carry out this transformative project prefiguratively and from the bottom-up.[45]

In the meanwhile, the first regional Anarchist Congress in Lombardy was held on 30 May 1920. According to the police report to the Milanese Prefect, the major themes of the discussion were the economic organization of workers, workers' committees, and the soviets. The participants agreed that

> revolutions need to employ the tools of class struggle such as factory workers' committees, and eventually taking possession of the factories themselves. In regards to factory worker committees, the Congress affirmed the necessity not to give them too much technical importance so that they do not become cooperationist organs but can remain revolutionary ... Finally, in regards to the constitution of Soviets, it was affirmed that Soviets must be the spontaneous outcome of the revolution rather than the imposition of a communist apparatus within a bourgeois regime (as quoted in Buttà, 2015, p. 206).

This is a demonstration of the active involvement of the anarchist in programmatic efforts within the council movement toward developing a distinct vision. An important point here is that instead of Gramsci's earlier suggestion to prevent the integration of the councils into a corporatist scheme by keeping the organizational base of their control "purely proletarian", the anarchists sought remedy in preventing the councils to gain "too much technical importance". Their position on the question of the soviets was aligned with that of Gramsci during his polemics with Bordiga.

The mutiny in Ancona that broke out on 26 June, under the leadership of syndicalist and anarchists, put the socialist organizations in an even more difficult position (see Levy, 1999, pp. 120-1; Clark, 1977, pp. 144-5). Soon after the outbreak of the revolt, the PSI postpone the meeting that it had called for to bring together all revolutionary groups into a united front. On June 25, the PSI and CGL issued a statement opposing any local actions. They argued that the crisis of bourgeois forces was getting worst and the final clash was near. They warned against workers' actions "which may split the concerted movement" (Tasca, 1938, pp. 68-9). There was a growing pressure on the FIOM to launch solidarity actions in munition industries in the industrial triangle,

[45] In an article in l*'ordine nuovo* on 3 July, the reason for why the German Revolution failed was associated with to substituted their political power with economic power, and a determination on the part of these proletarian masses to introduce proletarian order into factory, to make the factory the basic unit of the new state, to build the new state as an expression of the industrial relations of the factory system (Gramsci, 1977, pp. 306-7). This was precisely the bottom-up transformative prefiguration that Gramsci had in mind.

especially Turin. The FIOM leadership's resistance to such calls and the CGL's condemnation of the revolt created discontent among Turin metal workers, as expressed by internal commissions and factory commissars (Bertrand, 1982, p. 394; Clark, 1977, p. 145). In the meanwhile, the anarchist organization, many of whose activists were also members of the USI, met in Bologna and formally adapted Malatesta's Programme (Buttà, 2015, p. 196). The Programme provided its essence as follows:

> expropriation of landowners and capitalists for the benefit of all; and abolition of government. And while waiting for the day when this can be achieved: the propagation of our ideas; unceasing struggle, violent or non-violent depending on the circumstances, against government and against the boss class to conquer as much freedom and well-being as we can for the benefit of everybody (p. 188).

The rapid loss of ground, even at the FIOM's stronghold, became evident when, in mid-July, Turin metalworkers revolted against their union under the leadership of syndicalists. The issue of collaboration with the syndicalists and anarchists also created a crisis within the Turin section of the PSI in July by causing a breakdown of the alliance at the local leadership between *l'ordine nuovo* group and the abstentionists.[46] This issue and the topic of participation in the next municipal election split *l'ordine nuovo* group and cost them the leadership of the Turin section of PSI. In the absence *l'ordine nuovo* group, the factory council revived in Turin but this time under the leadership of syndicalists.

Malatesta published a series of important articles (5, 12, 15 August) in the *Umanita Nova* in which he argued against the reform measures such as minimum wage and mandatory arbitration as a method of perpetuating the proletarian condition and prolonging capitalism. Instead, he urged workers to "take possession of all the instruments of labour, all the wealth, land, raw material, houses, machinery, food stuff, etc." and "sketch out as far as possible the new form of social life." Discussing the occupation of factories, he argued that workers should "continue and intensify their work on their own account "to transform factories for the need of the community. He called on agricultural labour to enter "into direct relations with the industrial and transport workers for the exchange of product" (Malatesta, 2014, p. 399). He also called on railway workers to continue their work to facilitate the occupying workers.[47] At the USI's National Congress on 17 August, the

[46] While Tasca and Terracini were strictly against such collaboration, the abstentionist Giovanni Boero and Gramsci were open to it (Clark, 1977, p. 140). This along with the

[47] As part of a sustained propaganda effort, Malatesta repeated similar arguments in another article published on 27 August.

syndicalist metalworkers' organizations declared the necessity to continue the struggle by all means necessary including the occupations of factories (Buttà, 2015, p. 208).[48]

To force the employers to negotiate on wage demands, the FIOM passed a motion in its Genoa Congress (16-17 August), which was attended by the leaders of the CGL and the PSI, to start "obstructionism" to slow down the production. There were two chief reasons behind such a strategic choice. First, the union would avoid embarking on a prolonged strike when the union's financial resources were already depleted. Secondly, the union leaders were aware that it would be costlier for the employers to face reduced production than strike or lockout. However, under the growing pressure of the syndicalists which were calling for immediate occupations of factories,[49] union leaders conceded that in the case of a lockout, they would have no choice but to occupy the factories to continue the production. From the perspective of the employers, the refusal to engage with the labour negotiations was less about economic calculation, especially in the midst of rising inflation that would make an increase in wages less costly for them, but more about political pressure on the government to comply to their demands regarding reversal of tax reforms and other protectionist measures that would secure their short-term interests. They expected Giolitti's government to repress the militancy of the workers not by unleashing a massacre but by engaging in the same level of repression as was done during the Turin uprising.

The government in its own turn was hoping that the union's announcement to start obstructionism would compel the industrialists to resume the negotiations. The government was also active in persuading the industrialists to avoid lockouts by warning them of the danger of such action and coordinate their decision with the government beforehand.[50] The government believed that the industrialists were using the threat of lockouts to pressure the government into their line. Given the complexities of using the repressive forces to resolve the conflict, the government, therefore, pursued a neutral non-interventionist position (Clark, 1977, pp. 164-5). This impossible triad only needed a spark for all to crumble down.

To sum up the second period, the alignment of forces within the labour movement became progressively clearer and more antagonistic towards the Turinese councilists. *L'ordine nuovo*'s loss of the leadership of the Turin section of the PSI severed the group from an important organizational

[48] It was around this time when the Prefect of Milan cautioned Giolitti that many workers were leaving the FIOM and joining the USI (Bertrand, 1969, p. 311).
[49] Nevertheless, the USI did accept to go along with the FIOM's plan for the sake of the proletarian unity (Clark, 1977, p. 154).
[50] Writing to Enrico Corradini, the under-secretary of Minister of Interior on 2 September, Giolitti clearly expressed the position of the government in the early days of the occupations. He said "With regard to dispute in metal industry I believe in would be best for government action to be as little overt as possible. Government, in principle, must not intervene unless summoned by both parties […] In Turin, I explained to the industrialists that they cannot count on the use of the security forces…" (see Appendix 1, Spriano, 1975, p. 174).

force. The movement seemed too radical for the corporatist aims of the CGL leadership and the reformist wing of the PSI, and too moderate for the Maximalist methods of the PSI leadership. The Maximalists largely dropped the discussion of soviets after the end of the April Strike; the abstentionist faction hailed the failure as proof of its reluctance to consider factory councils as revolutionary; and the reformist saw it as an opportunity to curb the revolutionary outlook of the party. Therefore, for different reasons, the national leadership of the CGL and key fractions of the PSI at the national level increasingly distanced themselves from the factory councils by not only containing the rank-and-file militancy geographically and sectorally, but also making agreements with the employers' organizations that directly undermined the institutions of factory councils via the internal commissions. Yet, the employers' organizations were adamant to destroy the organs of rank-and-file militancy and to regain their absolute managerial authority at the workplace. This made the issue of workplace democracy even more contentious.

Dissatisfied with the conduct of the socialist organizations especially at the national level, the centre of gravity of rank-and-file militancy began to shift towards syndicalist and anarchist forces which had shown effective leadership and active solidarity with the movement notably during the General Strike. The increasing influence of the syndicalist forces within the "council democratic" movement accelerated after April. The battle over the internal commissions was a key entry point into the movement for the USI and its expansion within the urban industrial working class. As their hold deepened, they found it more difficult to work with the socialist trade unions to channel the ground power of the syndicalists to the administrative level of the state at the negotiating table. This was not only because of historically rooted antagonism between these two tendencies but also because the socialist trade unions did not want to give further platform to the council movement.

The programmatic efforts concerning the "council democratic" movement also underwent important transformations in this period. *L'ordine nuovo* group, which continued to play the leading theoretical force behind the movement until at least middle of this period, focused largely around three topics: clarifying the distinction between the "soviet" model and the "council" model in response to Bordiga; criticizing the PSI's lack of effective leadership towards revolutionary transformation and how the party had to be renewed; and expanding on various aspects of the peasant-worker alliance. As the syndicalist influence within the movement grew, *l'ordine nuovo* experienced internal struggles along programmatic visions for the movement. This manifested itself with regards to the question of the relation between the councils and the trade unions.

In the meanwhile, the syndicalists and anarchists were becoming keener in programmatic efforts especially in relation to the "council democratic" movement. Building on the entry point of

"workers' control", they embraced the occupation of factories and lands as a strategic path towards a social revolution. The occupations of several factories in this period gave an appealing angle for the syndicalist (and anarchist) forces to make a distinct mark on the programmatic evolution of the movement.

The alliance patterns also underwent a series of transformations during this period. The decline in the organizational influence of the socialist forces reduced the willingness of the socialist movement to expand their alliance with syndicalist forces. In the meanwhile, this gradual withdrawal forged new alliances between syndicalist and anarchist forces involved in the council movement. The alliance possibilities beyond the left-wing forces and working class were heavily affected by the result of the November election. The PPI that had emerged as a powerful political party made it even more difficult for socialists/communists to break through the peasant and sharecropping population. The election also threw the liberal forces into a crisis. This made the powerful industrial and agricultural interests rapidly develop their own organizations and seek political alliances elsewhere. The resounding electoral success of the PSI made these interests deeply fearful of an impending "Bolshevik" revolution in Italy. They were, therefore, exceedingly cautious about their cooperation with the socialist forces. Lastly, the active involvement of the UIL after the takeover of Fiume as well as their shift towards "reformism" (Bertrand, 1969, p. 259) made any alliance with the socialists, anarchists, and the USI impossible.

While the prospect of an alliance between the socialist and syndicalist organizations at first seemed limited, there was still some hope that they could collaborate at least conditionally on certain issues later in this period. The PSI's attempt to regain control of the increasingly divergent labour movement by calling for a united front of all revolutionary groups failed after the Ancona revolt broke out. Moreover, the possibility of an alliance with the left-Catholic forces quickly vanished when they staged a challenge to the leadership of the socialists in militant strikes in the agricultural regions where the two organizations had substantial overlaps in their potential constituencies. The events had brought the anarcho-communists and the syndicalists considerably closer. As for alliance possibilities beyond the working class, despite the desire of the anarcho-communists and syndicalists to mobilize sharecroppers and peasants, they faced similar limitations as *l'ordine nuovo* with respect to this social class. This had become ever more challenging and complex as the strength of the Catholic organizations had exponentially grown.

Third Period (24 August 1920 – 30 September 1920)

The event that triggered the explosive deadlock at the end of the third period took place when the workers at Romeo Works in Milan occupied their factory on 24 August after the employers responded to their demands with a lockout. While desperately trying to control the

spread of the movement by limiting it to one city, the FIOM ordered the seizure of all factories in Milan.[51] In response, the Confindustria ordered lockout throughout Italy. In a telegraph on 1 September from the Prefect of Milan to the Ministry of Interior, we read about view of the industrialists in the metal sector, saying that obstructionism has "degenerated into a condition of complete anarchy in the factory" and the sit-down strikes had led to "a virtually complete stoppage of production". They accused the occupying workers of committing acts of violence, concluding that "the firms affiliated to the federation proceed to a closure of the factories in a manner to be decided by individual consortia" (see Appendix 1 in Spriano, 1975).

In a few days, the occupation took place in all major cities in the north and central Italy (Lyttelton, 1977, p. 70; Bertrand, 1969, pp. 321-2). *L'ordine nuovo* published an article on 2 September on discussing the notion of occupation. The article rejected the idea that factory occupation on its own could produce "any new definitive position" since the power remains in the hands of capital. It pointed out the vulnerability of the proletariat to the sabotage of the technicians, shortage of raw material, and constraints in the distribution of products. Therefore, it concluded that "the occupation of the factories in and of itself [...] cannot be seen as an experience of communist society" (Gramsci, 1977, p. 327) and saw it as nothing more than "the reformist and anarcho-syndicalist utopia" (p. 328).

In the days that followed, instances of factory occupation also occurred in Campania and Sicily (for a list of cities, see Spriano, 1975, pp. 60-2). The occupation took place in engineering and metal works factories, shipbuilding plants, chemical and textile factories, stimulating factory council type activities everywhere (Clark, 1977, pp. 157-161; Franzosi, 1997, p. 291; Bertrand, 1969, p. 322). Altogether, half a million workers were involved in factory occupations across Italy (Spriano, 1975, p. 60). The occupations were conducted peacefully, and the occupied factories were run in an orderly fashion. Although desertion became a significant issue at least in some factories in the second week (see Bertrand, 1969, p. 324), the majority of the absentees were workers from the countryside who did not directly participate in the occupation. Furthermore, the supply of raw material, despite the active support of railway workers, soon became a major obstacle (Maione, 1975, p. 244). To prevent sabotage, there was a strict procedure put in place by the workers in many factories to protect the periphery of the factory and not to allow strangers in. Police reports came out that workers were smuggling and distributing arms into the factories (p. 252). This had an important consequence on the attitude of the industrialists as they began to take the possibility of insurrection more seriously. While continuing its "active non-interventionist" role of trying to bring the two sides together and making it clear that the government has no intention to use force on the

[51] By 31 August, there were 280 factories where occupied in Milan alone (Tasca, 1938, p. 76).

occupiers without provocation, the Prefects began making arrangements for possible armed conflicts with the workers after a few days into September.[52]

Amidst the upheaval in the industrial sector, peasants accelerated the land occupations at the beginning of September. However, there was a profound disconnect between the two radical movements in ways that crippled any meaningful alliance. Some of the social and institutional reasons behind such disconnect has already been discussed above. The land occupations were often led by veterans and sometimes by the Catholic peasant leagues. The weakness of socialists in the South (with the exception of modest presence in Latium and Apulia) and their ideological detachment from the peasant movement inhibited the socialists to have any influence in this process. The USI and the anarchists were the only organizations that consistently argued for the peasants to occupy the uncultivated land during the third period.

As early as 4 September, the USI intensified its call on workers to occupy their factories, mines, lands, and banks across Italy. The socialist organizations had to move fast to stay on top of the movement that was not only already expanding at their own pace but also were prone to fall into the leadership of the syndicalist forces. The representatives of the PSI, the CGL, and the Chamber of Labours, therefore, met in Milan on 4-5 September to discuss the situation. They decided that if no satisfactory solution was reached either due to employers' intransigence or government's break of neutrality, then they would have to commence "the objective of control over the industry to achieve collective management and the socialization of means of production" (as quoted in Spriano, 1975, p. 73). Such radical discourse was surely part of the strategy of the socialist organizations to put pressure on the employers to come to the negotiating table and should not be taken as a sign of readiness of the socialist organizations to commence a social revolution. And yet, depending on how the processes unfolded, the unintended consequences of such manoeuvring could go well beyond the strategic calculation of the leadership and push the organization into a radical, albeit not necessarily irreversible, path.

The CGL rediscovered the slogan of "workers' control" as a possible middle ground between the demands of the occupiers and more radical elements within the labour movement, and the flexibility of the industrialists (Maione, 1975, p. 239). The ambiguity and malleability of the concept of "workers' control" were perfectly suited for such a convoluted situation. In the absence of a widely recognizable and politically forceful articulation of its radical possibility, the concept could be cast by the reformist elements within the CGL in ways that would suit the return of the situation into normalcy and towards a corporatist path. The CGL leadership, therefore, added the

[52] As the news of possible armed conflict with the workers grew, the Prefect of Turin, Taddei, on 5 September, and the Prefect of Milan, Alfredo Lusignoli, on 7 September, requested additional troops to be deployed to their cities.

demand for "trade union control" to the negotiation, which was in fact also against factory council control. But even this was not acceptable to many industrialists, at least immediately (see Appendix IV, Spriano, 1975). To make sure that the industrialists navigate through this with utmost unity and agility, the Confindustria resorted to a high level of centralization in the exclusive hands of its Executive Council from 7 September. This itself led to serious tensions between more uncompromising and moderate groups of industrialists within the confederation (Sarti, 1967, p. 55).

On 5 September, the CGL announced the commencement of a national council on 10 September with all socialist leadership to discuss the socialization of industry. Once again, such a radical language was invoked to pressure the employers to cave. However, this announcement preempted the meeting of the USI on 6 September in Genoa, attended by powerful unions such as the Italian Railway Union (*Sindacato Ferrovieri Italiani*), postal, and shipyard sectors, during which the syndicalists decided to wait for the outcome of the CGL conference on 10 September (see Bertrand, 1982, pp. 396-7). Despite its general appeal among a sizable proportion of the rank-and-file, the USI did not have access to the negotiating tables like the CGL or the Chamber of Labour. Short of a full-blown mass insurrection or strong alliance with the peasant movement, it had to play its strategies off of the decisions of the socialist unions and the party.

The most consequential meeting between the CGL and PSI took place between 9-11 September in Milan.[53] After a long discussion on whether the present situation was a political or an economic strike, the question of whether socialist organizations should call for a revolution was put on the table (see Spartaco, 1958). The CGL offered to leave the decision (and full responsibility) to the Maximalist leadership of the revolution to the PSI. The union leaders were clear about their objectives to push for union control over industry rather than revolution. They also knew that the party directorate did not have the resolve to take up such a challenge when even the Turin delegates were unprepared to carry out the movement offensively beyond the factories. Two motions, one in favour of union control of industry (drafted by Ludovico D'Aragona from the CGL) and another for the revolution (drafted by Ercole Bucco) were put to a vote. The latter was defeated by 590,000 to 409,000 votes (with 93,623 abstention most of whom were from the FIOM) in favour of the former proposal (Spriano, 1975, p. 92). With the question of revolution put to rest, the issue was now to resolve the deadlock along the line of "workers' control".

It was time for industrialists and the government to make their moves. Any "neutrality" in a tense standoff would expire quickly. This was the predicament of the government as the occupation entered its second week. It was then that the government's strategy shifted into a more active role

[53] Note that the USI representatives were not invited to this important convention and the representatives of the two important autonomous unions, the railway and maritime sectors, did not have a vote.

by using bank credits to pressure industrialists into negotiation with the labour leaders around the theme of "trade union's control". It even went as far as threatening to cut off all credits from the employers if they continued their intransigent position towards the CGL (Spriano, 1975, p. 99). The government knew that in the present economic and political situation, the promise of union's control would face severe limitations but saw it as a necessary step to complete the corporatist scheme that it had envisioned for post-war Italy. As Giolitti told Corradini, "a final solution of the industrial question lies in the integration of workers, if necessary as shareholders, into the structure of the industry, in full practical participation" (as quoted on p. 99). Such interpretation of "control" fit with the vision of the PPI and the CIL. There was also the possibility that such a scheme would split the socialist party between the left and the left-wing socialists.[54] Hence, even though the Catholic block was not directly present at the negotiating table between the capital and labour, its vision was captured in the particular interpretative framework that the government had put forward. In his meeting with the CIL and Confindustrial leaders on 15 September, Giolitti proposed to set up a joined commission of representatives from unions and employers to draft a factory council legislation (Maier, 1975, p. 186). The resolution expressed the Confindustrial's agreement to "accept a control over industry [...]" towards "genuine collaboration and co-responsibility between the different factors of production", provided that "this does not establish a trade union monopoly" (as quoted on p. 159f38). It had become apparent to many forces within the wide political spectrum that they have entered into a new regime of capital-labour relation on the basis of corporativism.[55]

The government's handling of the situation did not go well with all the industrialists and caused profound resentments among some fractions within the capitalist class. But the government succeeded in bringing the key elements of both sides together on 19 September to sign an agreement that included measures such as wage increase, cost-of-living bounces, six days of paid holiday, and overtime pay. Regarding the issue of "control", the agreement included the formation of a joint commission to prepare legislation along the lines of the CGL to "secure an improvement in disciplinary relations between the buyers and sellers of labour and an increase in production" (as quoted on p. 106). As such, it consolidated the traditional role of the union as the mediator in the transaction of commodified labour between workers and capital, with some modest provision for oversights of the operation of the enterprise.

[54] This played out differently since the split came not between the reformist and the Maximalist but the radical left wing which soon formed the Italian Communist Party (*Partito Comunista Italiano*, PCI).
[55] Although the initial reaction of the industrialists towards the CGL's demand for the union control of industry was one of hostility (Castronovo, 2005, p. 103-4), they eventually came around as a result of the government pressure and their own realization, starting from some of the most influential members at the leadership of Confindustria such as Ettore Conti (Milanese industrialists who became the president of the Confindustria), Silvio Crespi (the owner of a textile factory and the *Corriere della Sera* and a director of *Banca Commmersiale*) and Olivetti, of what such a scheme would mean in reality (Maier, 1975, p. 187).

The referendum held on 24 September syndicalists were deeply dissatisfied with the results. On 25 September, Borghi wrote on the position of the USI towards this settlement that "we advise the metalworkers to reject every offer of collaboration with ownership [...] to persist in the definitive conquest of the factories and in the realization of a new regime based on production and social equality" (as quoted in Bertrand, 1982, p. 400). Of those who voted, the majority went to the affirmative vote. The union, therefore, ordered the end of the occupation on 30 September and the return to the normal operation. By the time the government finally put a bill on the basis of the recommendations of the joint commission for a vote in the Chamber of Deputies in February 1921, the whole political scene shifted dramatically in the wake of the Fascist onslaught against the socialist's organizations and finally, nothing came out of the legislation.

The end of this period marked the effective end of "council democracy" movement in Italy. But beneath the façade of disheartening return to normalcy at the end of the occupations, there was a tectonic shift that had been taking place. Even though the corporativist regime of labour relation into the post-war order was temporarily extended, its particular evolution led to deep antagonism not only within the radical elements of the labour movement but crucially within the capitalist and agrarian bloc against the government and the socialist forces. The former went to establish the communist party and the latter found refuge under the Fascist regime.

To sum up, the third period emerged from the strategic response of the socialist union to employers' unyielding position towards union's wage demands as well as the growing pressure of the syndicalists and anarchists within the labour movement. It unleashed an astonishing wave of autonomous movements across Italy that was qualitatively different from the traditional forms of labour militancy such as strikes and obstructionism. Rather than withdrawing their labour power temporarily or quantitatively from the capitalist production in the form of limited strikes, the workers in the occupied factories took over the means of production in violation of private property and continued the production in varying degrees under their own management. Even though the method of struggle followed along the syndicalist lines, the direct involvement of the socialist organizations in this phase fundamentally influenced its evolution especially in the light of the numerical strength of their membership and their privileged position as potential negotiating partners. The strategic orientation of the socialist block towards the developments in this period was effectively in the hands of the reformist wing which used the fear of more radical possibilities to optimize its negotiating position with the employers. It was an opportunity for the socialist union to forcefully conclude the unfinished corporatist project that had begun in WWI.

The notion of "workers' control" was at the centre of wildly different programmatic efforts in this period. The *ordine nuove* group, already significantly marginalized compared to the earlier

periods, distanced themselves from these occupations and called on socialists to warn the industrial workers of the futility of such methods to prevent their disheartening against the feasibility of communism due to what the group saw as an inevitable failure. The socialist union countered the syndicalist articulation of the notion of "workers' control" by giving it a corporatist significance. While the anarchists and syndicalists continued their propaganda efforts along similar lines as in the previous period, the privileged position of the socialist organization limited their programmatic reach.

In some ways, this period presented the working-class organization with an exceptional wave of solidarity within a wide spectrum of professions and locations. There were, however, important gaps rooted in the previous periods with regards to the effective disconnect between factory occupations and the wave of solidarity around it, and the peasant land occupation that was largely by veteran peasant-soldiers and Catholic peasants. The continued lack of serious efforts among the socialist organizations to incorporate the peasant movement and their antagonism towards the Catholic movement hindered the possibility of developing such alliances. Furthermore, despite the programmatic interest of the syndicalists and anarchists towards radical peasant movements, their organizational weakness among that segment of the population fettered their ability to force an effective alliance with the peasant movement.

Concluding Remarks

The ways the relation of forces linked to the "council democratic" movement evolved during the *biennio rosso* determined the particular trajectory of the movement. Under the condition of the war mobilization, the direct involvement of the state in the production process had coupled the democratization of the workplace more tightly to the democratization of the state. However, the rapid return to the liberal form of the state after the war created a buffer between these spheres, making the translation between the two more effectively mediated by various organizations. The locus of revolutionary class struggle after the war appeared primarily at the workplace level through the radicalization of the internal commissions. The industrial triangle and in particular Turin, the centre of war production and the hot spot of working-class militancy during the war, became the site where the "council democratic" movement emerged.

The socialist organizations initially had the most direct link to the movement whose majority of members were also members of these organizations (especially the CGL). Furthermore, the leading force behind the programmatic articulation of the movement, *l'ordine nuovo* group, were influential figures in the local branch of the party. Hence, the PSI had entered into a transformative project, not of its making but within its organizational influence. Given the political framework after the war, the PSI had to play a crucial role in facilitating the expansion of the movement and

the generalization of its project to press against the limits of the liberal state and transform the state from within. However, the party failed on two fronts: first, to facilitate the generalization of the movement by channelling its effects constructively within the state, and second to expand its organizational reach by developing institutions of local self-government outside the factories in parallel yet linked to the internal commissions.[56] Therefore, the Maximalist strategy of the PSI at the national level blocked an effective inside-outside strategy even after its historic success in the 1919 general election.

In the first period, the movement did not seem to raise many concerns among the CGL leadership. As long as the internal commissions could be kept under the control of the union, they could be seen as the institutional basis of the union at the factory level, functionally useful especially in the light of exponential growth of union membership after the war. However, the incomplete character of the corporatist scheme during the war had weakened the role of the unions to mediate between these rank-and-file organizations and the state. This made the internal commission susceptible to relatively independent rank-and-file militancy. This possibility became more realized when the factory councils in Turin gave voting rights to all workers regardless of their union membership to select their delegates who had to be union members. This was in line with the project of a radical democratization of the workplace, on the basis of the principle of imperative mandate and instant recall, to give a say to workers on their representatives.

The implications of the activities of the Turinese councilists began to worry the socialist union leadership. The leadership of the CGL used the April Strikes to spur the movement into submission. But the militant actions of the workers and the relative noninterventionist attitude of the liberal government made the employers ever more adamant to establish an absolute managerial authority through centralized coordination. The persistent intransigence of the employers in the context of the debilitating strategy of the union leadership towards the council movement intensified the rank-and-file struggle over workplace democracy. It was then that the organizational influence of syndicalist and anarchist forces within the movement grew significantly.

Under the rapidly increasing intransigence of the employers towards working-class demands, the unions, under the organizational pressure of the syndicalist and anarchist forces, engaged in more militant tactics such as obstruction and slow-down. This later escalated to union-sanctioned factory occupations in response to employers' national lockout. This sparked the enthusiasm of syndicalist forces linked to the movement since the form of the action corresponded

[56] The relatively large network of cooperatives or other local self-help entities that had been created in the course of the war can be considered among the organizational candidates for possible expansion and radicalization of the movement outside factories.

to their programmatic vision for the movement that they had already experimented with in earlier periods well. For the socialist trade unions, on the other hand, it was important to show their ability to manage this volatile situation despite its revolutionary outlook. This could potentially be used as a springboard to bring the internal commissions completely under its control but also to present itself as a powerful and indispensable partner in the corporatist management of industrial relations.

The asymmetry of access between the socialist and syndicalist forces to the legal-administrative channels of the state caused the formers' strategic orientation towards the movement to decisively shape the trajectory of the movement. Therefore, despite the increasing influence of the syndicalists within the movement, the trajectory of the movement followed the path laid out in the negotiations between the leaders of the socialist movement and the representatives of the leading capitalist organizations. These negotiations themselves were held upon the background support of the capitalist state.

Regarding the programmatic efforts, the movement benefitted tremendously from the elaborations of *l'ordine nuovo* group in the initial periods of its evolution. The group firmly believed that the vision for the transformative process should be appropriate to the particular contours of class struggle in Italy, rather than an artificial reverberation of the process elsewhere (notably, in Russia). They saw the internal commissions as the primary institutions that could potentially carry out a transformative project. This would start from radical democratization of the workplace, during which workers come to recognize themselves as producers capable of a disciplined movement towards self-management (a notion that had been utilized centrally during the war) rather than wage earners submissive to the authority structure of the workplace either imposed directly by the employers or mediated by the unions.

The programmatic efforts of the *l'ordine nuovo* group which had gone far in developing a strategic vision for the movement to transcend its primary locus of activity along "workers' control" dimension into a general organization of the society on the organization basis of councils. However, as the prominent figures of *l'ordine nuovo* group were organizationally part of the socialist party, their programmatic vision eventually came into conflict with that of the national leadership. However, the failure of the PSI to generalize the movement as outlined above hindered the realization of the transitional programme of *l'ordine nuovo* group from the struggle over radical "workers' control" towards a "council democratic" republic. The party leadership also did not offer a transformational programme to facilitate the expansion of the movement along the "citizens' control" dimension. Indeed, the strict division between the leadership of the "political" and "economic" strikes between the PSI and the CGL respectively, reinforced in the Pact of Alliance at

the end of September 1918, further formally hampered the sublation of "workers' control" and "citizens' control' as the constitutive modes of the movement.

Under the influence of anarchist thoughts as well as the concrete organizational strength of the syndicalist organizations, the programmatic centrality of the industrial working-class was weakened, loosening the delineation of the movement as a result. Therefore, anarchists and syndicalists envisioned a cascading process of occupations in various spheres of social life under the direction of councils towards self-management of society. Their effectiveness to shape the trajectory of the movement, however, was severely hindered by their organizational weakness to expand radical self-governing entities outside the factories.[57] Nonetheless, the programmatic entry point into the sphere of industrial working-class without abandoning their former ideological ties and organizational strongholds was the notion of "workers' control". This notion took on a radical meaning in line with the anarchist and syndicalist ideological disposition.

Therefore, the struggle to define the trajectory of the "council democratic" movement in this juncture found its locus around the notion of "workers' control". Over time, the movement saw the programmatic influence of syndicalist forces grew, along with their organizational significance. The syndicalists and anarchists' rejection of (party-) politics and the conquest of the state power influenced the democratic project of the movement. Their programmatic vision to achieve communism was more compatible with the tactic of occupation compared to the party-centred vision of *l'ordine nuovo* group. But this rejection in the context of the persistence of the juridico-administrative structure of the state meant that the anarchists and syndicalists forces could only influence the important decisions being made within the state relevant to the context of the struggle merely, if at all, indirectly.

The socialist union had a strong incentive to push for an interpretation that effectively meant a "trade union control", the extent of which was modest regulatory oversights. The absence of the more radical elements within the "council democratic" movement at the negotiating table prevented their interpretation from directly impacting the formulation of the emerging definition. This nominally caste the socialist trade union as a "partner" in a corporatist relation with the employers' organizations. Once the process was transferred from the factory levels to the legal-administrative path, it was feasible for the government to regain control over the tempo and shape of its evolution. After a protracted process, nothing came out of the proposed legislation. Trade unions fell back on their familiar method of strikes in a bitter struggle to defend the gains they had won since the war.

[57] See Levy (2000, pp. 124-5) for a list of neighborhood anarchist affinity groups in Piedmont.

At the same time, they were faced with a rapid rise of fascist squads that existentially threatened the very foundations of the labour movement.

Lastly, the alliance patterns in relation to the forces operating within the movement evolved over these three periods. The geographical localization of the movement at its inception and the initial dominance of the socialist forces within the movement pushed the question of alliance to the background. *L'ordine nuovo* group did provide some elaboration on the importance of incorporating the peasantry into the council movement. However, such programmatic visions, as abstract and vague as they were, were hindered by the organizational and programmatic limitations of the socialist forces at the national level.

The socialist forces at the national level were trying to forge a series of tactical alliances with Catholic forces on certain reform issues in the first period. However, these primarily concerned the *salariati*, *braccianti*, as well as the sharecroppers in the *mezzadaria*[58] among who Catholic organizations were an increasingly influential force. However, due to the perceived lack of significant overlap between the social base of the progressively dominant Catholic forces among the agricultural labour and that of the council activists among the industrial working-class, the significance of this alliance could not be translated into a relevant factor within the immediate strategic horizons of the council movement.

As the influence of syndicalist grew from the second period, there was initially some change of prospective alliance between the socialist and syndicalist organizations. This potentiality was accompanied by a number of initiatives by the PSI at the national level to form a revolutionary united front. However, aside from the complications on the way of such an alliance due to the organizational preconditions demanded by the socialists, the outbreak of the Ancona revolt effectively annulled such possibilities. Moreover, the strategic response of the socialist organizations towards the April Strike further alienated the syndicalists from the prospect of an alliance with socialist forces. In the meanwhile, the organizational expansion of syndicalist forces within the movement especially in the second half of the second period put the socialist council activists on the defensive and more hesitant to pursue alliance with the syndicalists. But this situation brought syndicalists and anarchists closer together in the second period. While they were also programmatically keen to incorporate the agrarian movement, they also suffered from organizational weaknesses in the south and large parts of the centre of Italy.

During the third period, even though the wave of factory occupations provided the (ultimately unrealized) possibility for an unprecedented alliance between various forces within the

[58] See Appendix B for the definition of these terms in the context of the agrarian production in Italy.

working-class movement, the organizational forces involved in the council movement failed to coordinate with the wave of land occupations especially in the south. Instead, these were led largely by veteran associations and some Catholic organizations. The consequence of the deep-rooted limitations in alliance possibilities between the militant forces in the North and the peasants in the South, which was never systematically tackled by the revolutionary organizations, became ever more visible at this juncture.

It was soon after the effective pacification of the revolution that the process of a violent passive revolution led by fascist forces began. It quickly sealed not only the fate of whatever was left of the legacy of the "council democratic" movement but also the very existence of the left-wing working-class organizations.

Chapter 7

The Trajectory of the "Council Democratic" Movements in a Comparative Perspective

Introduction

The past two chapters outlined the trajectories of the "council democratic" movements in Germany and Italy. The trajectory of these movements was discussed through the analysis of the transformations that these movements underwent in the immediate post-war years. By taking a relational approach, the analysis outlined how the evolution of the movements was shaped by strategic interactions between the forces engaged with the movements through their organizational links, programmatic efforts, and alliance patterns.

This chapter looks at the trajectory of the "council democratic" movements from a comparative perspective. It uses comparative movement analysis by taking Germany and Italy as "negative" cases and Russia as the "positive" case. Identification of the trajectories of these cases as "negative" and "positive" needs to be qualified. This characterization rests on the general framework discussed in the introductory chapter that conceptualizes the analytical form of "council democratic" movement as a dialectical relation between its two modes, "citizens' control" and "workers' control". As outlined in the case studies, the lopsided trajectories of the movements in both Germany and Italy could not succeed in sublating the two modes into a realization of "council democracy". It is in this sense that the trajectories of the movements in Germany and Italy are taken as "negative" cases and contrasted with the trajectories of the movements in Russia, between the February and the October Revolutions, as a "positive" case of successful sublation. This is not to imply a "happily ever after" narrative of the Russian Revolution. Indeed, the transformations that took place after the October Revolution stripped the movement of much of its essential characteristics. However, those processes were governed by a different set of factors and require their own analysis that falls outside the scope of the present study. For the purpose of the comparative analysis, it suffices to look at the trajectory of the "council democratic" movement in Russia between the February Revolution and the October Revolution.

Using the strategic-relational approach to movement analysis that deploys the concept of organizational links, programmatic efforts, and alliance patterns, the chapter first provides an overview of the key characteristics of the transformation of movement in Russia between February and October 1917. Then the comparative analysis contrasts the two "negative" cases of Germany and Italy with the "positive" case of Russia to link the specific transformations of the movement in each case to the relational dynamics that unfolded in these countries.

Overview of the Case of Russia

The trajectory of "council democratic" movement in Russia can be organized into three periods:[1] from 23 February 1917 to mid-April 1917, which marks the beginning of the February Revolution through the period of "dual power" strategy, from 18 April 1917 to end of June 1917, which marks the beginning of the "April Crisis" through the first socialist-liberal coalition government, and from 1 July 1917 to 25 October 1917, which marks the beginning of the "July Crisis" to the Bolshevik insurrection and the beginning of the October Revolution.

Upon the downfall of the Tsar monarchy in late February 1917, a great number of councils emerged across the country.[2] The historical roots of these self-governing bodies in Russia as the organizational expression of the popular demands for democratization in the "political" sphere go back to the 1905 revolution. In the context of a highly repressive absolutist state, the basic demands of the soviets in 1905 were the establishment of the Constituent Assembly and a democratic republic (Anweiler, 1975, pp. 50, 63). Attempts to establish an associational representation of the working class within the "economic" sphere go back to at least 1901 to create factory-wide workers' committees (p. 26). The modest democratic gains, including the introduction of the State Duma, legalization of trade unions, and limited land reforms, that were achieved as the result of the 1905 revolution were severely restricted or annulled by 1907.[3]

Notwithstanding the continuities that existed between the movement before and after the February Revolution, the collapse of the central state in 1917 fundamentally changed the political and social significance of the councils. Especially due to the absence of strong civil society organizations, the epicentre of popular power fell squarely on the councils, making the left-wing political parties keenly interested in them as organizations of mass politics.

Due to the organizational weakness of the rival socialist and anarchist organizations at the dawn of the revolution (Avrich, 1967; Engelstein, 2018), the movement was initially dominated by the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionary Party (*Partija socialistov-revoljucionerov*, SR) (Avrich, 1963; Hasegawa, 2018). Mensheviks were quick to issue a call to all workers a few days after the Revolution began to form soviets (Galili, 2019, p. 24; Hasegawa, 1977). Therefore, actively participating in the expansion and political direction of the movement. The party achieved

[1] The dates mentioned with regards to Russia follow the "Old Style" dates (according to the Julian calendar). Since the analysis does not make one-to-one chronological comparison between the cases, the dates are not converted to the "New Style" dates (according to the Gregorian calendar that was implemented in Russia on 14 February 1918).
[2] Oskar Anweiler (1974, p. 113) estimates that there were 400 soviets in May 1917, 600 in August 1917, and 900 in October 1917.
[3] By 1914, the membership of the Bolshevik or the Menshevik factions of the Social Democrats hovered around 0.5 to 0.8 per cent of the industrial workforce. Also, the trade union membership in 1914 was around 1.2 to 4.6 per cent of the industrial workforce (Albert, 2014)

the leadership of the most influential soviet in the country, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. In Moscow, the second largest and industrialized city in Russia at the time, Mensheviks were also dominant in the soviets and the factory committees in the first two periods of the revolution (Anweiler, 1975, p. 126). The composition of Menshevik's executive committee was strongly moderate belonging to the group which operated legally during the war (Galili, 2019, p. 26). Hence, it was this group that determined the political strategy of the party in the early stage of the revolution. The SR was uniquely advantageous over other forces in villages.[4]

The foundation for what became the chief programmatic vision of the movement in the first period was laid out after a series of mutinies in the army between 28 February and 1 March. In response, the Petrograd Soviet issued the so-called "Order No. 1" on 1 March calling for the formation of committees and the election of soldiers' representatives in all military units throughout the country. The units were formally subordinated to the Soviets and their committees; yet, they were to follow all orders issued by the Military Commission of the State Duma *unless* the order counters decrees issued by the Soviet. It also granted full citizenship rights to soldiers while not on duty. This was the first instance of the general strategy of "dual power" (*dvoevlast'e*) that dominated the movement in the first period within both the "political" and the "economic" spheres. It is important to consider "dual power" not as a natural condition of any revolutionary situation but a specific strategy with its own real or imagined possibilities, limitations, and contradictions in the context of a given balance of class forces.

The formation of "dual power" strategy at the state level still required substantial programmatic effort by the Menshevik leadership. Julius Martov, one of the leading members of the Menshevik executive committee belonging to the "Internationalist" faction, cautioned against giving unconditional support to the provisional government and even more so against participating in a coalition as this would run the risk of depriving the social democrats of their independent proletarian policy or turn the proletariat against the party (Galili, 2019, p. 37). This stemmed from the conclusion reached within the "Internationalist" faction that the "camp of democracy" lacked sufficient legitimacy within the state agencies, the army, and Zemstvo, therefore requiring cohabitation with the liberal Constitutional Democratic Party (*Konstitutsionno-Demokraticheskaya Partiya*, Kadet) (pp. 59-60). The SR was on the same page with regards to the Provisional Government (p. 100-1).

The Agreement towards establishing "dual power" strategy without any institutional linkages between the two was concluded between the executive committee of Petrograd Soviet and

[4] Despite the state repression during the war against the activities of the SR, the party thrived rapidly after the war by building on its already established reputation in the villages (Badcock, 2010, pp. 134-6).

the State Duma on 2 March (Galili, 2019, p. 63). This general political strategy secured the formal independence of the soviets from the provincial government, thereby sustaining the class character of the revolution as embodied in the "duality" of this "power" while paradoxically devising the possibility of a conditional social peace deemed necessary for the success of the long-term goals of the revolution. It laid out the condition of a generalized "citizens' control" over the conduct of government without interfering directly with it. This was indeed similar to the idea of "workers' control" in the "economic" sphere. However, there the Mensheviks were far less innovative and enthusiastic about the prospect of a "dual power" strategy at the point of production.

The unions were generally not as strong as the factory committees after February (Anweiler, 1975, pp. 126-7; Smith, 2004, p. 21).[5] There was also a considerable overlap between the two organizations, on the matters related to the recognition of factory committees and trade unions, as well as the participation of factory committees and trade unions in hiring and firing practices (Koenker and Rosenberg, 1989, p. 176).

As early as 5 March, the Petrograd Soviet called for the formation of factory committees (*fabricno-zavodskoy komitety*).[6] Many workers saw the downfall of the Tsar regime as an opportunity to end the despotism within the factory, particularly in state enterprises (Koenker and Rosenberg, 1989, p. 101) and to improve their working condition. Workers' demands for democratization of workplace were based on the revolutionary ideals to be treated in ways "deserving of a worker and a free citizen" (as quoted in Galili, 2019, p. 73). The factory committees were in charge of representing workers at each enterprise vis-à-vis the employers and other institutions on issues related to wages, working hours, and working conditions, observing the application of regulations, supervising hiring and firing practices at the enterprise, and overseeing the military conscription of workers (Smith, 2017, p. 82). Any impasse between factory committees and management was to be dealt with by arbitration committees.[7]

In the most abstract sense, the disposition of the factory committees towards power relation within the factory resembled the "dual power" strategy in the other spheres. The factory committees refrained from direct involvement in the management of production and instead assumed a supervisory role over the employers who retained their general albeit conditional managerial authority. Such democratic control, as modestly limited as it was during the first period (see Koenker and Rosenberg, 1989, p. 127; Smith, 2017; Avrich, 1963), was perfectly compatible with

[5] For the diversity of the trends within the Russian trade unions, see Shkliarevsky (1992).
[6] For the links between these factory committees and the tradition of electing stewards (*starosty*) that go back to at least 1905, see Smith (2017, pp. 57-8), Avrich (1963), and Shkliarevsky (1992).
[7] Establishment of such arbitration committees was agreed upon between the Petrograd Soviet and the Society of Factory and Works Owners (SFWO) on 10 March for the purpose of avoiding unofficial rank-and-file actions in the case of deadlock between the factory committees and the employers (Smith, 2017, p. 77).

the great bulk of factory committees' activities focusing on the improvements of the economic and working conditions of workers. Such congruence was further entrenched in the context of the absence of established trade unions strong enough to monopolize a delimited set of "economic" struggles. The slogan "united around one revolution and organizational centre" was the most popular among Petrograd workers in this period (as quoted in Galili, 2019, p. 106). It effectively supported the "dual power" strategy to go along with the government insofar as it followed the resolutions of the soviets.

Such a "dual power" strategy in the "economic" sphere was not possible without at least a passive collaboration of the capitalist class. In the first period, capitalists were more concessional towards the demands of the labour. On 10 March, the negotiations between the Petrograd Soviet and the leading capitalist association, the Petrograd Society of Factory and Plant Owners (PSFPO), reached an agreement to introduce 8-hour day, minimum wage, double-paid overtime, and the recognition of factory committees (Gaili, 1989, pp. 239-42).[8] Some of the leading industrialists believe that further radicalization of the revolution could be averted through an alliance between the progressive bloc and the moderate socialists (Galili, 2019, p. 24).

Just as the working class saw the end of the Tsar regime as an opportunity to break the despotism in the factories, the Russian peasants, who did not play a significant part in the uprisings leading to the February Revolution (Anweiler, 1975, p. 119), saw it as a chance to break free from traditional roles (Retish, 2008, p. 2). For the peasants, the notion of citizenship was an integral part of the revolution. Peasants were eager "to become full citizens and to play a major role in reconstructing the nation" (p. 67). Therefore, their aspirations went beyond land rights and included demands for freedom and equality (p. 83). The announcement by the Provisional Government in the first days of the revolution to abolish all hereditary and class restrictions and to prepare for an immediate convocation of a Constituent Assembly as well as representatives to local self-governing bodies on the basis of universal male suffrage[9] was a strong indication towards such desire for freedom and equality. Besides its substantial symbolic power, the convocation of the Constituent Assembly was seen as a necessary step towards legitimizing land reforms.[10]

In the first period of the revolution, the Peasant Union movement swept across the country and began preparing peasants to vote in the forthcoming Constituent Assembly election. However, the soviets, led principally by the SR whose views were generally more radical than the Peasant Unions, began challenging the authority of the Peasant Union in the countryside (Retish, 2008, pp.

[8] For the agreement between the Petrograd soviet and the PSFPO, see Hickey (2011, Document 4.11).
[9] Suffrage was extended to women in July 1917.
[10] See the report of the Samara Provincial Peasant Congress held between 25-29 March that tied the full legitimization of land reform to the convocation of the Constituent Assembly (Hickey, 2011, Document 5.6).

85-9). Soon, peasant soviets began to emerge especially in the urban centres. These were largely independent of workers' and soldiers' councils. The SR played a central role in the organization of these councils (Anweiler, 1975, pp. 121-2). Nevertheless, the relationship between the soviets and the Peasant Unions was not in the form of a hostile takeover or frontal challenge, but one of domination through a diversified collaboration including information affiliations, joint electoral lists, etc. (Badcock, 2010, p.137).[11]

Contrary to Mensheviks' deep distrust of peasants as the symbol of Russia's "backwardness" (Galili, 2019, p. 29), the SR had long oriented itself ideologically and organizationally towards the Russian peasants and believed in their transformative power in the revolution (Anweiler, 1975, p. 91). Therefore, the collaboration between the Mensheviks and the SR within the soviets at different levels laid the foundation for a representational alliance between workers and peasants, giving the hegemonic project of the revolution a solid social foundation. Of course, this was meaningful only insofar as the social bases of these organizational representations stayed reasonably attuned to the parties. Despite the organizational weakness of the Bolsheviks in the rural areas, their programmatic vision on what needed to be done in the countryside was firmly articulately from early on. On 11 March, Bolsheviks' Petrograd newspaper wrote "The revolution's slogan must be to replace the old authorities in the countryside. The organized peasantry must take local power into its own hands [...] Democratic self-government in the army, villages, and towns!" (Hickey, 2011, p. 94).

The continuation of the war effort despite the revolution created a fundamental contradiction at the heart of the revolutionary process. It continued to worsen the economic situation of the country and to heighten the social tensions associated with the war mobilization. Furthermore, it pressed on the tension that had already existed within those left-wing parties with a significant internal cleavage around the question of the war. This was notably the case for the Mensheviks and the SR, between their "internationalists" and "defensist" factions. In the context in which the class character of society has been revealed by the revolution and institutionally inscribed in the "dual power" strategy itself, the continuation of the war which now required the compliance of the soviets demanded serious programmatic efforts by the parties of the left.

Two programmatic innovations emerged in this period, one by Irakli Tsereteli (Menshevik) and another by Lenin, that gave diametrically different answers to the dilemma of the orientation of the soviets towards the war effort. Tsereteli's notion of "revolutionary defensism" (see Galili, 1982; Galili, 2019, pp. 134-40), formulated in late March, presented itself as a third way between

[11]The end of the rise of the Peasant Union came after the First Provincial Peasant Congress in 6-10 June 1917 which was dominated by majority SR (Retish, 2008, p. 90).

"internationalism" and "defence", thereby bringing the two factions within the Mensheviks together more coherently. It merged the idea of a continued war effort in defence of the revolution against German imperialism while insisting on a consorted effort to appeal to socialists in other countries in order to bring about a "just and universal" peace. This strategic shift was a remedy, albeit a temporary one, against the confrontation between the soviets and the Provisional Government on the question of the war; yet, it was entirely predicated upon demonstrable and effective steps by the Provisional Government towards peace without annexation. However, it led to another contradiction, undermining the very possibility of the "dual power" strategy, since "revolutionary defensism" required abandoning what Tsereteli called "the policy of an irresponsible opposition" (p. as quoted in Galili, 2019, p. 136). This position, which soon became the new ideological norm within the Menshevik executive committee, was not conceived originally as a departure from the "dual power" strategy but a strategy of pressing the Provisional Government to initiate the process of peace without annexation while continuing the "defensive war" as an existential struggle in favour of the revolution. Nevertheless, "revolutionary defensism" paved the way towards soviets' greater "cooperation" with more "progressive" segments of the capitalist class, therefore, lending the Provisional Government a level of active support. This mediation shifted the contradiction between two factions within the party and tired the fate of the principal organizing forces behind the programme more intimately to the government's handling of the war.

On 7 April, Lenin published "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution" (more commonly known as the "April Theses") which articulated a "council republican" programme.[12] Having firmly rejected the "dual power" strategy by refusing "any support for the Provisional Government", Lenin called for the transfer of power to the soviets to establish "not a parliamentary republic [...] but a Republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labors', and Peasants' Deputies, throughout the country from top to bottom," therefore demanding the establishment of what he called a "commune state". Nevertheless, it condemned the Provisional Government for not having set an early date for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, thereby assuming that the promised democratic process would result in the transfer of power to the soviets.

The programme considered the introduction of socialism as the immediate task of the revolution "to bring social production and the distribution of products at once under the control of the Soviets of Workers' Deputies". It further called for "confiscation of all landed estate. Nationalization of all country's land, which will be distributed by the local Soviets..." (see Hikey, 2011, Document 3.15). This radical view was not only rejected by the majority of the Mensheviks

[12] The idea of soviet power did not appear in Bolsheviks' manifesto, written by Vyacheslav Molotov on 28 February 1917, which instead called for constitutional convention.

and SR leadership, calling it "absurd and impossible" (see Hickey, 2011, document, 3.16), but also majority members within the Bolshevik Party at least until the party conference in late April when Lenin's view to win over the party, though far from unanimously so (Anweiler, 1975, pp. 155-7). Nevertheless, it was not disconnected from the sentiment of more radical segments of the rank-and-file within the movement,[13] even though the majority of workers, in general, were not ready to accept the programme of "all power to the soviets" (Galili, 2019, p. 157).

As the economic situation continued to deteriorate, workers' demands for higher wages and better working condition also grew. This was contrary to the expectation of the employers who had taken a more conciliatory approach to such demands earlier in the first period. This led to a shift in the orientation of the industrialists not only towards workers' demands, but also their own organizations (Koenker and Rosenberg, 1989, p. 146-8), further undermining the condition of the possibility of "dual power" strategy.

Amidst these transformations, a diplomatic debacle leading to massive protests effectively ended the first period. It began when the message by the Foreign Minister, Pavel Miliukov, to the Entente forces regarding Russia's commitment to continue the war on the same principle as those of the Tsar regime was published on 18 April, sparking a political crisis known as the "April Crisis". Protestors commonly demanded the resignation of Miliukov and the War Minister, Alexander Guchkov to resign; some even called for the dissolution of the entire cabinet (see, for example, Hickney, 2011, document 6.15 and 6.19).

The consolidation of the political crisis fell on the shoulders of the Menshevik and SR leadership, which in this period enjoyed a comfortable majority in key governing bodies of the soviets.[14] The Menshevik leadership was at first skeptical about the consequence of abandoning the "dual power" strategy and forming a coalition with the liberal forces. A resolution passed in a round of meetings among the Menshevik leaders (21-25 April) stated that "[coalition] would fuse the soviet to the government and extinguish the soviet's role as a revolutionary democracy's institution that exercises control over the government." It characterized coalition as "a radically unstable situation" which would cause an unavoidable collapse of the government (see Hickey, 2011,

[13] For example, a resolution passed on 4 April by the workers' meeting at the large Novel Engineering plant in Petrograd read "the working class cannot trust any government that is made up of bourgeois elements and that depends upon the bourgeoisies." It further called for immediate convocation of the Constituent Assembly and peace without annexation (see Hickey, 2011, Document 6.1). Similarly, workers at Staryi Parviainen plant, under the dominance of the (left) SR, passed a resolution on 13 April to "remove the Provisional Government ... and pass power ... to the soviet" (as quoted in Melancon, 2004, p. 152).

[14] The First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies (3-24 June) was firmly under the dominance of "revolutionary defensist" Mensheviks and SR. The congress elected the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (*Vserossiysky Centralny Ispolnitelny Komitet*, VTsIK) which was in charge of legislative and administrative tasks within the general framework outlined by the Congress. The Mensheviks and the SR were in strong majority also in the VTsIK.

document 6.23). The SR leadership was less wary of the prospect of "changing organizational dualism into organizational monism" (see Hickey, 2011, document 6.24). However, the crisis deepened the schism within the SR between the majority in the leadership and those on the left whose now-demonstrable suspicion towards collaboration with the Provisional Government to achieve peace led them to abandon the "dual power" strategy (Melancon, 2004, p. 152), though not at the cost of forming a coalition with the liberal forces.

Amidst these considerations and hesitations, the resignation of Miliukov and Guchkov and visible signs of defection among the soldiers against military command facilitated a change in Menshevik strategy towards a coalition. Tsereteli articulated this strategic shift as necessitated by an exceptional situation. He qualified the coalition as limited to the issue of war and peace while emphasizing the need for the soviet to declare full confidence in the Provisional Government (Galili, 2019, pp. 178-181). On 1 May, the Executive Committee of Petrograd Soviet voted in favour of the participation of socialists in the Provisional Government. Shortly after, the first liberal-socialist coalition government was created.[15] This led to the diffusion of authority into the Provisional Government by virtue of the partial albeit significant participation of the Menshevik and SR representatives in it. This diffusion occurred while the soviets still retained, and in some areas such as foreign policy even increased, their "control" function over the Provisional Government on formal grounds (i.e. the effective continuation of the "dual power" strategy).

This hybrid form of authority structure was an obstacle to pressing workers' demand on the crucial questions of peace and economy. It was unpopular among workers as they were deeply suspicious of the "bourgeois government". They rather see their socialist representatives take over the majority of seats in the cabinet in order to aggressively push for a peace policy and establish greater control over the conduct of the government; an alternative that was articulated by the remaining Menshevik "internationalists" (Galili, 2019, pp. 182-88).[16] Therefore, the division between the rank-and-file within the movement and their leaders on the general issue of "citizens' control" grew.

During May and June, there was an acute deterioration of the economic condition which manifested itself in the factories.[17] Although still most strikes in this period revolved around economic demands (see Koenker and Rosenberg, 1989, pp. 173-7), most factory committees

[15] Alexander Kerensky (Menshevik) became the Minister of War and Navy, Viktor Chernov (SR) became Minister of Agriculture, and Pavel Pereverzev (SR) the Minister of Justice.
[16] For example, Martov suggested a "pure democratic" government dedicated to radical reforms, most notably immediate armistice and democratization of the army, and immediate preparation for socialization (Galili, 2019, p. 322).
[17] From the beginning of the revolution to the end of the second period, 563 enterprises, with 100,000 workers, had closed down (Avrich, 1963, p. 170).

expanded on their control activities and began monitoring supplies of raw material and fuel (Smith, 2017, p. 149; Galili, 1982, pp. 252-3). It was also in the second period that the factory committees began considering ways to coordinate their actions in cities and even between provinces and Petrograd (Avrich, 1963, p. 175).

In the hope to quell the radicalization of factory committees (Smith, 2017, pp. 63-4), the Provisional Government issued a decree on 23 April to give a more well-defined institutional and legal structure to them. However, the decree did not mention the "control" function of the factory committees. The leadership of the soviets and the Mensheviks also refused to sanction the exercise of control by the factory committees, and instead, called for regulation agencies. However, workers believed that neither the economic nor the political survival of the movement could be entrusted to the employers or the coalition cabinet. Also, that it was now up to them to impose greater control in their enterprises (Galili, 2019, pp. 250-3). In this sense, the growing division between the rank-and-file and the leadership extended also to the issue of "workers' control" within the "economic" sphere.

In the meanwhile, the Bolsheviks intensified their activities within the factory committees. Their formulation of "workers' control" also resonated with the syndicalist and anarchist tendencies among the workers (Anweiler, 1975, p. 127). The growing popularity of the Bolsheviks among workers in this period, particularly in the factory committees, is evident in the increasing number of factory deputies who were recalled and replaced with deputies affiliated with the Bolsheviks (Galili, 2019, p. 297).

In this period, the activities of anarchists became more pronounced, calling for "the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government" (as quoted in Copp, 1993, p. 131).[18] It was also around this time that many of the anarchist activists were arriving in Russia from exile for the first time after the February Revolution. From May 1917, anarchists in the capital began to focus on their organizational development and to cooperate with the Bolsheviks on certain issues (p. 134). For example, anarcho-syndicalists in Petrograd intensified their efforts via their activities in the factory committees to elaborate on the syndicalist tendencies in the factories in the form of "workers' control" (p. 140). Furthermore, anarchist and Bolshevik activists jointly organized a mass demonstration in Petersburg against the government on 18 June (p. 132).

Indeed, the issue of "control" proved to be the chief issue at the first Petrograd conference of factory committees held between 30 May and 5 June. In the conference, the Menshevik Minister of

[18] This position was to the left of the left-wing of the Bolshevik, such as that of Lenin who, in an article published on 22 April, cautioned against "Blanquist attempt to 'seize power' [or] 'arrest' the Provisional Government" (see Hickey, 2011, document 6.19).

Labour, Skobelev, called for "state control" rather than "workers' control" over the industry, and that under the mediation of the trade unions rather than the factory committees (Avrich, 1963, p. 166-7). The opposing formulated resolution by Lenin called for the institution of "genuine workers' control," "by means of a series of carefully considered measure, introduced gradually but without delay, leading to the complete regulation of production and distribution of goods by workers" (as quoted in Avrich, 1963, p. 167). The resolution also demanded two-third of all institutions of control be occupied by workers and that the government bring the war to a rapid conclusion. The Bolshevik resolution was passed with a strong majority, indicating the growing grip of the Bolshevik within the Petrograd factory committees.

The widening gulf between the factory committees and the trade unions on key ideological and strategic questions became apparent during the 3rd All-Russian conference of trade unions in Petrograd in the last week of June. Following an undeniably Menshevik line of argument on the nature of the February Revolution, the trade union leaders in the conference argued that "the organizations of control must be such as are able to speak and act in the name of the entire revolutionary democracy of Russia...and not of only one interested portion – the workers" (as quoted in Avrich, 1963, p. 168). Despite the resolution presented by Vladimir Milyutin on the Bolshevik vision of "workers' control", the counter-resolution presented by N. Cherevanin (Menshevik) favouring broad participation of popular forces in the organization of state control over production won over the majority (p. 169).

In May and June, industrialists abandoned their faith in progressive labour policies and attempted to reverse the previous concessions. While their trust in the leadership in employers' association declined, their sense of class interest increased in this period. They were pessimistic due to both the change in the composition of the Provisional Government and the relative loss of authority in their enterprises. Employers' reaction shifted from passive resistance against workers' demands in May to militant rejection of their demands and the decision of the arbitration committees in June (Galili, 1982, pp. 250-2; Galili, 2019, pp. 219-28; Rosenberg, 1974, pp. 172-3). The industrialist organizations also began voicing their opposition including what they perceived to be state intervention in the economy (p. 244).

Regarding broader social classes, the end of the rise of the Peasant Union came after the First Provincial Peasant Congress, 6-10 June, following the First all-Russian Congress of Peasant Deputies during which an SR leadership was elected. The declining popularity of the Peasant Union was rooted in the dissatisfaction of the peasant members with the leadership's vision towards the state power limited to supraclass social mediation at the time when the land question had become ever more contentious. There was a definite shift among peasants towards a more active

government with radical policies to address their grievances. The decline of the Peasant Union gave way to the soviets, under the majority SR leadership, to gain dominance among peasants. The First Peasant Congress pledged "loyalty to the Petrograd Soviet" and stood behind the "revolutionary defensist" strategy (Retish, 2008, pp. 90-1). However, the support of peasants for the soviet leadership was predicated upon meaningful land reform and the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, both of which were gravely hindered by the continuation of the war. In April, the Provisional Government set up a network of committees to prepare for land reform and to resolve land disputes. At first, the peasants were willing to cooperate with these committees. However, as the food crisis worsened, the peasants became less cooperative in giving up their products that they believed was rightfully theirs (pp. 97-8).

The "July Crisis" began when Kadet ministers resigned from the Provisional Government on 2 July in reaction to the decision by Kerensky and Tsereteli to give limited autonomy to Ukraine. Paradoxically, their resignations strengthened Revolutionary Defensists' belief in the importance of a broad coalition. However, the mass mobilization and armed demonstrations against the Provisional Government on 3-7 July ("July Days"), in reaction to the Russian military offensive starting on 18 June, disrupted the attempts to solidify the coalition. Demonstrators called for a purely socialist government and "all power to the Soviets" (Galili, 2019, pp. 322-6). Despite all these backlashes, the programmatic orientation of the Menshevik-SR leadership towards the strategy of coalition did not change. In reaction to the growing popularity of Bolsheviks and anarchist among workers and soldiers, the Provisional Government and the Soviet leadership blamed the Bolsheviks for staging an insurrection and used this pretext not only to incite popular resentment against the Bolsheviks but also crack down on the party. The party was prohibited, its newspapers banned, and leaders arrested or exiled. In the short term, this damaged the organizational capacity of the Bolshevik. Nevertheless, in the long run, the government actions against the Bolsheviks moulded the popular image of the Bolsheviks as the polar opposite of and a widely (though not always clearly) known alternative to what the Provisional Government stood for. Furthermore, it also helped consolidate the differences within the Bolshevik party itself (Rabinowitch, 2007, p. 4).

In a series of articles immediately after the "July Day", Lenin laid out a proposal for a programmatic adjustment by the Bolsheviks in response to the recent upheaval. In the article "Political Situation" written on 10 July and another "On Slogans" published in mid-July, [19] Lenin argued that the slogan "All Power to the Soviets!" in the sense of a peaceful transfer of power to the

[19] It should be noted that although "Three Crises" was written on 10 July and discussed extensively by the Central Committee on 13 and 14 July, it was not published until 2 August.

soviets was no longer adequate in the current non-peaceful situation. He instead pushed for a decisive mass uprising to overthrow the government and establishing the "dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasants". The unique situation in the third period allowed for such a strategic position to be placed to the left of the soviet leadership without having to dismiss the idea of soviets as ultimately mass organizations for self-governance. Furthermore, the continued failure of the government not only to convene the Constituent Assembly but even to officially declare Russia a republic[20] allowed Lenin to present this departure while staying committed to the idea of a rapid convocation of the Constituent Assembly.[21]

Despite Kerensky's relentless efforts to form a coalition with the Kadets and despite the dismal result of the Kadets in the Municipal Duma elections in this period indicating the declining popularity of liberals,[22] the leadership of the Kadets remained steadfast. Finally, the resignation of Kerensky on 21 July broke the intransigence of both sides to come together and form the second coalition government, with Kerensky as its "Minister-President". This was achieved through a series of largely symbolic but not unimportant concessions such as standing in the government as "responsible" delegates rather than party or Soviet "representatives". In certain respects, the coalition brought Kadets and the moderate socialists together on the question of forceful response to the Bolsheviks and the general orientation towards strengthening the military command. However, the political basis of coalition did not overcome the growing tensions between the Kadets and Mensheviks, and the SR leadership on the question of land reforms. Nor did it provide promising pathways to overcome worsening industrial conflicts (Rosenburg, 1974, pp. 191-5).

In fact, by the end of July, the undeniable growth of the council movement in the communities, factories, and garrisons all over the country and the worsening and the growing militancy of the peasant movements in the countryside further weakened the left-wing of the liberal bloc which insisted on the continued collaboration with moderate socialists and strengthened the right-wing tendencies which saw right-wing military suppression of the soviets as the only way out of the deadlock. As a result, the party programmatically shifted towards the conservative groups and threw its full support behind General Kornilov.[23] This trend intensified during August ever more explicitly and gave ample space for the right-wing counter-revolutionary forces to organize.

[20] This only happened on 1 September.
[21] For example, see Lenin's two articles published on 3 and 13 October where he argued that as long as bourgeoisie and aristocratic landlords hold power (and now it is entirely theirs), the Constituent Assembly's convocation is not guaranteed. [...] If the bourgeoisie is able to prevent the transfer of power to the soviets, it will disband the Constituent Assembly" (Hickey, 2011, document 12.5).
[22] See Rosenburg (1974, Table 3, p. 189) for the election results.
[23] This was made evident during the ninth party congress of Kadet that opened on 23 July (Rosenburg, 1974, pp. 196-205).

In July and August, the economic crisis deepened. Employers were becoming more militant against the power of the factory committees, some of which had now moved further into controlling orders and finances. The situation brought the employers' organizations in closer contact with the Kadets to coordinate their actions in their efforts to contain the advancements of the council movement and regain control of both the political and economic spheres.

The rapid shift to the right reached its peak when General Kornilov attempted a military coup against the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet on 27 August. The putsch was crushed quickly and Kornilov was arrested. The failed coup showed the weakness of the Provisional Government and the complicity of the Kadets in such blatant counter-revolution attempt. Having lost their legitimacy as a force behind the democratic republic, the Kadets moved further to the right. This was evident in the majority view in their 10th congress in early October.

The Bolsheviks saw their popularity grew exponentially after this event. Following the election of Trotsky as the Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet on 31 August, Kamenev's resolution was adopted by the Petrograd Soviet on 1 September calling for an exclusively socialist government. This enabled the Bolsheviks to gain effective control of the Petrograd Soviet (Rabinowitch, 2007, p. 5). By 5 September, the majority of Moscow Soviet was Bolshevik affiliated. Therefore, after the early September elections in Petrograd and Moscow, it became clear that Bolsheviks had gained hegemony in the soviets. The Bolshevik slogan shifted back to the soviet power, but with an important caveat, calling for all power to "Bolshevik soviets" (Anweiler, 1975, pp. 172).

It was around this time that Bolsheviks became concerned about the pace by which the influence of anarchists was growing among workers.[24] However, given the organizational capacity of the anarchists compared to their effective alliance with the Bolsheviks in the previous period, the anarchists were not presenting a threatening alternative to the Bolsheviks. Rather, they were facilitating the alignment of the radical segments of the working class with the general orientation of the Bolsheviks towards soviet power. Nevertheless, from September, many Bolshevik resolutions qualified "workers' control" of production as implying a state-wide control in order to distinguish their formulation from those of anarcho-syndicalist programme of factory seizures (Smith, 2017, p. 165).

In the context of the growing popularity of the Bolsheviks within the soviets, the Mensheviks, in an article published in Petrograd Menshevik newspaper on 15 September, distanced themselves from the idea of soviets as the foundation of a democratic republic. The article argued

[24] For empirical evidence on the growth of anarchists, see Copp (1993, pp. 169-70).

that “the soviets do not embrace the entire democracy. This is even truer now than in the revolution’s first months [...] Now, the lines are clearer and many of those functions [as the local self-government institutions that they were involved in at the beginning of the revolution] have passed from soviets to other democratic organizations” (Hickey, 2011, document 12.2). The SR Central Committee clarified its position on the question of soviet power in a similar vein in an editorial published in the SR Petrograd newspaper on 30 September. It argued that the formation of the soviets was the necessary element in the first phase of the revolution “because they were the only institutions in the country, the provinces, and the villages addressing economic and administrative chaos.” But, it argued, given the emergence of the new democratic institutions and the capitalist economic order that the Russian Revolution had to operate within, soviets “cannot constitute the basis for a state in a democratic republic” (Hickey, 2011, document 12.3). Given the weakness of formal democratic apparatus, the two parties could not effectively decentre the locus of popular power from soviets to other democratic institutions. In other words, the “other [or new] democratic organizations” that the Mensheviks and SR were referring to were severely lacking the capacity to offer a functioning alternative to the institutional power of councils. Therefore, as their organizational links with the soviets weakened, so did their institutional links with the popular movement as a whole.

Lenin, who in the early September had argued for the formation of a purely socialist government to eventually transfer the power to the soviets, began articulating a more radical position at a meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee. In two letters on 12-14 September to the Central Committee, he argued that amidst a wave of peasant uprising around the country calling for the transfer of land to peasants and government’s military repression of these movements, the time has arrived to usher “all power to the soviets” as the only possible path to bring about immediate peace and land reform (Hickey, 2011, document 12.4). Despite such proposals that gravitated towards equating the notion of soviet power with insurrection, the Bolshevik Central Committee was not yet convinced of such a possibility especially given the bitter wounds of the “July Days”. They instead continued their call for the formation of all-socialist government before the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. This was aligned with the calls by factory workers for “homogenous socialist government” or “homogenous government of representatives of revolutionary democracy” (Smith, 2004, p. 26). It was not until 10 October that the majority within the Bolshevik Central Committee was convinced of this path forward and officially decided to prepare for insurrection. After this, the slogan of “all power to the soviets” became identical to insurrection (Anweiler, 1975, pp. 172-188).

In September and October, the economic conditions continued to worsen, and industrial conflict intensified. The number of factory closures increased in these months. In such instances, factory committees took over the management of the enterprises to prevent their closure (Smith, 2017, p. 149; Avrich, 1967, p. 172).[25] By the end of September, the arbitration boards had lost all of their mediation power as the employers' associations in Petrograd had become completely indifferent to their function (Koenker and Rosenberg, 1989, p. 280). Increasingly, the employers refused to uphold the agreements that had been reached in the first period (Galili, 1982, p. 258). In the context of the growing radicalization of class struggle, the Bolsheviks and the left-SR joined forces on 21 September and called for an early convocation of the second national congress of soviets, to be scheduled for 20 October.[26]

The peasants had turned against the Provisional Government earlier in this period when the state agents sought to coercively get grain from the peasants. Also, the preparation process until August for the upcoming national election created tensions among peasants for the fear that the government was trying to get an inventory of their stock. By summer, the relationship between peasants and the political leaders had gone sore. Peasants sought to have representatives from their own ranks in the township elections in August and the upcoming constituent assembly. The Bolshevik rule did not affect the countryside until winter and particularly upon the implementation of the Land Decree (Retish, 2008, pp. 95-117). However, the SR continued to play a central role in the organization and articulation of the peasant movement. Indeed, the organizational activities of the left-SR among peasants was a crucial bridge between the Bolsheviks and the peasant movements to extend their hegemony beyond the working class.

To sum up, the "council democratic" movement in Russia emerged after the collapse of the Tsar regime. During the first period, the Mensheviks and the SR formed the main organizational forces behind the soviets and factory committees, making them the principal mediating force between the councils and the Provincial Government. Consequently, their programmatic vision of "dual power" strategy as a generalized form of "control" (in the sense of supervision) over the executive power in the "political" and "economic" spheres prevailed over others. The alliance between the Mensheviks and the SR was crucial in providing moderate socialists with a broad social appeal. The rapid growth of the SR after the February Revolution and their organizational activities within the peasant population alongside the Peasant Unions forged an important alliance

[25] By October, 289,000 workers (74 per cent of industrial workforce) worked in enterprises under some form of "workers' control". But even then, 90 per cent of small and medium size enterprises in Petrograd were untouched by "workers' control" (Smith, 2017, p. 185).

[26] Lenin had argued in a letter on 30 August to the Bolshevik Central Committee that the Bolshevik should work particularly with the left SR to guide the masses "so they demand immediate transfer of land to the peasants" (Hickey, 2011, document 10.14).

between the organizational representation of the working classes and the peasantry. The "dual power" strategy was not feasible without the collaboration of the forces involved. However, the continuation of the war, which was an absolute precondition for the collaboration of the Kadets with the moderate socialists, not only contributed hugely to the worsening economic condition of the country but also exacerbated tensions within and outside the political forces. It required a programmatic shift within the leadership of the Mensheviks and SR to come to terms with the continuation of the war efforts. This led to the emergence of "revolutionary defensism" as the programmatic resolution to this dilemma. However, it would not have been possible without closer collaboration between the soviets and the Provisional Government in the war effort. Therefore, what made it possible to exercise the "dual power" strategy paradoxically laid the ground to its termination or transcendence.

Amidst intensified political and economic crises in the second period, the "dual power" strategy was replaced with what can be described as a hybrid form of a socialist-liberal coalition government in which the socialists took a subordinate position while still maintaining the general authority of the soviets over the Provisional Government. Despite the continued dominance of the Mensheviks and SR in this period within the "council democratic" movement, the Bolsheviks expanded their organizational network particularly within the factory committees in key industrial cities. The Mensheviks and SR continued to pursue the "revolutionary defensism" that officially abandoned the generalized form of control over the executive power. The growing collaboration between the leadership of the soviets and the Provisional Government was taking place amidst intensifying class struggle in the workers', soldiers', and peasants' movements. This disparity made contestation over the articulation of "control" in theory and practice in both the "political" and "economic" spheres an important struggle. The programmatic vision of the left-wing Bolsheviks, first formulated by Lenin in his "April Theses", began to gain tractions within the council movement. This shift was grounded in the contradiction of the "revolutionary defensism" that became apparent as Russia got more deeply involved in the war without clear signs of victory or peace.

The third period saw a dramatic shift in the relations of organizational forces. Despite an immense set back in the aftermath of the "July Days", the Bolsheviks quickly regained their support until they gained a hegemony among significant segments of the working-class population by the end of August. In the meanwhile, the left-SR expanded its organizing activities among key segments of the peasant population as well as strategically important segments within the working-class population, creating the possibility of an alternative worker-peasant alliance to what was being pushed forward by the Menshevik and SR leadership. The liberal bloc, on the other hand,

progressively decoupled itself from the moderate socialists, starting from the beginning of this period, and aligned itself more tightly and explicitly with the conservative forces and the upper echelon of the military. The response of the moderate socialists to these developments was to seek a deeper coalition with the liberals while containing the militancy of the movement by legal and coercive means and gradually distancing themselves from the council movement. The programmatic vision of the Bolsheviks underwent several transformations during this period. Despite hesitations and disagreements, the executive committee was pushed towards the left until it authorized an insurrection, in alliance with the left-SR, to overthrow the Provisional Government.

Comparing the trajectories of the movements in Russia, Germany, and Italy

This section examines the trajectories of the "council democratic" movements in Germany, Italy, and Russia comparatively. It focuses on the evolutions of these movements which, in the case of Russia, led to radical articulations and consolidation of "citizens' control" and "workers' control" and, in the case of Germany and Italy, the deradicalized articulation of the two dimensions of "council democracy" and the ultimate dissolution of the movements.

The structure of the comparative analysis is different from that of the within-case analyzes. The latter was organized around the analytical categories of organizational links, programmatic efforts, and alliance patterns, across the respective periods, along the two constitutive dimensions of "council democracy" (i.e. "citizens' control" and "workers' control"). The within-case analysis followed a strategic-relational approach which required treating the movement itself as a terrain of contestation between various (endogenous and exogenous) organizing forces. In other words, the analysis of the movement is always mediated by the complex interactions between various organizing forces, each with its own formal aspects (i.e. internal structure, material/symbolic capacity, and relation within the state) and substantive aspects (i.e. programmatic effects, social base, and alliance patterns).[27] This analysis reveals the micro-dynamics of contestation that come to shape the trajectory of the movement during a given period along a given constitutive dimension. Simplified summaries of these analyzes can be seen in Table 2, organized along the analytical categories.

The comparative analysis presented here does not engage in a one-to-one examination of these analytical categories across the three cases. Instead, it compares the trajectory of the movement along the two constitutive dimensions across the cases. It offers a bird's-eye view of the evolution of these movements, within their given contextual circumstances and structural conditions. In other words, it embeds the comparative evolution of the movements within

[27] In this sense, organizing forces themselves are more institutionalized or formalized movements in their own account.

contextual and structural factors specific to each case. The strategic-relational factor, with its organizational, programmatic, and coalitional dimensions, is what ultimately translates the significance of any conjuncture operating through any structure into political action.

The comparative analysis begins by highlighting the differences in the initial conditions from which the movement in each case emerged. It then examines the comparative trajectory of the movement first along the dimension of "citizens' control" and then along the dimension of "workers' control", across the three cases. The analysis compares the ability of the movement in each case to form alliances with broader popular classes, particularly with the peasantry. This emphasizes the ability of the movement in each case to broaden its hegemonic project beyond the working class.

Case study	Analytic Category	Period 1 (Germany: 1/11/1918 – 21/12/1918) (Italy: 21/6/1919 – 14/11/1919) (Russia: 23/2/1917 – 15/4/1917)	Period 2 (Germany: 24/12/1918 – 14/4/1920) (Italy: 15/11/1919 – 24/4/1920) (Russia: 18/4/1917 – 30/6/1917)	Period 3 (Germany: 15/4/1920 – 7/10/1920) (Italy: 24/8/1920 – 30/9/1920) (Russia: 1/7/1917 – 25/10/1917)
Germany	Key Organizational Linkages	SPD; Free Trade Unions; USPD; *Obleute*; Spartacus League	SPD; USPD; *Obleute*; KPD; FVdG	ADGB; DMV; KPD; FAUD
	Significant Programmatic Efforts	SPD: councils as transitory to be dismantled after the convocation of the National Assembly as soon as possible; USPD: divergent views ranging from those of the SPD to council republic; Spartacus League: all power to the councils	SPD: active dismantling of councils and full redirection of politics to the liberal democratic framework; USPD and the anarchists in Bavaria: radical republicanism; *Obleute*: "pure councilism"; Commission of Nine: bottom-up cooperative socialization process; FVdG: radical socialization	ADGB: protection of union control and authority over labour relations; DVM: democratization of the ADGB, schemes for industrial unionism; FAUD: revolutionary unionism
	Substantial Alliance Patterns	Free Trade Unions with leading capitalist organizations under the ZAG; SPD with elements of the old regime; USPD with BBB in Bavaria	SPD with DDP and Center Party; USPD with KDP and anarchists in Bavaria; USPD, KDP, syndicalists in the Ruhr region and Central Germany	Communists and syndicalists within the Red Army especially in Ruhr during the uprising against Kapp Putsch
	Dominant Accumulative Strategy	"republicanism"	"radical republicanism" || "syndicalism"	"radical unionism"
Italy	Key Organizational Linkages	PSI (Turin section); FIOM	PSI; FIOM; USI	PSI; CGL; FIOM; USI; Anarchists
	Significant Programmatic Efforts	*ordine nuovo*: transformation of factory committees to factory councils, radical democratization of trade unions, councils as institutions of transformative prefiguration towards establishing "workers' democracy" PSI maximalists: dictatorship of the proletariat on the basis of soviets	*ordine nuovo*: expanding on previous ideas, clarifying relationship between councils and unions; PSI abstentionists: rejecting *ordine nuovo's* ideas about councils, calling for formation of soviets; USI and anarchists: "workers' control" as an (anarcho-) syndicalist notion, linked to the occupation of the means of production	USI and anarchists: "workers' control" as generalized movement towards occupation of the means of production CGL: defining "workers' control" as trade union control
	Substantial Alliance Patterns	---	Some tactical alliance between PSI (Turin section) and the USI during the first half of this period; syndicalists and anarcho-communists	syndicalists and anarcho-communists
	Dominant Accumulative Strategy	"maximalist electionism"	"maximalism"	"syndicalism"
Russia	Key Organizational Linkages	Mensheviks; SRs; Bolsheviks	Mensheviks; SRs; Bolsheviks; Anarchists	Mensheviks; SRs; Bolsheviks; Left-SRs; Anarchists
	Significant Programmatic Efforts	Menshevik-SR: generalized "supervision" by the soviets and the factory committees	Menshevik and SR: councils' more active cooperation towards ending the defensive war and protect the revolution; Bolshevik: council republicanism and self-management of the means of production by the councils	Bolsheviks: all power to the soviets; overthrow of the government to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poor peasants; immediate peace and land reform
	Substantial Alliance Patterns	Mensheviks and SRs; Peasant Unions and SRs;	Mensheviks and SRs; Menshevik-SR with Kadet; SRs with peasant organizations; Bolsheviks and anarchists	Bolsheviks and left-SRs; left-SRs and the peasant organizations
	Dominant Accumulative Strategy	"dual power"	"revolutionary defensism"	"all power to soviets"

Table 2: An Overview of Movement Trajectories along the Analytical Categories

The Initial Conditions in a Comparative Perspective

The initial locus of the struggle for radical democracy at the time of the emergence of these movements different in the three cases. The movement initially was preoccupied with struggles along the "citizens' control" dimension in the German case, and along the "workers' control" dimension in the Italian case.

As discussed previously, the German trade unions were integrated into the corporatist scheme that was set up during the war more deeply than their Italian counterpart. This was not only due to the organizational capacity and the numerical strength of the German trade unions but also their position towards the *Burgfrieden* during the war. Moreover, the realignment of principal class alliances that took place right before the German Revolution placed the trade unions at the centre of the post-war reconfiguration of class relations in Germany, allowing them to draw significant concessions from the employers. Their organizational capacity and structural position in the lead-up to the post-war transition enabled the German trade union leaders to fend off the thrust of radical democratic movements to undermine the fundamentals of industrial relations. The collapse of the militarized state apparatus facilitated the proliferation of the conciliar democratic struggle along the "citizens' control" dimension. Therefore, the movement's initial locus of struggle in Germany appeared largely along the "citizens' control" dimension.

In the case of Italy, the integration of trade unions into the state war mobilization, whose structure operated primarily at the factory level particularly in the last period of the war, was more limited and precarious. The bypassing of the trade unions weakened their structural position in their ability to contain the radicalization of the rank-and-file amidst a postwar economic crisis and conversely strengthened the structural position of the internal commissions as institutions of direct mediation. It is precisely through these institutions that the "council democratic" movement in Italy found its initial locus of struggle. Furthermore, while the Italian state entered into a period of deep crisis after the war, there was a continuity in the state apparatus which hindered the rapid expansion of the movement into the struggle for a radical democratization of the state along the "citizens' control" dimension. Rather, the movement's initial locus of struggle in Italy appeared first and foremost along the "workers' control" dimension.

In Russia, the "council democratic" movement found its loci in both "political" and "economic" spheres from the beginning. The breakdown of the autocratic regime brought the question of democratization within the "political" sphere to the forefront of the movement. At the same time, the movement extended itself to the "economic" sphere in which class relation between capital and labour was brutally undemocratic and largely unmediated. The trade union movement in Russia was relatively quite weak, having suffered years of illegalization and suppression both

before the revolution. Therefore, the terrain of struggle for economic democracy was far less contested, allowing the factory committees to expand their sphere of activities more freely within the "economic" sphere.

The Comparative Evolution of the Movement along the "Citizens' Control" Dimension

The trajectory of the movement in Russia along "citizens' control" during its first period evolved within the broader strategy of "dual power". As a political strategy, "dual power", at least as implemented in Russia, set up a control function over the executive branch that continued to serve the general interest of the capitalist class. It mirrored the relationship between the principal classes in a capitalist society onto the bifurcated structure of the state apparatus; thereby, the balance of class forces is inscribed in the very architecture of the state.

Despite its form, it was based on cooperation between the classes. It did not seek to replicate the general form of industrial action in which the working class asserts itself by withdrawing its labour-power from production. Rather, it lent conditional support to continue the functionality of the state while preventing the executive power to engage in counter-revolutionary actions and to give an opportunity to working-class organizations to gradually build knowledge and confidence in the technical management of the state apparatus. It saw "citizens' control" essentially as supervision" or "monitoring" (*Kontrol'*) over the executive power of the Provisional Government enacted through the democratic organizations of subaltern classes (i.e. the soviets in the case of Russia). It was a republic whose class nature was made formally visible and whose sovereignty was divided along the lines of technical capability and popular legitimacy.

The political interventions of councils as the new organizations of the popular struggle for democracy were largely mediated by other organizational forces. The significance of this went well beyond representational mediation since, in the context of "dual power" strategy, the very legitimacy of the state as a whole relied entirely on the ability of these forces (including those within the Provisional Government) to stabilize the deep disequilibrium of forces within the state. This was also predicated upon the ability of these forces to maintain control of their constituencies. The Mensheviks and SR took the role for the most part within the council movement. Their organizational capacity was more superior and their social base broader than other forces within the movement. The underlying ideology behind the programmatic vision of these two organizing forces rested on their conviction that the February Revolution was a "bourgeois revolution" during which the country would develop its institutional capacity within the liberal-democratic framework in the "political" sphere. Therefore, councils were seen as necessary but transitory entities to organize the society after the Revolution. Due to the weakness of the existing democratic institutions and the pressing requirement of the war, the election of the Constituent Assembly was delayed. This

retained the centrality of the soviets, which for the most part saw themselves as transitory, and yet primary institutions of self-government and popular sovereignty.

However, given the continuous postponement of the election to the Constituent Assembly in Russia, the Bolsheviks, which were influential among a structurally powerful segment of the working class in Petrograd, had the opportunity to present a radical programme for the movement while insisting on the widely popular demands for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.[1] In this way, the Bolsheviks were able to capture a wide range of democratic aspirations for "citizens' control" under a relatively coherent programmatic vision that spanned from anti-statist anarchist to democratic parliamentarian. This allowed the articulation of the councils as radical institutions despite, or precisely because of, their democratic diversity.

This bears an important similarity with the trajectory of the council movement in Germany during its first period. Like the Russian case, the collapse of the (militarized) state apparatus after the war created a space for a radical reconfiguration of the "political" sphere and articulation of "citizens' control". However, the purely socialist Provisional Government that was formed at the beginning of the revolution annulled the possibility of a "dual power" strategy in Germany. While the socialist composition of the Provisional Government formally gave unprecedented power to the socialist forces to reconfigure the newly proclaimed republic, it also obscured the class nature of the capitalist state. Furthermore, the growing integration of the SPD into the state that had accelerated in the last period of the war made the party leaders firmly determined to bring a swift end to the potential influence of the councils in the "political" spheres and put the country on the programmatic pathway that had already been outlined in the party's Erfurt Programme. The political base of the Erfurt Programme was firmly anchored on a "republican" view of the state and the necessary reforms to get there. Such a "republican" political strategy meant that the councils were at best transitory organizations that emerged to maintain social order for a short period after the collapse of the militarized state at the end of the war and until the election of the National Assembly. Given the existing political culture and organizational capacity of the German state to hold such an election at a national scale quickly, such an election to the National Assembly could be held remarkably quickly after the Revolution. This was utterly impossible in Russia within the same time frame as in Germany. This reduced the length of time during which the political system had to rely on radical democratic organizations such as councils, if their programmatic vision could be formed to align with that of the SPD.

[1] The Bolsheviks turned against the Constituent Assembly only after the October Revolution.

The principal organizing forces behind the movement in this period was the SPD/Free Trade Unions and the USPD (and to a more limited sense the *Obleute* and Spartacus League). The SPD could activate its vast organizational network throughout large parts of the country to increase its influence within the council movement. The presence of the leading members of the SPD, all seasoned politicians, at the highest positions of state power and the relatively centralized structure of the party give the SPD a unique position to establish effective hegemony over the movement by coordinating the boundary of its strategic horizon outside and inside the state.

The USPD's limitations in organizational capacity significantly in its inability to bring the rapidly growing movement across the country under its direction. However, this by itself did not necessarily have to amount to *coup de grace* for the party. As we saw in the case of Bolsheviks whose sphere of influence on the movement in the first period was severely limited to radical segments in the capital, a combination of contextual factors and relative strategic clarity could over time make up for the initial organizational deficiencies. However, neither of those were to avail the USPD. The armistice at the onset of the Revolution augmented the internal tensions between various factions within the USPD whose basis of the alliance was the opposition to the war. This disoriented the party's strategic response to the development into the first period, leaving the USPD unable to offer a coherent programmatic vision for "citizens' control". As discussed in the case study, there was great diversity within the USPD towards the political model of the new republic, including liberal-parliamentary democracy, hybrid models between parliamentarism and councilism, and council republicanism. The momentum behind a rapid convocation of the National Assembly as spearheaded by the SPD and supported for the most part by the majority within the leadership of the USPD pushed the radicals operating within the party to formulate "citizens' control" in opposition to the National Assembly.

The transmission of "council democratic" movement into the "political" sphere was far more limited in the Italian case during its first period. This was not only because of the continuity in the state apparatus after the war but also the role of the PSI leadership and their general strategic orientation. "Maximalist", understood as a political strategy and at least as implemented in Italy, seeks to "hollow out" the unitary state either from within ("maximalist electionism") or from without ("abstentionism") in two ways. First, it does so by using the legal channels of liberal-democratic state to progressively increase the presence of socialist forces within the state to ultimately cripple the functionality of the state apparatus. Second, it does so by denouncing the legitimacy of liberal-democratic framework by refusing to engage in its democratic process while building the power of socialist forces outside the state to ultimately overthrow the state apparatus. Therefore, despite its form, "maximalism" is based on disquieting noncooperation amidst formal

participation. One can say that “maximalism” is the political form of a general strike in the making. This is in sharp contrast to the characteristic of “dual power” strategy in the Russian case. In its electionist variation, it sought to use the liberal-democratic framework of political legitimacy, which was forced over time to include the representation of the working class into the state, as a means to enunciate its ultimate illegitimacy as an instrument of the ruling classes. In its abstentionist variation, it denounced the liberal-democratic framework as a facade with the sole reason of incorporating the working class into the state to pacify their revolutionary potentials. In building towards the inversion of the balance of class forces either within or outside the state, both variations would use the state apparatus as a political platform to increase the visibility of the socialist and working-class movement, but ultimately in an apolitical way. Within this broad political strategy, it was implausible to conceive of the council movement in its possible transformational prefiguration. Rather, councils were seen as the elemental form of the future socialist state effectively on stand-by until the revolutionary seizure of power by the party.

The leading organizational force behind the movement in the first period was the *l'ordine nuovo* group in Turin whose leading figures were part of the PSI. Despite the programmatic efforts of the group to make sense of the emerging movement beyond its activities within the “economic” sphere, the party leadership at the national level whose general programmatic orientation towards the state followed a “maximalist electionist” framework did not facilitate the expansion of the movement as a generalized form of class struggle within and outside the state. The programmatic orientation outlined under “maximalist electionism” could not conceive of councils as means of revolutionary transformation in ways that were outlined in the programmatic vision of *l'ordine nuovo* group. This would require a different role for the party to channel the struggles outside the state into a strategic confrontation with various class forces within the state and facilitating the radical expansion of the movement using the state apparatus. In other words, it would require the party to act as a conveyer belt between the struggles inside and outside the state while being involved in the strategic articulation of movement in response to changing balance of forces in a given conjuncture. Instead, the majority of the party leadership saw councils as elements of the socialist state after the revolution rather than organizations that could facilitate the parallel transformation in the “economic” and “political” spheres.

The programmatic vision outlined by the “abstentionist” wing of the PSI was unable to resolve the question of the transmission of the council movement into the “political” sphere. In seeking to bring the council movement into the “political” sphere, it dismissed the existing manifestation of the movement in the “economic” sphere as a moment in a larger process and instead insisted on a great leap to establish soviets and to push for “all power to the soviets” in Italy.

Its programmatic vision rests not only on a flawed assumption about the translatability between the Russian and the Italian contexts but also on a conception of the "council democratic" movement as a process that could unfold purely within the "political" sphere. Contrary to "maximalist electionism", it did see councils (at least in their "political" mode) as means of revolutionary transition. It questioned the legitimacy of the liberal-democratic framework by withdrawing its consent from its channels of popular expression especially elections and strived towards building working-class power outside the state until it would be powerful enough to overthrow the ruling classes through a wave of revolutionary actions. In this sense, it was still a maximalist strategy. In both "maximalist electionism" and "abstensionism", the party withdraws from direct engagement with class forces within the state and build towards a final stand-off.

From the second period in the trajectory of the movement in Russia, the "dual power" strategy was progressively replaced with various coalition strategies between the liberal and socialist forces. In contrast to coalition formations in the parliamentary-democratic framework in which the legitimacy of the state relies on its popular-democratic basis, the coalitions that were formed in Russia prior to the Constituent Assembly carried the burden of the legitimacy of the state as a whole. In other words, whereas the failure of coalition strategies within the parliamentary-democratic framework tend to be resolved endogenously, outside such a framework it could lead to the crisis of the state itself. Therefore, while not all coalition failures would result in a crisis, if it did then it would likely appear as a political crisis in the former case and a state crisis in the latter case. This is an important consideration to keep in mind when comparing the nature of coalitions and their failures in the cases of Italy and Germany, and Russia. In contrast to the Italian case in which the collapse of the coalition between liberal and Catholic parties in the third period did not lead to a generalized state crisis, the failure of the coalitions in Russia between the liberal and socialist parties starting from the second period always plunged the whole of the state into a crisis of legitimacy.

The hybrid form of an authority structure that appeared in Russia in the second period presented a transitional phase between "dual power" and coalition strategies, legitimized on the basis of "revolutionary defensism", was a move towards the formation of a unitary state architecture. As it brought together various parties into a coalition, it replaced the type of "citizens' control" that asserted itself onto the executive power extrinsically as negation, with one in which it operated at best intrinsically as determination. In this way, the fault line of the potential crisis was no longer between the two political axes clearly inscribed in the bifurcated state architecture but within the singular axis of coalitional government in an increasingly undifferentiated unitary state. The latter configuration would implicate the leadership of the parties involved vis-a-vis their bases

much more directly than the former. As such, the failure in the latter case to realize "citizens' control" substantively would more likely result in radical dissociation of the constituency from the leadership of the party. Combined with the consideration above regarding the nature of coalition different frameworks, we can make sense of why the failure of the coalition in Russia had such fundamental consequences on the legitimacy of the socialist parties and the state in contrast to that in Germany under the "Weimar Coalition".

While the Mensheviks and SR continued to dominate the council movement in the second period, the change of broad political strategy to "revolutionary defensism" had implications for the significance of councils in their programmatic vision. While participation in the coalition government carried greater risk for the stability of the state, it required the council movement to abandon the generalized form of "supervision" over the executive power and to embrace an active form of cooperation. This meant the end of the generalized form of "supervision" over the executive power. However, the implementation of such a programmatic shift proved ever more untenable amidst the deepening economic crisis and pressing demand for peace.

In the meanwhile, the Bolsheviks expanded their organizational network particularly within the factory committees in key industrial cities. Lenin's April Thesis outlined a clear and remarkably libertarian vision for the council movement. It not only facilitated the Bolsheviks to strategically orient themselves towards the movement more coherently but also for more radical tendencies within the working-class movement to form effective alliances with the Bolsheviks. The continued postponement of the election of the Constituent Assembly allowed the Bolsheviks to avoid positioning themselves against the broad democratic demands of the population. In other words, it made it possible to maintain a broad republican programme that encapsulated both parliamentary and council republican visions. This was precisely what the parties to the left of the SPD in Germany were deprived of after the first period.

The prompt election of the National Assembly in Germany at the beginning of the second period, which served as both a constituent assembly and unicameral legislature, changed the terrain of struggle for "citizens' control". Contrary to the dominant tendency during the first period of the trajectory of the movement in Germany in which "citizens' control" was to be carried out primarily through the supervisory work of councils elected on the basis of recallable delegates, the emergence of the National Assembly demanded the translation of "citizens' control" as a contestation between the representatives of various political parties elected by individual citizens on the basis of universal suffrage in the terrains of parliamentary politics to devise laws and oversee their implementation by the executive power of the government. As such, "citizens' control" was no longer embedded in the very institutional form of political contestation as is the case in the conciliar framework; rather, it

may appear at best as a secondary effect of parliamentary contestation between various political parties.[2] Given the democratic legitimacy that the state and its parliamentary form of political contestation, workers' loss of trust in the SPD, led not to a collapse of state legitimacy but a major shift in the electoral results in 1920 between the two socialist parties.

Although assertion of "citizens' control" within a formally liberal-democratic framework with substantial room for councils might still be possible, it would require strategic alliances, consorted programmatic efforts, and effective coordination of forces inside and outside the state in ways that could muster enough power to be able to wield the state towards a "council democratic" vision of "citizens' control". The role of political parties in this process remains crucial especially in their ability to wage effective struggles between various class forces within the state while actively translating the struggles outside the state into political contestation inside the state with the aim to transform the state. But given the dismal outcome of the election for the USPD, the party could not assert its more radical, though debilitatingly incoherent, programmatic vision for the movement in the "political" sphere through parliamentary activity either.

One of the consequences of the shift to parliamentary struggle is that the organizational forces involved in the "council democratic" movement which either do not operate as (formal) political parties or fundamentally reject parliamentary struggle stand in a distinct disadvantage in their ability to shape the political process that concerns the framework within which the movement evolve. This does not mean that their activities are necessarily inconsequential. It is conceivable that by remaining outside the formal political process, they might gain a larger degree of freedom to engage in various activities concerning the movement or remain untainted by the real or imagined flaws of the existing framework and the performance of forces within it. In fact, such considerations played a part in the strategic calculation of some of the organizations that did not participate in what they deemed to be a bourgeois state. However, given the structure of political legitimacy and formal political process especially in its ability to contain political crises, those organizing forces wishing to assert their influence on the political process concerning the movement often have to form alliances with political parties inside the state while solidifying their support within the movement to stay a relevant organizational force to reckon with.

The progressive radicalization of the movement in Bavaria towards a radical republican vision of "citizens' control" is a case in point. This involved anarchists, the left radicals within the USPD, and a small minority from the newly established KDP. The impact of their uprising on the state and the movement as a whole remained quite limited and localized. A similar process of

[2] This is not to say that "citizens' control" in conciliar framework is an unmediated phenomenon. As we have seen throughout the analysis of the movements, the role of organizational forces remains central in this process.

radicalization in Berlin could assert itself onto the state and expand its reach within the movement even less. The power of the USPD and the KPD within the state, both as the main organizing forces involved, had been severely weakened from the beginning of this period. The KPD had refused to participate in the election to the National Assembly. It also could not forge an alliance with the *Obleute* to expand its social base at least among the critical segments of the working class in the capital. The USPD, whose position within the emerging state had already been severely weakened at the end of the first period, saw its influence dwindled within the formal channels of the state after its poor electoral results. These diminished the ability of the radical trends within the movement to sustain their radical project.

In the case of Italy, this limitation is evident in the way the syndicalist organizations, particularly the USI, was marginalized during the third period. Despite the significant shift within the movement towards syndicalism both in their organizational and programmatic activities, the inability of the USI to form an effective alliance with the PSI isolated them from the legislative process that fundamentally reshaped the evolution of the movement thereafter. Similar limitations concerned the anarchist groups in both Italy and Germany.

By the end of the second period, the struggle for a radical democratic articulation of "citizens' control" within the council movement in both Germany and Italy effectively came to an end. In Italy, the trajectory of the movement was largely isolated from influencing the formal political process. In Germany, the movement was rapidly contained and decoupled from the formal political process. In Russia, however, the activities of the movement along the "citizens' control" dimension became even more vibrant towards the end of the second period and into the third period.

Let's sum up the evolution of the "council democratic" movements along the "citizens' control" dimension. The evolution of the movement in the context of continued mobilization for the war in the case of Russia as opposed to the context of demobilization and post-war recovery in the cases of Germany and Italy already laid out profoundly different criteria for the trajectory of the movements. In the context of repeated postponement of the convocation of the Constituent Assembly in Russia that could potentially offset the popular struggles, on the basis of conciliar power, it became increasingly clear to ever-larger segments of subaltern classes that their most pressing demand, peace without annexation, could only come about by further democratization of the state to realize "citizens' control" over the "political" sphere. The war also burdened the emerging political structure in Russia to continue a project that required a national unity towards

total mobilization. This was required at the time when the state apparatus was struggling to reshape itself after the Revolution and when the possibility of explosive class antagonism was at its height.[3]

In Germany and Italy, the war question that had caused so much upheaval especially during the third period of the making of these movements was, from the outset of the emergence of the movements, replaced with the question of the transition to peacetime. This phase was surely not free of its own tensions and contradictions. But it allowed a transformation in the perceived essence of councils. This had implications for workers' councils, soldiers' councils, and peasants' councils respectively. It meant that workers' councils could be treated as institutions for peacetime production for economic recovery rather than industrial mobilization and war production and for the military-industrial complex. It also implied that soldiers' councils could be seen as institutions of demobilization and public order rather than war mobilization and military order. Lastly, it entailed that peasants' councils were to function as institutions of rehabilitation of demobilized peasant-soldiers and maintenance of rural order rather than catering the army with new flesh and infusing the countryside with patriotic sentiment.

Since the movement in each case was mediated through organizing forces with their own relationship to the state, some operating directing within and others at some distance from the state, the structure of the state influenced the evolution of the movement. Aside from their particular characters, the different ways in which contradictions and tensions were rendered through the state related to the difference in the state structure between these cases. In this regard, the presence or absence of a parliamentary-democratic structure plays a central role in the probability of containing political crises from becoming a generalized state crisis. This gave a different significance to political formations such as coalition in Russia on the one hand, and Germany and Italy on the other.

The strategic responses of various forces, particularly those of political parties, are crucial in understanding the differences in trajectories of the movement. In this regard, the strategic role of the Bolshevik party in all the three analytical dimensions remained fundamental in exploiting the contextual and structural specificities of Russia to successfully press for radical implementation of "citizens' control" on the basis of conciliar power as the only solution for realizing the basic aspiration of the movement. None of the organizational forces in Germany or Italy were able to do so with the same strategic precision.

[3] This is despite the fact that the country experienced a relative reduction of class antagonism during the first period of the trajectory of the movement, as the collapse of the aristocratic absolutist state temporarily brought capitalist and working classes together. As we saw in the outline above, the crisis that ended this period and reignited class antagonism had its roots precisely in the contradictions opened by the war.

The Comparative Evolution of the Movement along the "Workers' Control" Dimension

The analysis now shifts to the trajectory of the movements along the "workers' control" dimension. In Russia, the locus of the struggle for democratization appeared from the onset of the February Revolution not only within the "political" but also the "economic" spheres. Instituted formally as part of the generalized form of control established on the basis of "dual power" strategy, factory committees assumed authority over certain managerial aspects of labour relations. Even though the scope of such activities was quite modest especially in the first and second periods, they were seen as significant steps forward in the path towards the democratization of the relations of production along the organizational form of councils.

Even though the structure of industrial relations in Russia in the context of the acute weakness of the trade union movement made such imposition of the factory committees inevitable, it was not possible without the collaboration of the dominant fractions or organizations of the capitalist bloc, just as the establishment of the "dual power" strategy in the "political" sphere was predicated upon the collaboration of the liberals. The background of that conditional collaboration was the war effort, albeit for different reasons. Indeed, this situation during the first period led to the general reduction of industrial conflict and class antagonism, and an increase in the concession made by the employers towards workers' economic demands. However, after the end of the first period, when the "dual power" strategy began to be replaced with a coalitional strategy, the dynamics of class relations at the point of production increasingly radicalized amidst worsening economic condition and political crises.

The Mensheviks were not very keen on pursuing the project of democratization of the "economic" sphere on the basis of conciliar power. They much preferred to empower the unions to establish a regulated industrial relation modelled after the idea of the Western European model of capitalist production. The Bolsheviks had some organizational presence in the factory committees and (to a lesser extent) in the soviets, especially in Petrograd. However, due to its limited organizational capacity after years of suffering from suppression, the Bolsheviks had to rebuild their organizational network and expand their social base. During the first period, the party still did not have a clear programmatic vision towards the council movement. Forces to the left of the Bolsheviks such as the anarchist and syndicalist groups were organizationally much weaker and scattered. Their relative absence meant that the Bolsheviks did not have to compete much against forces to their left.

In Italy, the movement initially concerned itself with the democratization of industrial relations through factory committees. However, there was no supportive structure like what existed under the auspices of the Russian "dual power" strategy in post-war Italy. It is true that factory

committees had been empowered by the particular form of war mobilization that took place especially during the third period. Nevertheless, after the war, employers, especially those belonging to large industries, much rather deal with the trade unions than with the factory committees. Such strategic selectivity towards trade unions diminished the political space for a relatively uncontested evolution of factory committees. As part of the transition to peacetime industrial order, they were willing to make substantial economic concessions to the trade unions' demands and thereby take the wind out of the sails of the factory committees whose tendency to intrude into authority structure of the enterprise they found deeply threatening.

In turn, the trade unions, eager to affirm their position in the postwar era, initially found factory committees useful in extending trade unions' reach to enhance trade unions' presence at the enterprise level and press the employers to make concessions. Toward the end of the first period, the CGL leadership, supported by the leadership of the PSI, sought to contain the transformation of factory committees to a general proletarian institution by preventing the expansion of voting to non-union members. Under the pressure of the rank-and-file, this strategic manoeuvre was only successful insofar as it managed to restrict factory commissars to union members only. Between these two pillars of power in the germinating industrial relations, factory committees had to carve out their sphere of authority and activities more vigorously on the question of "workers' control" and more firmly at the enterprise level.

Under the programmatic efforts of *l'ordine nuovo* group, the movement began a process of transforming the factory committees into factory councils. They were seen in their prefigurative possibility as institutions of the working class to transform the capitalist social relations generalizing itself from the "economic" sphere into the "political" sphere towards the transformation of the state. The relative organizational weakness of the syndicalist and anarchist in the first period especially in Turin gave more space to the programmatic efforts of the *l'ordine nuovo* group.

In Germany, the conditions for the growth of the movement in the "economic" sphere during the first period was even more restricted, even though the Revolution appeared to have opened a vast space for popular struggles for democratization. This was predicated upon the initial conditions discussed above within which the movement in Germany emerged. Therefore, the question of "worker' control" in Germany was temporarily delayed and left to the Socialization Committee to offer a clear pathway towards the democratization of the economy.

The further radicalization of councils within the "economic" sphere upon worsening economic situation after the first period of the trajectory of the movements manifested themselves differently in the case of Russia compared to those of Italy and Germany. In Russia, the pressing

requirements of the war effort in the context of a weak trade union structure continued to give factory committees enormous leverage within the industrial relations.

The strategic orientation of the Mensheviks towards the factory committees underwent a quiet transformation after the party's turn towards "revolutionary defensism" in the second period. The active cooperation that the general political strategy required, amplified on the background of the Menshevik's more fundamental view of the Russian revolution as a "bourgeois revolution", pushed the party to focus its energy more on the development of trade unions. Given the weakness of the trade unions, however, it could not wholly abandon its activities within the factory committees. Nevertheless, this inclination allowed the more radical tendencies, most notably the Bolsheviks, to expand their influence within the factory committees.

Furthermore, factory councils had institutional primacy not just in the struggle for "workers' control" but the struggle for economic improvement. This allowed the councils to act as institutions that could capture a broad set of working-class demands without having to draw a line between "radical" and "reformist" and position themselves along such an axis. This gave the factory committees institutional flexibility to undergo radicalization without having to abandon its broad appeal.

The Bolsheviks who have been active in the factory committees from early on intensified their organizational efforts within these working-class institutions and provided a clearer programmatic articulation of "workers' control" on the basis of conciliar power. Their superior organizational capacity compared to those of anarcho-syndicalists and the appealing affinity of their programmatic vision to some aspects of anarcho-syndicalism paved the way for an informal alliance between the anarcho-syndicalist groups. Operating in such a setting was also hugely beneficial for the Bolsheviks. Just as they could maintain their appeal within the "political" sphere to broadly democratic demands for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly while calling for radical "citizens' control" on the basis of conciliar power, they could insist on the broad economic demands of the working class while calling for radical "workers' control" on the basis of conciliar power.

The process of radicalization of factory committees in Italy unfolded differently in the second period. In the context of postwar economic transition and the structural empowerment of trade unions, factory committees lost much of the institutional leverage that they did and perhaps could otherwise have. Given the active presence of trade unions in postwar economic struggles and the heightened attention of the union leaders to the independent activities of the factory committees that could potentially undermine their position in the industrial relations, factory committees fell increasingly under the organizational leadership of the syndicalist forces. The shift became ever more visible after the defeat of the April Strike in the second period.

The organizational force behind the growth of syndicalist influence in the movement in Italy was the USI. This process was accompanied by an increase in the programmatic efforts of the syndicalist within the movement along the "workers' control" dimension. The shift towards syndicalism continued despite the limited alliances that were made between the left-wing socialists in Turin around *l'ordine nuovo* group and the USI in the early stages of the second period. The articulation of "workers' control", therefore, gravitated further towards the programmatic vision of the syndicalists.

In Germany, the radicalization of movement within the "economic" sphere emerged largely after the intense struggle within the "political" sphere during the first period. The first spark appeared early in the second period in the mining region of Ruhr where the socialist trade unions were relatively weak. This as well as the resolution passed by the First Congress to begin the socialization of the mining sector immediately created a unique space for the radical tendencies in the working-class movement to organize themselves around workers' frustration with the deepening economic crisis and the constant deferral of the socialization program.

Although syndicalist organizations in Germany were relatively weak, they were able to grow their organizational capacity by building on certain traditional tendencies in the mining sector that gravitated towards syndicalism. This process, amplified by the repeated failure of the socialist forces to meet worker' demands in the region, allowed organizations such as the FVdG to become mass organizations in a relatively short span of time. Furthermore, under the influence of the FVdG, the programmatic vision of the movement in the region approached a broadly defined syndicalist understanding of "workers' control". Despite the growing popularity of the syndicalist forces, their external and often intransigent relation with the state made it extremely difficult to transmit their organizational strength incrementally and to influence the balance of class forces within the state.

In the second period, the movement sought to appeal to the legal-administrative channels of the state, as in the case of negotiations with the Essen delegates who managed to gain formal recognition of factory councils although outside the legal framework applied to the workers' committees. Similar actions took place in Central Germany but more along the line similar to the activities of the council activists in Turin towards the democratization of unions by opening up voting rights to workers' committees to all workers. In their programmatic vision, the articulation of their radical demands still revolved around the idea of the general socialization plan, however, with expanded control rights over management to prepare the industries for socialization and a bottom-up organization of the socialized industries.

In Russia, the radicalization of the movement in the "economic" sphere accelerated into the third period as the capitalist and liberal blocs increased their intransigence towards the movement

and resorted to reactionary tactics such as lockouts and putsches to gain control of the political process. This parallel yet interconnected development created the condition for the sublation of the two constitutive modes of the movement, under the organizational and programmatic work of the Bolshevik in alliance with the left-SR and other radical left groups. Thereby, they were able to successfully transform the accelerating gravitation towards self-management into an articulated whole.

In Italy, there was a growing radicalization of the movement along the "workers' control" dimension in the third period. The influence of the syndicalist forces continued to deepen within the movement in this period. Although the wave of factory occupations that surfaced during the third period had strong affinities with syndicalist programmatic visions and substantively influenced by their organizational efforts before and during the period, its evolution was formed primarily by the overarching activities of the PSI and the CGL in negotiation with the central government. The structural position of the socialist forces as the legitimate and preferred negotiating partner allowed them to assert their strategic position and shape the course of the movement in its most radical period. Through the mediation of the socialist forces, the liberal government found a way to place the trajectory of the movement on the legal-administrative path on the basis of its own deradicalized and corporatist interpretation of "workers' control".

In Germany, the further evolution of the movement along the "workers' control" dimension in the third period continued under the influence of anarcho-syndicalist organizations such as the FAUD as well as militant factions within the socialist trade unions including the DMV. Both pursued some version of radical unionism to democratize the trade union movement on the basis of the councils. The former aimed at circumventing the existing trade unions and establishing revolutionary unions. The latter sought to transform the union movement from within by radically democratizing it and instituting industrial unions.

The struggles for democratization within the DMV resembles the activities of council activists in Turin around *l'ordine nuovo*. Like their Italian counterpart, they also had to struggle in and through powerful socialist trade unions and position themselves with respect to the policies of the socialist party at the local and national levels. Their struggle towards radical organizational and programmatic activities eventually drew the attention of the union leaders and led to a frontal attack between union leadership and council activists. Similar to the case of Italy, the structural position of the socialist trade unions in the postwar industrial relations, which was far more superior than what existed in Italy, allowed them to effectively contain the leftward push exerted internally by radical socialists within the DMV and externally by anarcho-syndicalists in the Ruhr region.

Let's sum up the evolution of the "council democratic" movements along the "workers' control" dimension. While movement trajectories in all three cases underwent radicalization, the ways in which the process unfolded differed profoundly between the positive and negative cases. The context of war after the Revolution in Russia loomed large as a multifaceted factor behind the ways in which the contradictions of imposing "workers' control" influenced the trajectory of the movement. While giving the working-class organizations at the point of production a unique capacity to put forward various demands for economic improvement and democratization of the workplace in exchange for their continued participation in the war effort, it simultaneously limited how much they could expand their demands before they would undermine the very condition of their wartime empowerment. The transition to a peacetime economy in Germany and Italy opened the space for rapid realignment of class forces and fundamental recomposition of industrial relations in ways that potentially benefited certain forms of working-class organizations over others.

The structure of industrial relations in Russia with weak trade union organizations put factory committees in a superior position to shape the contours of "workers' control". Conversely, after the February Revolution, the Russian capitalists, whose class organizations and consciousness were relatively weak compared to those in Germany and Italy, lost the support of the repressive apparatus of the state that they had so heavily relied on for years to maintain industrial order and assert managerial authority. In both Germany and Italy, the presence of relatively strong socialist trade unions and their role as the preferred partner in the eyes of capitalists created an explicit competition between various trade unions and the factory councils.

It was within these contextual and structural factors that the strategic orientation of the Bolsheviks can be understood. This includes their concerted efforts to grow organic support in the factory committees and exert a left-ward push within the labour movement towards "workers' control" on the basis of conciliar power and form effective alliances with other radical forces. In both Germany and Italy, the strategic orientations of the main socialist parties were either diametrically opposed to the realization of the movement (as in the case of the SPD) or profoundly confused regarding the nature of the movement (as in the case of the PSI). Other left-wing parties were either organizationally weak, programmatically incoherent, or coalitionally too distant from the channels that could exert forces within the state.

Hegemonic Reach of the Movement in Comparative Perspective

The horizons of popular struggle for democratization of social relations expanded in these countries in varying degrees when peasants began to assert themselves onto the existing feudal class relations. While in Russia and Italy, these took the particularly militant form of widespread land occupations and redistributions, they can be seen as part of the general struggle for democratization

of the existing social relations in all these cases. However significant on their own account, the implication of those struggles on the "council democratic" movements are examined in the analytic framework presented in this study as part of the alliance patterns with social classes outside the movement. If we understand "council democratic" movement as essentially a working-class project, the ways in which the movement could link up with other social classes were fundamental in their ability to create and stabilize an intraclass hegemonic order.

Regarding broader popular classes, it was only in Russia that the peasant movement was brought into the orbit of "council democratic" movement. It went beyond the formation of peasants' councils or the inclusion of some peasant representatives into the existing councils at various levels. The SR whose theoretical stance towards and organizational activities within the peasantry went back to pre-revolutionary years, was the chief force behind this alliance. As outlined above, the contours of the relationship between the SR and the peasant movement changed over time. However, in the first period, the ability of the SR to establish an effective alliance with the organizational forces in the villages, most notably the Peasant Unions, and the success of their programmatic efforts to effectively articulate some of the major grievances of the rural population paved the way for the party to gradually assert itself as a leading organizational force within the peasant movement. In addition to the SR, some of the leading members of the Bolshevik executive committee had paid serious attention to the peasant question in the revolutionary process in Russia that allowed the party, despite its organizational weakness in the countryside, to remain attentive to the incorporating the peasant movement in its programmatic articulation for the council movement.

In contrast, the leading socialist forces in Germany lacked both concrete organizational networks within the peasant population and theoretical elaboration on the potentially active role of the peasant movement in the revolutionary process. The only notable attempt to build an alliance with organizational forces within the peasant movement was the USPD in Bavaria. However, as discussed in the case study, even this was rather limited in scope and time. Alliance with the peasant movement was even more deficient in the Italian case, even though the peasant movement itself in its aspirations and activities resembled that in Russia in many ways. Similar to the German case, the organizational weakness and theoretical negligence of the socialist party towards the peasant question contributed centrally to failure to link up with the peasant movement. Furthermore, the acute absence of formal peasant organizations in Italy as institutions of active mediation made the task of alliance formation particularly complex even in the instances, such as in the case of *l'ordine nuovo* group, where programmatic articulations provided some elaboration on the question.

These were the processes, shaped by the conjunctural, structural, and strategic particularities in each case, that came together to shape the relative divergence between the trajectory of

movement in Russia and those in Germany and Italy. In Russia, the movement achieved a sublation between its “political” and “economic” aspects and establish a relative hegemony over the subaltern classes. In Germany and Italy, there was a fundamental incongruence between the two aspects of the movement and a failure to establish a hegemonic order within the working-class movement along the conciliar power, let alone other subaltern classes.

Chapter 8

Reflections

This study makes an empirical contribution to the comparative study of "council democratic" movements. Furthermore, it makes a number contributions to the fields of historical sociology, contentious politics, and state theory. This chapter begins by providing an overview of the broader implications of this study for the above fields before turning to its theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of "council democracy" more specifically. It then surveys areas of future research before presenting the concluding remarks.

An Overview of Broader Contributions and Implications

Among the vast array of topics that have been the subject of studies in the field of historical sociology, there has been relative neglect in analyzing the radical democratic movements that emerged after WWI. This gap in the English language literature becomes more pronounced when contrasted to the great number of studies conducted on other aspects of the interwar period, particularly regarding the rise of fascism in Europe. The unique importance of these movements, as part of the historical moments when these countries came closest to social revolutions and in many ways offered untravelled pathways towards democratic socialism as a third way between Bolshevism and social democracy, has been largely overshadowed by the Russian Revolution on the one hand and the fascist movements on the other.

The comparative analysis of these movements in their relations to the particular form of war mobilization in each country sheds light on the reciprocal relationship between war, state, and society. By looking at the state in relational terms, the study goes beyond the established wisdom that relates state-making to war making and examines the precise ways in which different forms of war-making, themselves shaped by class struggle within and outside the state, result in different kinds of state making, which further impacts the terrain of class struggles in ways that enable the emergence of different kinds of radical movements.

At the methodological level, the study deploys the relatively underutilized comparative process tracing innovatively by applying it to highly volatile contexts and relatively ephemeral processes. This is in contrast to the way comparative process tracing has been typically used to uncover path dependencies that require a relatively stable phase of institutional reproduction after the critical conjuncture juncture. This methodological expansion as exemplified here allows researchers to use this method in a larger set of social phenomena including the study of revolutions.

The study makes a novel contribution to the field of contentious politics by offering a strategic-relational approach to movements from a Marxist perspective that brings in class struggle at the centre of its analytic framework. It differs from the recent attempts to incorporate insights from Marxism into social movement studies in the way it takes organizational mediation as essential in analyzing the dynamics of subaltern politics.

Furthermore, by conceptualizing movements in relational terms, it overcomes the common tendency in the field, including in the dynamic model of contention (McAdam et al., 2001) as one of the most widely used frameworks in social movement studies, to theorize movements as self-contained and stable entities that come into external and direct relations with the state. The framework used in this study instead sees movements themselves as a terrain of struggle between a diverse set of forces, either endogenous or exogenous to movements, with their own historicity, organizational capacities, ideological orientations, relation to the state, etc. This approach is more powerful to understand the reciprocal influences between states and movements that go beyond some strategic calculations at the level of "attribution of threats/opportunity" and "innovative collective action" as in the dynamic model of contention.

The study also contributes to the strategic-relational perspective in Marxist state theory by expanding the empirical implications of this approach beyond the study of the formation or crisis of authoritarian states, or the regulation and stabilization of the capitalist state. The primary focus of these studies has been the state itself, either in its exceptional or normal forms. Movements have at best taken a back seat in these analyses. The present study brings the question of the formation of movements to the forefront of the analysis while firmly embedding them, both in their process of making and trajectory, in the state processes. It shows how this approach can be used to understand the (de-)formation of radically subversive movements in relation to the transformations of the capitalist state. Therefore, it expands the applicability of the strategic-relational approach to the state and potentially brings it closer to the sphere of social movement studies.

Contributions to the study of "Council Democracy"

Theoretical Contributions to the Study of "Council Democracy"

The research grounds its empirical approach in a general conceptualization of "council democracy". It embeds the formal structure of "council democracy" in that of capitalist social relations. Hence, "council democracy" ceases to either stand in an entirely "external" relation to capitalism or operate entirely "within" its structural parameters. Rather, it is conceived as "integral" to the dynamics of class struggle in capitalist social relations. This says something different, or

perhaps more, than the claim that "council democracy" is always already present in the "shell of the old" society either as an ideational possibility or partial actuality. The conceptualization relies on the centrality of (intra- and inter-) class struggle as the dynamic force behind capitalism in its reproduction, transformations, crises, and transcendence. Being integral to such a complex nexus of class struggle implies that, both at the level of ideation and actualization, "council democracy" is the result of contingent, indetermined, unstable, and dialectical processes. Therefore, one cannot speak of its "existence" as a unified phenomenon either at the "edges" or "under the surface" of the capitalist social relations. This is precisely why it is examined in its "making" and "trajectory", rather than its law-like development. This approach highlights the fact that history is the concrete unfolding of processes that are made by creative agents whose very constitutions as actors and conditions of engagement are themselves the ever-changing products of the past and present struggles.

The constitutive dimensions (or more accurately, "dialectical modes") of "council democracy", "citizens' control" and "workers' control", reflect the loci of a diverse set of struggles mapped onto the formal separation between the "political" and the "economic" spheres in capitalism. As discussed before, this is not to say that struggles can indeed be classified as either political or economic. However, this formal separation has made it possible for the dynamics of struggle within one sphere to be relatively decoupled from the other. Also, this has made it possible to conceive of transformative projects in one sphere, even those of quite radical nature, without directly and immediately implying the necessity of extending the project into the other sphere.

Therefore, it is possible for the two constitutive dimensions of "council democracy" to evolve asynchronously and involve a seemingly unrelated or independent set of struggles. Furthermore, the two constitutive dimensions can have their own diverse articulations that can well deviate from the transformative potential of "council democracy". In other words, while "citizens' control" and "workers' control" are dialectical modes of "council democracy", they do not exclusively belong to its transformative project.

This places the struggle for "council democracy" (i.e. "council democratic" movements) within broader struggles for the articulation and realization of "citizens' control" and "workers' control". These notions can be mobilized under various transformative projects, involving a diverse set of forces with their own political and ideological traditions. Such a diffusional effect requires the analysis of the forces involved in these struggles beyond those in the labour and socialist movements. This gives a certain "openness" to "council democracy" that allows a broader set of forces (e.g. radical republicanism, anarchism, syndicalism, etc.) to come into the piecemeal (trans)formation of certain aspects of "council democracy".

The two notions could also be utilized as instruments of pacification, either by engaging explicitly in the process of deradicalized articulations, or implicitly through legislative and institutional manoeuvring to hinder radical possibilities. Such articulative ambiguity is indeed an essential aspect of examining the (de-)formation of "council democratic" movements. This gives a certain "instability" to the dialectical process behind "council democracy".

The conception of "council democracy" in terms of class struggle requires the analysis of its concrete historical manifestations in particular movements, rather than dynamics of law-like structures or transformation of ideas. As such, the analytical framework itself is dependent on the specificities of the concrete movements that are being studied.[1] Nevertheless, the state remains a crucial, if not a central, factor in shaping the terrain of class struggle in capitalist society. This is due to its essential, though contradictory and crisis-prone, role in organizing the political hegemony of certain classes, and disorganizing the collective power of other classes. Therefore, the analytical framework used in the first part of this study serves as the basis for more complex frameworks that may be needed when considering the manifestation of the phenomenon in other contexts.

Understood in strategic-relational terms, the state's response to any particular project within a given conjuncture cannot be fully predicted in advance or understood in the abstract. The struggle between these forces further depends on various creative agents whose strategic engagement within the state can have significant consequences for the form and substance of the state. In other words, the state is seen as a politically privileged extension of class struggle in the shape of a form-specific relationship between various forces, with their own incongruent relationship with various classes and class fractions. Given the centrality of the state in a capitalist society, all these have profound consequences for the form and substance of class struggle within and outside the state, which in turn can impact the form and substance of the state itself. While these transformations can provide the conditions for the possibility and form of fundamental challenges to the capitalist state and social relations, they can also yield the pathways to resolve those contradictions and tensions. Which way the scale is tipped in a given conjuncture depends on the balance of forces and their strategic engagements in relation to the capitalist state with its own structural specificity and strategic selectivity.

The discussion of the making of these movements illustrates how the strategic responses to various crises of the state by the forces which struggle within the state may transform the formal as well as the substantive aspects of the state in ways that could create a particular type of radically

[1] These may include the relation between the movement and the particular phase in the development of capitalism. It can also involve the entanglement of the movement with other, albeit certainly interlinked, circuits of exploitation such as colonialism and imperialism. Therefore, the analytical framework used in this study is not a comprehensive scheme that can be applied to all cases of "council democratic" movements.

subversive movement. This possibility is contingent not only on the balance of forces within and outside the form-specific state but also on the specific strategic responses of these forces to challenges that the state faces. Therefore, the form specificity and strategic contingency make the concrete analysis of each case unavoidable.

Part II shifts the focus to the movements to trace their trajectories. It treats the movement itself as a loosely defined terrain of struggle on which various class forces struggle for hegemony. This struggle, therefore, is mediated by endogenous or exogenous organizational forces that engage within the movement. These organizational forces give materiality to the movement as a relational entity.[2] The degree of relationality of the movement – the degree of its openness to the intervention of various forces within it – might change over time. In effect, it can itself become an organizational force on its own account with more well-defined boundaries and internal cohesion. It, nevertheless, remains within the ecology of other organizing forces within and outside the state.

The mediating role of organizational forces within the movement implies that the formal and substantive aspects of the movement are relegated to the accumulative effects of those organizing forces. Therefore, to analyze the evolution of the movement requires an examination of the changing relations of forces within the movement given the case-specific structural and conjunctural conditions and in the context of broader societal transformations. Furthermore, the strategic contingency and historicity of these organizations require a concrete analysis of the constellation of these forces in each case.

One of the corollaries of the discussion in Part II concerns the question of dual power. It is common to associate the emergence of councils as a clear sign of the formation of dual power, itself a defining moment in the revolutionary process. However, as this study recounts, the emergence of "dual power" was not only a particular strategy that was made possible in a specific conjuncture and within specific structural conditions, but in important ways that it had a stabilizing effect. This is in contrast to the way the emergence of "dual power" is often seen as the marker of a "revolutionary situation".[3] In fact, it is not in the duality of power that one has to conceive the significance of

[2] At a deeper level, each organizational force itself can be seen as a "movement", perhaps with more well-defined boundaries depending on the level of bureaucratization and internal coherence, with various ideological fractions competing for hegemony. Therefore, the engagement of these organizational forces within another movement can have impacts on the relations of forces within the organization itself. This might also lead to internal crises and splits within these organizational forces. However, this ontological claim about organizational forces can be bracketed when analyzing a movement by treating each organizational force as a relatively stable and coherent entity. This is unless the internal fragmentation significantly impact the strategic relation of that force within the movement.

[3] Charles Tilly (1978), one of the most influential theorists of contentious politics, introduced two distinct notions "revolutionary situation" and "revolutionary outcome" to dissect the periods of emergence and outcome of revolutions. He defined the essential characteristics of revolutionary situation as "the presence of more than one bloc effectively exercising control over a significant part of the state apparatus" (p. 190) and revolutionary outcomes as "the displacement of one set of power holders by another" (p. 193). These notions remain quite central in the movement studies (Foran and Goodwin, 1993; Tilly, 1993; Goodwin, 2001; Maher-Ciccariello, 2007; Rockefeller, 2007 Bennani-

councils. Rather, it is the struggle towards radical democracy whose distinct organizational form is the council form. This is a notable change in the conception of councils. Seen in the latter sense, the democratic struggle need not necessarily take the form of a duality in the state structure but can, and indeed has to, pursue its transformative project both within and outside the state.

Empirical Contributions to the Study of "Council Democracy"

As stated in the introductory chapter, there is a relative gap in the literature on the comparative analysis of the radical democratic movements that emerged in the immediate aftermath of WWI in Europe. This gap includes both the analysis of their makings and their trajectories. The present study addresses this gap by analyzing two of the most important cases of such movements in Western Europe, Germany and Italy. Using comparative process tracing, the study gives an account of the making of "council democratic" movements in Germany and Italy, in contrast to their absence as such in France, and their trajectories after their emergence in these two countries, in contrast to a comparable movement in Russia.

In all belligerent countries involved in WWI, the state-led war mobilization created a situation of direct and heavy intervention of the state into the political and economic life of the society. However, there were fundamental differences between the way these states engaged in this massive project. These differences are understood by taking a strategic-relational approach to the state and by examining the consequences of states' involvement in the war on the terrain of class struggle.

The analysis in Part I shows the formation of a militarized corporatist state during the war operating on the basis of a "two-nations" hegemonic vision in Germany and Italy. The study illuminates the reciprocal relationship between such transformations that provided the conditions for the emergence of "council democratic" movements after the war and the struggles between various class and popular forces within or at some distance from the state. The "two-nations" hegemonic vision in these countries failed to create a coherent and unifying ideological framework to bring together historically and structurally antagonistic social forces behind the war effort. This not only weakened the legitimacy of the state-led war project but also forced the state to intervene more directly in preserving the unstable equilibrium of compromise between different class forces. The marginalization of the parliament and militarization of the state prevented class struggle from being refracted through parliamentary channels and linked contradictions and tensions of the state

Chraïbi and Fillieule, 2013; Akder and Özdemir, 2015). Tilly developed these concepts by building on Leon Trotsky's concept of "dual power" (Tilly, 1978, p. 190; Goodwin, 2001, p.12; van der Linden, 2009, p. 261). However, he qualified Trotsky's formulation by allowing the power blocs to contain more than one social classes and the possibility of there being more than two contending blocs. But otherwise, the notion carries the essence of Trotsky's conceptualization.

(including those within the military apparatus) more directly to those within the capitalist labour relations and society more broadly. The corporatist arrangement extended the boundaries of the integral state and tied the working-class organizations more actively to the state's war project. Under these conditions, alienation from and resistance against the militarized corporatist state and the war project implied that the scope of democratization struggles had to be extended to the whole of the integral state and society.

This was in contrast with the formation of a transversal tripartite state operating on the basis of a "one nation" hegemonic vision in the case of France whose form of labour militancy after the war resembled the more "traditional" form of strikes. The "one nation" hegemonic vision in France deepened the self-mobilization of the society. It reduced the state's burden of maintaining ideological unity and decentralized the ideological operation by multiplying the layers, particularly outside the state, that could arbitrate to maintain the legitimacy of the war effort. The continued authority of the parliament and the non-militarized transversality of the French state succeeded in diluting class struggle and balancing the interest of the industry and general public within its larger war project. This relatively decoupled contradictions and tensions within the state (including those within the military apparatus) and those within the capitalist labour relation and society. The structural hybridity and flexibility of tripartism allowed working-class organizations to maintain a positional ambiguity toward the state-led war project as an insider-outsider with relation to the integral state. It enabled the diffusion of working-class struggle at different levels of potential intervention and preserved the tie between the leadership of the working-class movement and the rank-and-file.

The analysis further examines the differences between the case of Germany and Italy to make sense of why the "council democratic" movements that emerged in these countries gravitated towards one or the other of its two constitutive dimensions. This set the initial condition for the emerging movement to find its primary locus of struggle along the "citizens' control" dimension in the case of Germany and the "workers' control" dimension in the case of Italy. It shows that the German trade unions were integrated into the corporatist scheme more deeply than their Italian counterpart. This was not only due to the organizational capacity of the German trade unions but also their position towards the *Burgfrieden* during the war. Moreover, the realignment of principal class alliances that took place right before the German Revolution placed the socialist trade unions at the centre of the post-war reconfiguration of class relations in Germany, allowing them to draw significant concessions from the employers. All of this came together to shift the locus of the struggle of the "council democratic" movement in Germany initially to the "political" sphere. In the case of Italy, the integration of trade unions into the state war mobilization, whose structure

operated primarily at the factory level particularly in the last period of the war, was more limited and precarious. The bypassing of the trade unions weakened their ability to contain the radicalization of the rank-and-file amidst a postwar economic crisis and conversely strengthened the structural position of the internal commissions as institutions of direct mediation. Furthermore, while the Italian state entered into a period of deep crisis after the war, there was a continuity in the state apparatus which shifted the locus of the "council democratic" movement in Italy away from the "political" sphere.

The analysis in Part II shows how the trajectories of "council democratic" movements should be understood by examining the changing relationship of organizational forces within the movement and their strategic orientation towards it. These, over time, shaped the formal and substantive aspects of the movement. These movements were themselves a subset of the larger social relations (which includes the entangled evolution of the state, civil society, and society, with these organizational forces directly or indirectly active within them). Hence, their transformations along the two constitutive dimensions of the movement should be understood within the structural and conjunctural conditions specific to each case.

The comparative analysis in Part II emphasizes the crucial differences in structural, conjunctural, and strategic aspects between these cases and their roles in the particular trajectory of the movements. The movement in Russia developed in the context of the continued war effort by a structurally weak state that had to rely on radicalized soldiers, workers, and peasants while having to deal with an organizationally weak and unstable capitalist class. The context of the war focused the democratization project of the council movement towards achieving peace without annexation and protecting the revolution. In contrast, the emergence of the movement in Germany and Italy after the end of the war redirected the focus of their democratization projects on the question of demobilization, improvement in the lives of the subaltern classes, and expansion of collective control over the "political" and "economic" spheres. One might say that in Russia, the peace was a means to protect the revolution; in Germany and Italy, the revolution was a means to protect the peace.

In Russia, due to the structural weaknesses of the state apparatus, pressing the condition of the war, and a lack of commitment from the leading forces, elections to the Constituent Assembly were continuously postponed. This prevented the formation of a parliamentary system and a democratic constitution for the new republic that could carry a broad democratic legitimacy. Hence, class contradictions and tensions traversed through the state more generally. This was reflected either in the very architecture of the state in the form of "dual power" or inwardly in the coalitional form of two supposedly opposing forces within the provisional government. As a result, the

Mensheviks and SR were drawn into a spiral of growing popular discontent in the face of the unending war and deepening political and economic crises. In this context, the Bolsheviks presented themselves as the articulators of and organizational force behind the rising tension between the antagonistic classes. Hence, their programmatic vision eventually won over the movement.

In contrast, in Germany, due to the capacity of the state apparatus, more forgiving conditions after the war, and the fierce commitment of the leading forces, elections to the National Assembly were held extremely quickly after the revolution. In Italy, the parliamentary form was reinstituted after the war. Therefore, class contradictions and tensions could be refracted in these two cases into the parliamentary structure, thereby containing more radical possibilities of "citizens' control". This, in the German case, further disoriented the diverse composition of the USPD with a segment gravitating towards the parliamentary path (which itself was split between the social democratic tendency and democratic socialist tendency), and another segment drawn to the radical republican path (which, in its radical form, coincided with council republicanism). Furthermore, the KPD was organizationally too weak and ideologically uncommitted to participate in the elections for the National Assembly. It was also disconnected from the loci of council activities and organizationally too thin to build its base independently within the movement to bring a fast-declining movement under its leadership.

With respect to the forces outside the socialist bloc, the relative weakness of the anarchist and syndicalist forces in Russia and the programmatic plasticity of the Bolsheviks after the adoption of the April Theses, which could encapsulate the ideological aspirations of more radical forces to their left, freed the Bolsheviks from having to compete for hegemony against the syndicalist and anarchist forces. In contrast, the syndicalist and anarchist forces in both Germany and Italy exercised a gravitational pull within the working-class movement to capture the growing discontent with respect to the unachieved goals of the democratization project. In Germany, the radical manifestations of the movement were, for the most part, crushed brutally by the (para-)military. In the case of Italy and what remained in Germany after the crackdown, they were marginalized and contained due to their structural inaccessibility to the formal channels of politics. Instead, the trajectory of the movement was determined in the negotiations led, on the side of the working classes, by the reformist wing of the socialist forces, which was uninterested in a further radicalization of the movement and was keen to bring the situation back to "normal politics". Therefore, despite the sudden eruption of militancy in both Italy and Germany in the final period of each case, both with the critical presence of radical forces including syndicalist and anarchist forces, the movement was contained through a formal legislative process.

The analysis also illuminates the processes that allowed the movement in Russia to establish effective alliances with the peasantry to establish a broad hegemonic project in ways that the movements in Germany and Italy failed to do. In Russia, peasants were radicalized not just on the question of land reform or improvement of their living conditions but also on the question of becoming citizens and being recognized for their ongoing sacrifices for the nation. Therefore, frustration with the constant delays not only in land reform but also the elections to the National Assembly increasingly radicalized the Russian peasants. Due to the organizational influence of the SR (and the left-SR in the last period) among the peasants, they remained organizationally linked with the council projects.

In contrast, the Italian peasants had no such aspirations to become active citizens and, in any case, they had been included in an expanded franchise. The national project was too alien to them since they could not see themselves historically as part of the political unity of the country designed and imposed by the affluent North. What the Italian peasants wanted was land reforms and relative improvement of their living conditions. The former was authorized by the liberal government. The fact that there was almost no organizational link between the peasant and socialist movements made them further isolated from the democratic project that was taking place in the North. The German peasants, who had been included in the expansion of the franchise shortly after the Revolution, quickly withdrew from the council movement since the demobilization process (in which councils played a crucial role) efficiently brought the peasant-soldiers back to the rural regions. Afterwards, they were content with focusing on reviving their ways of living and improving their lives. Furthermore, the strength of political representation of the supposed general interest of the agrarian classes, the Center Party in Germany soon after the election to the National Assembly, coupled with the organizational weakness of the socialist forces within the peasant movement led to further isolation of the peasants from the revolutionary process.

Areas for Future Research

Further Investigation into the Case Studies

There are several areas in which research into the study of the "council democratic" movements in Germany and Italy can be improved. This section provides a list of important considerations that are ripe for future research.

The influence of the Russian Revolution on the formation of the council movements needs careful examination. Such investigation should go beyond the indications of general inspiration, as important as they were, and should look into the ways and the extent to which activists and ordinary workers knew about the council movement in Russia. In the case of Germany, this requires not only looking at the leading theorists and activists but also soldiers on the Eastern Front who might have

come in contact with Russian soldiers and been exposed to the Bolshevik propaganda. Given the fact that the Germany military used to draft militant working-class organizers, such as Richard Müller, to the army as a form of punishment, it is likely that they might have come in contact with Russian soldiers and learned about the experiences in Russia. The activities of the Bolshevik government in Germany and Italy both during and after the war can be further incorporated into the analysis.

As discussed in the study, women played a central role in the making of the "council democratic" movements. However, more research needs to be done on the agitational, subversive, and prefigurative activities of women in Germany and Italy during the war both inside and outside the factories. A comparative analysis of women's activities in other belligerent countries could illuminate the specificities of those countries in which the council movement emerged. Such research should extend its scope to examine the transformation of these activities and networks after the war as well as the role of women in the council movement and their perception of the movement as it unfolded.

There is a tendency, in maintaining the centrality of organizations in the present study, to overshadow the day-to-day, non-organizational, and unaffiliated activities of workers and citizens who were involved in the movement. Even though organizational forces remain the key actors in the strategic-relational approach to the movement, paying more attention to the aspirations and perception of workers in their daily activities within and around the councils, can shed light on the ways in which the trajectory of these movements influenced by, resonated with, and reflected the perception of the workers who were directly involved in them.

More research needs to be conducted on the peasants in Germany and Italy with regards to their aspirations towards the movement, particularly along its "citizens' control" dimension, during the German Revolution and the *biennio rosso*. This requires a more detailed analysis of not only the relation between the peasantry and the nation-state as well as the industrial working class, but also the pattern of mobilization and demobilization of peasant-soldiers. Furthermore, the organizational structure of peasant movements in these two countries can be investigated and incorporated further into the analysis to better understand the dynamics behind the inability of the movement to establish viable alliances with the peasants.

The present study systematically integrates the influence of the syndicalist and anarchist forces into the analysis. As we saw, they played a crucial role, despite the limitations they faced, in shaping the trajectory of these movements in Germany and Italy. With some notable exceptions, the existing studies have not paid enough attention to the significance of the syndicalist and anarchist forces in the evolution of "council democratic" movement. Such research would involve further

incorporation of the existing literature in German and Italian as well as archival studies on these forces, their leading figures, and workers' perception of their activities. This would help to better clarify the distinct contributions of these forces to the organizational and programmatic activities related to the movement as well as their overlap with socialist forces.

One of the limitations of the present study is its primary focus on the working class (although broadly defined but mainly preoccupied with the industrial working class), the capitalist class (primarily the large capitalists and capitalist organizations), and the peasantry. There were some elaborations on the role of the Catholic organizations in relation to the movement. However, the potential contributions of other social classes (or certain fractions in the above classes) are not systematically analyzed. This requires a broader definition of social classes to include economic, political, and ideological axes to consider the direct involvement and indirect influences of these forces on the evolution of the movement.

Lastly, the present study largely bracketed the embeddedness of the nation-states and the national economies in the larger context of regional and international state-system and economic relations. Although there was a much lesser degree of internationalization in the period of this study compared to the later phases in the development of capitalism, supernational forces have already placed considerable pressure on the nation-states and national economies in ways that influenced the horizons of possible strategic actions and structural conditions. This is even more notable for the defeated countries, like Germany, or those victorious ones which were considered a burden for the Entente, like Italy. Therefore, the impact of these supranational forces on the evolution of the council movements in Germany and Italy can be further analyzed.

Broadening the Scope of the Research into "Council Democratic" Movements

The conceptualization and analytical schemes proposed in this research to study "council democracy" allow us to detect other historical manifestations of the phenomenon and examine their makings and trajectories both individually and comparatively. This would make it possible to trace a distinct trend within the broadly defined socialist tradition without losing sight of its incredible diversities in different contexts. As mentioned before, the analytical framework would need to be modified especially when studying the phenomenon in different phases of the development of capitalism. Nevertheless, the general conceptualization and the analytical framework introduced here can provide a backbone for such elaborations. To begin such a project of writing a tradition of "council democratic" movements, one can broaden the scope of the research into "council democratic" movements by including other cases around the WWI era, analyzing the revival of these movements after the Second World War until the mid-1970s, and again the re-emergence of such movements in the 21st century.

In addition to the cases studied in this research, there were a number of other important cases of "council democratic" movement in the WWI era, each of which can reveal certain aspects of the phenomenon that are not captured here or further highlight the commonalities with the transformative processes outlined in this research. These cases include Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Norway.

Austria and Hungary present a situation in which the making of these movements took place under the Dual Monarchy. How the peculiar structure of the state and the specificities of state-led war mobilization under the Dual Monarchy impacted the making of these movements could shed light on a unique set of factors that influenced the emergence of these movements in Austria and Hungary after the war. Furthermore, the trajectories of these movements after their emergence, given the significant economic, political, and social disparities and differences between the two territories, could present a useful comparative perspective on the factors governing the evolution of these movements.[4]

Poland did not become an independent republic until after the collapse of the German Empire in 1918. Before that, the Polish territories were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the German Empire, and the Russian Empire. Since these three Polish territories developed under very different political, economic, and social conditions and were subject to very different regimes of state-led war mobilizations, the process of the making of these councils and possible differences in their composition after their emergence makes Poland an intriguing case study. Furthermore, the entanglement of the nationalist movement in the Polish territories with the transformative project of the "council democratic" movements after the war can be particularly insightful regarding the real and potential ethnonational aspects of the council movement.

Norway presents a curious case in which the council movement emerged without the country having been formally involved in the war.[5] It was neutral during the war but strongly leaned towards the Entente in trade agreements, effectively becoming the neutral ally of Britain after 1917. Inspired by the Russian Revolution, radicals within the Norwegian labour movement called for the formation of workers' councils during a general workers' congress in the spring of 1917. Workers' councils appeared in numerous places across the country between December 1917 and May 1918 among the metalworkers. This resonated with the growing frustration of many workers towards the leadership of the trade unions and the labour party to meet their demands. The

[4] For notable secondary literature on the Austrian case, see Carsten (1972), Hautmann (1978; 1987), Garamvölgyi (1983), Haumer (2015), Leder et al. (2019), and Bauer (2021). For notable secondary literature on the Hungarian case, see Tökés (1967), Janos and Slottman (1971), Volgyes (1970; 1971), Kovrig (1975), Hajdu (1979), Péteri (1984), Borsányi (1993), Varga (2010), Pritz (2010), Krausz and Vertes (2010), and Apor (2015).
[5] For some information on workers' councils in Norway in the WWI era, see Nordvik (1945), Bjørgum (1996), and Bratteteig (2012).

demands of these councils were largely limited to the eight-hour day and the control of the production of necessary goods. Hence, it should be analyzed largely along the "workers' control" dimension.

The "council democratic" movements that emerged between 1956 and 1980 can be categorized into three general groups: those that appeared in the Eastern Bloc formally under the actually-existing socialism (including Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia), those that emerged in the Western countries under liberal democratic capitalist system (including France, Italy, Portugal), and those that appeared in the so-called global south (including Algeria, Chile, Iran). Generally speaking, they can be mapped onto the general conceptual scheme of "council democracy", with the case of Hungary standing as the most vivid example of the evolution of the movement along its "citizens' control" dimension and the case of France along its "workers' control" dimension. Furthermore, the role of the state, as well as the constellation of organizational forces in both their making and their trajectories, remain central to any systematic analysis of these movements. Nevertheless, this phase presents new theoretical challenges that need to be addressed and incorporated into the analytical framework. As a whole, the emergence and trajectory of these movements should be understood in the context of capitalist dynamics, growing internationalization of the state-system, the presence of the socialist bloc. It is also possible that the prior theoretical elaborations on "council democracy" might have influenced these movements. Each group also presents a distinct set of challenges, making comparative studies within each group and across groups potentially fruitful.

The cases in the Eastern Bloc can shed light on how conditions for the emergence of "council democratic" movements under formally socialist states and economies and how the radical democratic projects of these movements impacted and were impacted by the communist parties and unions in power. This did not always take an outright antagonistic form but, in the case of Yugoslavia for example, took a constructive form (although certainly with its own limitations and contradictions especially in the light of their development under market socialism).

The analysis of cases in the West can illuminate the complex relationship between the explosive events of 1968 (especially in the case of France), the emergence of stagflation in the 1970s (especially in the case of Italy), and the transition from dictatorship to democracy (in the case of Portugal). Lastly, the cases in the global south brings forth the question of the relation between the radical democratic project of the council movements, and anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements in both the making and the trajectories of these movements.

There has been a new phase in the manifestation of "council democracy" since the 2000s. This has surely been significantly different from and in many ways strikingly more limited than the

earlier phases. With some important exceptions such as the case of Venezuela which has offered a novel mutation in the evolution of "council democracy",[6] it has most notably appeared in the form of worker-recuperated enterprises in several countries around the world.[7] There has also been a revival of theoretical elaborations on various aspects of "council democracy", with some focusing more on the "citizens' control" dimension, and others including elaborating more on the "workers' control" dimension.[8]

Furthermore, the recent cases of workers' recuperated enterprises particularly in Argentina should be studied as the contemporary development of "council democracy" along its "workers' control" dimension. Also, the recent movements for "commons" to expand the locus of the socialization process from workplace to community, often under the organizational form of councils, is another area that can be seen under the conceptual umbrella of "council democracy". Lastly, some of the recent experiments towards establishing radical democratic governing structures under the organizational form of what can be taken as councils and with clear socialist sensibilities might be worth analyzing as contemporary cases of "council democracy" along its "citizens' control" dimension.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the deepening crises of capitalism since the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a renewed interest in thinking about alternative social arrangements to capitalism and alternative models of socialism different from those actually-existing socialism of the 20th century. This has provided the ground for burgeoning interest in "council democracy". The movements studied here in many ways exemplify these democratic socialist aspirations that the recent interests in alternatives find attraction in. In this lies the importance of studying these "council democratic" movements historically. It is only by re-examining the past critically and facing its contradictory legacies that we can rearticulate our programmes, our strategies of struggle, and our actions for a future informed by yet profoundly different from our past experiences and

[6] Without ignoring its significant and numerous limitations and shortcomings in the transformation of the state and the economy, the case of Venezuela can bring out a lot on how socialization of the means of production along with a transformation of the state in which there is a symbiotic relationship between the forces within and outside the state could potentially emerge and develop. The Venezuelan government also created the concept of "direct social property" which refers to "common property managed directly by the people, through workers' councils together with [] community councils" (Azzellini, 2011, p. 386).

[7] For example in early 2016, there were about 360 cases of workers' recuperation in Argentina, involving more than 15,000 workers, 78 cases of workers' recuperation in Brazil, involving more than 12,000 workers, several hundred workers' recuperation and workers' councils in Venezuela, two dozen cases in Uruguay, and several in Mexico, India, and Indonesia (Azzellini, 2016, p. 5). There have also been some cases of recuperation in France (ex-Fralib, ex-Pilpa), Italy (Officine Zero, Rimaflow), Greece (Vio.Me, ERT3), Bosnia (Dita), Croatia (ITAS), Egypt (Kouta Steel Factory, Cleopatra Ceramics), Turkey (Kazova) and the United States (New Era Windows, Serious Energy).

[8] This is not to say that each do not extend the discussion explicitly and considerably to the other dimension of "council democracy". The above classification is only with regards to particular focus each gives to one or another dimension with one leading towards radical republicanism and the other towards syndicalism.

present predicaments – for a future thoroughly democratic, free, and unalienated as every human social relation in harmony with nature deserves.

Appendix A

Socio-Political Context of Germany before WWI

Prior to the unification of Germany under Otto von Bismarck, Germany was a highly parcelized nation, with a large number of sovereign principalities, "free states" and Kingdoms. After several attempts towards unification in the 19th century under the leadership of its most powerful state, the Kingdom of Prussia, the German Empire was formed in 1871.

The general agrarian structure of Germany can be summarized as high parcelization in the Southwestern and the Rhineland (largely Catholic) regions, with a high concentration of small-land owners and peasant classes, and unparcelized land in the Northern and Eastern (largely Protestant) regions, with large-land ownership and farmworkers (Aldenhoff, 1996). Germany could no longer be considered a primarily agricultural state at the turn of the century, as the share of the industrial sector surpassed that of the agricultural sector.[1]

The rapid growth of industrial capital in Germany (see Berghahn, 2001) was accompanied by a parallel growth in financial capital. Contrary to American and British banks, German banks, particularly the so-called "universal banks" which operated under limited liability laws in contrast to the private banks, could legally trade companies' shares on the stock market and potentially attained voting rights as shareholders meetings. This led to a close relationship between powerful financial institutions and industries, with the financial capital having decision power within these firms and stake on the long-term health of these companies (Berghahn, 2005, pp. 21-7; Tipton, 1996, pp. 80-1).[2]

The political supremacy of Prussian ruling classes, the Protestant landed aristocracy (*Junker*) and the growing industrial capitalists, over the Empire was secured in the new constitution of the German Empire. The structural power of Junkers within the state put that social class primarily in charge of carrying out the transition to capitalism while protecting the class position of conservative agrarians. The German Emperor (*Kaiser*), who was also the King of Prussia and the President of the Federal Council (*Bundesrat*), was in charge of appointing and dismissing the chancellor, who was also the Prussian Prime Minister and the chairman of *Bundesrat* (i.e. the head of the government) and only accountable to the Emperor. The *Bundesrat* was elected on the basis of

[1] In terms of the percentage of workforce engaged in agricultural work, German reached 34.5 per cent in 1913 compared to 49.5 per cent in 1871, the majority of which were female workers (Broadberry et al., 2010).
[2] An example of this intertwinement is the involvement of Deutche Bank, Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft, and Bankhaus Delbruck, Leo & Co. in the creation of the electrochemical giant, Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG) (Berghahn, 2005, p. 22).

a three-class voting system to preserve the privileged position of the wealthy aristocrats. Prussia retained the largest number of seats within the *Bundesrat* in order to maintain the differential power of Prussian aristocrats over those in other regions. Although Germany had a parliament (*Reichstag*)[3] whose members were elected on the basis of universal male suffrage (over 25 years old), its real governing power was severely limited since it could only veto the legislations that were put forward by the *Bundesrat* and could not hold the executive branches of government accountable.[4]

The military was one of the primary elements within the state apparatus through which landed aristocracy, especially the Junkers,[5] sought to preserve their power (Förster, 1996, pp. 460).[6] This was conceived in the triangular structure of the German constitution, with Kaiser as the supreme commander of the armed forces. The link between the military and the government was the Prussian War Minister, whose position was weakened in the 1880s to further isolate the government from the military decision-making process. The government had very little say in military affairs. As a result of a compromise, Kaiser's authority to determine the strength of the army during peacetime was counterbalanced by the ability of the *Reichstag* to approve the military budget (p. 461).

Two processes threatened the hegemony of the landed aristocracy within the army. First, technological advancement increased reliance on heavy industries and the technical staff in the army echelon (Kitchen, 1968, p. 31; Förster, 1996, p. 455).[7] However, through structural and socialization methods, the aristocrats largely retained their class power at the upper echelon of the military. Another factor was the universal male conscription that was conceived to give the German army numerical advantage over those of the neighbouring countries, especially France. But conscription was potentially dangerous as it would put arms in the hands of ordinary people and would open the military ranks to democratization pressures. Therefore, the conscription was not fully implemented and was sharply skewed towards the rural population (Förster, 1996, p. 465).

The Junkers were fearful of the possibility of Catholic forces, particularly the Church and the newly established Catholic Centre Party (*Deutsche Zentrumspartei*), to mobilize the Catholic

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[3] The *Reichstag* was the result of the political alliance that Bismarck made with the liberal nationalists whose party, National Liberal Party (*Nationalliberale Partei*; NLP) in 1866. The NLP dominated the *Reichstag* and the Prussian parliament (*Landtag*) in the 1870s.
Bismarck sought in vain to undermine the electoral power of the liberals by passing a universal male suffrage upon the unification of Germany in the hope that the rural population would vote for conservative candidates.

[4] For an overview of constitutional structure of Imperial Germany, see Berghahn (2005, pp.178-84) and Lerman (2001, pp. 165-71).

[5] In 1888, 197 of 239 officers of the General Staff were Prussian (Kitchen, 1968, p. 5).

[6] The General staff remained predominantly of aristocratic origin. By 1906, still 60 per cent of all army generals were noblemen. (Kitchen, 1968, p. 23). By 1913, 22 or 25 commanding generals were aristocrats (Förster, 1996, p. 464).

[7] in 1860, 65 per cent of officers in the Prussian army were aristocrats. By 1913, this number was reduced to 30 per cent (Kitchen, 1968, p. 22).

population against the Reich. Bismarck launched the so-called *Kulturkampf* in the futile hope of undercutting the possible formation of that mass movement by repressive means. Instead, this campaign unified Catholics and strengthened the electoral outcome of the Centre Party (see Fairbairn, 1996, pp. 311-12). By 1875, Bismarck abandoned the *Kulturkampf*. This came at the time when the economic pressure in the context of the deepening recession shifted the state's economic policies from free trade towards protectionism, effectively ending the political alliance with the liberals.[8] The German Conservative Party (*Deutschkonservative Partei*) was established in 1876. The protectionist policies primarily served the interest of the dominant Prussian classes. They also led to a split in the liberal party in 1880 between the left-wing, the advocates of liberal values and free trade, and right-wing liberals, the advocates of powerful industrialists in Prussia and state protectionism. Thereafter, the government no longer needed to find a balance between the liberals, on the one hand, and the industrialists. Tariff legislations after 1879 helped to solidify the Junker-industrialist alliance (see Nolan, 1986, pp. 357-8; Aldenhoff, 1996, pp. 46-7).

There was an increasing number of trade associations that emerged shortly after the unification to lobby the government and unify the collective action of the capitalists.[9] One of the earliest and most influential trade associations was the German Iron and Steel Industrialists (*Verein deutscher Eisen- und Stahlindustrieller*; VdESI), founded in 1874. Despite some internal and external tensions and oppositions, the VdESI was generally successful in creating a hegemonic unity within the sector and the manufacturer that revolved around steel and iron (Feldman and Nocken, 1975). Another powerful umbrella organization that operated at a national level was the Central Association of Employers of Germany (*Centralverband deutscher Industrieller*; CDI), founded in 1876, which also largely focused on mining and heavy industries.[10] One of its main objectives was to push for protective tariff and export policies that were in the interest of its members. As German export grew, the light industries (not including the electrochemical industries) formed their own association, the Federation of Industries (*Bund der Industriellen*; BdI) in 1895 to push for more free trade policies (Feuchtwanger, 2001, pp. 115-16). The aftermath of labour militancy in the opening years of the 20th century, led to the establishment of the Head Office of the German Employers' Organizations (*Hauptstelle Deutscher Arbeitgeberverbänd*) and Federation of German Employers' Associations (*Verein deutscher Arbeitgeberverbände)* in 1904 to coordinate employers' strikebreaking actions in different sectors. Besides these employers' associations in the

[8] It should be noted that Bismarck brought the National Liberals into the government bloc in 1887 to form an electoral cartel not only to counter the growth of the Catholic Centre and the socialist party, but also to split the liberals.
[9] There were 8 business associations in 1875, 70 in 1877, 143 in 1895, and 673 in 1910, with highest concentration in mining, paper, iron, and cement industries. By 1907, about three-quarter of mining production and half of iron and steel production were under the control of these associations (Berghahn, 2005, p. 25-6; Feuchtwanger, 2001, pp. 100-1).
[10] Many of the VdESI personnel also worked in the CDI (Feldman and Nocken, 1975, p. 418).

industrial sectors, organized agrarian interest groups also grew around 1890. Two of the most notable ones were the German Agricultural Society (*Deutsche Landwirtschafts-gesellschaft*) founded in 1885 and Agricultural Chambers (*Landwirtschaftkammern*) founded in 1894 (see Aldenhoff, 1996, pp. 33-40).

Towards the end of the 1870s, Bismarck focused his attention on the rising power of German socialist parties and industrial working classes. He also believed that this could rally the industrialists and Junkers behind the project of unification (Nolan, 1986, p. 360). He imposed a series of repressive anti-socialist laws in 1878 to abolish associations with socialist tendencies and to prohibit socialist publications (Lidtke, 1966, p. 79). However, the law did not ban the Socialist Workers' Party of Germany (*Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands*; SAPD) from running in the *Reichstag* elections in the subsequent years. Hence, even though it hinders its electoral and membership growth, the state repression was ineffective in curtailing its upward trajectory. Nevertheless, the structural features of the state that inserted the masses into politics also hindered a meaningful translation of their political influence.

To further preempt the socialist appeal among the working class, Bismarck introduced a series of laws to create a corporatist safety net in the 1880s (Nolan, 1986, pp. 360-1; Tegel, 1987).[11] The federal government was also hoping to use these provisions to concentrate the budget in the hands of the Reich. Although these measures covered millions of workers, they did not have the effect that the government was hoping for (Lees, 1996, pp. 221-5; Tegel, 1987, pp. 17-18). On the one hand, the provisions failed to satisfy workers as they rather than employers were made to provide the large majority of the funds. On the other hand, they failed to strengthen the budgetary power of the federal government as it was sidelined in the majority of these programs, except partly in the pension scheme (Lees, 1996, p. 222). Yet, the activities of the state here created an embryonic form of labour-capital alliance. This is especially because the administrative implementation of these schemes later required the assistance of trade unions (see Steinmetz, 1991). Simultaneously, the repressive measures of the state against the socialist organization, in fact, rallied workers more firmly behind the socialist organizations as it nakedly showed the class character of the state and laid the ground for the emergence of "state within the state" in the following decades (Berger, 1995, p. 72). After the end of the anti-socialist laws, the impressive electoral strength of the socialist party, now renamed The Social Democratic Party of Germany (*Sozialdemokratische Partei*

[11] These wide-ranging measures included health insurance for workers (1883), accident insurance (1884), and the old-age and disability insurance (1889).

Deutschlands, SPD), as well as the exponential membership growth of the Free Trade Unions clearly exhibits the rising power of the Socialist and labour movement.[12]

After the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, the government continued to facilitate the condition of the Junker-industrialist alliance by imposing agrarian tariffs and initiating a project of developing a German battle fleet at the end of the 1890s and beginning of the 1900s. The new Emperor, Wilhelm II, who was determined to play a more direct role in the politics of Germany using his constitutional position, sought to pursue more liberal internal policies, notably towards improving the working condition, while much more aggressive and confrontational foreign policies, especially in Africa.

Despite the end of open hostility towards the socialist movement, the government continued to try to take the wind out of the socialist sails through social reform measures.[13] Nevertheless, the impetus behind the labour movement after years of suffering from state repression could not be contained by such measures. An important bill in 1891 to try to contain labour militancy at the shop floor sought to establish workers' committees in all companies over 20 employees through which they could communicate their demands to the employers. Unsurprisingly, the employers fought hard against making these institutions permanent bodies. Given their organized pressure within the state, they succeeded in preventing any significant advancement of this initiative (Berghahn, 2005, pp. 30-1). In the Ruhr mining sector, there was a comparable institution that was established by the government after the 1899 strikes called Trade Court (*Gewerbegericht*). Although the union candidates dominated these institutions in the following years, their practical effects were quite limited (Hickey, 1985, pp. 243-4).

A major shift occurred in the programmatic orientation of the SPD in the immediate aftermath of the 1890 election. The Erfurt Programme, replacing SPD's Gotha Programme, was adopted in 1891. A deterministic interpretation of "Marxism", itself a theoretical expression of the socio-economic developments in Germany and the political limitation of the state structure, became the official ideology of the party. Accordingly, the socialist transformation was portrayed as inevitable both in its ends in the collapse of capitalism and its means in the growing social antagonism and struggles. The party did not need to specifically prepare workers' capacity for carrying out the coming revolution. It could at best give a sense of conscious unity to the heightening struggles while, at the practical level, focusing on reformist measures. Given the

[12] See Geary (1989) and Nolan (1986, pp. 369-70) for other reasons behind the successful growth of social democracy among the working-class communities.

[13] Some of the expansions of social provision in this period include improving on the social insurance schemes, launching of industrial courts to mediate between employers and workers, establishing industrial inspection to check the working condition, regulating of the employment of women and children, and abolishing Sunday work (Feldman, 1992, p. 24; Lees, 1996, pp. 223-4).

relative weakness of the anarchist and syndicalist movements in Germany (see Carlson, 1972; Gabriel, 2011; Bock, 1990), the socialist framework became strongly hegemonic within the left.

After the end of the anti-socialist laws with their detrimental effects on socialist unions (Lidtke, 1996, p. 285-6), the socialist trade union movement experienced a revival.[14] However, its growth within the working class did not remain unchallenged. The Centre Party established its own Catholic trade union in the hope that it could utilize the hesitation of many Catholic workers from joining the socialist movement. However, it was never able to reach the level of the socialist union.

After 1890, the socialist trade union saw the gradual defeat of the localist tendencies by those, such as Carl Legien, the Chairman of the General Commission of German Trade Unions, towards centralization and the national coordination of trade union movement, as well as rationalization of industrial militancy (Moses, 1987, pp. 29-32; Lidtke, 1996, p. 286).[15] This was at least partially due to the increasing coordination of the employers to defeat local strikes through extensive and coordinated use of lockouts (see e.g. Domansky, 1989, p. 339). Notwithstanding all the centralization and membership strength, the union's efforts to expand collective agreement fell far short of what was expected.

A similar process of centralization that took place within the trade union movement occurred within the SPD, although later from 1903 after a series of debates between the federalists and centralists eventually laid the ground for the centralized bureaucratic party structure (Tegel, 1987, p. 20; Nolan, 1986, p. 384). Under the anti-socialist conditions, the party had operated in a very loose organizational form and guidelines. In the 1890s, despite the spectacular expansion of its network, it could not evolve beyond certain limits as it was legally forbidden to organize across the borders of federal states until this ruling was overturned in 1899. At the turn of the century, the party began to organize at the state (*Land*) levels, especially in the southern states (Schorske, 1983, pp. 120-1). The party was creating an electoral machine especially designed to maximize its chances of electoral success.

Amidst these developments, Legien spearheaded the debate with the localists about the need for the unions to take a more neutral position in party politics. This marked the beginning of the divergence between the union and the party (Schorske, 1983, pp. 11-13). The growing

[14] The socialist union grew exponentially in the prewar period since 1890. The membership of the Free Trade Union increased from 619,556 at the turn of the century and 2,200,000 by 1914 (Bock, 1990, p. 61). This pattern was different in the Ruhr region. There was also a 90 per cent loss in union membership among the Ruhr miners between 1889 to 1895 due to "economic crisis, religious differences, and the persistence of traditional views" (Nolan, 1986, p. 383). However, the membership of the Old Association (*Alter Verband*) whose leaders were associated with the socialist movement saw a significant improvement after the turn of the century, peaking at 29.4 per cent of the Ruhr mining workers in 1905 (see Hickey, 1985, p. 234). However, the problem of mobilizing the Catholic workers, particularly the Polish migrant workers remained a central issue for the socialist movement in the Rurh (pp. 249, 260-1).

[15] See Block (1990) for some of the factors contributing to the marginalization of localist unions.

independence and the dominance of the union over the party (Lidtke, 1996, p. 285-8; Nolan, 1986, pp. 384-5) found its official expression in the 1906 Mannheim agreement between the SPD and the union requiring the Party to consult the union before a substantial change of programme. Given the rapid growth of the union membership, the locus of executive power of the workers' movement shifted towards the trade unions, which in turn steered the party's policies on key issues (see Berger, 1995, p. 72; Schorske, 1983, pp. 51-3, 108-9), such as mass strike and foreign policies, towards those of the union.

Nonetheless, the party was far from abandoning its extra-parliamentary agitation. The economic downturn of 1910 and the failure of the new chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, to pass its modern proposal for reforming the Prussian three-class voting system in that year, fueled one of the largest active class agitations by the SPD and the Free Trade Unions in the prewar years.[16] The employers did not hesitate to engage in the class war by extensive use of lockouts to exhaust the financial resources of the unions (Schorske, 1955, pp. 180-181). The apparent militancy and organizational power of the socialist movement attracted more workers to join the Free Trade Unions and the SPD so that by 1912, the union claimed over 2 million and the party about 1 million members.[17]

Despite the electoral and numerical strength, the SPD could not achieve any significant victory through its parliamentary activities before WWI except for some moderate tax reforms which came as a consequence of the passage of the 1913 Army Bill. It introduced some direct taxes at the cost of a massive expansion of the German military and caving to the demands of rapidly growing pro-military extra-parliamentary pressure group, Army League. Similarly, the trade union movement could not achieve significant concessions from the employers nor enforce the collective agreement on various sectors.[18] The socialist movement sought the solution to this paradox in republican aspiration to establish "free people's state" by expanding the democratic capacities of the working class people through the suffrage reform until, as they believed, capitalism crumbles on its own weight.

The most powerful class alliance within the state was not free of contradictions either. The Junkers and the industrialists differ sharply on the issue of direct versus indirect taxes. The latter was uncompromisingly against direct and inheritance taxes, and the latter quite wary of direct tax. The conservatives in the *Reichstag* refused to even vote on the bill. The resignation of Bülow from chancellorship was a sign that the alliance between the parties that stood for the agrarian interests

[16] 369,011 workers engaged in work stoppages in 1910 (Schorske, 1983, p. 180).
[17] The annual income of the union in 1912 was M. 88 million (Broué, 2005, p. 14).
[18] By 1914, only about 16 per cent of the German workers were covered under a collective agreement (Geary, 1989, pp. 122-3). See Hickey (1985, pp. 244-8) for the limitation of the union movement in the Ruhr region.

and those that represented the industrial and commercial interests have reached a point of bifurcation – a large scale war that would preserve the supremacy of the Junkers through the military apparatus while advancing the interest of heavy industries could delay this process, as it did. The colonial expansionism coupled with the agrarian protectionism of the state was favoured by the ruling classes but its funding (i.e. different tax schemes) created class fragmentations and realignments.

The collapse of the Bülow Bloc – a coalition of parties against the socialist and catholic parties – created the impetus among the right-wing of the SPD to try to expand its basis and win the votes of small employers. This would entail toning down the party's revolutionary rhetoric and extra-parliamentary agitations and working towards a partnership with the liberal party (Broué, 2005, p. 19). After a series of debate and considerable confusion during the 1909 Leipzig Congress, the party overturned its previous objection in principle to parliamentary collaboration with the liberal parties, which after the end of the Bülow Bloc have moved towards the left and away from the governing centre of politics. This opened the possibility of new strategic alliances within the state. In 1910, amidst significant waves of strikes, the new Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, tried to make modest reforms to the three-class suffrage but failed as it was blocked by the conservatives. Despite this structural limitation, the SPD achieved its best electoral result in the 1912 election, gaining 110 seats with 34.8 per cent of the vote and becoming the largest party in the *Reichstag*.

Appendix B

Socio-Political Context of Italy before WWI

The process of Italian Unification (*Risorgimento*) instated a political system that, in the condition of limited suffrage[1] and the lack of effective party competition, operated on the basis of informal representation of a wide range of interests, co-option of political oppositions through patronage and corruption, and manipulation of the electoral process – what is referred to as *trasformismo* (see Valbruzzi, 2015). This manufacturing of centrism that had already started under Cavour's broad coalition (*Connubio*) was perfected under Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti, who dominated the Italian politics from 1901 until WWI. The weakness of the political party structure in Italy created an acute incoherence between the economic interests and political representation. The two large political blocs before the turn of the century, the Historic Right and the Historic Left were vague identifiers that contained heterogeneous and even contradictory sets of policies. Generally speaking, the former, gravitating towards the interests of the Northern rentiers and some Southern aristocrats, stood for free trade, a strong army, and a balanced budget, a nationalized railway. The latter, gravitating towards the interest of Northern and Southern small businesses and professional classes, stood for expanded public education, a wider franchise, public works, expanded navy, and colonial adventures especially after the 1890s (Clark, 2008, pp. 75-6; Donovan and Newell, 2008).

Despite the rapid growth of industries after the turn of the century, Italy remained a largely agrarian society before WWI. In 1870, 61 per cent of the population worked in the agricultural sector (Broadberry et al., 2010, p. 61). This number decreased to 59 per cent at the turn of the century (De Grand, 1989, p. 16), and still 55.4 per cent in 1913 (Broadberry et al., 2010, p. 61). The agrarian social relations varied geographically: *Latifundia* in the South, *mezzadria* in the Centre, and agrarian capitalist in the North (Snowden, 1989; Lewin and Elazar, 2002; Elazar, 2001, pp. 40-8; Clark, 2008, pp. 15-19). The *latifundia* was characterized by a high level of land monopolization in the hands of a small number of aristocratic families who generally lived far away from the lands, whose power was undisputed by the effective absence of the central government. In these areas, the tenants were under perpetual and massive debt to the landlords. Besides the many small peasant holdings, it also generated a significant number of day workers and seasonal workers. The *mezzadaria* system in the central region of Italy was dominated by sharecroppers, who not only had

[1] Until 1912, Italy had a very restrictive suffrage. Before 1882, voters had to be over 25 years old, literate, and pay at least 40 lire a year in taxes. These requirements reduced the eligible voters to only 8 per cent of the male population (or 2.2 per cent of the total population). Despite some reforms in 1882, the percentage remained below 10 per cent of the male population (see Clark, 2008, pp. 77-8).

to give up half of their products but also had to pay for tools, seeds, and machinery owned by the landlord. This entailed a direct and hegemonic control by the landlord over the labour and lives of the tenants, making this type of agrarian social relations less volatile than in the South. It also made this system less likely to transform due to the limitation in capital supply. In the Northern regions, there was a rather high level of land monopolization albeit much smaller than that in the South. However, there was general commercialization of agriculture in the North which transformed the agrarian social relation into a capitalist type, based on wage labour and landed bourgeoises. The dominant forms of agricultural labour in the North were workers with a fixed wage on annual contracts (*salariati*) and migrant day-labourers employed on a seasonal basis and paid on an hourly basis (*braccianti*) (Lewin and Elazar, 2002, p. 617; Brustein, 1991, p 655). There were also resident farm servants paid in goods and services (*garzon*) (Brustein, 1991, p. 655). In Emilia and Romanga, where the agrarian relations were of a capitalist nature, the urban elites maintained dominance over the agricultural business, even though the old aristocracy remained influential in places like Bologna (Maier, 1975, p. 42). These explain the underlying condition for the strong presence of socialist forces in both industrial and agricultural sectors in the North.[2] The PSI had a rather strong presence in the North, especially in the Po Valley, where the rural organization of the PSI, *Federterra*, established its stronghold.[3] There was generally a profound difference between the interests and hopes of the agricultural workers and the peasant proprietors and stable tenants (De Grand, 1989, p. 32).

The aristocratic class as a political force underwent a slow disappearance from 1848 when the nobility's absence in the new parliamentary order significantly reduced its direct and independent political power and institutional status. Through the constitutional position of the monarchy in unified Italy, as formulated in the *Statuto Albertino* of 1848, they preserved special status and played prominent albeit few and decreasing roles in key institutions of the state such as the Senate and the military (Cardoza, 1997, pp. 55-6, 69-71). However, they failed to enter into the new political space by forming a conservative party or significantly utilize the popularity of Catholicism to affirm their existence.[4] Nevertheless, aristocratic families continued until WWI to

[2] The social relations of production do not completely explain the influence of socialist in every region, especially in Central Italy. Tuscany, for example, was predominantly a share-cropping region but it has a strong socialist presence (although less than in the Northern regions). Nevertheless, the differences between the social relations in the Central and Northern Italy and its relation to the state becomes a crucial factor behind the support of the landowning class for fascism after the *biennio rosso* (see Elazar, 2001). *Mezzadro* sharecroppers could potentially be incorporated into the socialist program (and to some extent they did); however, changing economic and political conditions that emboldened the contradictions between their interests and the socialist program.

[3] *Federterra* sets its principle program to "ameliorate the condition of agricultural labourer while setting the basis for eventual socialization of the land" (Brustein, 1991, p. 657).

[4] The inability to assert their influence through the Church has to do with the antagonism between the Church and the State that was particularly acute in Italy. This was due to the process of unification that came into direct confrontation

own large landed estates and remain among the wealthiest individuals in the country.[5] The supreme power of the King was assumed under the *Statuto Albertino*. As the head of the armed forces, he held extensive, albeit not exclusive, power over foreign and military policies. The legislative power was technically shared between the King, the Senate (appointed by the King for life), and the Chamber of Deputies. The important task of taxation, appropriation of bills, and allocation of army budget had to be originated in and voted by the Chamber of Deputies.

The military played an essential role, albeit a conflicting one due to its repressive nature, in nation-building project in Italy (Clark, 2008, p. 62; Gooch, 2014, pp. 7-15). Reminiscent of the structure of the Prussian army designed to shield the military from the intervention of the parliament, the strategic and administrative authority was transferred after 1882 from the Minister of War to the Chief of Staff, leaving the former as the spokesperson of the army in the government. Contrary to the universal conscription in Germany, however, the Italian military was deeply suspicious of citizen militia. Yet, similar to the predominance of Prussia within the German military, the army officers were overwhelmingly drawn from Piedmont, a trend that continued until the turn of the century (Clark, 2008, pp. 59-62).

Much of the industrial development and urbanization took place in the North (Corner, 2002, p. 19), henceforth increasing the divide with the South (Clark, 2008, pp. 29-30). The distribution of the population who worked in industry and services change slightly from 1873 to 1913 (p. 61). Although the government pursued free trade policies in the first few years after the unification, the global recession that began in the 1870s led to changes in state policies towards protectionism (De Cecco, 2002, pp. 64-5; Clark, 2008, p. 34; Coppa, 1971). The rapid industrial growth from 1896 that accelerated the trend of the 1880s (Gerschenkron, 1962, pp. 75-6) brought with itself newer fractions of the capitalist class, including industrialists and financiers (see Adler, 1995, pp. 23-4). The shortage of private capital made the role of the state and commercial banks critical in the industrialization process. Particularly in the industrial triangle (i.e. Turin, Milan, and Genoa), Turin was dominated by interests linked to the steel and metal sectors such as Ilva Fiat, Milan to the textile and finance sectors such as *Banca Commerciale Italiana*, and Genoa to the engineering and manufacturing companies and financial firms such as Ansaldo and *Banca Italiana di Sconto* (Clark, 2008, p. 247). There was a bitter rivalry between *Banca Commerciale* with its German-inspired mixed banking and to a lesser degree the *Credito Italiano*, on the one hand, and *Banca di Sconto* with its commercial-style banking, on the other (see Adler, 1995, p. 118 and Forsyth, 1993, p. 12).

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with the Vatican as well as the King's foreign policies against Austria (a Catholic country) and governments' efforts to abolish the privileges enjoyed by the Church.

[5] Anthony L. Cardoza (1997) reports that "two-third of the large landed estates and nine of the eleven wealthiest landowners [...] between 1901 and 1912 still came from the ranks of the aristocratic elite" (p. 201).

After the financial crisis in the 1890s, the government engaged in a series of bank rescue operations that became a durable method of state intervention at the time of crisis. In 1907, the Bank of Italy was established and took charge of the rescue missions of failing banks (De Cecco, 2002, pp. 70-2). However, the general weakness of the Bank of Italy (Forsyth, 1993, p. 41) and the vulnerability of mixed banking to the decline in industrial activity made these antagonisms within the capitalist bloc consequential for the politics of the country, especially with regards to interventionist policies and nationalist ideologies.[6]

Prior to the 1890s, the anarchist movements, which had gained significant traction among Italian workers since 1870, were effectively suppressed by the state in the 1880s (see Pernicone, 1993). External suppression and internal defection led to the decline of the anarchist movement in Italy. The Catholic church had a complicated relationship with *Risorgimento*. The state-building project not only threatened the material interests of the Church but also countered its supranational project. Any systematic engagement in the political project set up by the state after unification was seen as an implicit recognition of the political supremacy of the nation-state over the Church. Therefore, the Church pursued an intransigence strategy before 1898. But the Church had to respond to the growing internal pressure to use the political space, especially in light of (modest) expansion of suffrage, to further Catholic social aims. Hence, the Church began a process of developing political capacities to assert its power within the state (see Webster, 1961, pp. 3-25). However, in the absence of overt state repression like *Kulturkampf* in Germany, this process took on a slow and conciliatory path.

The growth of mass politics after the emergence of the PSI in 1893 and the Catholic movement presented the liberal class with new challenges. It was no longer possible to maintain the balance of forces through individual patronage and threats; although still an effective way of dealing with the South. In this context, Giolitti elevated the old *trasformismo* into a process of pacification through strategic inclusion and appeasement by engaging in a larger political project to satisfy certain elements within major political blocs. Catholic forces proved a more pliable force. After a wave of militancy in 1904, the Catholic movement worked with Giolitti against the "subversive" blocs that included the PSI and the newly established the Italian Radical Party (Pernicone, 1993, pp. 12-14).

[6] Perrone brothers, the owners of Ansaldo, mobilized their resources to undermine its rivals such as Ilva and Banca Commerciale by funding conservative and nationalist press to attack their links to the German interests (see Forsyth, 1993, pp. 159-162; Adler, 1995, p. 118). These campaigns intensified particularly in the lead up to Italy's intervention in WWI and went a long way in swinging the public option (see Papadia, 2016). Generally, the key Turinese capitalists and their powerful association, with close links to Giolittian politics, showed a lack of support for nationalist program and interventionist policies both in the case of the war with Libya and Italy's involvement in WWI (Adler, 1995, p. 83).

Founded in 1904, the Radical Party emerged out of the Historical Far Left (*estrema sinistra storica*). Its program was strongly republican and anti-clerical in substance, such as the complete separation of church and state, independence of the judiciary from political influence, universal suffrage for men and women. It also contained socially progressive measures such as free and compulsory education, reduction of working hours, unemployment assistance, and progressive taxation. The ideological focus of the Radical Party on republican values limited the ideological horizon of the PSI (particularly its reformist wing) from anchoring its vision distinctly on the democratization of the state through universal suffrage, welfare measures, progressive taxation, and institutional accountability. The Radical Party had a stronger base in Southern Italy and some of its leading figures such as Francesco Saverio Nitti and Ernesto Nathan were representatives of Southern Italy. Giolitti was very successful in absorbing the Radicals into his projects as they lost some of the principal objections towards the state in the light of a more moderate King, absence of threat to the democratic institutions, and Giolitti's social programs (Clark, 2008, p. 169). He brought in some of the leading figures of the Radical Party into his cabinet.[7]

Despite the consolidatory attitude of the reformist leaders of the PSI in the early years of Giolitti's tenure, it was more difficult to absorb the labour movement into the political structure. The PSI remained at the centre of Giolitti's political project until 1912 (Miller, 1990, pp. 26-29). The working-class organizations had entered a new phase in 1891 when the first Chamber of Labour was established in Milan on the model of the French Bourses to coordinate local labour actions, to serve as employment services, and to settle labour disputes (Horowitz, 1963, p. 43). They were organized geographically rather than by sectors or trades, which limited their ability to negotiate with employers but allowed the unskilled to gain membership and have representation. However, they were an effective organizational setup to coordinate strikes actions (Levy, 1999, p. 20). Even though they first had an apolitical and intraclass character in the 1890s, they eventually shifted towards socialism after the growth of socialist organizations in the 1900s. At the dawn of the Giolittian era, the Chambers of Labour began a process of establishing National Union Federations in 1901 which rapidly grew, reaching 27 federations with a membership of around 48,000 members in 1902 (Horowitz, 1963, p. 62). The most important one of these was the FIOM, and the National Federation of Agricultural Workers (*Federazione nazionale fra i lavoratori della terra*, Federterra), founded in 1901. The PSI had a rather strong presence in the North, especially in the Po Valley, where the rural organization of the PSI, *Federterra*, established its stronghold. It sets its principle

[7] For example, Nitti became the Minister of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce during Giolitti's term in office from 1911 to 1914.

programme to “ameliorate the condition of agricultural labourer while setting the basis for eventual socialization of the land” (Brustein, 1991, p. 657).

The wave of radical working-class actions between 1903 and 1906, during which the Chambers of Labour played a crucial organizing role, resulted in the control of Chambers by the revolutionaries and the National Union Federations by the reformists (with the exception of the railway sector). The internal conflicts between the revolutionaries and the reformists during the 1905 strikes led to the formation of the CGL in 1906. The reformists controlled the CGL firmly until it was destroyed by fascist forces. In any case, the CGL was never a highly centralized organization with sufficient authority over its affiliates (Horowitz, 1963, p. 77) and, given the large membership of the Chamber of Labour in the prewar years and its presence in the South (see Davis, 1989, p. 214), its strong local networks, and its militant character, it remained the focal authority within the Italian working class in the prewar period (Horowitz, 1963, p. 78).

It was around the time of the founding of the CGL that the PSI underwent major transformations. The syndicalists, whose hegemony rapidly declined after the strikes of 1905 (Horowitz, 1963, p. 53), broke from the party in 1906 but remained active within the CGL as well as among the agricultural workers of the North (especially in the Po Valley and Emilia-Romagna). A year later, the relationship between the union and the party was worked out at the CGL Congress. Resolutions were almost unanimously passed that demanded the leadership of the strikes be left to the CGL, *Avanti!* to be editorially approved by the union, and the party to coordinate its decisions both legislatively and executively with the CGL. This move was to preserve the independence of the CGL from the PSI and to protect the union policies from the potential radicalism of the party. The situation improved the relationship between the union and the party largely because the reformists played a hands-off attitude towards the union. But the membership of the party dropped significantly and its presence in the South further diminished (see Table 11 and Table 12 in Miller, 1990, pp. 165-6).

To contain the socialist movement, Giolitti made key promises to the socialists, including organizational freedom and legalization of strikes (Forsyth, 1993, p. 25; Corner, 2002, pp. 22-3) in return for their support of the liberal government. He did so strategically to empower the reformist wing of the PSI and the more moderate forms of labour actions. He went further and twice offered cabinet positions to the reformist socialists (in 1903 and 1911), also in the hope to split the PSI between its reformist and revolutionary wings (Di Scala, 1996, p. 29; De Grand, 2001, pp. 113-14, 166). Moreover, he treated labour unrest differently in terms of the use of the repressive measures,

depending on whether they occurred in the private or the public sector,[8] whether they had "economic" or "political" claims, whether they took place in the North or the South, and finally whether they were led by the reformist or revolutionary elements (see Di Scala, 1996, pp. 24-6). In the meanwhile, he began a series of welfare measures and social reforms, precisely to undercut the socialist appeal.[9] Nevertheless, Giolitti was convinced that modernization of the country could not be carried out without the entry of certain segments of the socialists into the state. His project, therefore, was to manage this process in a strategic manner and without establishing a lasting institutional framework for systematically dealing with the socialist. However, maintaining such a fragile equilibrium of forces essentially depended on his abilities as a shrewd politician (De Grand, 1989, p. 19).

The apparent left-ward shift of the state to accommodate rising working-class politics alarmed the employers and encouraged them to coordinate their actions by developing broader and stronger associations. After the general strike of 1904, the landowners and the industrialists began a process of forming employers' associations to coordinate their actions in response to the scale of workers' militancy. Turinese industrialists took the lead and formed the Industrial League of Turin (*lega industriale di Torino*, LIT) in 1906. Also, an extremely militant association among the landowners in Po Valley was formed around the same time (Davis, 1989, pp. 226-7). The success of the Turinese employers in coordinating their actions to defeat the general strike of 1907 led to the extension of the association to Piedmont region under the name of the Piedmontese Industrial Federation (*federazione industriale Piemontese*) in 1908, and later to the whole of the northern industrial region under the Italian Confederation of Industry (*confederazione Italiana dell'industria*, CIDI) in 1910 (see Adler, 1995, pp. 48-9).[10] Alongside the employers' organizations, the Association of Italian Joint-Stock Companies (*Associazione fra le Societa Italiane per Azioni*) began a parallel organization in 1910 to lobby for reducing tax burdens on businesses and protectionism.[11] Ideologically, the LIT leaders held a liberal understanding of the state and free-market ideology, that besides protecting the private property rights and civil order outside the factories, it rejected government interference in industrial affairs (see Adler, 1995, p. 52). They also

[8] For example, see the government's reaction to the 1905 railway workers' dispute, imposing a ban on strikes and a mandatory arbitration in railway industry (De Grand, 1989, p. 21).
[9] See Forsyth (1993, pp. 25-6) for the list of social reform measures from 1902 to 1912. Giolitti argued that modernization of Italy into a capitalist economy would be achieved "not by shooting the workers, but rather by instilling in them a deep affection for our institutions so that we ourselves and not the socialists will be seen as the promoters of progress and as the ones who are trying to do everything possible in their favor" (as quoted in Davis, 1989, p. 191).
[10] According to Adler (1995), the LIT initially had a membership of 200 firms that employed 27,800 workers. By 1914, this number grew to 639 firms that employed 65,319 workers (p. 39).
[11] Although there was a great divide among the different branches of the industry on the question of protectionism, (see Sarti, 1967, pp. 63-4). Given the influence of the heavy industry within the confederation, the Confindustria opted for pressuring the government to impose higher tariffs.

upheld the principle of employers' absolute managerial authority in the workplace as sacrosanct (see pp. 45-6). They showed no tolerance for the trade unions' or the state's interference with this principle and fought tooth-and-nail to preserve it. They were even willing to give some concessions to the unions in exchange for preserving the managerial authority (e.g. see pp. 62-4).

As early as 1902, when the first demand for shop floor representation in the form of internal commissions was put forward by striking metalworkers in Turin, the Turinese industrialists already felt would amount to a breach in their workplace authority (Adler, 1995, pp. 36-7).[12] This was not the case necessarily with the workers' unions as they generally did not intend to undermine the managerial authority but to negotiate for better wages and working conditions. This can be illustrated by pointing out the example of the negotiation of car manufacturing employers and FIOM in 1911.[13] The employers were willing to concede to the union's demands for higher wages, shorter working hours, and the unionization of newly employed workers, in return for the abolition of the internal commissions, the right to fire without notice, among other demands. Although workers overwhelmingly rejected the offer and went on strike in response, the employers defeated the strike and enforced their demands onto the union. This shows the importance of preserving managerial authorities for employers. This is precisely what came to the centre of workers' militancy during the *biennio rosso*.

However, besides the fragmentation within the capitalist bloc which hindered the rapid development of cross-regional and national employers' organizations, the ideological diversity of the leading figures in the capitalist bloc added additional complications in the use of the organizational capacity of their associations to launch into a political project (Adler, 1995, p. 52). Therefore, the liberal bloc remained in charge of consolidating a diverse set of interests[14] which no longer just meant the capitalist interests but also certain elements of the working-class interests as well. The government responded to the lockout action on May 1913 against the FIOM strike by refusing to assure the industrialists of protecting their factories from potential workers violence and even going as far as threatening them to publicize their intention to take a neutral position on this

[12] Davis (1989) argues that the first internal commissions emerged with the approval of progressive employers who believed that, in the absence of trade unions, such organizations would make the negotiations easier and wildcat strikes less likely (pp. 214-15). This could be the case insofar the internal commissions were involved with the wage negotiations. However, their negotiation over the technical aspect of production was likely to be the point of contention (Adler, 1995, pp. 36-7, 45).

[13] At that time, FIOM was still numerically small (1,517 of approximately 5,000 car workers were FIOM members) and was distrusted by the non-unionized workers. These factors weakened FIOM's bargaining position (Levy, 1999, pp. 46-7).

[14] In the case of Italy, such tendencies not only conditioned by the sharp divisions between the North and the South but also by the fact that the Italian state after unification was largely modelled on the Piedmontese state and peopled with many politicians with deep ties to the interests of that region.

matter. This created a deep distrust between powerful sections of the capitalist bloc and the liberal state.

Giolitti's attempts to resolve the deep and growing contradictions at the heart of *Risorgimento* through a skilful implementation of *trasformismo* ultimately and inevitably failed in the face of burgeoning mass politics, swelling antagonisms, and the economic downturn in the second decade of the 20th century. The watershed point arrived in 1911 when Giolitti, believing that he had already "domesticated" the socialists, decided to go to war with Libya to gain the support of the right-wing of the liberal bloc,[15] while trying to diminish the anti-war outcry of the socialists by expanding the suffrage and offering a cabinet position to Leonida Bissolati. This not only caused a deep crisis in the PSI that resulted in reformists' loss of control of the party and their eventual expulsion but also, after an expensive war campaign, only furthered the imperialist appetite of the interventionist conservatives. In the light of the radicalization of the PSI under the leadership of the Maximalists and increasing pressure of the right-wing liberals, Giolitti's last attempt in maintaining the unstable equilibrium of forces was to give way to the pressure from the Radical Party to significantly expand the size of electorate by passing near-universal male suffrage in 1912[16] and switching the centre of his political alliance by winning the support of the Catholics after the 1913 election.[17] But this only resulted in the break of the Radicals from the government, the eventual resignation of Giolitti, and the coming of Antonio Salandra to power in 1914.

The crisis caused by the Libyan War and the Bissolati affair put the revolutionaries in control of major organs of the PSI, namely, *Avanti!*, the Directorates, and the National Congress. The revolutionaries moved aggressively to centralize the party structure that hitherto was quite decentralized and unbureaucratic (see Miller, 1990, pp. 44-53) by subordinating all the organs as much as possible to the Directorate, and to purge the reformists from the party.[18] But these changes were responded to differently by the CGL. In May 1912, the CGL Directive Council announced the expulsion of the syndicalists from the union, decrying the incompatibility of their visions. Syndicalists were against state interventionism and its seemingly progressive legislation and emphasized the factory as the basis of union action rather than the craft or the geographic position (Levy, 1999, pp. 9-10). Syndicalists then found their own union, the USI, in 1912 while remaining active within radical Chambers of Labour. The CGL reacted to the changes within the PSI further

[15] See Gooch (2014, p. 38) for the historical roots Italy's military engagement in Libya.
[16] The reform expanded suffrage to all literate men above 21 years old, those who had completed military training, and all men above 30 years old regardless of their literacy (Clark, 2008, p. 188).
[17] In what became known as the Gentiloni Pact, the Catholic Electoral Union came to an agreement with Giolitti to transfer the Catholic vote to the government candidates in exchange for promises of supporting Catholic policies.
[18] By 1913, as Miller (1990, p. 164) reports, about half of the deputies elected in 1909 had been forced out of the party. But the revolutionaries were relatively unsuccessful in subordinating the Parliamentary Socialist Group *(gruppo socialista parlamentare*, GPS), in charge of drafting policies, to the Directorate.

by going as far as supporting initiatives to establish a labour party (Miller, 1990, pp. 169-70; Davis, 1989, p. 194). There was, therefore, a divergent drift between the party and the union on the political and the ideological questions after 1912. As the party moved towards more intransigent Maximalism, the union further embraced reformism. However, the relative independence that the union assumed for itself with respect to the party from the founding years prevented the total breakdown of the relationship. Nevertheless, this dynamic left the party, which was never a mass party in the prewar years despite its sizable presence in the parliament especially after the 1913 election, without a mass base that it could readily mobilize. It also left the union without a reliable political wing to press for its reformist ambitions at the state level.

Between 1912 to 1914, there was a multifaceted bifurcation within the working-class movement roughly along the axis of revolutionism and reformism: between the party and the union, between the syndicalists and socialists, between the Maximalist and reformist socialist, and between the Chamber of Labour and the Federation of Unions. This dynamic created a situation in which, different types of actions could be carried out with less internal resistance if it was launched in the appropriate organization, and state repression or government's consolidatory projects could be directed more discriminately to more militant organizations. Also, transformative processes were more likely to unfold across these organizations rather than within them, making a general radicalization of the working-class movement more difficult. Having said that, there were still structural elements that could direct potential contradictions differently. For example, both the Chamber of Labour and the Federation of Unions gained parity within the CGL by 1912, making it possible for the radicalization of the Chamber of Labour to affect the CGL internally.[19] However, some of the basic organs of the PSI such as the GPS was still under the control of the reformists and the party sections continued to have considerable independent power, making it more complex to formulate a unified action for the party.[20]

By the time Salandra became the Prime Minister, the liberal state was in a crisis. The fragmentation of its essential elements and the anti-interventionism of its major forces largely blocked the possibility of preserving the liberal order during the war. Once the country caved in under the pressure of the interventionists and entered the war on the side of the Entente, the state was rapidly transformed into an authoritarian form which extended well beyond the governing structure of the state and led to militarization of the civil society.

[19] Further level of complication is the fact that the reformism of CGL leadership made such perturbation process more difficult to traverse within the organization.
[20] The complex dynamics within the workers' movement was exemplified during the "Red Week" (7-14 June 1914).

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